标签： Asia

On August 12, 2026, China’s former premier Zhu Rongji, one of the most consequential economic reformers in modern Chinese history, passed away at the age of 97. Born in October 1928, Zhu leaves behind a complex legacy marked by groundbreaking achievements that reshaped China’s place in the global economy, and a signature unfulfilled vision that continues to shape tensions between China and the world decades after he left office.

Handpicked by Chinese reform leader Deng Xiaoping for a landmark mission, Zhu rose to national leadership at a moment of deep chaos in China’s financial system. When he took on his role, China’s trade operated on a broken dual-track structure: steep official tariffs on legal imports created massive incentives for widespread smuggling, much of it concentrated in the southern coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. What made this problem particularly intractable was that much of this illegal trade operated under the protection of the People’s Liberation Army, which had secured political autonomy from intra-party conflicts in exchange for stepping back from internal politics, and leveraged that privileged status to profit from unregulated commercial activity, including smuggling.

Zhu, alongside his policy team, calculated that cutting tariffs and bringing China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) would ultimately increase overall state revenue from import duties by eliminating the black market that was draining billions in lost income. This was a high-stakes gamble that directly threatened the entrenched interests of powerful military factions. Despite fierce opposition, Zhu pushed forward with his anti-smuggling crackdown, emerging victorious and stripping the PLA of its illegal commercial profit streams.

Zhu’s crowning achievement came when he successfully negotiated China’s accession to the WTO, a breakthrough that integrated China into the global trading system and set off decades of explosive export-led growth that transformed the country into the world’s second largest economy. But WTO membership was only the first part of his broader vision. Zhu’s ultimate goal was to achieve full current and capital account convertibility for the Chinese renminbi by 2000, positioning the currency to become the leading regional exchange currency in East Asia.

That goal was never realized, derailed by two catastrophic global financial crises spaced a decade apart. The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis exposed the vulnerability of emerging market open capital accounts to speculative market attacks, convincing Chinese policymakers to postpone full convertibility rather than abandon it entirely. After Zhu stepped down from the premiership in 2003, the deadline was repeatedly pushed back, and the 2008 global financial crisis sealed the fate of his vision.

The 2008 crisis had two defining impacts on China’s policy trajectory. First, it shattered Chinese confidence in the stability of the U.S.-led global financial system, eroding support for deeper market liberalization. Second, Beijing rolled out a nearly $1 trillion stimulus package to shield the Chinese economy from the global downturn. While the stimulus successfully stabilized growth in the short term, it created a persistent addiction to ever-larger doses of credit and state spending that has left China’s financial system saddled with massive hidden debts and opaque balance sheets.

According to unconfirmed rumors that circulated for years within policy circles, Zhu was a fierce critic of the 2008 stimulus and the subsequent waves of credit expansion that followed. Some accounts claim his public opposition to the direction of Chinese economic policy was so strong that he was placed under informal house arrest and barred from meeting with visitors. Decades later, as China grapples with a mounting debt crisis, many observers argue Zhu’s warnings have been vindicated, even as the imbalances he warned of have grown beyond control.

Today, economists widely agree that full renminbi convertibility is impossible under current conditions: opening China’s capital account with the country’s current level of hidden debt and non-transparent financial accounts would almost certainly trigger a massive speculative attack, collapsing the stock market, the exchange rate, and potentially the broader Chinese economy, sparking unprecedented social and political upheaval. This uncompleted reform, which Zhu (and reportedly Deng Xiaoping before him) identified as a critical long-term priority, has become a core source of friction between China and the global economy, argues the author.

The author, who interviewed Zhu in 1999 alongside ANSA correspondent Barbara Alighiero, offers a personal portrait of the former premier that highlights his distinctive leadership style. Comparing Zhu to then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin, whom he had interviewed shortly before, the author notes the two men could not have been more different. Jiang dominated every interaction, carefully monitoring the reactions of everyone in the room to his remarks, while Zhu was focused on engaging with the ideas and perspectives of the person he was speaking with. Where Jiang’s presence left Chinese official staff visibly tense, Zhu’s casual demeanor put everyone at ease.

