Global Pulse

分类： politics

  • Starmer says NATO in US’s ‘interests’ as Gulf tour ends

    Starmer says NATO in US’s ‘interests’ as Gulf tour ends

    As British Prime Minister Keir Starmer wrapped up a three-day diplomatic tour across the Gulf region on Friday, he delivered a clear defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, emphasizing that the decades-old security alliance serves core national interests of the United States alongside European powers. His remarks come in direct response to renewed public criticism and withdrawal threats from U.S. President Donald Trump, who lashed out at the alliance this week after NATO allies declined to join the U.S.-led Israel campaign against Iran.

    “It is in America’s interests. It is in European interests,” Starmer told reporters from UK broadcasters ahead of his departure from Doha, Qatar — the final stop of his regional itinerary that also included stops in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The 76-year-old defensive alliance, he argued, has delivered generations of improved security for all member states that would not exist without its framework. Starmer also reiterated his long-held position that European NATO members must step up to shoulder a greater share of the alliance’s financial costs, a point that has been a core demand from multiple U.S. administrations in recent years.

    Ahead of his departure from Qatar, Starmer confirmed he held a detailed phone call with Trump on Thursday evening, where he outlined on-the-ground perspectives from Gulf leaders focused heavily on the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical energy and trade chokepoints. The strategic waterway has been mostly closed to commercial traffic in recent days, putting global energy supplies at major risk. A temporary US-Iran ceasefire announced earlier this week was supposed to reopen the strait, but the deal has been thrown into jeopardy following Israeli strikes on Lebanon and widespread accusations from both sides that the truce terms are not being honored.

    Starmer noted that the bulk of his conversation with Trump centered on developing a coordinated practical plan to restore free navigation through the strait, and outlined the United Kingdom’s leading role in the emerging response. “We spent most of the time on the call talking about the practical plan that’s going to be needed to get navigation through the strait and the role that the UK is playing,” Starmer said. He confirmed London is currently assembling a coalition of more than 30 countries to develop both diplomatic and military frameworks to reopen the waterway to commercial vessel traffic.

    The tour also revealed Starmer’s growing frustration with the economic fallout of ongoing regional conflicts, with the British leader drawing sharp criticism of both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin for the volatility driving global energy costs. “I’m fed up with the fact that families across the country see their bills go up and down on energy, businesses’ bills go up and down on energy, because of the actions of Putin or Trump,” he said in an earlier interview during the tour, connecting geopolitical conflict directly to household economic strain in the UK.

    In additional diplomatic activity before wrapping up his trip, Starmer held a separate phone call with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, ahead of upcoming ceasefire negotiations scheduled to take place in Pakistan. A Downing Street readout of the call confirmed that Starmer thanked Sharif for his “critical role” in negotiating the existing temporary two-week truce that is currently holding in the region, as international actors work toward a longer-term de-escalation.

  • Top DPRK leader meets Chinese FM

    Top DPRK leader meets Chinese FM

    PYONGYANG – A high-profile diplomatic engagement took place in the DPRK capital on Friday, where Kim Jong-un, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and President of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), held formal talks with visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Wang, who also serves as a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, used the meeting to outline key priorities for bilateral cooperation between the two neighboring nations. During the discussion, Wang stated that China remains fully committed to collaborating with the DPRK to turn the important consensus reached by the top leadership of both countries and ruling parties into tangible progress, advancing mutually beneficial practical cooperation across multiple sectors. Against the backdrop of a shifting global landscape marked by overlapping geopolitical shifts and widespread uncertainty, Wang also emphasized the growing need for deeper communication and coordinated policy between Beijing and Pyongyang on major international and regional issues. This meeting marks a key milestone in ongoing diplomatic exchanges between China and the DPRK, coming as both countries navigate an increasingly complex global order.

  • Why Iran could be the one to finally kill Netanyahu’s career

    Why Iran could be the one to finally kill Netanyahu’s career

    Late Tuesday, Israelis fell asleep amid soaring tensions, after a stark threat from then-US President Donald Trump to erase Iranian civilization. Overnight, however, the landscape shifted dramatically: Trump had unexpectedly reached a ceasefire agreement with the Islamic Republic, ending a short but devastating regional conflict.

