标签： Asia

A month after completing what stands as the highest-profile diplomatic tour of Libya by the US’s top regional envoy since he assumed his role, Massad Boulos’ push for Libyan institutional unification remains mired in ambiguity, leaving regional observers and local factions questioning Washington’s core goals in the fractured North African nation.

Boulos, who serves as senior advisor to former President Donald Trump on Arab and Middle Eastern affairs, kicked off his multi-stop tour in early July with widespread expectations that he would unveil a concrete framework to resolve Libya’s decade-long political split. The itinerary kicked off with preliminary closed-door talks with factional representatives in Malta on July 6, followed by back-to-back face-to-face negotiations the next two days: first with Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, who leads the UN-backed western Libyan government, on July 7, and then with eastern Libyan strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi a day later.

In a notable break from standard diplomatic itineraries, Boulos also carved out time to meet with a range of influential independent players unaffiliated with either of the country’s rival ruling blocs. These included Naji Issa, governor of Libya’s Central Bank, and leading representatives from the Council of Elders of Misrata, the economically powerful western Libyan city that played a key role in defeating Haftar’s 2019–2020 offensive on western Libya.

Despite weeks of follow-up talks after the tour, no clear public roadmap has materialized for what Boulos framed during his visit as national unification efforts, a framework that has become widely known as the “Boulos initiative.”

This diplomatic push is not a new endeavor. As far back as September 2024, Boulos publicly committed that Washington would actively facilitate the reunification of Libya’s governing institutions, which have split along eastern-western lines since the outbreak of the country’s second civil war in 2014. That division came three years after a NATO-backed intervention toppled longtime Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi, leaving a power vacuum that has stoked ongoing instability.

Today, the country’s political landscape remains split: Haftar and his allied factions control eastern Libya, while Dbeibah’s UN-supported administration governs the west from Tripoli. The UN Support Mission in Libya has led formal peace negotiations since large-scale fighting ended in 2020, but the country has yet to achieve full institutional unification, with no national elections held to resolve competing claims to power.

After nearly 12 months of regular negotiations and meetings with Libyan officials from all sides, Boulos’ only confirmed major breakthrough has been the brokering of a unified national budget for both rival governments, agreed in April 2025. No additional concrete progress has been recorded in the months since. As of July 19, Aguilah Saleh, speaker of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives aligned with Haftar, confirmed that the legislative body had not received any official draft proposal for the Boulos initiative as of yet.

Slow progress on the initiative has been fueled in large part by mounting criticism from multiple major Libyan factions, whose opposition coalesced after a June 2025 Financial Times report cited anonymous sources familiar with the matter claiming that Washington was pushing a power-sharing deal that would install Saddam Haftar, Khalifa Haftar’s son and widely anticipated successor to the 82-year-old field marshal, as head of Libya’s highest executive body, the Presidential Council. The role is currently held by Mohamed Menfi, a relatively neutral political figure.

When Boulos arrived in Misrata on July 7 to begin his tour of western Libya, dozens of protesters gathered at the city’s airport to demonstrate against his visit and denounce what they called a “suspicious deal” to advance the Haftar family’s political power. Misrata, Libya’s commercial heartland, and its business and military leadership have a long history of fierce opposition to the Haftars; the city’s militias led the resistance that repelled Haftar’s 2019–2020 offensive to seize control of western Libya.

“The criminal Haftar is responsible for everything happening today, this is reason enough to reject a solution [involving his family],” Younes al-Salabi, spokesman for the Misrata Military Council, one of Libya’s largest armed factions, told Middle East Eye in an interview.

Misrata is not the only bloc opposing the initiative. In southern Libya’s desert region, rebel leader Mohamed Wardago, whose armed movement has waged an insurgency against Haftar’s forces since January 2025, echoed the opposition. “Nobody can accept that Haftar and his sons should hold key sovereign positions within the Libyan state,” Wardago said, confirming that his group had also seen reports of the US plan to install Saddam Haftar as Presidential Council head.

Jalel Harchaoui, a leading North Africa-based political analyst, confirmed that placing Saddam Haftar in the top executive role is the core component of the proposed deal. While the constitutional framework that defines the Presidential Council head’s powers remains vague, Harchaoui noted that Saddam Haftar already commands his own military units, so his appointment would expand the office’s influence and fundamentally reshape its role in Libyan politics.

