Global Pulse

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  • Can China repeat its EV success with robotaxis?

    Can China repeat its EV success with robotaxis?

    Across multiple major Chinese cities, driverless robotaxis are no longer a distant vision of the future — they are already weaving through daily commuter traffic. In Beijing’s high-tech Yizhuang district, these steering-wheel-empty vehicles share asphalt roads with traditional human-driven cars, while autonomous delivery vans cruise dedicated lanes moving packages to pickup hubs across the area. The district has emerged as one of China’s flagship testing and commercialization zones for autonomous driving technology, with domestic industry leaders including Baidu, WeRide, and Pony.ai already offering paid commercial robotaxi rides within clearly demarcated zones. Booking a service takes just a few taps on a mobile app; within minutes, an uncrewed vehicle arrives, and after confirming the destination on an in-car touchscreen, it smoothly merges into Beijing’s dense, chaotic mix of buses, cyclists, electric scooters, and pedestrians, navigating varied hazards with surprising confidence. The underlying technology is still maturing, but one pressing question is already at the forefront of global industry discussion: can Chinese firms replicate the success they achieved in electric vehicles, and turn robotaxis into another globally dominant sector?

    Chinese autonomous vehicle developers already hold a critical structural advantage: the sprawling industrial ecosystem that turned China into the world’s largest EV market, which now overlaps directly with self-driving technology. Unlike Tesla, which develops most of its autonomous driving hardware and software in-house, China’s self-driving sector is built on an interconnected network of specialized suppliers and manufacturers. Established domestic automakers such as BYD, Chery, Geely, and SAIC build the base vehicles, while dedicated technology firms develop and refine the autonomous driving software. Critically, autonomous vehicles rely on most of the same core components as electric cars: batteries, sensors, processing chips, and onboard computing hardware. Since these supply chains already operate at massive, proven scale in China, companies can iterate on technology far faster and at much lower development costs than many global competitors. “What you see is a pace of innovation and adaptation in the Chinese EV industry that I don’t think is matched anywhere else around the world,” explained Kyle Chan, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution. “China’s EV capacity doesn’t just stop there. It actually spills over into other related industries through something that I call these overlapping tech industrial ecosystems.”

    Supportive government policy has also accelerated the rollout. National and local governments have rolled out pilot programs across dozens of cities that allow companies to test fully driverless vehicles on public roads, creating the space for real-world refinement beyond closed testing tracks. China also offers an unrivaled training ground for autonomous algorithms: extremely diverse and complex real-world driving conditions. A single trip through a major Chinese city can expose a self-driving system to everything from jaywalking pedestrians to illegally parked scooters, mixed-traffic buses, and unpredictable last-minute maneuvers from other road users. “The traffic environment here in China is very complex,” Maeve Zhang, chief marketing officer at WeRide, told the BBC. This variety of road scenarios generates massive volumes of unique driving data that developers use to refine and improve their software at an accelerated rate.

    While China-based driving data is a major asset, companies face significant hurdles when planning rapid expansion into overseas markets, each with their own unique environmental challenges that domestic data cannot fully prepare systems for. “In the Middle East, the temperature is very high. In South East Asia, there is heavy rain… and in Switzerland, winter temperatures can be very, very low,” Zhang notes. Extreme heat and cold can degrade battery performance and reduce component lifespan, while heavy precipitation, fog, and snow interfere with the cameras and lidar sensors that autonomous systems depend on to detect surrounding obstacles.

    Robotaxis are just one pillar of China’s broader autonomous driving ambitions. QCraft, another major domestic player, is adapting its autonomous software for passenger cars, public transit buses, and last-mile delivery vehicles. The company reports its autonomous buses are already operating in more than 20 Chinese cities, and it is actively expanding into international markets. “It’s very promising on the technology side that maybe the next five, seven, at most 10 years, it will get into everybody’s life,” said James Yu, QCraft’s chairman and chief executive.

    Chinese companies are already expanding globally at a rapid pace, and their primary commercial rivals remain based in the United States. Waymo, Alphabet’s standalone robotaxi division, still holds the position of global commercial leader, operating paid fully driverless services in multiple U.S. cities. Amazon-owned Zoox and Tesla are moving forward with development far more cautiously, while Uber abandoned in-house autonomous vehicle development years ago, after a fatal 2018 testing crash derailed the program. Today, both Uber and its U.S. ride-hailing rival Lyft are actively partnering with Chinese autonomous driving firms to bring driverless services to their platforms. This partnership model gives U.S. ride-hailing firms immediate “access to millions of customers that they wouldn’t have if they created their own app,” explained Tu Le, founder of automotive industry consultancy Sino Auto Insights. “Through these partnerships, they’re able to commercialise and broaden their scope.”

    Despite Chinese firms’ advantages in low-cost manufacturing, Waymo has spent years building out mature customer service systems and app infrastructure that many newer competitors have not yet matched. “Having experienced Waymo and the WeRides and the Ponys… I would have to say the user experience for Waymo is much better than all the other competitors. I feel like Waymo is really becoming a standard mode of transportation for California,” Le noted.

    Public and political perceptions of driverless technology also differ sharply across global markets. In the U.S., labor unions have raised widespread alarms that mass deployment of robotaxis could displace hundreds of thousands of workers in taxi, delivery, and freight industries. In China, policymakers frame wide-scale automation as a solution to the country’s shrinking working-age population, but broad public discussion of potential downsides is limited by government censorship of dissenting views, making it difficult to accurately measure broader public opinion. Chinese President Xi Jinping has positioned AI and robotics as core components of the country’s push to develop “new quality productive forces” that will create high-skilled jobs and drive long-term economic growth, giving companies strong policy and financial incentives to invest heavily in autonomous driving development.

    Proponents of the technology argue that widespread robotaxi adoption could deliver major public benefits, particularly for underserved groups. “If we can bring the cost down for a robotaxi ride so that it’s as cheap – or maybe even cheaper – than hailing an Uber with a normal driver, then it really helps broaden mobility,” Le said. “Elderly folks, folks that are disabled – these robotaxis really allow them a lot more ability to travel.”

    Even with these potential benefits, widespread public and regulatory acceptance faces major headwinds, particularly around safety concerns. Earlier this year, a software glitch in Baidu’s Apollo Go robotaxi service left roughly 100 uncrewed vehicles stranded across Wuhan, with some passengers reporting they were trapped inside after doors automatically locked following the malfunction. Baidu suspended services in the city for several weeks, though the company says it remains on track to launch commercial service in the United Kingdom later this year. The incident underscored how high-profile technical failures can quickly erode public trust in the technology, mirroring similar issues that have derailed autonomous driving projects elsewhere. General Motors shuttered its Cruise robotaxi division last year to refocus its autonomous development efforts on personal consumer vehicles, after California regulators suspended Cruise’s operating permit in 2023 following a crash where one of its robotaxis dragged a pedestrian several meters after she was first struck by a human-driven vehicle.