    Following the White House announcement, Iranian state media released the 10 core terms that underpin Tehran’s agreement to the truce. Key provisions include a full permanent halt to cross-hostilities between Washington and Tehran, authorization for Iran to continue its domestic uranium enrichment program, formal security guarantees for Iran’s regional allied groups, war reparations for damage inflicted during joint US-Israeli strikes, and the right for Iran to impose transit fees on all commercial vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

    If these terms are formalized into a lasting US-Iran peace deal, political analysts widely agree it could spell the end of Benjamin Netanyahu’s decades-long political career. As a recent New York Times investigation revealed, Netanyahu was the primary driving force behind the conflict, single-handedly pressuring Trump to enter the war on Israel’s behalf. A ceasefire that leaves Iran strengthened would not only end his political run but also tarnish the hardline legacy he has spent decades building.

    Netanyahu launched the conflict on February 28 with an explicit goal: to topple Iran’s ruling Islamic establishment. As Iran withstood weeks of intense strikes without caving to US demands, he gradually walked back that ambition, shifting his stated objective to weakening Iran enough to strip it of its status as a major regional power. He also sought to position Israel as the primary proxy through which the US would manage Middle East affairs—an outcome that never materialized.

    Today, Iran’s ruling government remains fully intact, retains full control over its ballistic missile program, retains the capacity to restart full-scale nuclear activities, and has consolidated authority over the Strait of Hormuz, the global energy market’s most critical chokepoint. Many regional analysts now assess that Iran will emerge from the conflict as the most powerful state in the Middle East—a complete reversal of Netanyahu’s core war aims. For 30 years, Netanyahu has framed Iran as an existential threat to Israel and Western influence in the region; the conflict he pushed for has only turned that threat into a more formidable power.

    Beyond Netanyahu’s personal political standing, the new ceasefire terms also put the long-term future of the Abraham Accords at risk. The agreements, which normalized relations between Israel and several Gulf Arab states, were built on the framework of excluding the Palestinian issue from negotiations. If Iran solidifies control over the Strait of Hormuz, those same Gulf states will become increasingly dependent on Iranian approval to export their oil and natural gas to global markets. The conflict also exposed the weakness of Gulf states, which failed to respond to Iranian incursions on their territory despite their long-standing security alliances with Washington. This has fueled growing doubt among Gulf leaders about the reliability of US and Israeli security guarantees, opening the door to a gradual shift away from American regional dominance.

    The ceasefire also lays bare another major failure for Netanyahu: his claimed victory over Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement. After a November 2024 ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, Netanyahu and Israeli military leadership marketed a narrative of total defeat to the Israeli public, claiming the group had been dismantled as a military force and no longer posed a threat to northern Israel. For months, Israeli strikes across Lebanon went unanswered, reinforcing the perception that Hezbollah was broken. But when Hezbollah launched a massive retaliatory attack after Israeli forces killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, it shocked both the Israeli public and military leadership. A leaked conversation from the head of Israel’s Northern Command confirmed that military officials had massively underestimated Hezbollah’s remaining capabilities. Since the broader war began, the group has fired an average of 200 missiles into northern Israel daily, crippling economic and civilian life in the region. Now that Iran has demanded the ceasefire include Lebanon, Netanyahu faces political catastrophe: if the demand is met, the Iran-led Axis of Resistance—encompassing Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthi movement, and Iraqi paramilitaries—will gain formal international recognition for the first time. Netanyahu will be unable to convince Israeli voters, especially displaced residents of the north, that he defeated Hezbollah when he is forced to end the conflict by Iranian pressure.

    Across the board, Netanyahu’s war has ended in failure. He convinced the world’s sole superpower to join his campaign to topple the Iranian government, only to leave Iran stronger than before. He claimed to have destroyed Hezbollah, only to see the group emerge as a more potent threat to northern Israel. A Haaretz journalist recently captured the moment perfectly, comparing Netanyahu’s obsession with Iran to Captain Ahab’s obsessive hunt for Moby Dick in Herman Melville’s classic novel: just as Ahab’s obsession destroyed him, Iran’s new strength could end Netanyahu’s political career.