The proposed deal does not only elevate the Haftar family: multiple reports, including the June Financial Times investigation, indicate the framework would allow Dbeibah to remain in his post as prime minister in Tripoli. Though Washington has long-standing ties to Khalifa Haftar, who holds US citizenship, the State Department has also maintained regular direct diplomatic contacts with Dbeibah; Boulos described a July 26 phone call between the two sides as “productive.”

Dbeibah, who was appointed to his post by the UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in 2021 rather than elected through a popular vote, has faced growing public backlash in recent months. Since May 2025, repeated street protests have called for his resignation. Tensions flared again at the end of July, when protests sparked by widespread power cuts in western Libya shifted focus to Dbeibah, with demonstrators attempting to storm his Tripoli office. In recent days, protesters have closed five ministry offices and the national anti-corruption authority to protest collapsing public services, the ongoing electricity crisis, and plummeting living standards across the country.

Against this backdrop, a US-brokered deal that allows Dbeibah to retain power is deeply controversial among the Libyan public, even as it offers the embattled prime minister a critical political lifeline. “Dbeibah would gain recognition across the country and would, for the first time, be able to travel to Benghazi,” Harchaoui explained. “Both Saddam and Dbeibah would acquire national legitimacy, with the possibility of remaining in power without elections for at least a year, probably longer.”

While holding national elections remains an official priority for the United Nations, with the UN Security Council reaffirming its call for polls last month, elections have barely been mentioned as a core goal of Boulos’ initiative and do not appear to be part of his proposed framework. Misrata’s leadership says it supports a resolution centered on “the organisation of a constitutional referendum and elections,” while July protesters in Tripoli repeatedly called for “the fall of all political institutions, without exception,” to be replaced through a free electoral process.

In recent weeks, Boulos, a fluent Arabic speaker, has given a series of interviews to Arab regional media to defend and promote Washington’s efforts in Libya. In a July 27 interview with Saudi outlet Asharq Al-Awsat, Boulos argued that “unity is the basis for legitimacy and democratic elections,” meaning his framework prioritizes reaching a unification deal first before holding any national polls.

Analysts say this sequencing aligns with the White House’s core priorities in Libya: securing stable, pro-US partners rather than advancing rapid democratic transition. Since January 2025, when Libya announced its first oil licensing round in nearly 20 years, the US has actively encouraged American energy firms to invest in Libya’s oil sector, which holds the largest proven oil reserves on the African continent. A second core US priority is expanding security cooperation with Libya’s fragmented military, particularly Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), to counter Russian influence in the region.

Russia has provided direct military support to the LNA since the second Libyan civil war, with Russian paramilitary groups deploying thousands of fighters to back Haftar’s forces. In exchange, Moscow has gained access to key airfields and ports in eastern and southern Libya, which the LNA controls, allowing Russia to expand its military operations across the African continent.

Harchaoui noted that “The Pentagon believes that unifying the military commands would make it harder for Russia to maintain its presence” in Libya. So far, one of the only tangible US successes in this area has been the Flintlock 2026 joint military exercise held in April 2025, which marked the first time LNA units and Tripoli-based armed forces trained together on Libyan soil.

During his July tour, Boulos also prioritized meetings with top Libyan security officials, meeting not just the Haftar family in Benghazi but also Interior Minister Emad Trabelsi and Deputy Defence Minister Abdul Salam al-Zoubi in Tripoli, both of whom command powerful western Libyan armed groups. Still, even after months of high-level diplomacy, Boulos has failed to outline clear specifics for his initiative, including how military reunification would be implemented.

A recent UN Panel of Experts on Libya report has also added to skepticism, reiterating longstanding allegations of widespread human rights abuses and systemic corruption involving armed groups and factions aligned with both the Haftar and Dbeibah families. Khalifa Haftar in particular has been accused of war crimes by global watchdog groups including Human Rights Watch, and a US court has previously ruled that he is legally liable for torture and extrajudicial executions carried out by his forces.

Ultimately, the lack of clarity surrounding Boulos’ plan has fueled growing skepticism across Libya, even as a broad majority of Libyans from all factions support the ultimate goal of unifying the country’s fractured institutions.