    These challenges have led many analysts to argue that robotaxis will be far harder to export globally than electric vehicles. Deploying a commercial robotaxi network requires far more than building a capable vehicle: developers must navigate complex local regulatory approval processes, build high-resolution local road maps, establish on-the-ground local operation and maintenance teams, and win sustained public trust — all hurdles that even well-established U.S. firms have struggled to overcome. Chinese companies also face growing geopolitical barriers to global expansion. Unlike traditional electric vehicles, robotaxis continuously collect large volumes of mapping, location, and visual road data, which makes them a target for national security concerns in many overseas markets that are wary of Chinese-based technology firms accessing sensitive geographic information.

    Despite these well-documented challenges, industry leaders remain optimistic that regulatory attitudes are shifting in favor of autonomous driving. “We see very positive attitudes and very good policies and regulations coming out from governments both here in China and in some other international markets,” Zhang said.

    For Brookings’ Chan, the global race to commercialize robotaxis represents far more than just the arrival of a new transportation option. “China is trying to create this sort of high-tech economy that’s digitally connected, that’s AI-powered, and that builds on its existing strengths today in batteries, EVs, motors and other related technology,” he explained.

  • Spain may style itself as Israel’s most fervent adversary, but its sanctions are far from comprehensive

    Spain may style itself as Israel’s most fervent adversary, but its sanctions are far from comprehensive

    Amid growing global outcry over Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, widely condemned by critics as genocide, most Western governments in Europe and the Americas have remained conspicuously silent on the issue. Spain has emerged as a rare exception, positioning itself as one of the most outspoken Western critics of Israel’s actions, positioning itself as an outlier among Western nations.

    Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has pushed for multilateral action to halt global arms trade with Israel, including a high-profile campaign to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Spain was also the first and only European Union member state to formally recall its ambassador to Israel, and announced a halt to new arms sales to Israel as early as October 2023.

    However, a 2025 investigation from Barcelona’s Delas Centre for Peace Studies reveals a stark gap between this rhetoric and actual trade data. The report finds that military imports from Israel actually increased dramatically after October 2023, totaling €36.7 million ($41.9 million) by February 2025 alone. This included arms, ammunition, tanks, and armored fighting vehicles categorized under standard international trade codes. The report explicitly notes that Spain never imported more Israeli military equipment than it did in the 16 months following the 7 October 2023 attacks.

    This pattern shifted only in September 2025, when Sanchez signed into law a formal full arms embargo against Israel, alongside a ban on imports of goods from Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories. Unlike the earlier partial pause on new sales licenses, this legislation establishes a formal, blanket legal prohibition on arms trade with Israel.

    Eirene de Prada, an international law professor and member of Juristas por Palestina (Lawyers for Palestine), explained that the new legislation marks a formal shift from administrative restraint to binding legal rule. But she warns that broad loopholes, exceptions for pre-existing contracts, and ambiguous regulatory gaps leave the embargo far weaker than its public framing suggests. In comments to Middle East Eye, De Prada accused the Spanish government of deliberate doublespeak: while the embargo sends a strong symbolic statement condemning Israeli actions, regulatory loopholes embedded in the Royal Decree-Law allow trade with Israeli defense firms to continue largely uninterrupted.

    Under Spanish legislative rules, a Royal Decree-Law is classified as an emergency measure for extraordinary and urgent need, requiring parliamentary approval within 30 days of enactment. Royal Decree-Law 10/2025, passed in October 2025, justifies the embargo by noting that the extreme humanitarian crisis in Gaza creates an urgent need to block the transfer of defense and dual-use materials that Israel uses against civilian populations.

    Alejandro Pozo, an investigator at the Delas Centre, argues that even with its flaws, the legislation represents a meaningful step forward. He notes that the embargo sets a critical global precedent, proving that a full arms embargo on Israel is a politically feasible policy for Western nations. Even so, Pozo confirms that the law leaves all pre-existing military contracts intact and grants Spanish authorities broad discretion to approve exceptions when deemed justified.

    Just three months after the law’s passage, the Spanish government exercised one of these exceptions to authorize transfers of defense and dual-use materials for four Airbus-led aeronautical projects, citing the projects’ significant industrial and export potential. The approved transfer included an anti-missile defense system produced by Elbit Systems, an Israeli defense manufacturer widely documented as complicit in Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

    Pozo explains that Israel’s core interest in trade with Spain is not selling finished weapons to Spanish buyers, but gaining access to Western markets that lower the cost of Israel’s domestic military production and sustain its long-term occupation of Palestinian territories. He added that Israeli defense firms also exploit loopholes in EU trade rules, which allow Spain to trade defense equipment via other EU member states and purchase Israeli weapons manufactured by EU-based Israeli subsidiaries. These transactions are not covered by the current embargo, and account for a large share of Israeli military-related activity in Spain. Many Israeli-designed weapons are produced in Spain by local subsidiaries of Israeli firms or by domestic Spanish manufacturers operating under Israeli production licenses.

    To close these gaps, Pozo argues that policymakers must target the financial flows that directly or indirectly fund Israel’s war machine, rather than only regulating direct arms transfers. He calls for sanctions modeled after the sweeping comprehensive sanctions the EU imposed on Russia, which target all core Israeli economic and political interests.

    Spain is far from alone in facing this contradiction between anti-Israel rhetoric and continued complicity in what UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese has termed the “economy of genocide.” Colombia, another leading critic of Israel’s actions, implemented a national ban on coal exports to Israel that took effect in August 2025. But after the ban went into effect, South Africa – which brought Israel’s case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and co-founded the Hague Group supporting Palestinian legal claims – stepped in to become Israel’s largest coal supplier.

    South African Trade Minister Parks Tau has argued that imposing unilateral sanctions on Israel without formal multilateral UN backing violates World Trade Organization non-discrimination rules and exposes South Africa to costly international legal challenges. But Patrick Bond, director of the Centre for Social Change at the University of Johannesburg, rejects this claim. He points to a July 2024 ICJ ruling, later upheld by the UN General Assembly, that explicitly requires all nations to end any form of complicity with Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestinian territories. Bond argues this ruling creates a binding international legal obligation to restrict trade with Israel, and that South African authorities already have the legal authority to ban such exports under existing “dangerous exports” regulations – no new legislation is required. “The coal export ban could be implemented immediately,” Bond confirmed.

    Even in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro has spearheaded a regional push for sanctions against Israel, untangling long-standing military ties has proven far more complex than banning coal exports. In February 2024, Petro announced his government would end all new arms purchases from Israel and reduce bilateral military cooperation, but Colombian Defence Minister Ivan Velasquez later confirmed that all existing contracts would be honored, including maintenance for Colombia’s fleet of Israeli-built Kfir fighter jets. The Colombian Armed Forces also still rely heavily on the Israeli-made Galil rifle, which was used extensively by Israeli forces in Palestine and Lebanon, and was deployed to suppress left-wing insurgent groups during Colombia’s decades-long civil war.

