分类： politics

A major diplomatic dispute between China and the United Kingdom has erupted after London moved to fully nationalise loss-making British Steel, a move Beijing has condemned as an unfair seizure of private property.

Last year, the UK government already took over day-to-day operational control of British Steel’s primary facility in Scunthorpe, while formal ownership remained with China’s Jingye Group. That arrangement severely constrained Whitehall’s ability to make long-term strategic decisions about the plant’s future. This deadlock broke this week, when Parliament passed emergency legislation on Wednesday authorizing public takeover of steel assets that pass a public interest test. On Thursday, Downing Street formally executed the nationalisation, arguing that bringing the struggling steelmaker into public hands is the only way to protect thousands of domestic jobs and preserve what officials call a “vital national capability” for the UK’s industrial base.

Beijing immediately pushed back against the decision. In a formal statement released Friday, China’s Ministry of Commerce said the country “firmly opposes and is strongly dissatisfied with the British government’s decision.” The ministry accused the UK of disregarding the tangible economic and social contributions Jingye has made to the UK since acquiring the steelmaker, adding that the forced nationalisation carried out under the banner of national security “seriously infringed upon Jingye’s legitimate rights and interests and severely undermined the confidence of Chinese companies investing in the UK.” Beijing has called on London to uphold its binding obligations under the China-UK Bilateral Investment Treaty, and noted that it will closely track developments while supporting Jingye in pursuing all legal avenues to defend its interests. No specific countermeasures were outlined in the statement.

Jingye, which has confirmed the company was losing approximately £700,000 per day prior to the full takeover, has already stated it intends to pursue financial compensation for the nationalisation. The BBC has so far been unable to secure an on-the-record response from Jingye’s leadership regarding Thursday’s formal announcement.

For the UK government, the nationalisation resolves the operational uncertainty that has hung over the Scunthorpe plant for months. With full public ownership, officials now have full authority to map out the facility’s future while keeping its critical blast furnaces operational. However, the long-term financial burden is substantial: the UK’s National Audit Office estimated in March that the Scunthorpe works already costs public coffers roughly £1.3 million per day, a figure Business Secretary Peter Kyle acknowledged the government would cover “for the immediate future.” Analysts broadly agree that Downing Street has no intention of retaining permanent ownership of the loss-making business.

The timing of the dispute is particularly awkward for UK politics, as incoming Prime Minister Andy Burnham is set to take office on Monday. Burnham will now be forced to navigate a delicate balancing act: managing the fallout from the nationalisation while preserving the economic benefits that come from strong trade and investment ties with the world’s second-largest economy. The row threatens to create an early foreign policy strain on the new premiership, adding another layer of complexity to already fragile Sino-British relations.

A decade after a landmark international arbitration ruling on South China Sea territorial claims, tensions between the Philippines and China have erupted into a new diplomatic row, sparked by an offensive AI-generated cartoon published by China’s state-run outlet China Daily. The controversial animation, posted to the outlet’s public Facebook page on July 10, depicts the Philippines as a cowering monkey wearing a national flag shirt, shoved onto a rickety boat-based karaoke stage by large arms emblazoned with the flags of the United States and Japan. After being berated for singing an incorrect tune, the monkey pulls out a sign referencing the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award before being thrown into the sea and struck by a water cannon — a deliberate reference to repeated encounters between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the disputed waters.

Manila’s leadership has roundly condemned the imagery, labeling it dehumanizing, racist, and unacceptable in civil diplomatic discourse. In an official statement, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs argued that political and legal disagreements between the two nations do not justify the use of derogatory, dehumanizing content that violates basic norms of state-to-state communication. The ministry demanded immediate removal of the video, warning that the offensive imagery and accompanying misinformation only deepen mutual distrust between the two neighbors. The Philippine defense ministry went further, describing the clip as contemptible propaganda that exposes what it called the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of China’s official propaganda apparatus. Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro, who was personally sanctioned with a travel ban by Beijing earlier this year, called the pattern of aggressive messaging impossible to ignore, referencing what he described as erratic behavior from Chinese authorities in recent months. As of press time, the video remains publicly accessible on China Daily’s Facebook page, and Chinese official bodies have not issued any response to Manila’s formal rebuke.