A major rift has emerged over a touted Gaza ceasefire breakthrough after a senior Hamas official confirmed the Palestinian armed movement will refuse any disarmament steps until Israeli military forces fully withdraw from the besieged enclave. Speaking to Al Jazeera, senior Hamas representative Ghazi Hamad emphasized that Israel will have no part whatsoever in any process to surrender the group’s weapons. Instead, Hamad noted, any disarmament initiative will be led exclusively by an independent Palestinian national committee.

The announcement comes amid a deeply broken ceasefire that took effect in October 2025: while Hamas has largely honored the truce terms, Israel has launched an unrelenting bombing campaign across Gaza that has already killed over 1,000 Palestinians and wounded hundreds more, in direct violation of the agreement.

Per reporting from Agence France-Presse, unnamed Hamas sources confirmed that a technocratic Palestinian committee established by the Board of Peace to govern Gaza would act as the sole authority responsible for managing and storing the group’s arms. The framework aligns with a broader ceasefire implementation deal that the Board of Peace announced Friday, confirming Hamas had formally approved the detailed plan for the next phases of the truce.

In a public statement posted to X, the Board of Peace framed the deal as the product of months of intensive, good-faith negotiations advancing a peace plan put forward by former U.S. President Donald Trump. The plan lays out new governance structures, expanded security arrangements, increased humanitarian aid access, large-scale reconstruction and economic recovery for Gaza, as outlined in the Trump proposal and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2803. The Board of Peace called the decision a “historic breakthrough,” claiming it would see Hamas disarm prior to an eventual Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza.

The White House echoed that celebratory framing in a July 30, 2026 post on X, writing “Today, the Board of Peace reached a HISTORIC agreement for the COMPLETE DISARMAMENT of Hamas and all other armed groups in Gaza. A monumental step toward lasting PEACE and SECURITY.”

Israeli officials have yet to issue any formal comment on the new agreement, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his cabinet have repeatedly stated Israeli forces will not withdraw from Gaza, where the Israeli military has waged what the report terms a genocidal war and ethnic cleansing campaign against Palestinian civilians. Back in May 2026, Netanyahu publicly stated his goal for Israel to seize full control of 70 percent of Gaza’s territory, noting “We currently control 60 percent of the Gaza Strip, and my directives are to move toward controlling 70 percent.”

As of July 2026, the Israeli military campaign has killed more than 73,000 people in Gaza, with thousands more still unaccounted for and presumed dead under the rubble of destroyed buildings. The small enclave, home to nearly 2 million Palestinians, has been left almost entirely in ruins, with 90 percent of the local population displaced from their homes. Most displaced Palestinians now live in overcrowded tent camps with no access to basic sanitation infrastructure. This report was originally published by Middle East Eye, an outlet that provides independent coverage and analysis of the Middle East and North Africa region.

In mid-July 2025, a controversy sparked by unsubstantiated allegations of Israeli nationals working at a controversial tech-backed project in southern Malaysia has thrown a harsh spotlight on the deep contradictions between Kuala Lumpur’s longstanding pro-Palestine foreign policy and its aggressive push to attract global foreign investment.

On July 15, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim made a forceful public declaration: any Israeli national found on Malaysian soil would be immediately deported, and the country would not compromise on its immigration stance, a position rooted in Malaysia’s official non-recognition of the state of Israel. The prime minister’s comments followed the emergence of online claims that Israelis were embedded in the Network School, a little-known initiative tied to the so-called ‘Network State’ concept launched by former Silicon Valley venture capitalist and Stanford professor Balaji Srinivasan, located in Johor state’s Forest City development.

Within hours of the allegations surfacing, Johor Chief Minister Dato Onn Hafiz Ghazi ordered state agencies including the Iskandar Puteri City Council to launch a full review of the Network School’s business compliance, and called for federal agencies including the Home Ministry, Immigration Department, police and customs to lead a formal probe into the claims of Israeli presence. Malaysia’s federal Home Ministry quickly greenlit the investigation.

After two rounds of inspections covering 379 foreign nationals registered at the site, Malaysia’s Immigration Department confirmed no regulatory violations were found among the vast majority of those checked, but noted that 19 individuals could not be traced. Director-General Dato Zakaria Shaaban told reporters the untraced people may have entered or exited the country through irregular channels, and authorities have launched a nationwide lookout for the group. On July 17, Ghazi’s administration issued formal notices to the Network School after uncovering that one of its linked properties was operating without a valid business license.