    To break these long-standing ties, Colombia signed a €3.1 billion contract with Swedish defense firm Saab in November 2025 to purchase 17 Gripen E/F fighter jets, which will replace the aging Kfir fleet by 2032. In May 2026, Petro also unveiled a domestically produced rifle to gradually replace the Galil, but the transition is expected to take five years to complete.

    A shared vulnerability of both Spain and Colombia’s embargo policies is their vulnerability to reversal by future administrations. In Colombia, President-Elect Abelardo de la Espriella, who takes office in August 2026, has already publicly proposed expanding collaboration with Israeli defense industries. His commitment to expanding extractive mining also threatens to roll back Petro’s coal export ban, which was implemented via presidential decree and has not been enshrined in permanent national legislation.

    In Spain, the embargo has greater formal legal standing as a properly enacted law, but it is still not immune to rollback. De Prada explains that a future administration with a parliamentary majority could substantially amend or fully repeal the embargo. It could also weaken the embargo in practice through broad interpretation of the “general national interests” clause that allows for frequent exceptions, or by simply reducing the rigor of regulatory enforcement.

    Pozo confirms that if the center-right Partido Popular or far-right Vox win the 2027 national elections, they could easily eliminate the embargo entirely. This would likely be a symbolic political act rather than a response to domestic defense needs, as both parties have openly condemned Sanchez’s Gaza policy. Both parties voted against the embargo in October 2025, with Vox reiterating Israel’s claimed right to self-defense and accusing the Sanchez government of using the embargo as a smokescreen to distract from domestic corruption allegations.

    Experts say Colombia’s incoming right-wing administration’s plan to rapidly reset ties with Israel serves as a clear warning to Spain’s current government. De Prada argues that sustained, long-term policy of holding Israel accountable requires far more robust regulatory measures than the current limited embargo. She told Middle East Eye: “Ultimately, the next step must be moving from a limited, reversible embargo to a comprehensive, permanent policy of non-cooperation, non-assistance, and non-recognition, supported by effective parliamentary oversight, administrative transparency, and full supply chain traceability.”

    Until that shift occurs, the gap between symbolic political gestures and concrete action, and between public rhetoric and policy practice, remains unmistakeable.

  • World Cup 2026: Fifa ‘crossed a red line’ after decision to overturn ban for US striker’s red card

    World Cup 2026: Fifa ‘crossed a red line’ after decision to overturn ban for US striker’s red card

    The global football community has been thrown into uproar after Fifa’s stunning weekend announcement that U.S. striker Folarin Balogun will be cleared to compete in the United States’ upcoming World Cup match against Belgium, defying the standard automatic one-match suspension that follows a straight red card. Balogun received his sending-off during the U.S.’s previous fixture against Bosnia and Herzegovina, a punishment that under normal tournament rules would automatically bench him for the next round.

    Historically, overturning a straight red card suspension is almost unheard of: Fifa’s official disciplinary code explicitly prohibits appeals for immediate red card dismissals, and only one similar exception has ever been recorded, dating back to 1962 when automatic suspensions were not yet codified in tournament rules. This unprecedented decision comes after days of high-level lobbying from senior U.S. officials, according to reporting from American news outlet Politico. Within minutes of Balogun’s red card being issued, White House and U.S. soccer leadership launched a coordinated push to reverse the call: Andrew Giuliani, executive director of the White House Fifa World Cup Task Force, joined by U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and senior United States Soccer Federation officials, spent four days lobbying Fifa leadership to change the ruling. Multiple reports have also confirmed that former U.S. President Donald Trump made personal phone calls directly to Fifa President Gianni Infantino to press for the suspension to be lifted.

    Fifa has defended its reversal by citing Article 27 of its disciplinary framework, a bylaw that grants the governing body broad authority to suspend any pre-existing disciplinary measures. But the move has drawn fierce condemnation from football governing bodies, current and former leaders, pundits and fans worldwide, who universally accuse Fifa of caving to political pressure and granting preferential treatment to the U.S. tournament host.

    The Belgian Football Association, whose team stands to directly lose out from the decision, issued an official statement saying it was “astonished” by the ruling, noting that it directly contradicts core provisions of the World Cup’s disciplinary code that mandate automatic one-match suspensions for red card recipients. Though Belgium was granted the right to appeal the decision on Monday, it was given only a matter of hours on the same day to submit its challenge, a timeline critics have called intentionally restrictive.

    European football governing body Uefa also released a scathing rebuke of the decision, saying Fifa had “crossed a red line.” In its official statement, Uefa emphasized that football’s integrity depends on consistent, enforceable rules, noting that the automatic one-match suspension for a red card is not a discretionary call: “When the certainty of rules is no longer guaranteed by its guardians, the integrity of the game is at stake and the credibility of a competition is undermined,” the statement read.

    Criticism has also poured in from across the football and political spheres on social media, with many figures highlighting the glaring double standard of Fifa’s decision. Former Fifa President Sepp Blatter weighed in on X, writing, “Red cards are not overturned by political phone calls. They are overturned by rules, evidence and independent bodies… Football must never become a playground for political power.” Analysts and fans have also pointed out that Fifa has previously suspended entire national federations, including Nepal’s, for government interference in football operations — a policy that appears to have been set aside for the U.S. this time.

    Many social media users have also called out perceived favoritism toward the host nation. A Reddit commentator noted that the rarity of red card reversals has long acted as a level playing field for all teams, so making an exception for the U.S. can only be interpreted as preferential treatment. Former professional footballer Yannick Bolasie drew attention to double standards across global confederations, writing, “All I’ll say is if this was AFCON and they let a man play after he got a red card, the nonsense being said would be crazy.”

    Even some American commentators and fans have acknowledged the problematic nature of the decision. Political commentator and former Obama administration spokesperson Tommy Vietor noted, “As a fan, I am obviously overjoyed that Balogun will get to play,” but added that “it will make the rest of the world feel like the tournament was rigged.”

    The controversy has also spilled over into broader political critiques of the Trump administration. One social media commentator highlighted that Trump recently attempted to eliminate birthright citizenship at the U.S. Supreme Court — the very policy that grants Balogun, born in the United States, his American citizenship and eligibility to play for the U.S. national team. Geopolitical analyst Bruno Macaes further connected the decision to broader questions of Fifa’s political ethics, referencing ongoing global criticism of Fifa’s decision to allow Israel’s football association to remain in international competition despite accusations of genocide in Gaza.

    Trump, for his part, praised Fifa’s ruling in a post on his Truth Social platform. British media personality Piers Morgan has called the incident “the biggest story, and potential scandal, of the World Cup.” Middle East Eye has reached out to both the White House and Fifa for additional comment on the reports of political lobbying and the controversial reversal.

