Global Pulse

标签： Asia

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  • Unpacking the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey defense pact

    Unpacking the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey defense pact

    On August 7, 2026, a landmark trilateral defense agreement was signed in the Saudi holy city of Mecca by the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. Named the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement, this pact formally enshrines a collective defense principle: any armed aggression against one signatory will be treated as an attack against all three nations. It builds on the 2025 bilateral Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, expanding cooperation to include joint military drills, defense industrial partnerships, cross-border technology sharing, and coordinated intelligence exchange. While the framework for deeper collaboration is publicly established, details of operational protocols, specific military commitments, and implementation timelines remain undisclosed. This new pact represents one of the most consequential shifts in Middle Eastern and South Asian geopolitics in recent years, driven by overlapping but not identical national priorities across the three countries.

    ### The Strategic Drivers Behind the Pact
    The timing of the agreement is far from coincidental, rooted in a deeply unstable Middle Eastern security landscape. Decades-long tensions between the United States and Iran have yet to produce a lasting ceasefire, while Iran-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen have stepped up attacks and threats against Saudi territory and Saudi-linked commercial and infrastructure assets. A recently finalized U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement remains tied to ongoing negotiations over Saudi-Israeli normalization, with Washington conditioning the deal’s implementation on Riyadh formally joining the Abraham Accords. At the same time, shifting dynamics in the ongoing Gaza crisis and stalled talks over a regional peace framework have put new pressure on major Muslim-majority nations to take more active roles in regional security and diplomacy.

    For Saudi Arabia, the pact addresses growing anxieties over its vulnerability to regional threats as it pursues its ambitious Vision 2030 economic transformation agenda. Recent disruptions to Red Sea shipping and heightened risks of closure to the Strait of Hormuz, through which a quarter of global oil trade passes, have underscored how quickly regional conflict can derail Saudi economic goals by disrupting energy exports, scaring off foreign investment, and disrupting core trade routes. Riyadh thus needs strategic partners that can supplement its own defense capabilities with manpower, intelligence, advanced technology, and geographic depth.

    Pakistan brings a long-standing defense partnership and a large, battle-tested military establishment to the alliance, while Turkey answers Saudi Arabia’s need for a second, ideologically aligned partner with expanding regional influence. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara has actively pursued a policy of expanding its strategic footprint far beyond its Anatolian heartland, positioning itself as a leading power across the entire Muslim world. Turkey has deepened political, military, and industrial ties across the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia, driven by Erdoğan’s goal of elevating Turkey to a top-tier global power. Its active military involvement in Syria, long-running confrontation with Kurdish militant groups, and expanding partnerships across the Muslim world confirm its broad extra-regional ambitions.

    ### Pakistan’s Dual Calculus: Benefits and Hidden Risks
    For Pakistan, the pact offers immediate tangible benefits at a time of deep economic and political uncertainty. Islamabad has long been dependent on external financial assistance and bailout packages to stabilize its economy, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has failed to resolve the country’s deep structural economic weaknesses. Beijing has also grown more cautious about extending new large-scale financing to Islamabad and has pushed for repayment of outstanding loans, while Pakistan has struggled to secure sufficient financial support from other global and regional partners.

    Under the new trilateral framework, Saudi Arabia is expected to provide much-needed financial aid, discounted energy supplies, and new foreign direct investment, while Turkey will offer access to advanced defense technology, military training, intelligence sharing, and defense industrial collaboration. Domestically, Pakistan’s military establishment can frame the agreement as proof that the country has regained its status as a strategically critical global player, strengthening Field Marshal Asim Munir’s domestic legitimacy and consolidating the military’s long-held political influence.

    However, the pact carries significant long-term risks for Pakistan that could undermine its national sovereignty and security. Unlike the earlier bilateral Saudi-Pakistan arrangement, which was built on Saudi financial support in exchange for Pakistani military capabilities, Turkey’s entry adds a broad new geopolitical and defense industrial dimension to the alliance. Turkey already has a deep defense partnership with Pakistan: the two countries cooperate on drone development, naval platform manufacturing, and joint defense projects, and their partnership expanded dramatically during the 2025 India-Pakistan border confrontation, when Ankara provided open political support to Islamabad and Turkish defense systems and advisors reportedly played a role in Pakistani military operations.

    The new trilateral framework will accelerate this cooperation, giving Pakistan greater access to Turkish defense technology, including participation in Ankara’s cutting-edge KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet program. But for Turkey, this partnership is more than a commercial defense arrangement: it is a core component of Ankara’s “Asia Anew Initiative,” which seeks to expand Turkish geopolitical influence across South and Southeast Asia. Recent high-level military visits from Bangladesh and Pakistan to Ankara confirm this expanding strategic push, which includes a growing Turkish maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.

    The greatest long-term risk for Pakistan is what analysts term “strategic entrapment.” If the pact’s collective defense commitments require Pakistani military deployments beyond Saudi territory, Islamabad could find itself drawn into conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and other regional hotspots that serve no core Pakistani national interest. Pakistan already stretched its military resources during the 2026 Iran conflict, when it deployed approximately 8,000 troops, a full fighter jet squadron, and advanced air defense systems to Saudi Arabia under its 2025 bilateral pact.

    Most critically, closer alignment with Saudi Arabia and Turkey threatens to severely damage Pakistan’s historically delicate relationship with Iran. Pakistan shares a 900-kilometer porous border with Iran, and Tehran has already issued sharp criticism of the new trilateral pact, warning that it will not deliver greater security to Saudi Arabia. If Iran views Pakistan as an active participant in Saudi and Turkish efforts to counter Iranian regional interests, Islamabad could face rising diplomatic pressure and increased militant activity along its western border, particularly in Balochistan, where the Pakistani military is already fighting a long-running separatist insurgency and countering militant violence.

    Pakistan currently finds itself balancing multiple competing strategic demands: securing Saudi financial support, deepening defense ties with Turkey, maintaining its all-weather alliance with China, managing its complex relationship with the United States, and avoiding open confrontation with Iran, all while positioning itself as a neutral mediator in the ongoing Iran crisis. This balancing act is growing increasingly unsustainable, and once Pakistan commits military and logistical resources to Saudi and Turkish security goals, withdrawing from those commitments will become progressively more difficult.