This latest incident comes amid a steady escalation of maritime frictions between Beijing and Manila over the past decade, rooted in overlapping territorial claims to two key contested features: the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, which China refers to as Huangyan Island. Geographically, Scarborough Shoal sits just 160 kilometers off the coast of the Philippines, more than 800 kilometers closer to Manila than to mainland China. In recent years, Chinese Coast Guard vessels have regularly deployed high-pressure water cannons against Philippine civilian and military vessels operating near the shoal, resulting in vessel damage and crew injuries. Just last June, tensions flared twice in quick succession: Beijing installed a floating barrier across the entrance to Scarborough Shoal’s lagoon, which was removed only after Manila filed a formal diplomatic protest, and later announced a travel ban barring Teodoro and his immediate family from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau.

The current row falls on the ten-year anniversary of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling at The Hague, which sided with Manila in a case brought by the Philippines, concluding that China’s sweeping nine-dash line claims across most of the South China Sea have no legal foundation under international law. Beijing has consistently rejected the ruling, refusing to recognize the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the territorial dispute. In the caption accompanying its controversial video, China Daily reiterated Beijing’s long-held position, framing the arbitration award as not a tool for peace but rather a deliberate pretext for confrontation framed as international law. The caption repeated Beijing’s narrative that the Philippine government is allowing itself to be used as a pawn in the geopolitical strategies of outside powers, specifically the US and Japan, by stirring up tensions in the disputed waterway.

The monkey cartoon is not an isolated incident: it is the latest in a series of satirical, mocking posts published by China Daily on its Facebook page in recent weeks targeting Philippine actions in the South China Sea. Previous posts in the series have depicted the Philippines as a clown and a snake, among other unflattering animal and character portrayals. This escalation in rhetorical and symbolic aggression comes as the Philippines has deepened its security cooperation with the United States and other regional allies in recent years, stepping up its own patrols and resistance to Chinese territorial assertions in the contested areas.

TOKYO — Japan’s parliament is set to approve a controversial revision to the Imperial House Act on Friday, a piece of legislation that critics warn threatens the long-term survival of the country’s 1,500-year-old hereditary monarchy by entrenching a rigid male-only succession rule amid a rapidly shrinking and aging imperial household.

Under the existing law, women born into the imperial family are barred from ascending the Chrysanthemum Throne, even when they are the incumbent emperor’s direct eldest child. This rule blocks 24-year-old Princess Aiko, Emperor Naruhito’s only daughter and one of the most popular members of the royal family, from succeeding her father. Public support for Aiko’s accession remains widespread across Japan, but the law dictates the line of succession will next pass to Naruhito’s 60-year-old younger brother Crown Prince Akishino, followed by Akishino’s 19-year-old son Prince Hisahito — the first male royal child born into the immediate imperial family in four decades. After Hisahito, the next eligible heir is 90-year-old Prince Hitachi, Naruhito’s elderly uncle.

Today, only 5 of the 16 adult members of the imperial family are men, and there are no minor children in the household. This demographic collapse is the core backdrop to the legislative revision, which the government of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has framed as necessary to protect the purity of the paternal imperial bloodline, which conservative leaders argue is the only source of the emperor’s symbolic authority and legitimacy. While the current emperor’s mother is a commoner, the Imperial House Law requires all heirs to be born to men of royal descent.

The most contested provision in the revised law would allow the imperial family to adopt unmarried male descendants of distant paternal imperial branches, who gave up their royal status in post-World War II reforms, into the household to sire future heirs. A second, less controversial provision would allow princesses who marry commoners to retain their royal status and official duties, a change from current law that requires them to renounce their titles after marrying outside the imperial family. That change was added to address longstanding criticism of the existing rule that pushed princesses like Mako, Naruhito’s niece, to leave the imperial family entirely after marrying a commoner, a move many observers saw as an escape from the institution’s strict, suffocating constraints.