  • Alexandra Eala provides a ‘ray of hope’ for the Philippines despite Wimbledon exit

    Alexandra Eala provides a ‘ray of hope’ for the Philippines despite Wimbledon exit

    LONDON — For 21-year-old Filipina tennis star Alexandra Eala, the 2025 Wimbledon Championships ended one round short of her first Grand Slam quarterfinal berth, but her historic run at the sport’s most prestigious grass-court tournament has already cemented her status as a trailblazer for Philippine tennis and a source of national pride.

    Eala’s Cinderella run at the All England Club delivered one of the tournament’s biggest upsets earlier in the draw, when she ousted defending champion Iga Swiatek in an electrifying third-round clash. Her run came to a close on Monday on Centre Court, however, as Italy’s Jasmine Paolini outlasted her in a tense three-set battle, 6-4, 4-6, 6-3.

    The result did little to dim the celebration of Eala’s achievement among Filipino fans, who packed watch parties across her home country and turned out in force to cheer her on in London. For the global Filipino community, Eala’s breakthrough transcends the final scoreboard.

    “She’s like a ray of hope for the Philippines,” Roberto Ocampo Jr., a London-based Filipino nurse and tennis fan who attended Eala’s match against Paolini, told reporters. “Especially at her age. She made history. That’s one thing that we can tell to the next generation.”

    As the Women’s Tennis Association confirmed, Eala’s run to the fourth round marks a historic first for Philippine tennis: she is the first player from the country to reach the last 16 of a Grand Slam singles tournament in the Open Era. This milestone comes just one year after Eala suffered a first-round exit in her 2024 Wimbledon debut, highlighting her rapid rise through the professional ranks.

    A left-handed player who trained during her teenage years at Spain’s renowned Rafael Nadal Tennis Academy, Eala has drawn inspiration from other legendary Filipino athletes who paved the way for her success. Early in the tournament, she recalled growing up watching boxing icon Manny Pacquiao, whose bouts turned into national holidays across the Philippines, where communities would gather to watch and employers would give workers time off to cheer him on.

    She also name-checked two other modern Filipino sporting greats as inspiration: weightlifter Hidilyn Diaz, the country’s first Olympic gold medalist, and gymnast Carlos Yulo, who won two Olympic gold medals at the 2024 Paris Games and returned home to a hero’s welcome with pledges of cash, property and other national honors.

    Like many Filipino sports fans, Ocampo hopes Eala’s breakthrough will open new doors for young aspiring tennis players across the Philippines, where access to the sport remains limited for many low-income communities. “This kind of sport (many) are not privileged enough to hold a tennis racket,” Ocampo said. “There’s so many kids back home, they have the talent. They need the opportunity.”

    Off the court, Eala’s star power has grown exponentially during the tournament. She met Catherine, Princess of Wales, and posed for a widely shared photo with the royal patron of the All England Lawn Tennis Club. A viral action shot of Eala diving to reach a wide shot during her upset win over Swiatek has even been memed across social media, with fans editing a superhero cape onto the young star to dub her “Super Eala.” The Philippine Embassy in the United Kingdom has closely tracked her progress throughout the tournament, sharing regular updates and public messages of congratulations to her on official channels.

    Eala herself has framed the historic run as a key step in her long-term career, rather than a final destination. Reflecting on her loss to Paolini, she acknowledged that uncharacteristic issues with her serve held her back on the day, but framed the result as a normal part of professional sport.

    “I understand that’s part of the job. I don’t think I’m going to be playing the best tennis of my life every single day,” Eala said. “But I have days like that. Everyone has days where they don’t play their best tennis.”

    The 21-year-old, who notched her first big WTA breakthrough earlier this year by reaching the semifinals of the 2025 Miami Open, said she leaves Wimbledon proud of her performance and focused on continuing her upward trajectory. “I’m really proud of how I handled things. I just have to kind of move forward and continue with my progress.”

    Eala has long said she hopes to serve as a role model for young kids across the Philippines who dream of competing in professional tennis, and her 2025 Wimbledon run has already turned that goal into reality for a new generation of aspiring athletes.

  • Israel’s death towers: Gaza civilians killed by remote attacks during ceasefire

    Israel’s death towers: Gaza civilians killed by remote attacks during ceasefire

    In the final stretch of joyful wedding preparations for his daughter, 43-year-old Khalil al-Masri had every reason to smile. Less than two weeks before the ceremony, he traveled with his eldest son to Gaza City’s Rimal neighborhood to finalize payment and confirm the reservation for his daughter’s dream wedding dress. With that task complete, the pair stopped at a nearby confectionery to mark the happy occasion, joining two friends for a seat at an outdoor table. What came next was a senseless, sudden tragedy: a live bullet tore through Masri’s skull, leaving him unconscious as his son and friends stared on in terror.

    Rushed to Gaza’s al-Shifa Hospital for emergency care, Masri, a father of seven, succumbed to his fatal wound on June 14. His brother Mahmoud al-Masri described the jarring turn of fate in an interview with Middle East Eye. “It was a complete shock. He was very happy and laughing with his friends. He ordered a dessert, but the bullet penetrated his head before the order was served,” Mahmoud said. “The wedding was turned into a funeral.”

    Captured on the sweet shop’s entrance surveillance footage, Masri’s killing is far from an isolated incident. The deadly shooting unfolded against a backdrop of steadily escalating Israeli fire targeting Palestinian civilians across multiple regions of the Gaza Strip in recent weeks, even as the event is framed as occurring under a ceasefire agreement. While the exact source of the bullet has not been officially confirmed, Mahmoud says the gunfire originated from the east, pointing to two likely sources: an Israeli surveillance quadcopter operating in the area minutes before the shooting, or an Israeli military “lifter” – a fortified watchtower fitted with heavy machine guns – positioned roughly 1.7 kilometers away in the contested Yellow Zone.

    The Yellow Zone is an area Israel was required to withdraw from as part of the second phase of an earlier ceasefire deal, after occupying it in the agreement’s first stage. To date, Israel has refused to cede control of the territory, and now holds more than 60 percent of the entire Gaza Strip. Deployed at 23 separate locations across the eastern Gaza Yellow Zone, per data from the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, these military lifters elevate weapons and surveillance hardware to extend visual range and enable open fire across large civilian-populated areas.

    The same day Masri was killed, at least five more Palestinians were hit by Israeli fire in another central Gaza City neighborhood. Among them was 19-year-old university student Muhammed Abu Hassira, who was walking home from the gym along al-Wehda Street when Israeli forces opened fire. Just like Masri’s case, witnesses could not confirm whether the fatal shot came from a quadcopter or a military watchtower.