    ### New Strategic Challenges for India
    The Makkah Pact creates a new set of complex security challenges for India, which cannot afford to dismiss the trilateral alliance as a purely Middle Eastern development. For New Delhi, the core concern is not just that Pakistan will receive additional military support from Saudi Arabia and Turkey: it is that Pakistan will act as a gateway for Turkey to expand its strategic footprint into South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

    At the same time, Indian policymakers need not view Saudi Arabia’s participation in the pact as a sign that Riyadh intends to abandon its deepening strategic and economic ties with New Delhi. Saudi Arabia holds massive economic, energy, and investment interests in India, and its primary motivation for joining the trilateral pact is to counter Iranian-aligned threats closer to home, not to undermine Indian security interests.

    The real risk for India lies in the combined capabilities the three allies bring to the table: Saudi Arabia’s financial resources can bolster Pakistan’s military capacity, Pakistan provides geographic access, manpower, and military infrastructure across South Asia, and Turkey contributes advanced defense technology, training, and intelligence coordination. This creates a far more capable military ecosystem in Pakistan than the earlier bilateral Saudi-Pakistan arrangement.

    Turkey’s long-standing open support for Pakistan on Kashmir and its expanding maritime and defense presence in the Indian Ocean mean that New Delhi cannot treat the Turkey-Pakistan partnership as a purely bilateral matter. Shared ideological alignment on political Islam also creates opportunities for greater cross-regional strategic coordination that could run counter to Indian interests.

    To protect its national security, India will need to closely monitor the implementation of the pact, particularly with regard to practical cooperation on intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, defense industrial collaboration, technology transfer, and cross-regional military deployments. New Delhi should also deepen strategic engagement with other nations that share concerns over expanding Turkish influence, strengthen its own defense, maritime, and intelligence capabilities, and deepen security and economic cooperation with other Gulf Cooperation Council members.

    Notably, India should not abandon its own expanding strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has repeatedly signaled that it values its ties with New Delhi, and New Delhi can work to make clear that the trilateral defense pact need not derail bilateral cooperation between India and Saudi Arabia. India’s goal should not be to force Saudi Arabia to choose between India and Pakistan, but rather to make Riyadh aware of the potential risks of enabling the buildup of Pakistani military capabilities that could eventually be used against Indian interests.

    As regional geopolitical alignments grow increasingly complex, Pakistan has gambled that the pact will restore its strategic relevance in the Middle East and South Asia. But by entering this trilateral alliance, Islamabad has stepped into a far larger geopolitical game whose long-term consequences it may ultimately be unable to control.

  • The political black hole over the Strait of Hormuz

    The political black hole over the Strait of Hormuz

    Uncertainty over the status of Iran’s supreme leader and deepening internal power rifts have pushed the country to the brink of state failure, sending ripple effects of instability that reach all the way to China’s doorstep and leaving Beijing facing a tricky diplomatic dilemma. At the center of current regional tensions is a newly emerging Iran-Oman agreement that regime-affiliated media in Iran claims will formalize Tehran’s continued control over the Strait of Hormuz, the critical chokepoint through which roughly a fifth of global oil supplies pass daily. From Washington’s perspective, any international recognition of Iran’s full control over the strait would deliver a major blow to U.S. and global commercial interests, granting Tehran a powerful strategic tool to blackmail the international community during future political disputes by threatening to block traffic through the waterway.

    With U.S. midterm elections approaching and high-stakes multilateral negotiations underway with Beijing across a range of issues, the Biden administration is strongly motivated to block international recognition of Iran’s claim, a move that carries major stakes for U.S. global influence. But behind what appears to be a political win for Tehran lies a far more concerning, underreported transformation inside Iran’s ruling regime that points to accelerating fragmentation of central power and looming systemic chaos.

    On August 5, China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency published remarks from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who openly acknowledged that communication with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has become extremely difficult in recent weeks. Analysts say this unusual public comment, amplified by a major Chinese state media outlet, may be a quiet signal that Beijing itself is struggling to establish reliable lines of communication with Tehran’s top decision-makers, raising questions about who actually holds power in the country. Iranian media reports have further fueled these doubts, claiming Pezeshkian was only granted a brief meeting with a figure presented as Khamenei, held in a dark, tinted-window vehicle at a secret location outside the capital.

    It remains unclear whether Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Iran’s late long-time supreme leader Ali Khamenei, even exercises full control over his own circumstances, let alone the affairs of the entire country. These disclosures from Iran’s own elected president confirm long-running rumors of bitter, intractable splits at the highest levels of Iran’s leadership. The most radical factions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are widely believed to have seized de facto ultimate power, using Mojtaba as a largely powerless figurehead to legitimize their rule. This arrangement has isolated both Mojtaba and the hardline IRGC leadership, creating a cascade of disruptive internal power dynamics that threaten to unravel central governance.

    To compound this instability, Iran’s military command structures were deliberately decentralized and devolved to local regional units years ago to pre-empt the risk of U.S. decapitation strikes on top leadership, and there is little sign these structures can be re-centralized any time soon to restore clear top-down command. Unconfirmed but persistent rumors also suggest Israeli intelligence has cultivated close contacts with senior Iranian officials who are prepared to launch a coup against the current hardline regime, fueling a culture of pervasive paranoia and mutual suspicion across all levels of government. Under this climate, any official, for any reason, can be targeted and purged on accusations of treason, making it nearly impossible to build consensus or implement consistent policy.

    The result is a broken decision-making system: any proposed compromise with external powers can be immediately vetoed by radical factions that dismiss any deal as a “traitor’s surrender,” while the official supreme leader remains a distant, opaque figure controlled by unelected hardline factions behind the scenes. Despite this political chaos, Iran still retains active production capacity for missiles and drones, as well as large stockpiles of these weapons, creating a dangerous scenario: a fractured state with plentiful tools to project destabilizing force across the region.

    This portrait adds up to a country mired in deep institutional disarray, on the edge of full state failure. Yet history shows that failing states can survive for years while remaining a major threat to regional security, as seen in Myanmar, where years of brutal civil conflict have failed to unseat the ruling military junta. A collapsed, failing Iran would expand a broad arc of instability stretching from Central Asia all the way to the Mediterranean coast. The U.S. has thus far avoided being drawn into the messy Iranian quagmire, but even if Tehran retains de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz, the country’s political fragmentation poses unique new risks to regional security and global oil markets.