Scholars and critics have denounced the revision as an explicit move to block female monarchs and entrench patriarchal traditions, rather than a practical solution to the monarchy’s demographic crisis. “It’s a declaration to prevent female monarchs and to defend the male-lineage at all costs,” explained Hideya Kawanishi, a Nagoya University expert on Japanese monarchy. “They cannot say it’s male chauvinism, so they call it tradition.”

Prominent Japanese feminist scholar Chizuko Ueno pointed out the stark irony of the nation’s first female prime minister leading the push for male-only succession. She also criticized the framework’s dehumanizing approach to royal women, noting that it “treat male royals as stallions and put female royals under pressure as ‘childbearing machines’ to produce male offspring.” That pressure already took a documented toll on Empress Masako, a Harvard-educated former diplomat and commoner who developed a stress-related mental health condition after decades of public criticism for failing to produce a male heir following Princess Aiko’s birth.

Even former senior palace officials warn the male-only system leaves the monarchy extremely unstable after Prince Hisahito. “Because of the male-only succession rules and the dismissal of princesses who marry commoners, the monarchy after Hisahito is extremely unstable,” former Imperial Household Agency chief Shingo Haketa told Kyodo News recently.

Historians note the male-only system has not functioned as claimed throughout Japanese history: nearly half of all past emperors were born to concubines, a practice that was abolished 100 years ago under Emperor Taisho, Naruhito’s great-grandfather, eliminating the primary safety net that previously guaranteed male heirs. A 2005 government proposal to reform the law to allow female monarchs was scrapped after Prince Hisahito’s birth, leaving the crisis unaddressed.

Critics also question the practicality of the adoption provision. The distant male relatives eligible for adoption are at least 36 generations removed from Emperor Naruhito, tracing their shared lineage back to a common ancestor 600 years ago, after 51 members of 11 branch imperial families renounced their royal status in 1947 to reduce the postwar financial burden on the monarchy. Many question whether any of these distant relatives would agree to upend their lives to enter the highly restrictive imperial institution, where members have no control over their careers, housing, or personal choices. “Who wants the son of an adoptee who nobody knows to be emperor instead of Aiko?” asked Yoshinori Kobayashi, a cartoonist who has campaigned publicly for Aiko’s succession.

Asahiro Kuni, an 81-year-old former member of a renounced imperial branch who worked as an engineer for a major Japanese corporation, told TBS he would advise his own family to decline any invitation to rejoin the royal household. “It’s cruel to tell 15-year-olds to change the entire course of their life for this,” he said, adding he supports allowing female monarchs to lead the institution.

Polling and public commentary confirm broad public support for Princess Aiko’s accession. “The emperor is a symbolic figure, and I don’t see why women cannot serve in the role,” said Junichiro Tsujimura, 78-year-old founder of a popular sushi chain. Another Tokyo resident, 78-year-old Yoshio Iwase, noted Aiko is the emperor’s direct legitimate heir, adding that “there used to be female emperors in Japan’s history, so why not now?” Japan has had eight female monarchs in its history, with the last being Empress Gosakuramachi who ruled from 1762 to 1770.

Many observers also worry the government’s push to entrench male-only succession runs counter to the legacy of former Emperor Akihito, who abdicated in 2019 after working to modernize the monarchy, connect it closer to the Japanese public, and apologize for Japan’s actions in World War II. Palace watchers widely believe Akihito supports reform to allow female succession, and Emperor Naruhito has also signaled quiet disapproval of the current bill. In a June statement, Naruhito said he hoped discussions on the revision would reach a conclusion “that will gain understanding of the people” — a comment interpreted by observers as a subtle expression of his displeasure with the government’s approach.

Seventy-one years after a single activist’s 58-day hunger strike reshaped the political map of the world’s largest democracy, another Indian protester is testing the enduring power of voluntary self-denial as a political tool. Educationist and climate activist Sonam Wangchuk has now survived 19 days on nothing but salt water during an indefinite hunger strike in New Delhi, shedding more than 9 kilograms as he advocates for sweeping education reforms in support of the online satirical Cockroach Janta Party movement. As his health declines rapidly, public concern over his condition has grown, and the Delhi High Court has ordered the national government to monitor his vital signs and provide emergency medical intervention if required.