    Khaled al-Tarshawi, Abu Hassira’s uncle, recounted the teen’s final moments to Middle East Eye. “Muhammed was on his way home from the gym at around 7pm, he was on al-Wehda Street when the Israeli occupation suddenly opened fire, hitting him and other pedestrians. He and four or five others collapsed to the ground,” al-Tarshawi said. “He was shot in the abdomen. People rushed to carry him and the other wounded to the hospital. He was transported on the seat of a wheelchair because there were no vehicles. Doctors tried to save him, but by the time he arrived, he had already lost a significant amount of blood.”

    Abu Hassira had just wrapped up his second semester studying engineering at a Gaza university, having earned his high school diploma and enrolled despite the ongoing conflict. “He was intelligent, patient, and always devoted to his parents. His mother was devastated when she received the news, but his father was even more heartbroken. Muhammed was his eldest and most beloved son,” al-Tarshawi said. “Muhammed survived the devastating Israeli attacks throughout the two and a half years of the genocide and refused to leave Gaza City. He refused to evacuate to the south and managed to stay alive during the worst periods of the genocide. But he was killed during the ceasefire by a quadcopter or a lifter.”

    Fatal Israeli fire has continued through all avenues of daily life in Gaza in the months following the October 2023 ceasefire agreement. In addition to watchtower sniper fire and quadcopter strikes, Israeli tanks and ground snipers deployed within the Yellow Zone have repeatedly opened fire on pedestrians and displaced families’ makeshift shelters in areas formally labeled “safe zones,” leaving dozens dead and injured over the past eight months.

    Just 24 hours after the killings of Masri and Abu Hassira, 13-year-old Amir al-Bashiti was killed by an Israeli bullet inside his family’s displaced person tent in Khan Younis, southern Gaza. His father Emad al-Bashiti said the bullet, which likely came from an Israeli tank, struck the boy just moments after he came inside for the night. “It was around midnight and he was playing with his cousins and friends outside the tent. I called on him to come in and sleep and I wish I didn’t,” Emad said. “He came in carrying his blanket and told me ‘I want to tell you what happened’. At the time, there were sounds of Israeli tanks moving and some gunfire close to the camp. I told him to sit down and go to sleep because there were shootings. He insisted on telling me the story before he went to sleep.”

    Before Amir could finish sharing his story, the explosive bullet tore through his head and exited his neck, killing him instantly in front of his entire family. “It wasn’t a normal bullet, it was an explosive one. I heard it explode after it penetrated his head,” Emad recalled. “He fell on the ground and vomited blood. I held his hand but he was unconscious. By the time I carried him and rushed outside to reach the hospital, he was already dead.” Amir and his family had been displaced from Rafah and had sought shelter in Khan Younis’ Batn al-Samin, a zone designated as safe for displaced people that now hosts tens of thousands of fleeing Palestinians.

    In recent weeks, the targeting of Palestinian civilians has expanded far beyond the contested Yellow Zone, with deadly strikes hitting even areas marked as safe under the ceasefire framework. On a single Friday in June, one Palestinian child was killed and two members of the Totah family wounded when an Israeli quadcopter dropped an explosive on the group as they collected water east of Gaza City. Another Palestinian was killed by Israeli fire the same day east of Deir al-Balah in central Gaza.

    Official data confirms the scope of the ongoing bloodshed: since the ceasefire agreement took effect in October 2024, at least 1,072 Palestinians have been killed and 3,463 more injured across the Gaza Strip. Since October 2023, Israeli attacks have killed at least 73,098 people in Gaza, with thousands more still missing and presumed dead under the rubble of destroyed buildings.

    For families like the al-Bashitis, the term “ceasefire” bears no relation to the reality on the ground. “Whoever calls this a ceasefire is overlooking what is actually happening on the ground. It is not a ceasefire, it is continued fire,” Emad al-Bashiti said.

  • Trump, Turkey and Nato: What’s at stake at the Ankara summit?

    Trump, Turkey and Nato: What’s at stake at the Ankara summit?

    A pivotal NATO summit convening this week in Ankara, Turkey, stands poised to reshape the 75-year-old transatlantic alliance’s strategic direction, as leaders gather to address a planned drawdown of United States military forces in Europe and chart a course for the bloc’s next evolution, dubbed NATO 3.0.

    US President Donald Trump is set to join alliance heads of state and government in the Turkish capital, where tensions are already expected to emerge over negotiations to shrink America’s long-standing military footprint on the continent. Ahead of the high-stakes gathering, Turkish authorities have launched a sweeping effort to spruce up Ankara: city workers have planted thousands of decorative flowers, resurfaced damaged arterial roads, and erected large fabric banners to cover aging, poorly maintained structures that line major summit routes. Starting Tuesday, the city will implement a two-day partial lockdown to secure the event, and security officials have detained dozens of people they identify as potential protest organizers, including members of left-wing groups, environmental activists, and pro-Palestinian demonstrators, to prevent unplanned disruptions described by officials as “public nuisances.”

    For the Turkish government, the summit represents far more than a security meeting: it is a high-profile global marketing opportunity to tie Turkey’s booming domestic defense industry to Western supply chains and highlight the country’s growing industrial capabilities. Turkey has rapidly expanded its defense manufacturing footprint in recent years, emerging as a leading global exporter of armed drones, advanced ammunition, and naval vessels, with defense exports projected to hit $10 billion in 2025. Ankara’s existing alignment with NATO’s industrial standards also positions the country to capitalize on any expansion of the alliance’s European defense output, a factor that has softened criticism from Western allies of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s increasingly hardline crackdown on domestic political opposition. European leaders have opted to set aside concerns over democratic backsliding in Turkey in exchange for Ankara’s commitment to contribute troops from NATO’s second-largest standing military (second only to the United States) and help jumpstart a continent-wide revival of European defense production.

    The summit’s central agenda item revolves around the alliance’s new strategic framework, already labeled NATO 3.0 by alliance insiders. The concept builds on two prior eras of alliance adaptation: the post-Cold War restructuring that defined the original NATO 1.0, and the shift to counter-terrorism readiness that followed the September 11 attacks, known as NATO 2.0. The updated framework prioritizes three core goals: upgrading allied military capabilities, modernizing cross-bloc defense industrial infrastructure, and redistributing the burden of collective defense as the United States reorients its global military focus toward countering China.

    The Pentagon has already announced a six-month review to determine which conventional forces, aircraft, and capabilities it will withdraw from European bases. While the full details of the drawdown have not been made public, anonymous military sources shared specifics with Reuters outlining steep cuts to US assets allocated to NATO: the number of F-15 and F-15E fighter jets available to the alliance will drop by a third to 99, the fleet of MQ-4 and MQ-9 Reaper surveillance and strike drones will be halved to 12, KC-135 and KC-46 refueling aircraft will be reduced from 79 to 63, and only one strategic bomber and one aircraft carrier will be assigned to NATO operations, down from the prior commitment of two each.