    One potential path to de-escalation that has been floated by geopolitical analysts involves offering security guarantees to Mojtaba Khamenei and other top Iranian leaders in exchange for Tehran rolling back its claims to full control over the strait. On a more positive note, Iran’s growing internal instability has paradoxically helped unify regional states that were once deeply divided over how to address Tehran’s expansionist threats. Middle Eastern nations are now converging on coordinated strategies to limit Tehran’s harmful regional influence, building new medium- and long-term pressure campaigns to constrain the regime. This has also accelerated regional plans to build oil and gas export pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely, a shift that will ultimately restrict Iranian trade and further isolate the country’s hardline religious leadership.

    For China, the current situation creates a tricky diplomatic balancing act. While Beijing would likely welcome any setback to U.S. interests in the region, its demonstrated inability to intervene and mediate the dispute for Gulf allies has left China sidelined from evolving regional political dynamics, which are increasingly dominated by the U.S. and Israel. Finding common ground with Washington and Jerusalem to address the Iranian crisis would be a major challenge for Beijing, in large part because it is not clear what strategic benefits Beijing would gain from such collaboration. However, the emergence of a large, unstable political black hole along China’s western border will almost certainly create new security and economic risks for Beijing in the near term. The Iranian meltdown is unfolding at the same time that Russia faces ongoing military setbacks and struggles to hold its position in Ukraine, meaning China could soon find itself bordered by multiple zones of active instability – a outcome that Beijing has long sought to prevent.

  • Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s rocky relations: A brief history

    Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s rocky relations: A brief history

    In a moment laden with religious and geopolitical symbolism, the leaders of three major Muslim nations gathered this week in Islam’s holiest city of Mecca to perform Friday prayers together, capping years of gradual reconciliation and marking a new chapter in regional security cooperation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif joined the collective worship at the site, a public display of unity that follows years of strained ties between Ankara and Riyadh.

    The symbolic prayer service comes on the heels of a landmark breakthrough: the signing of a historic trilateral joint defense agreement between the three countries, which for the first time places the three regional powers under a unified security framework. While Pakistan has long maintained warm, stable diplomatic and economic ties with both Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the relationship between Ankara and Riyadh has been defined by centuries of rivalry and decades of alternating détente and open rupture.

    To understand the gravity of this week’s developments, it is necessary to trace the long, fraught history of relations between the two nations. Tensions over claims to leadership of the global Sunni Muslim community date back to the founding of both modern states in the early 20th century, with roots stretching even further to the 19th-century Ottoman-Saudi war, when Ottoman forces crushed an early Saudi expansion across the Arabian Peninsula. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed after World War I, the House of Saud defeated local rivals to seize control of Mecca and Medina in 1925, ending more than 350 years of continuous Ottoman rule over Islam’s two holiest sites. Formal diplomatic relations between the newly established Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Republic of Turkey were not established until the 1930s, and the two sides maintained generally cordial ties for decades after: both backed Iraq during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War (with Saudi support far more public) and aligned with the United States during the 1991 Gulf War.

    Even during this period of calm, however, low-level frictions persisted. Turkey repeatedly criticized Saudi Arabia for demolishing historic Ottoman-era sites across the kingdom, including fortresses, cemeteries, and 19th-century railway infrastructure. The most high-profile dispute came in 2002, when Turkey’s culture ministry condemned the demolition of the 220-year-old Al-Ajyad Fortress, which overlooked Mecca’s Grand Mosque. Turkey’s then-parliament speaker called the destruction “sinful behaviour in breach of the moral values of Islam”, but Saudi Arabia defended the move as a exercise of its sovereign right to redevelop the site to accommodate growing numbers of religious pilgrims. The site was later redeveloped to house the Mecca Clock Tower, one of the tallest structures in the world.

    This era of cordiality, interrupted only by minor disputes, collapsed into deep strategic disagreement after the 2010 Arab Spring. While both Riyadh and Ankara backed efforts to oust longtime Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, their approaches to regional uprisings diverged sharply across the Middle East. In Egypt, Turkey openly supported the first democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi and fiercely condemned the 2013 military coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a close ally of Saudi Arabia. For years after the coup, Ankara hosted Egyptian opposition media outlets and dissident groups, and Erdoğan refused to recognize Sisi’s government, calling for the release of tens of thousands of political prisoners.

    Strategic rifts widened across the region in subsequent years. During the 2017 Saudi-led blockade of Qatar, which accused Doha of supporting terrorism and meddling in regional affairs, Ankara sided openly with Qatar and deployed military forces to the Gulf state. In post-revolution Libya, where power fractured into rival factions after 2011, Turkey backed the internationally recognized government in Tripoli, while Riyadh threw its support behind eastern-based warlord Khalifa Haftar. Tensions boiled over into open hostility in early 2018, when Mohammed bin Salman labeled Turkey part of a “triangle of evil” alongside Iran and extremist religious groups.

    Relations hit their modern lowest point later that year, following the killing of veteran Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a former contributor to Middle East Eye, who was murdered by Saudi operatives inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. Turkish prosecutors indicted 20 Saudi citizens over the killing, building a case based on phone records, entry and exit logs, witness testimony, and analysis of Khashoggi’s personal devices. Erdoğan publicly stated the killing had been ordered at the “highest levels” of the Saudi government. In the years that followed, Riyadh imposed an unofficial boycott on Turkish goods that saw Turkish exports to Saudi Arabia plummet 92% year-on-year in 2021, after systematically pressuring local businesses to drop Turkish products from store shelves. Both sides also blocked each other’s state media outlets.

    After more than four years of open rupture, Ankara and Riyadh formally ended their dispute in 2022, as part of a broader wave of regional rapprochement led by Saudi Arabia. That June, Mohammed bin Salman traveled to Ankara for his first visit since Khashoggi’s killing, meeting Erdoğan at the presidential palace and agreeing to deepen cooperation across trade, defense, energy, and tourism. A key concession from Turkey that cleared the way for reconciliation was the transfer of the Khashoggi murder trial to Saudi courts, meeting a core Saudi demand for restoring ties.