Wangchuk’s protest is far from an anomaly in India’s modern political history. No other nation has integrated the hunger strike into its political fabric as deeply as India, a tradition rooted in centuries of religious practice and refined into a core tool of anti-colonial resistance and post-independence activism. Long before the founding of the Indian republic, major South Asian faiths including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism have long framed voluntary fasting as a morally significant act of self-denial, a framework that Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of India’s independence movement, adapted to modern political struggle.

Between 1918 and his assassination in 1948, Gandhi undertook at least 15 major fasts to oppose religious violence, caste discrimination, and British colonial rule. He argued that a hunger strike was not an act of coercion, but a moral gesture of suffering designed to awaken the conscience of opponents and the public alike. His longest fast stretched 21 days, while his final 1948 fast, completed just weeks before his death, helped end communal bloodshed in Delhi. Writing on the eve of that fast, Gandhi described fasting as a peaceful alternative to violent resistance: “Fasting is his last resort in the place of the sword.”

The 1947 fast Gandhi held in Kolkata to end brutal religious rioting won praise even from critics of the tactic. The British-run *Statesman* newspaper noted at the time that while it had long disagreed with the use of fasting as a political tool, “never in a long career has Mahatma Gandhi, in our eyes, fasted in a simpler, worthier cause than this, not one calculated for immediate effective appeal to the public conscience.”

Independent India inherited this centuries-old tradition, and hunger strikes have since been deployed to demand action on nearly every major national issue: farmers’ rights, caste-based affirmative action, environmental protection, anti-corruption legislation, and the repeal of controversial national security laws. High-profile cases dot modern Indian history: In 2011, iconic activist Anna Hazare’s 13-day fast reignited a national anti-corruption movement that captured the attention of the entire country. In India’s northeast, activist Irom Sharmila refused all solid food for 16 years to protest the draconian Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, surviving only through forced nasal tube feeding by state authorities. Prominent social activist Medha Patkar has repeatedly held prolonged fasts to demand fair compensation and rehabilitation for communities displaced by large-scale dam projects.

While hunger strikes are a global protest tactic, used by suffragettes in Britain and Irish republican nationalists as a tool of anti-colonial resistance across the British Empire, scholars argue the practice holds unique weight in India. “But in India, where governments can become deeply unresponsive, protesters often see fasting as the only way to force those in power to act,” explains Sayantan Saha Roy, an anthropologist at the University of Connecticut who studies the politics of fasting. Saha Roy notes that Gandhi’s transformation of the ancient religious practice into a modern moral and political act created a uniquely rich tradition of hunger strike protest in the country. “In a world of self-interested politics, they stand out as acts of self-sacrifice. As the protester’s body weakens, the moral and political pressure on those in power grows.”

That pressure, however, depends on public engagement to succeed. “Hunger strikes have to be performative to be persuasive. They’re not just aimed at the state, but at the public, whose outrage can pressure those in power,” Saha Roy says. He points to the 1970s and 1980s Irish republican hunger strikes as an example of how the tactic works: by framing their suffering as proof of the state’s cruelty, protesters sought to mobilize public support for their cause. “But there’s no guarantee the audience will respond, which is what makes hunger strikes such a precarious form of protest.”

For all its deep cultural roots, the hunger strike has faced consistent criticism from India’s leading political thinkers since independence. If Gandhi elevated the tactic to a respected moral weapon, B.R. Ambedkar, the architect of the Indian constitution, was deeply skeptical of its use in a democratic republic. In a 1949 landmark speech, Ambedkar argued that once constitutional channels for redress were established, fasting and civil disobedience should be replaced by formal democratic processes, warning that unregulated direct action became the “grammar of anarchy.” “The sooner they are abandoned, the better for us,” he said.

That debate has persisted into the 21st century. During Anna Hazare’s 2011 anti-corruption fast, leading political philosopher Pratap Bhanu Mehta argued that high-profile hunger strikes can become “deeply coercive.” When tied to a protester’s moral authority, he wrote, a fast unto death “amounts to blackmail.”