    Despite the reductions, NATO’s top commander, US Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich, confirmed last week that European allies have already moved to fill nearly all the capability gaps left by the US drawdown. Multiple European diplomats told Middle East Eye that the summit will formalize a strengthening of NATO’s European pillar, with member states set to pledge deeper industrial cooperation, expanded weapons production, and increased operational commitments to the alliance.

    Long-time European affairs journalist Guldener Sonumut, based in Turkey, notes that the shift will require structural changes to NATO’s command architecture. As the US steps back from conventional defense responsibilities, those roles will increasingly fall to European allies and Canada, while Washington retains control over strategic command and core planning functions. “This will require changes in Nato’s command structure, with the US retaining strategic command and planning leadership while Europeans take on more operational responsibilities,” Sonumut wrote in a weekend column.

    The summit also marks a turning point for the alliance’s defense industrial cooperation. NATO’s long-standing Standardisation Agreements (Stanag) are expected to remain the central governing framework for allied military equipment, a move that blocks the European Union from developing separate, standalone defense standards. The outcome is a major win for Turkey’s growing defense sector, which already designs and manufactures all its military hardware to meet NATO Stanag requirements. A dedicated defense-industry forum will be held on the summit’s opening day, where dozens of multinational defense cooperation agreements are set to be signed, covering sectors from multidomain operational capabilities to space-based intelligence gathering.

    Yahya Bostan, a columnist for Turkish daily Yeni Safak, argued last week that years of debate between Turkey and European powers over Ankara’s place in a post-US drawdown European security architecture have ended with a clear consensus: Turkey’s role remains firmly within the NATO alliance. Instead of building a new independent security framework, Bostan says European nations will instead increase defense spending and deepen collaboration under the NATO umbrella alongside Turkey.

    On the nuclear security front, analysts expect the US to reaffirm its role as the alliance’s primary nuclear security guarantor, potentially expanding the number of NATO member states allowed to host dual-capable weapons systems — platforms that can deploy both conventional and nuclear warheads. Currently, only five NATO allies, including Turkey, are permitted to host such systems, and Finland’s parliament has already passed legislation to approve hosting the weapons, clearing the way for its inclusion in the expanded scheme.

    European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte framed the summit’s collaborative vision in a joint op-ed published over the weekend in *The Economist*. “This is a true endeavour on both sides of the Atlantic. Our defences are unmatched when we leverage assets, expertise and innovative capabilities from California to Kyiv, Copenhagen to Warsaw, Oslo to Ankara,” they wrote. “The only way to get there is through co-operation: combining the efforts of countries and industries, allies and partners.” Off the record, European diplomats have already acknowledged Erdogan’s key role in convincing Trump to attend the summit in Ankara, and say they are counting on the Turkish leader to reinforce the value of continued US engagement with the alliance for the Trump administration.

  • Mourning and celebration collide as Iran, US both claim victory

    Mourning and celebration collide as Iran, US both claim victory

    In a striking convergence of historical moments, two defining global events unfolded in the same week: the long-awaited burial of Iran’s slain supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the United States’ 250th anniversary of national independence. Against a backdrop of a fragile 60-day ceasefire that paused a bitter US-Israeli initiated war to open negotiations for a permanent peace deal, both sides have leveraged their respective commemorative events to lay claim to victory in the conflict.

    Khamenei was deliberately targeted and killed in a US-Israeli airstrike on the very first day of the war, February 28. Islamic tradition requires prompt burial of the deceased, often within a day of death, but Khamenei’s remains were preserved for more than four months. Sustained US-Israeli bombardment across Iran made large-scale public commemorative gatherings impossible, forcing Iranian authorities to delay the farewell ceremony until the security environment allowed for a fitting tribute.

    Iran’s Islamic government aimed to push back against the invading force before holding a formal, elaborate state burial. An intermittent ceasefire took effect on April 8, which could have allowed for an earlier service – an event that would have carried the same level of security risk as the ceremony held this week, making the deliberate timing clear.

    The alignment of Khamenei’s burial with the US’ high-profile independence jubilee is no random coincidence, according to regional analysts. While some dismiss the overlap as accidental, a far more plausible reading frames the timing as a calculated move by Iran’s leadership to draw global attention away from the US celebration and assert the Islamic Republic’s continued relevance on the world stage.

    Iran’s new post-Khamenei leadership, headed by Khamenei’s son Mujtaba – who has remained out of public view after reportedly being wounded in the strike that killed his father – was fully aware of months of public planning for the US anniversary. US President Donald Trump, who partnered with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch the offensive against Iran, has spent months hyping the 250th independence celebration, promising to showcase what he calls America’s “Golden Age”. He used the event to once again formally claim total victory in the war against Iran.

    The evidence strongly suggests Tehran deliberately scheduled Khamenei’s burial to counter the US festivities. Iranian officials choreographed the mourning events to draw mass public participation and welcome dozens of foreign political and religious delegations from allied and friendly nations across the globe, a turnout that overshadowed much of the US celebration.

    The ceremony also honored Khamenei’s four decades of uncompromising rule as a marja, a leading source of emulation within the Shia Islamic religious hierarchy. Beyond honoring the late leader, the overlapping events sent a series of clear messages to both domestic and international audiences:
    – The Islamic Republic has survived a full-scale foreign invasion and emerged more unified and stronger than it was before the outbreak of war
    – The Iranian regime is far less unpopular and internationally isolated than the US and Israel, its main adversaries, have repeatedly claimed
    – The republic retains the resilience and capability to defend itself against both internal unrest and foreign military aggression
    – The Iranian government remains steadfast in its opposition to its enemies, and positions itself as the ultimate victor in the recent conflict

    The massive public turnout for mourning processions and the large number of foreign delegations in attendance even caught US leadership off guard: Trump had previously claimed that the Iranian people “hated” the former supreme leader, and did not anticipate the scale of public and international support on display.

    Going forward, Khamenei will be enshrined in Iranian history as a transformative religious authority, political thinker, and leader who built the Islamic Republic into a formidable, defensible regional power. While the Islamic system remains firmly entrenched in Iran, observers warn that urgent structural reform remains an unaddressed priority. Widespread public demands for expanded political and social freedoms, and improved economic living conditions, have not faded – instead, these grievances simmer beneath the surface of post-war unity.

    Uncertainty also hangs over the ongoing US-Iran negotiations, and the future political and economic trajectory of the country. If the two sides manage to reach a lasting comprehensive settlement that resolves core disputes – including Iran’s nuclear program, security in the Strait of Hormuz, the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, the lifting of international sanctions, the unfreezing of Iranian sovereign assets, and the reintegration of Iran’s economy into the global market – it would create space for the Iranian government to address longstanding public demands.

    Iran’s new President Masoud Pezeshkian and National Assembly Speaker Bagher Ghalibaf have both publicly signaled a willingness to pursue reform and change. However, the most powerful political actor to watch remains the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which gained additional influence after the war thanks to its new control over the Strait of Hormuz, granting the group expanded veto power over major domestic and foreign policy decisions.