Zhu’s path to power was unconventional. He was persecuted as a rightist during the 1957 anti-rightist campaign, spending decades on the political margins before Deng Xiaoping noticed his work in the mid-1980s, when he was a mid-level department head at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In 1988, Deng dispatched him to serve as mayor of Shanghai, tasking him with shaking up the city, which was lagging behind the fast-growing southern province of Guangdong, and turning it into a new spearhead for market reform. After the 1989 pro-democracy protests, Shanghai party secretary Jiang Zemin was promoted to Beijing to become Communist Party chief, clearing the way for Zhu’s own national rise. He became vice premier in 1993, and premier in 1998, serving as China’s de facto economic czar throughout his tenure.

No other modern Chinese leader has had as profound an impact on China’s economy as Zhu Rongji, but his aggressive push for financial transparency, market-oriented reform, and fiscal order was largely abandoned after he left office. He understood that market rules cannot be ignored indefinitely, and that ignoring the fundamentals of financial sustainability would eventually lead to economic collapse. In the wake of his death, observers are revisiting his legacy, with the author closing with a call to the Nobel Committee: as Zhu lived to 97, the Committee should honor his contributions to global economic reform with a Nobel Prize.

This article was originally published by the Appia Institute, where the author serves as director, and is republished here with permission.

A newly modified mysterious deck-mounted system on China’s experimental stealth corvette has sparked intense speculation among open-source naval analysts, highlighting a growing global naval competition to develop directed-energy weapons for both gray-zone coercion and cutting-edge defense against mass drone attacks.

First spotted at China’s Liaonan Shipyard in 2023, the modified stealth test vessel made headlines this month when Defense Blog reported that a previously installed missile launcher had been removed and replaced with an unknown box-shaped system mounted on the corvette’s deck. Open-source intelligence experts who have tracked the vessel’s development are split into two leading camps over the system’s intended function: one argues it is a ship-borne sonic weapon designed for non-lethal disruption of enemy personnel, while the other contends it is a high-power microwave (HPM) directed-energy system built to disable incoming swarms of drones and unmanned vessels.

Proponents of the sonic weapon theory point to China’s well-documented history of deploying acoustic devices for non-lethal harassment and crowd control operations, including multiple incidents in the South China Sea. In contrast, supporters of the HPM hypothesis note that the system’s boxy form factor and deck placement closely match the design of recently unveiled Chinese land-based HPM weapons, which are engineered to disable the electronics of small unmanned aerial vehicles at ranges exceeding three kilometers.

The War Zone (TWZ) outlined the test corvette’s core design parameters in an August 2024 analysis, noting the vessel features smooth, faceted low-observable hull surfaces purpose-built to minimize its radar cross-section. Its stealth-oriented design includes a main main gun hidden inside a faceted stealth cupola, structural features that suggest space reserved for a vertical launch system, and a modified mounting originally thought to be for an HQ-10 short-range missile system, but now believed to house a single aperture for electro-optical testing, laser trials, or prototype evaluation. The corvette’s streamlined mast and rumored hybrid all-electric propulsion system also reflect its mission to test new technologies for the next generation of Chinese littoral combat vessels.

China has a established track record of deploying non-kinetic and directed-energy tools in its gray-zone territorial operations in the South China Sea, where it uses ambiguous, deniable incremental and hybrid tactics to assert territorial claims without triggering full-scale armed conflict. In January 2025, the China Coast Guard was reported to have used a long-range acoustic device (LRAD) to harass a Philippine Coast Guard vessel, the BRP Cabra, operating in disputed waters. A similar deployment against Philippine fisheries vessels was reported in late 2023, following an early 2023 incident where a Chinese military laser was used against the Philippine Coast Guard ship BRP Malapascua, temporarily blinding members of its crew. Unlike conventional loudspeakers that project sound over a wide area, LRAD systems emit a concentrated, high-intensity sound beam similar to a flashlight’s focused light. While marketed for crowd control and ship-to-ship communication, the device is capable of causing permanent severe injury: a peer-reviewed April 2025 study published in the Chinese Journal of Traumatology confirmed that high-intensity acoustic exposure causes permanent acoustic trauma, eardrum rupture, ossicle fractures, and permanent hearing loss, with infrasound inducing organ resonance, dizziness, and internal organ damage and ultrasound causing thermal burns, blurred vision, internal pain, and bone damage depending on frequency.