    The reconciliation between Ankara and Riyadh fits into a broader regional shift: Saudi Arabia has moved to end disputes across the Middle East in recent years, including ending its three-and-a-half-year rift with Qatar, launching peace talks with the Houthi movement in Yemen, and restoring full diplomatic relations with Iran in a 2023 deal brokered by China. For Turkey, mending ties with oil-rich Gulf states was also an economic priority, as Ankara grappled with a collapsing national currency and widespread economic instability. Since the 2022 reconciliation, the two sides have signed a series of major deals on technology, defense, and renewable energy, highlighted by a 2023 Saudi agreement to purchase Turkish drones in what remains the largest defense contract in Turkey’s history.

    In recent months, growing strategic alignment on regional issues has pushed the two countries even closer. In Syria, both now back the new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa and have joined forces to lobby the United States to lift crippling sanctions on Damascus. In Libya, once a point of sharp division, both now back the internationally recognized unity government. In war-torn Sudan, both Riyadh and Ankara support the Sudanese Armed Forces led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, while the UAE backs the rival Rapid Support Forces. In Somalia, too, Ankara and Riyadh stand together in supporting the internationally recognized central government, while the UAE backs Somaliland’s bid for independence. Notably, a growing public rift has emerged between Saudi Arabia and its one-time closest Gulf ally the UAE, with Turkey increasingly aligned with Riyadh on these issues, even as Ankara avoids taking an open public stance to protect its own substantial financial ties with Abu Dhabi.

    This week’s joint prayer service and historic defense pact cement the completion of a years-long reconciliation process, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and creating a new trilateral security bloc connecting South Asia, the Anatolian Peninsula, and the Arabian Gulf.

  • Turkey says defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not aimed at Iran or any other country

    Turkey says defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not aimed at Iran or any other country

    ANKARA, Turkey – In a public clarification Saturday, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has pushed back against speculation that a newly signed trilateral defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey is crafted to target Iran or any other regional nation, framing the pact as a foundational step for strengthening collective security across the Middle East and South Asia.

    The landmark “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” was formally signed Friday by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif during a gathering in Islam’s holiest city, Mecca. Its core mutual defense clause mirrors NATO’s long-standing Article 5 framework, stipulating that any armed aggression against one signatory will be treated as an attack on all three nations.

    The agreement brings together three major regional players with complementary strategic strengths: energy-rich Saudi Arabia, Pakistan—a recognized nuclear weapons state, and Turkey, which boasts NATO’s second-largest standing military and one of the fastest-expanding defense industrial bases in the Eurasian region. The pact comes amid a period of heightened regional volatility, driven in part by escalating tensions linked to ongoing conflict across the broader Middle East.

    Speaking in an interview with Turkey’s state-owned Anadolu Agency, Fidan emphasized that the three signatory states have not pre-designated any country as a shared enemy. Hostile action against the alliance, he clarified, is the only threshold that would trigger the pact’s collective defense provisions.

    “We do not have any codified agreement, nothing we have signed, that identifies a specific common threat,” Fidan stated. “Any country that refrains from attacking us is not a target for our alliance.”

    Fidan further explained that the agreement’s mutual defense clause is operationally aligned with NATO’s Article 5, the cornerstone of the Western alliance’s collective defense posture that has been in place since the organization’s founding.

    When detailing how the alliance’s support mechanism would function in practice, Fidan noted that any affected member state must first submit a formal request for assistance. The nature of support provided by the other two nations would be scaled to match the severity of the threat, ranging from intelligence sharing and logistical backing to the full deployment of combat military forces.

    “These are multi-layered arrangements that adapt to the scale of any potential threat,” Fidan said. “This is the guiding framework we have established for our ongoing cooperation.”

    The foreign minister also revealed that multiple unnamed countries have already expressed interest in joining the new defense agreement. He specifically named Egypt as a “natural partner” for the alliance and stated that he expects Cairo to join the pact during its next expansion phase.

    To institutionalize ongoing cooperation, the agreement outlines regular coordination meetings between the three nations’ foreign ministers, defense ministers, and top military commanders. A permanent administrative secretariat for the alliance will also be established, with its headquarters set to be located in Saudi Arabia, Fidan confirmed.

  • Malaysia seizes container suspected of carrying goods bound for Israel

    Malaysia seizes container suspected of carrying goods bound for Israel

    In a move that underscores Malaysia’s long-held policy opposing trade that supports Israeli actions in Palestinian territories, Malaysian border authorities have seized a container at Johor’s Port of Tanjung Pelepas that was suspected of being ultimately bound for Israel, local media has confirmed.

    The seizure was carried out Friday by the Malaysian Border Control and Protection Agency (AKPS), launched after intelligence sharing prompted officials to order a targeted inspection of the container. According to AKPS’s official statement, quoted by local outlet Berita Harian, initial checks suggest the shipment violates Malaysia’s 2023 Customs (Prohibition on Export) Order, which bans all direct and indirect exports of any goods to Israel, specifically falling afoul of Item No 15 in the order’s Second Schedule.

    AKPS officials confirmed the agency is now conducting a full investigation into the cargo, to clarify the goods’ nature, technical specifications, intended end use and official classification. A key line of inquiry is whether the shipment includes strategic goods that fall under regulation by Malaysia’s Strategic Trade Act. The agency emphasized that any attempt to move goods to Israel, whether through direct or indirect channels in violation of national law and government regulations, will face strict enforcement action.

    Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim publicly praised the operation, framing the seizure as clear proof of the country’s commitment to preventing its territory from being used as a transit hub for trade that benefits Israel. In a public statement shared on the social platform X, Anwar congratulated AKPS for its rapid response to the intelligence and seizure of the suspected cargo.

    “This action demonstrates Malaysia’s firm stance to ensure that our country will never serve as a conduit for trade that could support or contribute to the Israeli regime’s atrocities against the Palestinian people,” Anwar said, adding that the operation aligns with both Malaysia’s commitments as a member of The Hague Group and the trade restrictions the government implemented in December 2023.

    The Hague Group, the international coalition Malaysia helped found, issued its own statement welcoming the seizure, noting the action gives practical, on-the-ground effect to the obligations all United Nations member states hold under international law. The group referenced the International Court of Justice’s July 2024 Advisory Opinion, which was later affirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/24, that confirms all states have a legal obligation to not provide aid or assistance that supports Israel’s unlawful occupation of Palestinian territory.