    For the moment, both Tehran and Washington can each claim a symbolic victory from their dueling, simultaneously held commemorative events. But the permanent agreement that negotiators work toward in the coming weeks will carry profound, long-lasting consequences for both nations, and for global security and stability.

    This analysis is from Amin Saikal, emeritus professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the Australian National University, The University of Western Australia, and Victoria University.

  • No, China did not manage to avoid a crash

    No, China did not manage to avoid a crash

    For decades through the 2010s, global economic observers widely regarded China’s economy as uniquely recession-resistant. Surviving both the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2015 domestic stock market crash and capital outflow event without recording a single quarter of negative growth, the country’s macroeconomic management strategy drew widespread fascination. As early as the late 2010s, analysts noted that Beijing had developed a distinct third tool for economic stabilization beyond the conventional monetary and fiscal policies used by most Western economies.

    Standard counter-cyclical policy relies on two levers: monetary policy, which cuts interest rates to encourage private borrowing and investment, and fiscal policy, which directs government spending directly to public projects to boost employment and aggregate demand. China, however, adds a third mechanism: direct credit policy. Leveraging state control over the country’s banking system, Beijing can order state-owned banks to expand lending rapidly during downturns, then rein in credit once growth stabilizes. When extended loans eventually default, the government steps in to remove nonperforming assets from bank balance sheets, allowing the system to continue lending and supporting growth that eventually reduces the relative size of public debt.

    Throughout the 2010s, this strategy relied heavily on directing new credit to the real estate sector, fueling what remains the largest property construction and price boom in modern history. That era of endless expansion came to an abrupt end in late 2021, when the default of industry giant Evergrande triggered a wave of bankruptcies and missed debt payments across the entire sector. Since then, property prices have fallen continuously, and housing construction activity has plummeted sharply, according to Bloomberg data.

    Yet official GDP growth figures never dipped below 3% even as the property crash unfolded. Mirroring its 2009 and 2015 playbook, Beijing ordered its state-controlled banking system to replace slowing real estate lending with a surge of new loans to manufacturing and industrial firms. The shift succeeded in keeping headline growth stable, leading some proponents of China’s managed market model to declare the strategy a resounding success. In a July 2026 social media post, economist Isabella M. Weber noted that many Wall Street analysts had predicted a 2008-style “Lehman moment” for China in 2021, but the bubble defused without a total financial collapse, arguing that this demonstrated an advantage of state-managed markets over unregulated free markets.

    Critics have long warned that this approach carries steep long-term costs: repeated credit-directed stimulus funnels capital to unproductive, politically favored firms, dragging down aggregate productivity growth. This pattern played out in the 2010s, when massive lending to real estate companies diverted resources from more productive sectors. Now, economists warn that the 2022-2024 wave of industrial lending could leave a lasting overhang of “zombie companies” that hoard labor and capital without generating meaningful economic output.

    Supporters of Beijing’s approach push back against these warnings, arguing that long-term costs are unproven, productivity is difficult to measure accurately, and any structural issues can be addressed later. They frame the outcome as a victory for China’s policy goals: successfully pivoting the economy away from excessive reliance on real estate development without triggering a broad economic contraction. Proponents of expanded state economic control in other countries have also held up China’s performance as evidence of the benefits of greater government intervention in markets.

    However, a closer look at labor market data and independent growth estimates tells a more complicated story. Despite official claims of continued stable growth, China did experience a sharp economic downturn following the property crash, and underlying growth remains far weaker than headline figures suggest.

    The first red flag appears in China’s labor market. In 2023, Beijing revised its methodology for calculating youth unemployment to use a narrower definition, after official figures hit record highs. Even with the methodological change, the youth unemployment trend has still moved upward. Official overall unemployment figures show only a small increase, but independent analysts note that these numbers are incomplete: they exclude migrant workers from rural areas, workers who have dropped out of the labor force, and people waiting to start new jobs. Alternative indicators, such as the non-manufacturing employment purchasing managers index, have remained consistently below pre-pandemic levels since the crash, and the migrant worker population has not grown at all since the COVID-19 pandemic. Record numbers of young people are now opting to pursue postgraduate education or civil service roles rather than entering the open job market, masking the true scale of weak labor demand.

    Even official GDP data contradicts claims that China avoided any quarterly contraction. China typically reports growth on a year-over-year basis, unlike the quarterly sequential reporting used in the U.S. and most other major economies. Official figures show that China’s economy contracted by 0.8% quarter-over-quarter in the second quarter of 2022, equal to an annualized contraction of more than 3% — a figure that was originally reported as a much steeper 9.3% contraction before being revised downward. Even official data confirms that current trend growth is roughly 2 percentage points lower than it was immediately before the pandemic.

    Numerous independent analyses suggest that even the revised official figures overstate growth, due to a long-standing practice of “smoothing” GDP numbers: official statistics understate growth in strong years and overstate it in weak years to present a more stable picture of economic performance. A 2016 academic study found that this practice has resulted in official data overstating actual growth by a substantial margin since 2002. Following the 2021 property crash, multiple independent research groups have reached similar conclusions.

    The Rhodium Group, a leading independent research firm focused on China, used alternative data sources to estimate that China’s economy actually contracted between 0.3% and 0.8% in 2022, compared to the official 3% growth figure, and grew only 1.5% to 2% in 2023, far below the official 5.2% reported. The Bank of Finland found that growth effectively stalled in 2022, and Capital Economics concluded that China did experience a full recession that year, even though growth has picked up moderately since. Adding to evidence of weak demand, China has slipped into deflation, with consumer prices falling into negative territory — a classic indicator of insufficient aggregate demand in a slowing economy.

    It is important to acknowledge that China’s credit-based stabilization policy represents a meaningful innovation in macroeconomic management that merits further study from policymakers around the world. Beijing succeeded in preventing the property crash from spiraling into a total financial collapse, a feat that many analysts once considered unlikely. Even so, triumphal claims that China has eliminated the business cycle and avoided any recessionary pain from the property bust do not hold up to scrutiny. Long-term productivity costs remain a major risk, and even in the short term, the downturn has been far deeper than official figures suggest. If China remains on a trajectory of permanently lower trend growth, the practice of smoothing official growth numbers will eventually become unsustainable, as there will not be enough strong growth in good years to offset the inflated numbers reported during downturns.

  • UK urged to sanction Netanyahu and justice minister over Israeli torture of Palestinians

    UK urged to sanction Netanyahu and justice minister over Israeli torture of Palestinians

    A cross-party coalition of more than 70 British members of Parliament and House of Lords peers has launched a formal call for the UK government to impose targeted sanctions on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and top Israeli justice official Yariv Levin, citing documented systemic abuse of Palestinian civilians by the Israeli government.