The crisis escalated on July 23, when the United States government summoned Malaysia’s ambassador to Washington, Tan Sri Muhammad Shahrul Ikram Yaakob, to demand clarification of Anwar’s deportation announcement. In a firm response, the Malaysian government reaffirmed it would not revise its longstanding immigration policy toward Israel. Srinivasan, for his part, took to social media platform X to request an audience with Anwar, seeking to reassure international investors and restore confidence in Malaysia as a viable destination for tech investment.

To understand the roots of this controversy, it is necessary to examine the unconventional nature of Srinivasan’s Network State project. First conceptualized publicly in 2022, the initiative frames itself as a “startup society” focused on peace, with the ultimate goal of crowdfunding physical territory to build a new sovereign state that would eventually earn diplomatic recognition from existing global governments. The project’s website describes it as a community built around an “ethnic diaspora” connected digitally, with physical outposts that act as “cloud embassies” where recruits can test the project before committing to stay. The Network State counts heavyweight backers including Silicon Valley titans Peter Thiel, Marc Andreessen, Joe Lonsdale and Patri Friedman, as well as major crypto firms such as Coinbase and Praxis.

Critics have long flagged the project’s troubling parallels to historical settler colonial ventures, noting that it centers on a digitally organized movement seeking to purchase and control physical territory in foreign nations. Many academic observers have also pointed out that Srinivasan frequently cites Israel as a model for successful nation-building, and draws direct ideological inspiration from Israel’s state-building experience. Compounding these red flags for Malaysia, multiple backers of the Network State have well-documented ties to Israel’s military and surveillance apparatus: Thiel’s data firm Palantir has invested heavily in Israeli military startups accused of providing surveillance technology that enables Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

Srinivasan launched the Network School in 2024, choosing Forest City in Johor for its close proximity to Singapore, a global tech hub. But the location itself is mired in decades of controversy. Forest City is a multi-billion dollar joint venture between China’s Country Garden Group and Malaysian firm Iskandar Esplanade Danga 88 Sdn Bhd, whose shareholders include Johor’s ruling Sultan Ibrahim and business interests linked to the United Malays National Organisation, Malaysia’s largest Malay nationalist political party. Built largely on reclaimed coastal land, the development has long faced condemnation from environmental activists and local communities: an investigative report by Mongabay confirmed that construction began without a required environmental impact assessment, leading to the destruction of critical seagrass habitats and massive sand dumping that erased hundreds of hectares of traditional fishing grounds relied on by local communities. Rights groups have also previously criticized the project for relying heavily on low-wage migrant workers from South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, with limited labor protections.

The Network School scandal is not an isolated incident, but the most visible exposure of longstanding tensions at the heart of Malaysia’s foreign and economic policy. Malaysia has positioned itself as a vocal supporter of the Palestinian cause and a critic of Israeli military actions in Gaza, but it has also actively courted billions in foreign investment from Western and U.S.-linked firms, many of which have documented ties to Israel.

Earlier this year, for example, a BlackRock subsidiary was allowed to join a consortium taking a ownership stake in Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad, a move that drew widespread criticism from Malaysian civil society groups, who called on Anwar to reject the deal over BlackRock’s links to what they described as “Zionist entity conducting a settler-colonial and racist genocide in Gaza.” Local media reports later revealed that the Anwar administration launched an aggressive media campaign to discredit critics of the BlackRock deal. In April, multiple major international defense firms with longstanding business ties to the Israeli military – including U.S. contractor Lockheed Martin, European missile maker MBDA, and U.S. firearms producer Colt’s Manufacturing – were allowed to participate in the 2026 Defence Services Asia and National Security Asia exhibition in Kuala Lumpur.

Civil society campaigners have also documented other ongoing links: Malaysian conglomerate Sime Darby maintains investment ties with Caterpillar, whose bulldozers have been used by the Israeli military for home demolitions in the occupied Palestinian territories; Australian rare earth producer Lynas continues its operations in Malaysia, with its minerals entering global defense supply chains that serve Israel; and activists have alleged that Malaysian ports have been used to facilitate shipments bound for Israel’s military supply chain. In 2025, Anwar welcomed former U.S. President Donald Trump to the ASEAN Summit held in Malaysia, despite widespread mass protests from pro-Palestine activists. Rights groups accused Malaysian police of detaining and intimidating peaceful protesters during the visit, while authorities maintained tight security to accommodate Trump.