    Contrary to expectations that wartime rallying would boost his support, opinion polls conducted during the conflict have shown no gain for Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition. With a national election looming, current polling puts his bloc at roughly 50 seats, 11 short of the 61-seat majority needed to form a new government. Even his core base of right-wing voters is growing disillusioned: for years, his supporters framed him as a leader divinely ordained to reshape the Middle East in Israel’s favor, a narrative that collapses now that Iran has emerged stronger. Even if his most loyal base remains intact, Netanyahu will struggle to rebuild trust with other segments of Israeli society, and disaffected right-wing voters are expected to defect to center-right, centrist, and center-left opposition parties.

    Even after Trump’s ceasefire announcement, the Israeli military has continued its strikes against targets in Lebanon, a move Iran has labeled a deliberate violation of the truce. Tehran has already threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to the continued attacks, leaving the ceasefire on extremely shaky ground. Analysts say Netanyahu’s continued aggression is no accident: backed into a corner politically, he has every incentive to sabotage the ceasefire to drag the US back into open war, in a last-ditch effort to salvage his political future and hardline legacy as the leader who secured Israeli dominance in the Middle East. Under heavy US pressure, Netanyahu hinted this Thursday that he was open to direct peace negotiations with the Lebanese government, but few analysts believe he will abandon his push to reverse the ceasefire. For a leader fighting for his political survival, there is little to lose in risking regional war to preserve his legacy.

  • Trinidad’s prime minister escalates feud with Caribbean neighbors over US policy in the region

    Trinidad’s prime minister escalates feud with Caribbean neighbors over US policy in the region

    A simmering diplomatic dispute between Trinidad and Tobago and its fellow Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states erupted into open confrontation Friday, as Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar doubled down on her demand that bloc Secretary-General Carla Barnett leave office when her five-year term expires this August.

    The rift at the heart of the conflict traces back to late 2025, when the United States deployed an unusually large military contingent near Venezuela’s borders in preparation for operations targeting then-Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. The move split the 15-nation regional trade bloc, with most CARICOM leaders rejecting the U.S. military deployment and reaffirming their longstanding commitment to keeping the Caribbean a formal “zone of peace.”

    Persad-Bissessar, who won Trinidad and Tobago’s general election one year ago, has broken sharply with that regional consensus. She has publicly dismissed the zone of peace framework as “zone of peace fakery,” and openly thrown her administration’s support behind both U.S. military strikes in the South Caribbean and the Trump administration’s broad crackdown on transnational drug trafficking and organized crime.

    In a statement late last year, as the U.S. finalized its operational plans against Maduro, Persad-Bissessar argued that CARICOM had incorrectly taken sides with what she called “the Maduro narco-government” under the false pretense of the zone of peace agreement. Her comments came as multiple regional governments raised formal complaints over the civilian harm and alleged illegality of deadly U.S. boat strikes carried out as part of the anti-drug campaign.

    The prime minister’s months-long campaign to oust Barnett has grown increasingly intense, ultimately forcing CARICOM leaders to hold an emergency summit Friday to discuss the secretary-general’s planned reappointment. As leverage to push her agenda, Persad-Bissessar has repeatedly reminded fellow leaders that Trinidad and Tobago contributes roughly 22% of CARICOM’s total annual operating budget, equal to approximately $20 million. She has made clear that her administration holds deep dissatisfaction with the bloc’s current policy direction, saying she cannot understand why the majority of regional states have aligned with Venezuela and Maduro rather than backing the U.S. position on counter-narcotics and regional security.

  • Prince Harry sued for defamation by charity Sentebale he co-founded

    Prince Harry sued for defamation by charity Sentebale he co-founded

    Court records have revealed a stunning development in the long-running rift at Sentebale, the African youth-focused charity once co-chaired by Britain’s Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex: the organization itself has launched a defamation suit against the royal and a former fellow trustee.

    The case, which was formally filed with UK courts on March 24, names Prince Harry and Mark Dyer, another ex-trustee of the organization, as defendants, with the legal claim categorized as covering defamation through both libel and slander. No additional supporting court documents have been made public as of yet, and neither representatives for Prince Harry nor Sentebale’s current leadership have issued any further comment clarifying the specific details behind the legal action.

