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A major diplomatic clash between the United Kingdom and Israel erupted this week after Jerusalem unveiled a package of retaliatory measures against London, including a entry ban on 11 British MPs, following the UK’s historic decision to sanction illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The escalation, which marks one of the most significant rifts between the two allies in recent years, unfolded on Tuesday as Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar announced a series of punitive steps in response to London’s policy shift.

Alongside the entry ban on lawmakers, Saar confirmed Israel would shut the British consulate in occupied East Jerusalem, withdraw British representatives from the International Gaza Support Center, and end all British training programs for Palestinian security forces. The banned British parliamentarians include high-profile critics of Israeli policy: former Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, independent MP Zarah Sultana, Labour MPs Naz Shah, Diane Abbott, John McDonnell and Richard Burgon, and all sitting Green Party of England and Wales MPs – Carla Denyer, Adrian Ramsay, Ellie Chowns, Sian Berry and Hannah Spencer. The list also extends to Fahad Ansari, an Irish-born lawyer who has represented legal efforts to reverse Hamas’ proscription as a terrorist organization in British courts; Ansari, who is not a UK citizen or MP, noted he already considered himself persona non grata in Israel and called the ban a badge of honor.

The retaliatory measures came hours after the British government made a landmark policy announcement: it formally recognized ongoing ethnic cleansing of Palestinians by settlers in the occupied West Bank, declared Israel’s decades-long occupation of Palestinian territory illegal under international law, and imposed sweeping sanctions on entities linked to illegal Israeli settlements. The government also enacted a full ban on all arms licenses and exports that could materially contribute to Israel’s occupation. France and Canada quickly joined the UK’s initiative by announcing their own bans on trade with Israeli settlements, a move widely seen as a major diplomatic win for London. Eleven additional nations – Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden – signed a joint statement with the UK affirming their plans to introduce national trade restrictions or support European-level measures against settlement goods, in line with international legal obligations.

The UK’s formal adoption of the International Court of Justice’s 2024 advisory opinion, which ruled the Israeli occupation unlawful and required all states to act to end it, was laid out by Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband in parliamentary remarks Tuesday. Miliband emphasized that the British government confirms settler-perpetrated ethnic cleansing is occurring in parts of the West Bank, adding that the Israeli government has not only turned a blind eye to the violence but has repeatedly supported forced displacement of Palestinians through official statements and policy.

Rather than being intimidated by the entry ban, the targeted British MPs have responded with open defiance, vowing to double down on their advocacy for Palestinian rights. In a statement following the announcement, Corbyn, who has made multiple visits to Palestinian territories to document conditions on the ground, said he had directly witnessed the violence of occupation and the systemic apartheid that curtails Palestinian freedom. He called Israel’s pattern of barring UN investigators and international journalists a deliberate attempt to hide its actions from the world, stressing that critics would never abandon efforts to expose the truth. “They are the ones who suffer from Israel’s apartheid. It is their freedom which is egregiously curtailed, alongside thousands of Palestinian refugees who are denied the right of return,” Corbyn said.

Naz Shah, one of the banned Labour MPs, described the selection of banned lawmakers as “rather random and, frankly, bizarre,” but added she was proud to back the UK government’s new sanctions, which align with the country’s international legal obligations. She reaffirmed her longstanding commitment to upholding international law, peace, security, and equal rights for both Palestinians and Israelis. Richard Burgon, another banned Labour MP who has campaigned for stronger action against Israeli policies and presented evidence of alleged war crimes to the International Criminal Court, said the ban would not silence him. “The decision by the Israeli government to sanction me today will not intimidate me into silence. I will continue to do what is right, speak out in defence of international law and stand up for justice for the Palestinian people,” Burgon said.

Zarah Sultana, the independent MP who left the Labour Party last year in protest over Keir Starmer’s refusal to take stronger action against Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, called the ban from the “fascist government presiding over genocide, apartheid and an illegal occupation” a badge of honor. She echoed other lawmakers in saying the punitive measure would only strengthen her resolve to speak out. “If anything, this ban only strengthens my resolve to keep speaking out against Israel’s genocide and against the UK’s complicity,” Sultana said.

All of the UK Green Party’s sitting parliamentary representatives were included on the banned list, a reflection of the party’s uncompromising stance calling for full sanctions on Israel, recognizing allegations of genocide in Gaza, and supporting proscription of the Israeli military as a terrorist organization. A party spokesperson said the Israeli government’s threats would not force the Greens into silence, praising the party’s MPs for standing up for Palestinian rights and demanding an end to British complicity in illegal occupation and violence. The Green Party called on the British government to go further than its current limited measures, imposing a full arms embargo and wide-ranging sanctions against Israel. Green Party leader Zack Polanski added that the party’s MPs had consistently stood “on the right side of history” by opposing ethnic cleansing, occupation and genocide, a position he said all British lawmakers should adopt.