Malaysia’s complicated balancing act is also shaped by its unique domestic political structure: a constitutional monarchy where power is divided between the federal government, state authorities and royal institutions, a system that has historically allowed large-scale foreign-backed development projects to move forward with limited public accountability or resistance. For Johor, the current site of the controversy, the stakes are particularly high: between July 2024 and June 2025, Malaysia attracted roughly $759 million in data center investments, with Johor emerging as a key tech hub as part of the newly launched Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone.

Government officials have repeatedly stressed that all enforcement actions against the Network School have been rooted in regulatory compliance, not political considerations, but the controversy has ignited a fierce national and international debate over whether Malaysia can maintain its principled pro-Palestine stance while continuing to court investment from firms and countries with deep ties to Israel. As of late July, the investigation remains ongoing, and the future of the Network School project in Johor remains uncertain.

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia – The United Nations’ special human rights rapporteur for Cambodia has outlined a series of pressing human rights challenges facing the Southeast Asian nation, spanning cross-border displacement, criminal cyberscam networks, and restricted freedom of expression, during an end-of-mission briefing held in the capital this Friday.

Nearly five years after one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in South Asian history, a Sri Lankan High Court has delivered a landmark verdict against the island nation’s former top law enforcement official over his role in the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings that killed over 260 people. On Friday, the three-judge bench found former Inspector General of Police Pujith Jayasundara guilty of gross criminal negligence, ruling that his failure to act on repeated advance intelligence warnings enabled the Islamic State-inspired coordinated attacks that shook the country.
Under Sri Lankan law, the death sentence Jayasundara received carries a de facto life imprisonment term, as the country has upheld an informal moratorium on executions for nearly half a century, a policy that current President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has publicly committed to maintaining. Legal representatives for the former police chief confirmed he will exercise his right to appeal the ruling, a process that will play out in higher courts over the coming months.
The 2019 attacks unfolded as a series of near-simultaneous blasts targeting three high-profile tourist hotels and three Christian churches—two Catholic and one Protestant—across Sri Lanka. Among the 269 people killed, 42 were foreign tourists, compounding the international fallout from the assault. A post-attack parliamentary investigation confirmed that both national police and intelligence agencies received multiple specific warnings about the planned bombings months in advance, but senior officials took no steps to shore up security or prevent the assault.
On the same day of Jayasundara’s verdict, the court prepared to issue a separate ruling for Hemasiri Fernando, the former Defense Ministry secretary, who faces the same criminal negligence charge connected to the attacks. Authorities have linked two domestic Sri Lankan Islamic militant groups to the planning and execution of the bombings, and all individuals believed to have directly participated in the attacks are dead. Additional trials are currently ongoing for dozens of other suspects accused of providing logistical support, funding, and coordination for the assault.
The verdict comes as persistent questions remain about the full scope of the conspiracy behind the attacks. Sri Lanka’s Catholic Church, which lost hundreds of worshippers in the church bombings, has repeatedly pushed back against official findings, arguing that the identified low-level perpetrators are not the true masterminds and that a far larger, still-uncovered conspiracy led to the 2019 attacks.

NAYPYITAW, Myanmar — On Friday, the leader of Myanmar’s military-aligned administration marked the first 100 days of his current term in office, using a national address to defend his government’s early track record and lay out a comprehensive five-year governance agenda — all as the country grapples with widespread internal armed conflict and mounting condemnation from the international community.

Min Aung Hlaing, the former head of Myanmar’s military who first seized state control from the democratically elected civilian government in a 2021 coup, was formally sworn in as president in April of this year. His appointment followed a general election that political analysts and global critics widely dismiss as a prearranged process to cement the military’s long-term hold on national power.

Speaking before an audience of more than 900 legislators, senior government officials, and military delegates gathered at the national parliament in Naypyitaw, Min Aung Hlaing asserted that his administration has already laid “critical groundwork” for the country by advancing its two core priorities: reestablishing nationwide peace and security, and driving inclusive national development.