China is also widely recognized as a global leader in HPM weapons development, making the theory that the mystery system is an HPM prototype highly plausible. Invisible and difficult to attribute, HPM weapons have already been linked to unexplained health incidents like the so-called “Havana Syndrome”, making them ideal tools for deniable gray-zone coercion. An HPM attack on a rival nation’s law enforcement vessel could temporarily incapacitate the crew, disable all on-board electronics, and force a mission abort, while leaving no clear evidence of attribution and allowing the attacking party to maintain plausible deniability to avoid escalation.

Beyond offensive gray-zone operations, HPM weapons also offer a transformative solution to one of the most pressing modern naval defense challenges: defending against mass drone and unmanned surface vehicle (USV) swarms, which are increasingly capable of overwhelming conventional ship-based missile defenses. Stealth warships may be particularly vulnerable to these swarms, which can use a mix of optical, radar, infrared, magnetic, and acoustic sensors to detect stealth targets across multiple signature types, and large coordinated swarms of attack drones and USVs can often slip through layered conventional defenses, with even a small number of penetrating attackers capable of inflicting severe damage.

Conventional defense against drone swarms requires large stockpiles of expensive interceptor missiles, which creates unsustainable cost-exchange ratios and runs the risk of depleting limited ammunition stocks during extended operations. A June 2026 South Korean military military exercise illustrated this challenge: even eight 20-millimeter Vulcan guns firing 1,000 to 3,000 rounds per minute at close range only managed to destroy 44 out of 50 slow, formation-flying quadcopter drones, with infantry required to eliminate the remaining six using shotguns and hand-held laser devices. In a real combat scenario, drone swarms would not cooperate in slow, predictable formations; they would attack from multiple directions, often combined with anti-ship missiles and USVs to maximize the probability of a successful hit.

Recent incidents have further underscored the vulnerability of large surface combatants to small, low-cost unmanned vessels. In July 2026, private American drone firm Seasats released publicly available footage showing its $240,000 Lightfish USV approaching a Chinese Type 052D guided-missile destroyer at close range in the South China Sea, proving that small, inexpensive unmanned vessels can reach high-value major combatants undetected. Ongoing conflicts, including the Iran War and Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, have further highlighted the magazine depth and cost challenges of relying on conventional missile interceptors: in both conflicts, naval vessels have been forced to expend large numbers of multi-million-dollar interceptors to destroy cheap, expendable drones, depleting limited stockpiles that are difficult to replace at sea.

Directed-energy systems such as HPM weapons and lasers have long been proposed as a solution to these problems, offering a nearly unlimited number of shots at negligible marginal cost, scalable effect depending on the target, and near-instantaneous engagement speeds.

Regardless of whether the mystery system on China’s stealth test corvette ultimately proves to be a sonic weapon, an HPM emitter, or another emerging technology entirely, its deployment on a purpose-built stealth test bed confirms a broader global trend: directed-energy weapons are moving from theoretical research to sea-based testing, with roles in both deniable gray-zone operations and high-end defense against mass unmanned attacks. While significant technical barriers related to power output, cooling, effective range, and resistance to enemy countermeasures still separate experimental prototypes from reliable combat-capable systems, the shift toward integrating directed-energy into frontline naval design is already well underway.

In a rare public break with government policy, Japan’s Crown Prince Akishino, heir apparent to the Chrysanthemum Throne and younger brother of sitting Emperor Naruhito, has publicly stated he holds “mixed feelings” about the conservative Sanae Takaichi administration’s recent update to the Imperial House Law that codifies a strict male-only, paternal-line rule for imperial succession.

The comments, delivered during a pre-travel press conference Thursday ahead of Akishino’s upcoming visit to Paraguay to commemorate 90 years of Japanese emigration to the South American nation, mark an unusual intervention from a senior imperial family member, who are traditionally barred from making public political statements. Akishino struck a carefully measured tone in his remarks, but pushed back against the gendered exclusion at the core of the new law revision.

“There is no difference between men and women” when it comes to fulfilling imperial family duties and meeting the needs of Japanese society, Akishino told reporters. When pressed on the government’s final decision, he added: “I have mixed feelings about it, and it’s rather strange if I don’t. It is a difficult question, and the reality is that I can’t talk about it. The society needs to keep making progress, and I believe it is important for people with different views to keep thinking what’s best.”