Mass public protests have erupted across South Korea in fierce opposition to the Seoul government’s potential plan to deploy military forces to support U.S.-led security operations in the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz, deepening a domestic and international debate over the country’s role in escalating tensions between the U.S. and Iran.

South Korean officials confirmed on Friday that the administration is actively evaluating options for what it frames as “contributions” to U.S. security initiatives in the strait, a chokepoint that handles nearly a fifth of the world’s daily oil trade. Just days later on Tuesday, a South Korean fact-finding military delegation was dispatched to the region to assess on-ground conditions, according to government statements.

The prospect of a South Korean military deployment has already drawn a sharp rebuke from Tehran. Iranian officials have issued a clear warning that any introduction of South Korean forces to the region would be “regarded as direct support for the party responsible for that aggression and will have serious consequences,” a statement that has amplified anxieties over potential retaliation against South Korean interests.

On Wednesday, hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside the U.S. Embassy in central Seoul, carrying hand-painted placards that called on the South Korean government to reject participation in what organizers labeled a “war of aggression” against Iran. Video footage shared widely across major social media platforms showed local police moving to push back dozens of protesters who had gathered close to the embassy compound, leading to minor scuffles in some instances.

Jung Kyung-jik, a representative of leading South Korean civic group People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, told reporters from Agence France-Presse that he fully understood Iran’s perception of any foreign military intervention as a direct threat to Iranian national security. “As Iran has said, the deployment of our troops to the region would amount to direct participation in an illegal war,” Jung stated. He added that “there have been numerous violations of international law arising from US attacks on Iran, including the bombing of an elementary school and energy infrastructure.”

South Korea has been subjected to mounting diplomatic pressure from Washington for months to formally join the U.S.-led coalition operating in the Strait of Hormuz. Former U.S. President Donald Trump had previously publicly criticized Seoul for failing to back U.S. policy toward Iran, tying the disagreement to broader frictions in the bilateral alliance that have persisted in years since.

For South Korea, the strategic stakes of any decision are exceptionally high: the country’s entire economy relies heavily on energy shipments that pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Data from 2023 shows that 61 percent of South Korea’s total crude oil imports and 54 percent of its naphtha imports traveled through the waterway last year alone, making stability in the region a core national economic priority.

According to reporting from The Guardian, the specific deployment options currently under review by South Korean military planners include sending a P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and a naval logistics support vessel. Local South Korean broadcasters have additionally reported that an elite navy explosive ordnance disposal team is also being considered for deployment.

South Korea’s presidential office has clarified that any final decision to deploy new military forces to the Strait of Hormuz would require a multi-step domestic approval process: first a review by the country’s National Security Council, followed by a cabinet resolution, and ultimately formal approval from the unicameral National Assembly.

This is not the first time Seoul has adjusted its military posture in the region amid U.S. pressure. Back in 2019, the South Korean government expanded the operating area of an existing anti-piracy naval unit deployed off the coast of Somalia to cover waters surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, a move that fell short of full participation in the U.S. coalition.

In a recent development, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung held talks with French President Emmanuel Macron this week on Tuesday to discuss the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. However, Seoul’s presidential office emphasized that the discussions focused exclusively on potential South Korean contributions to broader international efforts to uphold freedom of navigation, not any specific plan to deploy combat troops to the region.

Six months after the United States and Israel launched a military campaign aimed at forcing Iran into political submission, a dramatic shift in the dynamics of the Middle East conflict has emerged: Tehran is no longer just reacting to external pressure, it is actively escalating tensions to shift the balance of bargaining power in its favor. The most visible sign of this new approach is Iran’s recent threat to target American warships operating in regional waters with its upgraded solid-fuel Qassem Basir ballistic missile, a development that marks a potentially more dangerous phase of the ongoing standoff.

Tehran has framed the Qassem Basir as a game-changing capability that allows it to “take action against any threat, even before it is carried out.” Multiple intelligence reports point to this weapon being used during claimed Iranian tests targeting US vessels near the Strait of Hormuz on September 5. While Washington confirmed that an attack targeted its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington and a nearby guided-missile destroyer, US officials have not confirmed whether the new advanced missile was deployed, and noted that all American ships successfully evaded the strike.