    The conflict that led to this lawsuit stretches back months, rooted in a bitter power struggle over the charity’s strategic and operational management. Prince Harry exited Sentebale alongside his co-founder, Prince Seeiso of Lesotho, and a group of aligned trustees in March 2025, following heated disagreements with Sophie Chandauka, the charity’s sitting chair. The acrimony of the split played out largely in public view, prompting a formal regulatory probe by the UK Charity Commission.

    That investigation ultimately concluded that fault for the breakdown lay with all parties involved. The regulator also issued sharp criticism over the decision to air internal disputes openly, noting that the public conflict had caused measurable harm to Sentebale’s mission and reputation.

    Founded in 2006 by Prince Harry and Prince Seeiso, Sentebale operates across Lesotho and Botswana, with a core mission to advance the health, mental wellbeing, and life outcomes for vulnerable young people across southern Africa, particularly those living with HIV and AIDS. The organization has drawn high-profile royal and celebrity support for nearly two decades, making this internal split and subsequent lawsuit an extraordinary turn of events for a charity focused on impactful on-the-ground development work.

  • China asks Japan to take practical steps to safeguard ties

    China asks Japan to take practical steps to safeguard ties

    In a formal statement issued on Friday, China has called on Japan to acknowledge and correct its recent missteps, urging Tokyo to implement tangible measures to protect the long-standing political foundation that underpins bilateral relations between the two nations.

    The development comes immediately after Japan’s cabinet released its widely-watched annual Diplomatic Bluebook this Friday, which included a notable downgrade in how Tokyo characterizes its relationship with Beijing. For multiple years prior to 2025, Japan had referred to China as “one of Japan’s most important bilateral relations”; this year, the wording was revised sharply to only “an important neighbor.”

    Mao Ning, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told reporters that the root of the current strained trajectory in China-Japan relations can be traced directly to inaccurate and harmful remarks made by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi regarding the Taiwan question.

    Mao emphasized that these inappropriate remarks have not only severely damaged the core political foundation that has allowed constructive China-Japan engagement for decades, but also pose a clear challenge to the rules-based post-WWII international order that regional stability depends on.

    Closing her remarks, the spokesperson reiterated that Japan must abide by the four core political agreements signed between the two countries and honor all binding commitments Tokyo has already made to bilateral relations, in order to reverse the current downward trend in ties and prevent further escalation of tensions.

  • Mali backs Morocco’s plan for disputed Western Sahara, ending support for the Sahrawi Republic

    Mali backs Morocco’s plan for disputed Western Sahara, ending support for the Sahrawi Republic

    In a significant shift that reshapes the geopolitical landscape of North Africa, the West African nation of Mali announced Friday its formal endorsement of Morocco’s controversial plan to resolve the decades-long Western Sahara dispute, committing to the framework that grants regional autonomy under permanent Moroccan sovereignty. As a core component of this new policy, Mali’s transitional ruling government has formally withdrawn its prior recognition of the pro-independence Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), joining a growing bloc of African nations, the former U.S. Trump administration, and a majority of European Union member states that have thrown their support behind Rabat’s proposal.

    The official announcement was made in a public statement published by Mali’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which emphasized that “the Republic of Mali supports the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco as the only serious and credible basis for resolving this dispute and considers that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the most realistic solution.”

    The Western Sahara conflict, one of the world’s longest-running unresolved territorial disputes, has its roots in the end of Spanish colonial rule over the territory in 1975. A vast phosphate-rich coastal desert roughly equal in size to the U.S. state of Colorado, the territory is claimed by both Morocco and the Polisario Front, a pro-independence movement that represents the indigenous Sahrawi people and maintains its base of operations out of Sahrawi refugee camps in southwestern Algeria. For decades, the two sides have clashed over control of the region, with competing claims to full sovereignty over the territory.

    Most recently, the international community has coalesced around a new framework for negotiations, anchored by a United Nations Security Council resolution adopted in October 2025 that elevated Morocco’s autonomy plan to the central position in global conflict resolution efforts. The resolution does not set a binding outcome for the territory’s final status, but it explicitly characterizes the Moroccan initiative as a “serious, credible, and realistic” foundation for reaching a lasting political settlement, and designates the plan as the official basis for future negotiations between parties.