    Varsha Gandikota-Nellutla, Executive Secretary of The Hague Group, highlighted the significance of enforcement at ports rather than just rhetorical commitments. “The defence of humanity is won at ports, courts, and factories, not from the podium. Law that goes unenforced is no law at all. By halting this cargo, Malaysia has upheld the obligations that bind every UN member state under international law. We invite all states to join The Hague Group and do the same,” she said.

    As a founding member of The Hague Group, Malaysia is part of a coalition of nations that have pledged to block transfers of arms, ammunition, military fuel, related military hardware and dual-use items to Israel when there is clear risk these materials could be used to violate international law. The group’s founding founding declaration also requires members to bar vessels transporting restricted Israeli-bound materials from docking at member state ports.

    Friday’s seizure is not an isolated policy move, but follows broader restrictions Malaysia implemented in December 2023, when the government banned Israeli-owned shipping firm Zim from docking at Malaysian ports and barred all Israeli-flagged vessels from entering the country’s territorial waters. At that time, Anwar also announced that any vessel with a final destination of Israel would not be permitted to load cargo at Malaysian ports. The government framed those initial restrictions as a targeted response to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza and a reflection of Malaysia’s longstanding public support for Palestinian sovereignty and human rights.

    What makes this latest seizure notable is that it expands Malaysia’s enforcement beyond just Israeli-owned or flagged vessels, now actively targeting any cargo transiting through Malaysian ports that is suspected of being ultimately destined for Israel, even if it is not carried on an explicitly Israeli-connected vessel.

  • What Pakistan’s defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey means for the Middle East

    What Pakistan’s defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey means for the Middle East

    A historic new collective defence agreement signed last Friday in Mecca is dramatically reshaping the strategic landscape of the broader Middle East, uniting three of the Muslim world’s most powerful and influential nations under a mutual security framework that echoes Nato’s core collective defence principle. Dubbed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, the landmark pact includes a binding clause stating that any armed aggression against one signatory will be considered an attack against all three – a provision that immediately elevates the agreement’s geopolitical weight, despite the joint statement leaving specific military commitments intentionally undefined.

    For Pakistan, the world’s only nuclear-armed Muslim-majority nation, the accord marks a sharp break from its longstanding policy of cautious neutrality as a regional diplomatic mediator. By aligning formally with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Islamabad is repositioning its well-trained, combat-proven armed forces as a potential security anchor for an emerging strategic axis stretching across South Asia and the Gulf Cooperation Council region.

    This new pact reflects a far broader shift in regional power dynamics. As the decades-old regional security order anchored by the United States faces mounting strain from ongoing wars, shifting alliances and escalating tensions, major Middle Eastern powers are increasingly moving to take control of their own security futures, with Pakistan’s unique combination of nuclear deterrence and conventional military strength offering a new regional stability pillar.

    The agreement emerges at a moment of unprecedented upheaval for the Middle East’s traditional security architecture. The ongoing US-Israeli confrontation with Iran has remade the regional strategic map, with direct strikes reaching Saudi territory and critical commercial shipping lanes – including the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea – suffering widespread, costly disruptions. A senior anonymous Pakistani security official with expertise in regional affairs explained to Middle East Eye that all three signatory nations share overlapping economic and security priorities focused on stopping further regional escalation, a common interest that directly drove the decision to formalize the pact. Disruptions to Hormuz shipping have already hit Saudi energy and fertilizer exports, sending ripples through global markets, while import-reliant economies like Pakistan and Turkey have faced particularly severe economic fallout from these disruptions.

    The strategic calculations behind the agreement run even deeper. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have suffered attacks tied to the broader regional conflict, while Pakistan and Turkey both face growing concerns over cross-border instability spilling over from their extensive shared borders with Iran. For Ankara, an additional risk looms: external backing for Iranian Kurdish militias threatens to unravel the years-long fragile peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The wider regional conflict has also emboldened Iran and its Houthi allies in Yemen, who have stepped up direct attacks on Saudi territory.

    For Gulf leadership, the repeated failure of long-standing US security guarantees to deter these attacks has sparked growing doubts over Washington’s reliability as a security partner. The result has been a clear, decisive push by major regional powers to build new defence arrangements that reduce reliance on external security commitments. Former Pakistani ambassador Asif Durrani framed the pact as the “first concrete building block of an emerging regional security architecture”, noting that it signals a clear shift toward greater regional control over security affairs. On X, Durrani added that if this cooperative momentum holds, it could open the door to resolving decades-long conflicts – including the intractable Israeli-Palestinian issue – through a process led and driven by regional actors themselves.

    Regional analysts emphasize the pact is not an out-of-the-blue development, but rather the natural culmination of years of deepening trilateral cooperation between the three nations. Michael Kugelman, senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council, called the agreement “a logical outgrowth of deepening security ties” between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey that has accelerated over recent months. The new pact builds on pre-existing bilateral foundations: Riyadh and Islamabad signed a separate bilateral mutual defence agreement in late 2025, which saw roughly 8,000 Pakistani troops, fighter aircraft and advanced air defence systems deployed to the kingdom, while Turkey has long been a leading defence equipment supplier for both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Interestingly, Kugelman notes the pact is likely to be well-received in Washington, which has long pushed for greater security burden-sharing among its key regional allies, given the agreement’s core focus on collective deterrence focused on Iran.

    For Pakistan, however, the pact is about far more than just geopolitics – it is deeply tied to the country’s ongoing economic vulnerabilities, analysts point out. Islamabad spent months positioning itself as a neutral diplomatic bridge between Washington and Tehran, and even helped broker the June Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding to temporarily pause regional hostilities. But subsequent waves of escalation have squeezed the space for Pakistan’s neutral stance. For Pakistan’s ruling government, which is grappling with persistent high inflation and severe fiscal instability, strategic defence policy is now increasingly intertwined with pressing economic needs.