Beyond the missile test, Tehran has also announced plans to sign an agreement with Oman to establish a new shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz extending into the Persian Gulf, a move that remains unconfirmed as of press time. Taken together, these moves signal a clear break from the largely retaliatory strategy that defined Iran’s actions in the first half of the conflict. Today, the Islamic Republic is increasingly willing to raise the stakes on its own terms.

This shift does not mean Iran holds military superiority over the US – far from it. But Iranian leadership has concluded that prolonging and expanding the conflict increases the economic and strategic cost of the standoff for Washington and the global community, strengthening Tehran’s hand at any future negotiating table. This represents a stark reversal of the original goals of the US-led campaign, which was framed to force major changes in Iranian policy and even open the door to regime change. Despite massive military superiority that has inflicted severe damage on Iranian infrastructure and military capabilities, the US and Israel have failed to achieve their core political objectives.

Today, Iran’s political regime remains intact, its missile programs are still operational, the status of its nuclear program remains unresolved, and its network of regional proxies retains full offensive capability – a fact demonstrated by recent attacks on Saudi targets carried out by Houthi rebels. Most critically, Tehran has turned the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most vital energy chokepoints, into a powerful tool of economic leverage.

Over the past six months, the conflict has settled into a repeating cycle: escalation, diplomatic outreach, tentative agreements, renewed coercive action, and a return to diplomacy. Far from forcing Iranian capitulation, this pattern has taught Tehran that sustained resistance to US pressure ultimately yields better negotiating terms. The latest escalation is a direct result of that lesson.

Tehran does not need to destroy the US Navy or seize full control of the Strait of Hormuz to achieve its goals. It only needs to make commercial navigation through the waterway risky enough to force shipping companies to avoid the route, push up global marine insurance premiums, and embed persistent disruption risk into global oil prices. Recent shipping data already confirms that commodity traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen to its lowest level since May. Tehran has further warned it will implement wider navigation restrictions and launch what it calls “economic warfare” if Washington continues its campaign to strangle the Iranian economy via sanctions and blockades.

This new approach upends the original logic of the conflict. Former US President Donald Trump’s strategy was designed to make continued Iranian resistance progressively more costly. Today, Iran is making continued US coercion progressively more costly for Washington and the world. While Iran can never match American raw firepower, it holds an unassailable geographic advantage that no military force can eliminate: control over the world’s most critical energy transit corridor.

Measured against the original political goals of the US-led campaign – dismantling Iran’s political system, eliminating its nuclear program, destroying its long-range missile capability, and breaking its network of regional allies – the six-month conflict has fallen far short. None of these core objectives have been achieved decisively. The unresolved status of Iran’s nuclear program in particular highlights the fundamental limits of military power: airstrikes can destroy physical facilities, but they cannot eliminate the political incentives that drive states to pursue strategic nuclear deterrence.

This dynamic carries significant ripple effects across the Middle East and beyond. If regional governments conclude that developing independent nuclear capacity offers protection against external regime change campaigns, global nuclear non-proliferation efforts could face new, growing pressure. Saudi Arabia, for example, has long sought domestic uranium enrichment capabilities. Ultimately, analysts note, the nuclear issue will inevitably return to the negotiating table, the same place it started.

The costs of the ongoing stalemate are already being felt globally. Energy, marine insurance, and shipping costs have all risen, with inevitable political consequences for economies around the world. Meanwhile, the conflict has created unintended benefits for other major powers: Russia gains from higher global hydrocarbon prices, while China benefits strategically as US military assets, munitions, and political attention are diverted away from the Indo-Pacific region. For Gulf states, the conflict has delivered an uncomfortable reality: US military bases hosted to guarantee their security can also turn them into targets in a conflict they did not initiate.

Again, this does not mean Iran is winning militarily. The Iranian economy and domestic infrastructure have suffered enormous damage, and the US retains the capability to inflict far greater destruction if it chooses to escalate further. But Iran does not need to defeat the US militarily to achieve its core goals. It only needs to prevent Washington from using military superiority to force it into political submission, while raising the cost of continued conflict incrementally for the US and its allies.

This leaves Trump caught in an escalation trap partially of his own making. If he tightens the blockade on Iran, Tehran can further disrupt traffic through Hormuz. If he intensifies airstrikes and bombing campaigns, Iran can expand retaliatory strikes against US allies across the Gulf. If he chooses to enter negotiations, Iran now has every reason to demand stronger guarantees and better terms than it would have accepted six months earlier. Repeated cycles of escalation followed by a return to talks have also eroded the coercive power of US threats over time.