    Consistent with past Security Council resolutions on the issue, the 2025 text makes no reference to a full self-determination referendum that would include independence as a voting option — a solution that has long been the non-negotiable demand of the Polisario Front and its international backers, which include Algeria, Russia, and China.

    In recent years, Western Sahara has moved beyond a frozen conflict zone to emerge as an attractive destination for cross-border investment, as global firms from Europe and the United States have shown growing interest in developing the territory’s untapped economic potential. Key sectors drawing outside investment include commercial fishing, large-scale agricultural development, and cross-border infrastructure projects that would enable transmission of renewable wind and solar energy generated in the region, turning the disputed desert territory into a growing hub for clean energy development.

  • On Iran truce, all sides want bigger China role, but does China?

    On Iran truce, all sides want bigger China role, but does China?

    For nearly a century, Washington has positioned itself as the unchallenged guardian of regional stability across the Middle East, building deep military alliances with both Israel and Gulf Arab monarchies while consistently sidelining Beijing’s ambitions to play a larger diplomatic and security role in the strategically critical region. That long-held narrative of a US-led regional order has recently been fractured by the cross-border escalation between Israel, the United States and Iran, which has upended long-held assumptions about deterrence in the Gulf. Far from being cowed by Washington’s persistent military deployment in the region, Tehran launched retaliatory strikes against Gulf Arab states that had long been viewed as secure under US security umbrella, directly exposing the gaps in the decades-old US-led framework.

    In the moments before a devastating escalation, China played a quiet but pivotal part in pulling the region back from the brink of all-out war. Yet in a striking paradox, Beijing has refused to claim credit for its diplomatic intervention, a choice that experts trace to careful strategic calculation: Beijing judges that deeper, more public involvement in Middle East security carries major risks, while the current post-escalation status quo — where US influence appears weakened but Washington remains committed to shouldering the burden of Gulf security — already serves China’s core interests.

    Former US President Donald Trump, in an interview with Agence France-Presse, credited Chinese diplomatic pressure for pushing Iran to agree to the two-week ceasefire, a breakthrough that came barely an hour before Trump’s public threat to obliterate Iranian infrastructure and cultural sites was set to take effect. This account was independently corroborated by a senior Pakistani government official, who told reporters that Chinese negotiators stepped in to convince Iranian leadership to accept the truce at a moment when international hopes for a de-escalation were all but gone.

    Despite these accounts from third parties, Beijing’s own public statements on the ceasefire have been deliberately muted. Chinese officials have confirmed their support for the truce but have made no effort to highlight or celebrate their own diplomatic work behind the scenes.

    Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Washington-based Stimson Center, noted that this low-key approach is unusual for Chinese diplomacy, and suggested that Iran may have deliberately framed China as the key peace broker for strategic purposes. “Iran has singled out China as a potential security guarantor so there is an incentive on the part of Iran in presenting the optics of China playing an oversized role, in the hope that China would then be accountable for the implementation of the ceasefire,” she explained. “China doesn’t provide security guarantees and how do you even try to guarantee something with President Trump? It would just create problems for China down the road,” she added.

    Diplomatic moves continue this week, with US Vice President JD Vance set to open talks with Iranian officials in Pakistan on Saturday. Pakistan maintains close bilateral ties with China, and has actively courted the Trump administration in recent months, in large part to seek US backing in its ongoing territorial and diplomatic disputes with India.

    Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, struck a careful balance in his official comment, saying that China “welcomes all efforts conducive to peace and supports Pakistan in actively undertaking mediation.” He added, “As a responsible major power, China will continue to play a constructive role and make efforts to de-escalate tensions and quell the conflict.”

    Beyond diplomacy, China holds extensive economic stakes across the Middle East. As the world’s second-largest economy, China draws roughly half of its total oil imports from the region, though it has gradually reduced this reliance in recent years through rapid expansion of renewable energy capacity. Beijing has also been the most prominent country defying longstanding unilateral US sanctions on Iranian oil exports, and it stands to gain additional economic advantages after Tehran consolidated its control over the Strait of Hormuz, the critical chokepoint through which a fifth of global oil supplies pass daily.