    Historically, Pakistan has leveraged its military strength to secure critical economic support, most notably from the United States and Saudi Arabia. This new collective defence framework formalizes that model, allowing Islamabad to monetize its decades of operational military expertise – from joint training exercises and troop deployments to arms exports – in exchange for much-needed Gulf investment, discounted energy access and diplomatic support. For Riyadh, the partnership grants access to a large, experienced military with decades of counterinsurgency and combat experience, while for Islamabad, closer security ties open the door to transformative investment, financial assistance and deeper economic integration with one of the region’s wealthiest and most powerful states. “In this sense, Pakistan’s military strength is becoming an economic asset as well as a strategic one,” the anonymous Pakistani security official told Middle East Eye.

    The emerging trilateral partnership brings together three complementary forms of national power, as political analyst Sheharyar Khan, senior adviser at Pakistan’s Ministry of Law and Justice, explained. Khan framed the dynamic as a division of complementary strengths: Saudi Arabia contributes the financial capital, Turkey brings cutting-edge defence technological innovation, and Pakistan provides core military capability. “Together, the three countries could form a security partnership whose capabilities extend far beyond traditional troop deployment,” Khan noted. Each nation brings unique, complementary assets to the table: Saudi Arabia, home to Islam’s holiest sites, offers vast capital reserves, outsized influence over global energy markets and significant regional diplomatic clout; Turkey, which commands Nato’s second-largest standing military, boasts a rapidly advancing, increasingly self-sufficient domestic defence industry with world-leading expertise in unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare and precision-guided munitions that reduces reliance on foreign suppliers; and Pakistan contributes a large, combat-hardened ground force and the Muslim world’s only operational nuclear deterrent.

    Despite these potential benefits, experts warn the agreement carries significant strategic risks for Pakistan. Iran’s response to the pact was swift and sharply critical. Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of Iran’s parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, dismissed the arrangement in a post on X, writing “The Saudis should know that a paper agreement with Turkey and Pakistan does not bring them security, just as years of unilateral milking of the Americans did not bring them security.” This reaction underscores Islamabad’s core strategic dilemma: deepening integration into Gulf security architecture risks damaging its delicate, long-cautious relationship with Tehran.

    Analysts also warn of the risk of “entrapment” – the very real danger that Pakistan could be pulled into foreign conflicts that do not align with its own national interests. Historically, Pakistan has intentionally avoided direct entanglement in Middle Eastern power rivalries: in 2015, the country’s parliament famously rejected a request to join the Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen over domestic political and sectarian concerns. Pakistan is also home to a large Shia minority, many of whom look to Iranian clergy for political and religious guidance, meaning the government must avoid having its closer alignment with Riyadh and Ankara perceived as an anti-Iranian stance that could reignite internal sectarian tensions.

    The agreement has already sparked widespread debate over whether it could eventually expand into a broader multi-national security bloc encompassing additional Muslim-majority nations across the globe. Retired senior Pakistani military official Muhammad Saeed has suggested that additional Muslim countries from the Middle East and beyond could eventually join the framework. But Saeed also cautioned that military strength alone will not determine the pact’s long-term success. “For Muslim states, the real and collective strength will not come only through military capabilities but primarily through long-term investments and collaboration in knowledge, innovation, discipline, character, and tolerant interpretation of sectarian sentiment,” he wrote on X.

    The prospect of a more cohesive Muslim-majority security bloc has already drawn sharp attention from Israel. In February, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett explicitly warned against Turkey forming what he described as a “hostile axis” leveraging Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities “to surround Israel”. Analysts note, however, that Pakistan’s nuclear status inevitably reshapes the strategic calculations surrounding the entire pact. For Saudi Arabia, closer defence ties with Islamabad add an extra layer of deterrence at a time when the kingdom faces persistent threats from Iran while navigating its fragile normalization process with Israel.

    The pact’s implications stretch far beyond the Middle East. For Pakistan, closer alignment with Saudi Arabia and Turkey creates a new strategic counterweight to neighboring India. While Saudi Arabia maintains extensive economic and trade ties with New Delhi, the new collective defence framework further solidifies Pakistan’s role as a core security partner for key Gulf powers. Though India’s Ministry of External Affairs has responded cautiously, saying only that New Delhi is “closely following developments”, Indian national security analysts are monitoring the shift with growing concern. “While most are obviously seeing this from a Middle East lens, it impacts other theatres as well. Pakistan’s conflict-laden relationship with India [is] at the top of that list,” Kabir Taneja, executive director of the Middle East programme at New Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation, wrote on X. Former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal went further, calling the pact “a very negative development for Indian interests” in an X post, and suggesting India should expand its own strategic partnerships with the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Afghanistan to counter the shift.

  • ‘Used as human bait’: Leaked image shows elderly Palestinian men before execution by Israeli forces

    ‘Used as human bait’: Leaked image shows elderly Palestinian men before execution by Israeli forces

    A newly leaked photograph has reignited international scrutiny of Israeli military conduct in northern Gaza, offering fresh visual evidence of alleged human rights abuses against Palestinian civilians. The image, published by Palestinian journalist Younis Tirawi on the social platform X, depicts two blindfolded elderly Palestinian men from Beit Lahia, identified as Nadi Marouf and Ali Marouf, standing among Israeli military personnel. Tirawi confirms the photo was captured just hours before the pair were killed by Israeli forces in November 2024.

    According to Tirawi’s previous reporting from October 2025, troops from the 92nd Battalion of Israel’s Kfir Brigade abducted the two elderly men from their hometown, holding them as human shields for multiple days before executing them. This account aligns with an earlier October 2025 report from *The Palestine Chronicle*, which detailed that the men were detained, stripped to their underwear, and shot after being released near al-Tawam roundabout. The report added that the pair were forced to enter buildings ahead of Israeli soldiers, a practice that independent investigations have repeatedly documented across Gaza. Ramy Abdu, chairman of the Geneva-based Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, confirmed that relatives found the men’s bodies three days after their killing, confirming they were executed following their use as human shields.