Public skepticism has grown in recent years, fueled by a wave of performative, short-duration fasts staged by politicians for media attention. Social media is regularly filled with jokes and allegations that politicians sneak meals behind closed doors, ending staged “fasts” with lavish private feasts. Many fasts last only a few hours, while others are carefully produced media spectacles complete with branded stages, live news coverage, and pre-planned photo opportunities. Not all acts of self-denial carry the same moral or political weight, as historical outcomes reflect: Potti Sriramulu’s 1952 fast, which ended in his death on the 58th day, ultimately forced Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s government to create the new state of Andhra for Telugu-speaking people, a change that paved the way for the full linguistic reorganization of India’s state borders. By contrast, Hazare’s high-profile 2011 fast galvanized public support but saw its momentum fade quickly, and Sharmila’s 16-year protest failed to force a repeal of the law she opposed.

From a medical perspective, prolonged hunger strikes are always simultaneously a political action and a life-threatening emergency. After two weeks without solid food, the human body begins breaking down muscle tissue as well as stored fat, and electrolyte imbalances can trigger fatal cardiac arrhythmias. Even ending a fast carries risks, as reintroducing food too quickly can cause life-threatening metabolic complications. It is common practice for Indian authorities to hospitalize hunger strikers and administer forced feeding to prevent death, a practice that has been widely criticized by activists.

As Wangchuk’s health continues to decline, a growing coalition of opposition leaders, fellow activists, artists, and public figures have called on him to end his fast. Yet despite widespread cynicism toward staged protest fasts, the belief that voluntary suffering can shift political outcomes in ways speeches and marches cannot remains deeply rooted in Indian political culture.

Wangchuk’s protest follows the long-established script of Gandhian fasting, Saha Roy explains: “In the public demonstration of his suffering, Wangchuk seems to be following Gandhi’s path. As his health deteriorates, his protest gains traction and raises the political stakes for the government. How this unfolds remains to be seen.”

The outcome of Wangchuk’s fast will not only determine the fate of his demand for education reform: it will also offer a new measure of the enduring power of one of India’s oldest and most controversial political rituals.

In a move that has reignited debates over U.S. press freedom and escalated bilateral tensions with Beijing, the Trump administration announced Thursday sweeping changes to visa rules for foreign journalists working in the United States, slashing maximum stays from multi-year terms to just 240 days for most correspondents and imposing an even harsher 90-day limit exclusively for Chinese journalists.

The new regulation, unveiled by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), scraps the longstanding “duration of status” framework, which allowed eligible foreign journalists to remain in the U.S. for as long as they maintained their professional credentials. It will replace this flexible system with fixed-term stays, though officials note that visa extensions remain available for eligible applicants. The 90-day cap for Chinese journalists excludes correspondents based in Hong Kong and Macau, the U.S. confirmed.

DHS officials defend the change as a critical update to national security screening protocols. When the proposal was first introduced in August 2025, the agency argued that the growing population of foreign journalists in the U.S. had created new challenges for monitoring nonimmigrant visitors, and fixed-term stays would enable more thorough, recurring vetting to ensure all working journalists abide by the terms of their visas. The policy also extends the fixed-term replacement of “duration of status” to international students and temporary foreign visitors, aligning all these nonimmigrant categories under the new screening structure.

But press freedom advocacy groups have roundly condemned the new rules, warning they will severely undermine the ability of international correspondents to cover U.S. news and erode America’s global reputation as a defender of free speech. Reporters Without Borders called the shift from up to five-year stays to an 8-month maximum a cruel restriction that effectively cripples international news outlets’ ability to maintain permanent operations in the U.S. The organization added that the constant cycle of renewal applications will create a chilling effect, pushing journalists to self-censor to avoid angering the administration and having their extensions rejected.

The Committee to Protect Journalists echoed this criticism, framing the policy as a retreat from democratic values that betrays the U.S.’s self-proclaimed role as a global vanguard of free expression.