    According to reporting from Sky News, the open letter dated last week, addressed to newly appointed UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper, bears the signatures of 71 legislators from across the UK’s political spectrum. The campaign is led by sitting Labour MP Neil Duncan-Jordan, and already includes backing from 30 Labour MPs and seven Labour peers — a notable showing of dissent within the ruling party.

    In the text of the letter, parliamentarians argue that direct responsibility for the widespread, systematically documented torture of Palestinian civilians rests at the highest level of the Israeli government, with Prime Minister Netanyahu personally implicated. The group is calling on Cooper to take immediate action to end what they describe as enduring impunity for senior Israeli leaders by imposing sanctions on both Netanyahu and Levin, who holds multiple senior government roles including deputy prime minister, justice minister and interior minister.

    The letter notes that UK sanctions imposed last year on far-right Israeli ministers Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, while a welcome step, have failed to shift the Israeli government’s treatment of Palestinian detainees. Lawmakers add that the situation has since escalated dramatically, with perpetrators of abuse acting with near-total immunity from accountability.

    To back their claims, the letter cites a February 2024 United Nations report that concluded torture has become a core, institutionalized component of Israel’s occupation, inflicted systematically on Palestinian men, women and children through both in-custody abuse and a broader campaign of forced displacement, mass killing, systemic deprivation and destruction of critical infrastructure needed for daily life. It also highlights a recent controversial incident in which Netanyahu publicly praised the decision to dismiss military rape charges against Israeli soldiers accused of assaulting a Palestinian detainee.

    Additionally, legislators point to the interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla bound for Gaza by Israeli forces two months prior, during which multiple British citizens were detained while operating in international waters. Along with Labour signatories, the letter draws support from members of the Green Party, Plaid Cymru, Sinn Féin, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party, and one Conservative Member of Parliament, demonstrating rare cross-party consensus on the need for tougher action against Israeli leaders.

    In response to the letter, a spokesperson for the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office acknowledged the severity of the allegations, telling Sky News that “the reports of mistreatment of detainees by Israeli forces are disgraceful and we have raised this issue with the Israeli government.” The spokesperson added that all detainees are required to be treated humanely in line with the requirements of international law, and that all credible allegations of torture and abuse must be subject to full, impartial investigation. The UK, they confirmed, continues to pressure the Israeli government to grant the International Committee of the Red Cross immediate and unfettered access to all Israeli detention facilities, and called the prolonged detention of hundreds of Palestinian children without charge “completely unacceptable.”

    The latest call for accountability aligns with mounting international scrutiny of Israel’s treatment of Palestinian detainees. In March 2024, Francesca Albanese, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, presented a report to the UN Human Rights Council describing Israel’s prison system as “a laboratory of calculated cruelty,” documenting extreme abuses including the sexual assault of Palestinian detainees with bottles, metal rods and knives.

    Since Israel launched its large-scale military operation in Gaza in October 2023, more than 100 Palestinian detainees have been confirmed dead in Israeli custody, independent monitors report. Analysts widely view this number as a significant undercount, with the actual death toll believed to be far higher. This pressure comes after the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his former defense minister Yoav Gallant in November 2024, charging both with war crimes and crimes against humanity stemming from actions in Gaza since the start of the current conflict.

  • Greaves bats West Indies back into 2nd test against Sri Lanka on day 4

    Greaves bats West Indies back into 2nd test against Sri Lanka on day 4

    On a slow, run-friendly pitch at North Sound in Antigua, a dogged, record-building innings from all-rounder Justin Greaves has positioned the West Indies men’s test cricket team on the brink of a milestone: their first test series victory in four years. With one full day of play remaining in the second and final match of the series, the home side holds all the momentum heading into the final session, thanks to Greaves’ 325-ball marathon that yielded 180 runs.

    Resuming on Day 4 at 318-4, with Greaves already sitting on 85 overnight, the West Indies batters set about erasing the sizable first-innings deficit Sri Lanka had built after declaring at 549-9. The defining moment of the day came from a fifth-wicket stand that echoed one of the pair’s prior career-defining performances: Greaves and Shai Hope put together a 242-run partnership, dragging the West Indies from a precarious 144-4 to a comfortable 386-5. This collaboration mirrored the 196-run stand the two put together against New Zealand in December 2024, when Greaves hit an unbeaten 202 and Hope scored 140 to salvage a draw.

    Hope, who missed the first test of the series after picking up a shoulder injury in pre-match training, went on to notch his third century in five test matches, finishing with 112 off 199 balls. His knock included 10 boundaries, and he confidently handled both Sri Lanka’s pace attack and spin spearhead Prabath Jayasuriya, using clever footwork to neutralize the spinner’s threat. He survived a dropped review early in the day, when Sri Lanka’s appeal for a caught behind off Milan Rathnayake was turned down by the on-field umpire, and the touring side opted not to challenge the call. His innings ended in bizarre fashion close to the lunch break: attempting to pad away a length ball from left-arm spinner Sonal Dinusha down the leg side, Hope stepped outside his crease and missed the ball. Though wicketkeeper Kusal Mendis fumbled the catch, the ball ricocheted off his gloves onto the stumps, and Hope was ruled stumped.

    After Hope’s dismissal, Greaves continued to anchor the innings, shepherding the West Indies lower order to add 113 runs for the final five wickets. The right-handed batter eventually fell as the last man out, with the West Indies all out for 499, cutting Sri Lanka’s first-innings lead to just 50 runs. The innings marked Greaves’ third test century, and the second-highest score of his international test career, as he brought up his hundred off 201 balls on Antiguan soil.

    Sri Lanka’s bowlers never let up pressure through the day, relying heavily on disciplined short-pitch bowling to restrict run flow. Pace bowler Asitha Fernando claimed his third career five-wicket test haul, finishing with figures of 5-130 off 40 overs, while Jayasuriya chipped in with 3-131.

    By stumps on Day 4, Sri Lanka had navigated early wickets to reach 92-2 in their second innings. The touring side lost first-innings centurion Lahiru Udara for a four-ball duck and opener Nishan Fernando for 20, before Dinesh Chandimal (40 not out) and Kamindu Mendis (30 not out) put together an unbroken 60-run partnership to close out play. That result pushed Sri Lanka’s overall lead to 142 runs with one day of cricket remaining.

    Through the final 22 overs of Day 4, Sri Lanka scored at a rate of more than four runs per over, a pace they will need to maintain if they hope to set a defendable total and force a victory on a pitch that is expected to deteriorate on the final day. Only 21 wickets have fallen across the first four days, with 1,140 total runs scored, making conditions heavily favorable to batters and the home side, which already holds a 1-0 series lead after winning the opening test by an innings and 217 runs.

    A draw in the second test would be enough for the West Indies to claim their first World Test Championship series win since beating Bangladesh in the Caribbean in 2022, ending a four-year drought without a test series victory.