    This leaked photograph is the latest addition to a growing body of testimonies and visual evidence documenting the systematic use of Palestinian civilians as human shields during Israeli military operations in Gaza. Multiple independent probes have already confirmed the widespread nature of this practice: an Associated Press investigation published in 2025 gathered testimony from both Palestinian civilians and Israeli soldiers confirming the tactic was common, with Palestinians forced to enter potentially booby-trapped buildings and tunnels ahead of Israeli troops to clear for explosives or fighters. Al Jazeera later corroborated these findings, interviews with seven Palestinians and two Israeli military officers who described the routine use of this tactic. A United Nations investigation has previously ruled that forcing civilians to enter structures ahead of soldiers constitutes the use of human shields, a clear violation of international humanitarian law. In May 2025, the Israeli military acknowledged that the practice is “strictly prohibited” under its standing orders and announced it had opened investigations into multiple reported cases.

    Alongside these latest allegations of extrajudicial killing and human shielding, reports continue to emerge of abusive conditions for Palestinian detainees held by Israel. On June 21, 71-year-old Dr. Mazen Rantisi — a prominent Palestinian physician widely known as the “doctor of the poor” and chairman of the Health Work Committees, a leading Palestinian medical services organization — was arrested during a pre-dawn Israeli raid on his Ramallah home. In statements relayed through his lawyer, Rantisi confirmed that prison authorities at Ofer Prison withheld his essential daily medication for the first 10 days of his detention, and continue to deny him access to one critical drug. He also reported repeated cell raids by prison security that have included beatings of detainees, and that he has suffered rapid weight loss due to inadequate, unfit food rations consisting of mouldy bread, near-rotten tomatoes, uncooked hummus and foul-smelling rice. Belgian human rights organization Viva Salud has issued a statement expressing grave concern over the health and access to care for Rantisi and a second Health Work Committees official arrested alongside him.

    These developments unfold against the backdrop of a rapidly worsening humanitarian catastrophe across the Gaza Strip. Gaza’s Ministry of Health has confirmed that more than 73,000 Palestinians have been killed since the outbreak of war in October 2023, a figure that is widely understood to be an undercount: thousands of bodies remain trapped beneath the rubble of thousands of destroyed buildings, making a full accounting of casualties impossible. On August 4, Gaza held a mass funeral for 112 people killed in an Israeli air strike in 2023, whose remains were only recovered in recent excavation efforts. Gaza authorities estimate thousands more people remain buried under collapsed infrastructure.

    The crisis of food insecurity and malnutrition has reached catastrophic levels, according to United Nations data. The UN has already recorded 193 deaths from malnutrition in Gaza, 96 of which are children. In July 2025 alone, screening found 11,877 children between the ages of six and 59 months suffering from acute malnutrition, including 2,562 cases of severe acute malnutrition, the most life-threatening form of the condition. Projections cited by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimate that by October 2026, more than 100,000 children in the same age group will suffer from acute malnutrition, with over 31,000 facing severe, life-threatening cases. UN humanitarian agencies have repeatedly warned that critical levels of food insecurity and malnutrition will persist as long as severe restrictions on the entry of food, medicine and other essential supplies remain in place.

    The growing accumulation of allegations of abuse against Palestinian civilians, detainees and the dead has intensified global scrutiny of Israel’s military conduct in Gaza, as humanitarian organizations continue to document crippling restrictions on access to life-saving aid.

  • Typhoon Dolphin batters Japan’s Okinawa before bearing down on China

    Typhoon Dolphin batters Japan’s Okinawa before bearing down on China

    One of the most intense tropical cyclones of the 2026 Pacific typhoon season, Typhoon Dolphin, has swept through Japan’s southwestern island chain, leaving widespread disruption and minor injuries in its wake before turning toward China’s eastern seaboard, where emergency authorities have activated full preemptive safety measures.

    The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) has classified Dolphin as a “very strong” typhoon, recording maximum sustained wind speeds of 162 kilometers per hour (101 miles per hour) when the storm made its closest approach to Okinawa prefecture on Saturday. The hardest-hit regions across Japan are the remote southern islands of Amami Oshima and the main Okinawa archipelago, which bore the full brunt of the storm’s high winds and dangerous storm surge.

    As of the latest official updates from the Okinawa prefectural government, approximately 44,000 residential and commercial buildings across the affected islands have been left without electrical power, and five elderly residents have sustained non-fatal injuries from the storm. Three of the five injuries occurred when victims were knocked off their feet by powerful gusts, authorities confirmed. Local reporting from Japan’s public broadcaster NHK documents extensive storm damage across the region: countless mature trees have been uprooted across Nago City in northern Okinawa, and one passenger vehicle was found flipped onto its roof in a public parking lot, leaking motor oil onto the pavement.

    Days before the storm’s arrival, regional transportation networks already began shutting down to avoid risk. Naha International Airport, Okinawa’s primary international and domestic air hub, suspended all operations and closed its runways on Friday, leading to the full cancellation of all incoming and outgoing flights for the duration of the storm’s passage.

    JMA issued urgent public warnings throughout the event, cautioning residents to stay away from coastal areas due to extreme risks of life-threatening high waves, coastal flooding from storm surge, and dangerous embedded lightning strikes across the affected region.

    After moving past Japan’s southwestern islands, Dolphin is projected to continue on its northwest track and make landfall along China’s eastern Zhejiang province coast sometime between late Sunday and early Monday local time. Chinese emergency management officials have moved quickly to prepare for the storm’s arrival, upgrading the provincial coastal typhoon alert to the highest possible level and halting all port operations, ferry services, and in-person schooling across at-risk coastal districts.

    In line with this precautionary shutdown, Zhejiang’s Ningbo Lishe International Airport announced it would suspend all flight operations starting at 23:30 local time Saturday (15:30 GMT), with all air traffic canceled for the full day of Sunday.

    This year’s Pacific typhoon activity has been shaped by a strong El Niño event, which climate researchers note creates more favorable ocean conditions for the development of unusually intense tropical cyclones. The western Pacific typhoon season typically runs from May through October, when warm sea surface temperatures fuel storm formation. On average, the JMA records 25 tropical cyclones that reach tropical storm strength in the region each year, with approximately three of those systems making landfall in Japan, a small number of which typically reach “very strong” typhoon classification matching Dolphin’s intensity.

    For context, the term “typhoon” is the regional classification for mature tropical cyclones that form in the northwestern Pacific Ocean, while equivalent storms in the Atlantic and eastern Pacific oceans are referred to as hurricanes.