Under the five-year roadmap he outlined, the first two years will be dedicated to accelerating efforts to build a modern, economically developed nation founded on democratic principles and a federal governing structure. The remaining three years will be devoted to full-speed implementation of infrastructure and social development projects, he said.

Min Aung Hlaing also confirmed that special by-elections will be held in 2027 for 102 townships across Myanmar. These constituencies were unable to participate in the military government’s three-phase general election held late last year, due to ongoing armed conflict that has made normal electoral operations impossible in those areas.

The president added that the administration will continue enforcing the military’s controversial conscription law, while expanding and strengthening the country’s armed forces and national police as they battle pro-democracy opposition groups and ethnic minority insurgent movements across most of Myanmar’s territory. He noted that his government has extended an offer of dialogue to anti-military armed groups, and has already held formal talks with 13 separate ethnic armed organizations.

In a striking rebuke of regional diplomatic efforts, Min Aung Hlaing also criticized the 2021 five-point peace consensus brokered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was designed to de-escalate Myanmar’s civil conflict. He claimed the agreement was finalized without the consent of all ASEAN member states, and argued that the regional bloc has systematically discriminated against Myanmar since the 2021 coup. The ASEAN framework requires Myanmar’s ruling authorities to immediately end all violence against opposition groups and open inclusive dialogue between all warring parties, mediated by a special ASEAN envoy.

Turning to economic and infrastructure policy, Min Aung Hlaing announced plans to move forward with 10 major new power generation projects, including the long-suspended and highly controversial Myitsone hydropower dam. The project was halted more than a decade ago following large-scale public protests over major environmental and displacement risks. He added that the government will also continue preliminary work to develop the country’s first nuclear power plant.

On law enforcement and transnational crime, Min Aung Hlaing stated that Myanmar authorities have stepped up efforts to crack down on money laundering, drug trafficking, and the transnational online scam centers that have operated with relative impunity in parts of the country in recent years. To date, he said, more than 72,000 foreign nationals linked to illicit scam operations have been deported back to their home countries, covering 58 nations worldwide.

Min Aung Hlaing did acknowledge that the large-scale outflow of young working-age Myanmar citizens has created significant headwinds for the country’s economic development. However, he declined to acknowledge the well-documented link between the military’s conscription policy and this mass youth exodus, which independent analysts and opposition groups widely identify as one of the primary drivers of the trend.

Opposition leaders have pushed back sharply on Min Aung Hlaing’s address, arguing it does little to address the country’s deepening crises. Nan Lin, a spokesperson for the General Strike Coordination Body — one of Myanmar’s leading nonviolent pro-democracy opposition organizations — said the speech makes clear the military’s sole goal is to entrench its authoritarian grip on power. He added that widespread economic hardship will only worsen under what he called the junta’s failed governing agenda.

“No meaningful change can be expected from the junta,” Nan Lin said in a statement following the address. “They will use the conscription law to control young people through fear, and the situation could worsen as they continue to sacrifice young people in order to hold on to power.”

For more than 40 years, a quiet, unspoken assumption has anchored every core pillar of Israeli national security strategy: that the United States would forever remain the unchallenged hegemonic power in the Middle East. Under this order, Washington would not only guarantee Israel’s long-held qualitative military advantage over all regional rivals, but also absorb the diplomatic fallout of Jerusalem’s policy choices and maintain the regional balance of power aligned strictly with American interests. Today, that foundational assumption is steadily eroding – and Israeli policymakers have been far slower than necessary to confront this new strategic reality.

American dominance in the Middle East was never total, but it shaped every corner of regional order for decades. Washington built an interconnected architecture of military bases, massive arms sales, binding security guarantees, and consistent diplomatic cover that allowed it to act as the final arbiter of power from the eastern Mediterranean Levant to the oil-rich Gulf states. That framework, however, has been slowly unraveling for 20 years, a decline accelerated by multiple cascading shifts: the costly failure of the 2003 Iraq War, the widespread exhaustion of the post-9/11 global war on terror, an American public weary of open-ended, endless military commitments in the Middle East, and a long-running strategic reorientation toward the Indo-Pacific that successive presidential administrations from Barack Obama’s forward have pursued in fits and starts.

As Washington’s influence recedes, competing global powers have moved to fill the emerging power vacuum. China is now the top trading partner for all Gulf Cooperation Council states, while Russia has carved out lasting, influential military and political footholds in both Syria and Libya. Regional governments have not missed this shift, and have already begun adjusting their foreign policies to hedge against an increasingly multipolar region.