Iran’s latest moves are therefore far more than just another exchange of fire in a long-running conflict. Six months after the US and Israel launched their campaign to force Tehran into submission, Iran has learned that the longer it withstands pressure, the greater the costs it can impose on its adversaries, and the stronger its bargaining position will be when talks eventually resume. While the US retains the capacity to escalate far beyond anything Iran can match, it can no longer take for granted that more escalation will bring victory closer. Iran’s latest actions make clear that Tehran now believes the opposite is true.

At the outbreak of the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, few policymakers in Beijing or Moscow predicted that Tehran would be able to sustainedly withstand coordinated military pressure from two of the world’s most militarily advanced powers. In the conflict’s opening phase, the overwhelming air, intelligence, and technological superiority of US and Israeli forces inflicted heavy losses on Iranian military and infrastructure targets. What was initially planned as a rapid operation to cripple Iran’s core military capabilities has however evolved into a protracted, increasingly costly conflict that has defied early expectations.

Against all odds, Iran has retained intact its core governing political structure and a substantial portion of its operational military response capacity. This outcome delivers a clear demonstration that inflicting widespread physical damage does not equate to forcing a targeted state into unconditional surrender. Iran’s unexpected battlefield resilience is far more than a regional military development – it has become a real-world stress test for the outer limits of American global power for both China and Russia. While the two countries hold divergent core interests in the conflict, neither can dismiss a decisive Iranian defeat as a regional issue isolated from great power competition. Both Beijing and Moscow recognize that if the United States can leverage its military dominance to strategically neutralize one of West Asia’s most prominent independent powers, the regional balance of power will shift dramatically, with ripple effects extending into the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalry between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.

### China’s Balancing Act Between Economic Pain and Strategic Interests

Of all major global powers, China faces the sharpest economic incentives to push for an immediate end to the conflict. Decades of deep energy trade ties have made China Iran’s largest crude oil buyer, so disruptions to energy transit and rising insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz directly impact Chinese economic performance. Data from Reuters confirms that China’s seaborne crude imports fell to roughly 7.14 million barrels per day in August 2026, a nearly 40% drop from pre-war levels. This supply disruption has cut off major Chinese refineries from a critical, low-cost source of crude oil.

Yet this immediate economic pain sits at the heart of Beijing’s core strategic dilemma: while a prolonged war harms Chinese economic interests, Beijing cannot accept a outcome that leaves Iran strategically defeated. For China, Iran is far more than just an energy supplier – it is a core node in the broader web of political and economic partnerships China has built across West Asia to expand its influence without relying on the formal military alliances that underpin US power in the region. A strategic collapse of Iran would not only reshape bilateral relations between Tehran and Washington; it would entrench far greater US influence across West Asia and erode the strategic space China has painstakingly built in the region.

China’s policy over years of maximum US pressure on Iran has reflected this balancing act. Beijing’s support for Tehran has never been limited to rhetorical political statements. China has consistently remained one of the largest buyers of Iranian crude, with independent Chinese teapot refineries continuing to import Iranian oil even amid threats of harsh US secondary sanctions. This persistence is why US officials have made Chinese crude purchases a central focus of their economic pressure campaign against Iran. This economic relationship has grown even more critical since the outbreak of full-scale war: as Washington moves to cut off Iran’s oil exports and global financial access, China stands as one of the only major economies capable of absorbing excess Iranian supply and easing economic pressure on Tehran. For Beijing, continuing to import Iranian oil is not merely a commercial transaction – it is a test case for resisting the ability of US sanctions to dictate the policy of major economies outside the American orbit, which explains why the issue has remained a persistent source of bilateral friction between Washington and Beijing.

China’s engagement extends beyond energy trade. US intelligence reports in recent years have documented that Iran has gained access to certain dual-use technologies, including components critical to its drone and missile programs, through commercial networks linked to Chinese companies. While a clear line must be drawn between official Chinese government policy and the independent activities of these commercial networks, their operations demonstrate how sustained economic ties have helped preserve a large portion of Iran’s technological and industrial base even under strict international sanctions. Diplomatically, Beijing has also refused to back Iran’s full isolation from the international community. Alongside Russia, China has repeatedly called for a negotiated political resolution to the conflict and opposed what it views as unilateral US-led pressure campaigns against Tehran.