  • Australia survives red card and Japan rally for a 35-32 win in Les Kiss debut

    Australia survives red card and Japan rally for a 35-32 win in Les Kiss debut

    In a gripping, physically demanding test match in Osaka on Saturday, Australia’s national rugby union team, the Wallabies, secured a nail-biting 35-32 victory over Japan, delivering a winning start for newly appointed head coach Les Kiss. The result was far from straightforward, however: Australia was reduced to 14 players before halftime after lock Miles Amatosero received a red card, forcing the side to fight through extra pressure, sweltering conditions and a late Japanese fightback to claim the win.

    Kiss stepped into the Wallabies’ top coaching role last month, taking over from Joe Schmidt after a mixed opening phase of the Nations Championship, where Australia finished with a 1-2 record – picking up a victory over Italy following back-to-back losses to Ireland and France. For the opening match of this two-test series against Japan, Kiss made several notable selection calls: he named just one uncapped player, center Isaac Henry, recalled experienced Queensland Reds forward Lukhan Salakaia-Loto, and opted to leave veteran prop James Slipper out of the matchday squad.

    Throughout the 80 minutes, temperatures at the Osaka venue hovered near 30 degrees Celsius (86 Fahrenheit), adding an extra layer of fatigue for both sides. The game’s turning point came in the 32nd minute, when Amatosero was penalized for a dangerous cleanout on Japan captain Warner Dearns. Referees initially issued a yellow card, but upgraded the sanction to a red following a bunker review just before halftime, with the two sides locked at 14-all at the break.

    Down a player for the entire second half, Australia still managed to stretch its lead early after the break, with tries from Max Jorgensen and Fraser McReight pushing the Wallabies’ advantage to nine points. But Japan fought back methodically, cutting the deficit with two well-taken penalties from fly-half Takuro Matsunaga.

    The difference in the final 20 minutes proved to be Australia’s depth off the bench, as the Wallabies’ replacements maintained intense pressure on the Japanese defense. With 10 minutes remaining, prop Taniela Tupou crashed over the try line to extend Australia’s lead back to 10 points, appearing to put the game out of reach.

    Japan, however, had one final push left. Dearns, the host nation’s captain who was on the receiving end of Amatosero’s controversial foul earlier in the match, crossed for a late try to cut the gap back to just three points. Despite the frantic final minutes, Australia held firm to defend its narrow lead and close out the win.

    Saturday’s match also pitted Kiss against Japan head coach Eddie Jones, a former Wallabies coach who is currently serving his second stint in charge of the Japanese national side. The two teams will meet again next weekend in the second test of the series.

  • Families retrieve bodies after a 14-year-old killed at least 7 in a shooting outside Bangkok

    Families retrieve bodies after a 14-year-old killed at least 7 in a shooting outside Bangkok

    BANGKOK — A day after a 14-year-old school student carried out one of the deadliest mass shootings in Thailand’s recent history, grieving relatives arrived Saturday to claim the bodies of their loved ones, as the country grapples with shocking new details of the violence and rising concerns over gun access. The attack unfolded in the early hours of Friday in Nonthaburi province, a residential area just northwest of Bangkok. Officials confirmed the teenager first fatally shot his two grandparents at the family home, where he lived, before traveling to Debsirin Nonthaburi School and opening fire just after 10 a.m. The gunman eventually died by suicide at the school, bringing the total death toll to seven. As of Saturday, Thailand’s Ministry of Health reported 16 wounded victims remained hospitalized, with seven in critical condition. Most of those injured in the attack are between 12 and 14 years old, matching the age range of the shooter’s peers at the school. By early Saturday afternoon, all eight bodies — five school employees, the 14-year-old attacker, and his two grandparents — had been released from Bangkok’s Institute of Forensic Medicine to families for funeral arrangements. Wiroon Supasingsiripreecha, head of the forensic institute, told reporters that nearly all fatally wounded victims suffered a single lethal gunshot wound to a vital area, such as the head or chest. The wound suffered by the 14-year-old shooter aligns with the weapon recovered at the scene, he added, with more comprehensive forensic analysis, including toxicology screenings, expected to be released in the coming days. Officials confirmed the weapon used in the attack, described as a small, compact firearm, was legally registered to the shooter’s grandfather, raising new questions about firearm storage and regulation in the country. While preliminary reports indicate the teenager had shown visible signs of stress linked to academic and school pressures, some family members told local Thai media they had no prior knowledge of any mental health struggles or behavioral issues he may have been experiencing. In the wake of the attack, school administrators announced all classes would be suspended from August 10 through August 14, with all staff instructed to work remotely during that period. On Saturday, the campus stood eerily quiet, with only a small contingent of police stationed at the main entrance. A small number of mourners trickled in throughout the day to lay flowers at the gate, while parents arrived to collect personal belongings left behind by their children when the shooting unfolded. Charin Siriananchai, a local resident who brought his 9-year-old and 6-year-old sons to pay respects, said the entire neighborhood was stunned by the violence. “Everyone was saddened and shocked, because it was unexpected that this would happen in Thailand, and also it’s quite a great loss,” he said. One father of a student who was on campus during the attack, who asked to remain anonymous, said his son remains traumatized by the event and is unable to sleep alone. The deadly attack has once again put a spotlight on Thailand’s gun ownership regulations, which are among the most lax in Asia. According to 2017 data from Small Arms Survey and GunPolicy.org, the most recent comprehensive international study on the topic, Thailand has roughly 15.1 civilian-owned guns per 100 residents. That rate is far higher than most of its Southeast Asian neighbors — neighboring Malaysia counts less than one gun per 100 residents — and gives Thailand the second highest rate of civilian gun ownership in Asia, behind only Pakistan. 2023 statistics from World Population Review put Thailand’s firearm death rate at 3.49 per 100,000 people. While that rate is far lower than that of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is among the highest in Asia, with only the Philippines recording a higher rate in Southeast Asia. Though mass indiscriminate shootings remain rare in Thailand, the country has seen a steady increase in high-profile fatal shootings in recent years. In February 2024, a 17-year-old stole a service weapon from a police officer and carried out an attack at a public high school in southern Thailand, killing one person and wounding two others during a two-hour standoff that included hostage-taking. In 2023, a 14-year-old boy was charged in a fatal shooting at a major shopping mall in central Bangkok that left multiple people dead and injured.