The 2023 Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, brokered directly by Beijing rather than mediated through Washington, delivered the clearest warning yet that Gulf states no longer view American diplomacy as the only viable path to regional security cooperation. Today, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and even Egypt maintain genuinely multi-aligned foreign policies: they purchase Chinese infrastructure investment, Russian grain exports, and American military hardware simultaneously, and calibrate their public stances on issues ranging from Gaza to Iran to satisfy audiences in Beijing and Moscow as much as they do in Washington.

For Israel, this shifting regional order carries profound strategic implications. For decades, Israel has flourished within the framework of American hegemony. Its qualitative military edge is enshrined in binding U.S. law, it has enjoyed near-automatic diplomatic protection from Washington at the United Nations Security Council, and its economy has benefited from preferential trade agreements and decades of substantial American military aid. All of these advantages were made possible not only by the deep bilateral ties between the two nations, but by the fact that a hegemonic United States could easily absorb the diplomatic, reputational, and strategic costs of unconditional backing for Israel – at a time when no rival power was positioned to exploit the friction this created between Washington and the broader Arab and Muslim world.

That permissive strategic environment is now vanishing. In an increasingly multipolar Middle East, the costs of the U.S.-Israel alliance have become far more visible, and far more easily exploited by competing powers. Every veto the U.S. casts on Israel’s behalf at the UN is now leveraged by Beijing and Moscow to argue to Global South governments that American-led global institutions apply core principles of international law selectively and unfairly. Every round of conflict in Gaza or Lebanon becomes an opening for rival powers to position themselves as far more responsive to Arab and Muslim public opinion than Washington is willing to be, as seen clearly in Chinese and Russian diplomatic outreach to the Gulf and Islamic world during the 2023-2024 Gaza war.

Even Israel’s landmark regional diplomacy, most notably the Abraham Accords, was built on a core premise that has now been severely strained: that normalization with Gulf states could proceed on a separate track from the decades-long Palestinian question, under an American security umbrella that would make this political compromise survivable for Arab leaders. The Gaza war has stretched this premise to breaking point. Arab publics across the region remain far more passionate about securing Palestinian statehood than the architects of normalization agreements anticipated. And in a world where Arab governments now have access to alternative great power patrons and alternative export markets, they have far less incentive to absorb damaging domestic political costs purely to maintain favor with Washington.

This shifting landscape does not call for panic – but it demands urgent rethinking. None of these changes mean that American commitment to Israel is on the verge of collapse, or that Israel’s existing military superiority is in immediate jeopardy. But they do mean that the strategic context in which Israeli policy has operated since 1967 is fundamentally changing, and that proactive foresight will deliver far better outcomes than continued strategic inertia.

A realist assessment of this new order points to three core takeaways for Israeli policymakers. First, Israel’s long-term security will depend far more on stable, negotiated agreements with its regional neighbors – including a credible, lasting resolution to the Palestinian question – than on any permanent assumption of American unrivaled primacy in the region. Second, overreliance on unconditional American backing is a declining asset, as Washington’s regional influence continues to wane and American domestic politics grow increasingly divided over U.S. support for Israel. Third, in a Middle East with multiple competing great power patrons, Israel’s regional legitimacy will become a far more durable foundation for national security than military deterrence alone.

Of course, this reading of regional trend lines is not universally accepted, and it remains contested among strategic analysts. Advocates of the traditional approach argue that American commitment to Israel rests on durable public and congressional support that shows no sign of fundamental erosion. They note that China and Russia have demonstrated little appetite or capacity to replace the comprehensive security guarantees that the U.S. has long provided the region, and that claims of American decline in the Middle East have been overstated many times before.

Other analysts argue that Israel’s own military superiority and independent deterrent capabilities, not its alliance with any external patron, remain the true foundation of its national security. They add that normalization between Israel and Gulf states is rooted in genuine shared concerns over Iranian regional ambitions, rather than a fragile arrangement dependent entirely on American mediation.

Both perspectives deserve fair consideration as the regional balance of power continues to shift. This new multipolar order is still taking shape, and only proactive, adaptive strategy will allow Israel to navigate its new challenges effectively.