This is not the first time the Trump administration has pushed for this change. The first Trump term first proposed visa limits for foreign journalists in 2020, but the plan was scrapped in 2021 when Joe Biden took office. While the Biden administration did tighten visa rules for Chinese journalists to 90 days amid rising bilateral tensions in 2020, responding to restrictions placed on U.S. reporters in China after three Wall Street Journal reporters were expelled, it later relaxed the policy to extend maximum stays for Chinese correspondents to one year.

The decision to impose a country-specific 90-day cap comes as the Trump administration has ramped up anti-media rhetoric and targeted domestic news outlets with a wave of threats and legal action, even as it has pushed for broader restrictions on immigration across all categories. While foreign journalists are classified as nonimmigrants rather than immigrants, the rule aligns with the administration’s broader push for tighter border and entry controls.

Chinese officials have already pushed back hard against the new policy, framing it as a discriminatory measure that unfairly targets Chinese media operations. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian told reporters in Beijing that the rule will disrupt the normal work of Chinese media outlets in the U.S. and urged Washington to immediately reverse the discriminatory policy and protect the legal rights of Chinese journalists working in the country. Lin added that China retains the full right to implement reciprocal countermeasures in response to the U.S. move.

The new rule will go into effect 60 days after its formal publication in the Federal Register. While Congress holds the authority to reject the regulation, such a move is widely considered extremely rare in practice. Analysts warn the new restrictions will add new strain to already fraught U.S.-China relations, even though leaders of both countries have recently signaled they intend to work toward stabilizing bilateral ties.

In a high-stakes move that reshapes regional diplomatic dynamics, Iraq’s Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has ordered the creation of a specialized high-level investigative committee to probe networks smuggling advanced weapons from Iraq through Syria to Lebanon’s Iran-aligned Hezbollah, in direct coordination with Syria’s new post-Assad administration.

The announcement follows a confirmed seizure by Syrian security forces earlier this Thursday, which foiled an attempted smuggling operation along the Syria-Iraq border. According to Syria’s state-owned news agency Sana, citing an anonymous interior ministry source, the intercepted cache was explicitly bound for Hezbollah and contained a lethal arsenal including long-range missiles, anti-armor guided munitions, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Iraq’s Joint Operations Command, a military body that reports directly to the prime minister’s office, has pledged full accountability for any officials found complicit in the smuggling activity. The command emphasized that the investigation is focused on protecting the integrity of Iraq’s shared border, upholding national stability, and blocking actions that threaten the country’s national security.

The probe comes against a shifting geopolitical backdrop in the Middle East. Syria’s current ruling administration took power in December 2024 after ousting former President Bashar al-Assad, a long-standing close ally of both Iran and Iraq. During Syria’s decade-long civil war, multiple Iraqi armed factions deployed into Syrian territory to back Assad against opposition forces, with some of these factions holding key influence over the Iraqi government that took office in May 2024.

Like all preceding Iraqi governments, Iraq’s current administration has navigated a precarious balancing act between its eastern neighbor Iran and the United States alongside its Western and regional allies. Even as Baghdad has moved to build constructive diplomatic ties with Syria’s new government and support efforts to stabilize the war-torn country, it has faced sustained pressure from Washington to crack down on Iran-aligned armed groups operating within its borders, particularly those targeting U.S. and Israeli assets across the Middle East.

The escalating standoff between the U.S. and Iran has pushed Iraqi leaders to reiterate their commitment to cooperation with Washington, with al-Zaidi overseeing negotiations to expand bilateral partnership during an official visit to the U.S. capital this week.

Hayder al-Shakeri, a research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa program at London-based think tank Chatham House, explained that the investigation serves a clear diplomatic purpose. Al-Shakeri told Middle East Eye that the move allows Baghdad to demonstrate it operates independently of pro-Iran armed factions, sending a clear signal to the U.S. that the Iraqi government is ready to assert tighter control over unregulated cross-border networks.

However, al-Shakeri also cautioned that the true nature of the policy shift remains to be seen. “But whether this reflects a genuine, sustained policy shift, rather than a tactical gesture, will depend on whether the government follows through with arrests, prosecutions, tighter border enforcement, and action against the political or security figures protecting these networks,” he said.