Akishino’s remarks come just weeks after the Takaichi government passed the historic revision to the 1947 Imperial House Law, which retains the 1890s mandate that only men born to a paternal imperial line can ascend to the throne. The change has drawn widespread condemnation from activists and members of the public as anachronistic, sexist, and a existential threat to Japan’s already shrinking imperial institution.

Under the existing male-only succession rule, Emperor Naruhito’s 24-year-old daughter Princess Aiko — a widely popular figure among the Japanese public, a majority of whom have supported allowing female succession in opinion polling — is barred from inheriting the throne. The current line of succession designates Akishino as next in line, followed by his 19-year-old son Prince Hisahito, and then the emperor’s 90-year-old uncle, leaving a major gap in heirs after Hisahito.

While the new revision includes a small, widely welcomed provision that allows princesses to retain their royal status and duties if they marry commoners (requiring their husbands and children to remain non-royal), the most controversial provision codifies a plan to adopt unmarried male descendants aged 15 or older from distant paternal imperial branches into the immediate royal family to produce new heirs. Critics argue the policy explicitly prioritizes retaining a strict patriarchal bloodline over allowing the popular Princess Aiko to ascend, embedding gender discrimination into Japan’s core royal institution.

Historical records show Japan’s imperial tradition has long included female monarchs: eight women have held the throne throughout Japanese history, with the last being Empress Gosakuramachi, who reigned from 1762 to 1770. The formal mandate for male-only paternal succession was first written into law only in the 1889 Imperial House Law, a policy rooted in the strict patriarchal social order promoted by Japan’s Meiji government, and was largely carried over unchanged into the 1947 post-war Imperial House Law that remains the governing framework for the monarchy today.

Beyond concerns over gender equity, critics warn the government’s hardline stance on male-only succession threatens the legacy of former Emperor Akihito, who abdicated in 2019. Akihito, who spent his reign working to make amends for World War II-era aggression carried out in his father’s name, worked to open up the traditionally aloof monarchy to the Japanese public — a reform project continued by his son Emperor Naruhito. Many worry the Takaichi administration’s revision pulls the monarchy backwards toward outdated hierarchical norms, undermining decades of work to modernize the institution and align it with contemporary Japanese values.

Public backlash to the revision has already sparked widespread protests across Japan, with demonstrators arguing the policy ignores public will, sidelined the wishes of the royal family themselves, and perpetuates a discriminatory patriarchal system that places the importance of a centuries-old male bloodline above the needs and values of 21st century Japan.

In a high-profile move that has reignited a long-running territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled Thursday to the Russian-controlled Kuril Islands chain — a territory claimed by Tokyo — marking his first public visit to the contested Pacific archipelago. The trip immediately drew a sharp diplomatic rebuke from Japanese officials.

Putin’s itinerary on Iturup, one of the four southernmost islands at the heart of the disagreement, included stops at a local fish processing facility, a public hospital, and a regional primary school. During the visit, he held brief informal exchanges with local residents and held official talks with Valery Limarenko, the governor of Russia’s Sakhalin Oblast, which administers the island chain.

The territorial standoff over the four southern islands stretches back to the end of World War II, when Soviet forces seized the territories from Japan at the close of the conflict. To this day, Japan refers to the four islands as its Northern Territories and maintains they are part of its sovereign territory. The unresolved dispute has prevented the two nations from signing a formal peace treaty to officially end World War II-era hostilities between them.

Despite more than seven decades of diplomatic negotiations aimed at resolving the disagreement, no breakthrough has been reached. In recent years, Moscow has significantly strengthened its military deployments across the Kuril Islands, a step widely interpreted as a demonstration of its unwavering claim to sovereignty over the chain.

Following news of Putin’s visit, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi issued a formal statement announcing Tokyo’s “strong protest” against the trip. “The Northern Territories, including Etorofu (Iturup) Island, are Japan’s inherent territory both historically and from the perspective of international law,” Motegi said. This is not the first time Japan has issued such a protest: in 2021, Tokyo similarly condemned a visit to Iturup by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.

Putin’s trip to Iturup is part of a wider tour of Russia’s Far Eastern and Siberian regions. Ahead of arriving on the disputed island, the Russian president traveled to Sakhalin Island to observe the concluding phase of large-scale military drills conducted by Russia’s Pacific Fleet.