This does not mean Beijing is prepared to commit to direct military defense of Iran. China’s core priority remains ending the war to restore stability to global energy trade routes. Yet there is a critical difference between ending the conflict and ending it on terms that leave Iran severely weakened and the regional balance of power decisively tilted toward Washington. It is here that Iran’s battlefield resilience carries the greatest strategic weight for China: the longer Tehran demonstrates it can retain operational military capacity after repeated heavy attacks, the more complex Beijing’s calculation of the consequences of an Iranian defeat becomes.

Crucially, China does not need to enter the war directly to support Iran. Its existing toolkit of economic, commercial, technological, and diplomatic tools allows it to prevent Iran’s total isolation without becoming a formal belligerent in the conflict. Perhaps the most valuable outcome for China from the war, however, is not energy trade or preserved influence in West Asia – it is the opportunity to observe firsthand the operational performance of US military forces in a high-intensity conflict. Beijing has gained unfiltered insights into US long-range strike capabilities, air operations, ammunition consumption rates, logistics sustainment, and missile defense performance. For a country whose long-term strategic competition with the US centers heavily on the Taiwan scenario, this real-world observational data is strategically invaluable.

### Russia’s Divergent Strategic Calculations

Russia’s core interests in the conflict differ substantially from China’s. Unlike Beijing, Moscow does not rely heavily on West Asian energy imports, and elevated global energy prices actually create short-term economic benefits for Russian export revenues. For the Kremlin, the Iran conflict is tied directly to Russia’s standing as a Eurasian power and its long-term goal of building a multipolar global order.

For Russia, Iran is more than a regional partner: it is one of the few major powers openly locked in full-scale conflict with both the US and Israel, capable of drawing significant American geopolitical and military attention away from Europe and the ongoing war in Ukraine, easing pressure on Moscow. A 2026 analysis published in *Middle East Policy* argues that the conflict has created clear short-term strategic advantages for Russia, while also elevating Iran’s importance to both Russia’s regional influence and its bilateral partnership with China.

Evidence of deep military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran extends far beyond rhetorical political alignment. Reporting from the *Financial Times* confirms that Russian military experts have participated in a secret collaborative program with Iran since 2023 to develop propulsion technology for hypersonic cruise missiles, a cooperation that has continued into 2026. Additional independent reporting has documented ongoing cooperation in satellite technology and transfers of complementary military equipment between the two states. This cooperation does not amount to a formal mutual defense alliance, and neither China nor Russia has offered Iran a binding security guarantee comparable to the commitments of a formal defense pact. But this informal, flexible cooperation has emerged as the defining feature of their current alignment: both powers can use economic, technological, and diplomatic tools to strengthen Iran’s defensive capacity and constrain US pressure without committing to open direct war with the United States.

### Contours of an Emerging Multipolar Global Order

Ultimately, the long-term significance of the US-Israeli war on Iran does not depend solely on which side gains the upper hand on the battlefield. The larger, more consequential question is whether the United States still retains the ability to use its combined military and economic superiority to impose its preferred political outcome on a defiant regional power. For China and Russia, the answer to this question carries sweeping implications. If Iran can sustain its resistance despite intense military pressure and crippling economic sanctions, the conflict will confirm that US ability to inflict widespread damage does not translate into ability to dictate political outcomes – a lesson that carries particular weight for China as it prepares for long-term strategic competition with Washington.

At the same time, the policy approaches of China and Russia demonstrate that challenging US hegemony does not require the creation of a formal anti-US alliance. Purchasing Iranian oil, sustaining bilateral trade, transferring dual-use technology, engaging in informal military cooperation, and wielding Security Council vetoes are all tools that raise the strategic and political cost of unilateral US power projection. Most recently, in April 2026, China and Russia jointly vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on the Strait of Hormuz, with Beijing explicitly arguing that the council should not legitimize unauthorized military operations by unilateral coalitions.

This does not mean a cohesive China-Russia-Iran geopolitical axis is emerging. The three countries hold divergent interests on many regional and global issues, and none is willing to bear unlimited costs to advance another power’s goals. Even so, the war in Iran has accelerated a broader global shift: moving from a post-Cold War order where the United States unilaterally sets the rules and determines outcomes for international crises, toward a new order where competing great powers can systematically raise the cost of unilateral US power projection.

The conflict has brought the contours of this emerging order into sharp relief. For Beijing and Moscow, Iran’s fate is not merely the future of a single regional partner. It is a critical test case: can the United States still unilaterally determine the outcome of a major regional war, or can other global powers use resistance, informal partnership, and counterpressure to raise the cost of US hegemony high enough to push the international system irreversibly toward multipolarity?