    This is not Beijing’s first major diplomatic breakthrough in the region: in 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced the restoration of full diplomatic relations during talks hosted in Beijing, a deal that the Biden administration at the time deliberately downplayed to minimize China’s diplomatic influence.

    One senior regional diplomat based in the Gulf summed up Beijing’s approach, saying, “China’s strategy in the Middle East has been masterful. It has dominated business and never fired a single bullet, but with the changes in the region it knows it needs a political element.”

    Lyle Morris, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, noted that Trump’s decision to credit China for the ceasefire may also be rooted in his own diplomatic agenda. Morris suggested Trump may be seeking to improve bilateral goodwill ahead of his planned visit to Beijing next month, where he intends to push for concessions on trade and other key issues. Still, Morris emphasized that Beijing ultimately has far fewer core stakes in the conflict than the United States, Iran, Israel and the Gulf states. “China’s not a primary actor here,” Morris said. “Ultimately, it’s a supporting role, just by the nature of their capacity and their stakes in the conflict.”

    Even as Beijing regularly criticizes US global military dominance, it has almost no history of large-scale military deployments outside of Asia, and few analysts expect it to seek to directly replace the US security presence in the Middle East. Henry Tugendhat, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who focuses on China’s regional role, pointed out that Beijing’s top military priority remains focusing its forces near the South China Sea and Taiwan, the self-governing democracy that China claims as its own territory.

    “At the end of the day, China’s greatest interest in the region is simply stability for the economic relations it seeks to foster with the region,” Tugendhat said. “So it may yet accept a return to US security guarantees as their least bad option but that also depends on what’s negotiated by all parties at the conclusion of this conflict.”

  • Cross-Strait travel sees sharp increases under new policies

    Cross-Strait travel sees sharp increases under new policies

    New policy adjustments to streamline cross-Strait travel have delivered tangible, positive results, driving a notable year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter increase in people-to-people exchanges across the Taiwan Strait in the first quarter of 2026, according to official data released Friday by China’s National Immigration Administration (NIA).

    NIA spokesperson Lyu Ning announced that demand from Taiwan residents for travel permits to visit the Chinese mainland has expanded steadily since the implementation of two key easing measures rolled out in 2025. Starting July 1 last year, the mainland scrapped document processing fees for first-time permit applicants from Taiwan. Then, on November 20, the mainland expanded the number of ports authorized to issue on-arrival one-time travel permits for Taiwan residents from 58 to 100. This expanded network now covers 56 airports, 27 water ports, and 17 rail and highway ports across the mainland, greatly expanding access for Taiwan residents traveling from different regions and routes.

    Official statistics show that total applications for mainland travel permits from Taiwan residents climbed 11.8 percent year-on-year in the first three months of 2026, while the total number of Taiwan visitor arrivals to the mainland jumped 27.6 percent compared to the same period last year. Compared to the fourth quarter of 2025, applications from first-time Taiwan visitors to the mainland rose 4.5 percent, and applications for on-arrival one-time permits at ports increased 24.7 percent quarter-on-quarter.

    In addition to measures benefiting Taiwan residents traveling to the mainland, a third policy change introduced in November 2025 removed geographic restrictions for mainland residents applying for family visit endorsements to Taiwan. Previously, applicants were required to submit their materials at local immigration offices in their registered hukou (residence) region; the new policy allows mainland residents to submit applications at any immigration office across the mainland, regardless of their place of registration. This reform has drastically cut the time and financial costs for mainland residents seeking to travel to Taiwan to reunite with family members who reside on the island.

    Data shows travel from the mainland to Taiwan has also grown steadily following the policy adjustments. In the first quarter of 2026, total applications for travel endorsements to Taiwan from mainland residents increased 8.2 percent quarter-on-quarter. Family visit endorsements accounted for 21.8 percent of all endorsement applications, marking a 24.2 percent rise from the previous quarter, and the total number of trips made by mainland residents to Taiwan rose 10.7 percent quarter-on-quarter.

    Lyu emphasized that since the new policies took effect, both port-of-entry permit applications from Taiwan residents and family visits from the mainland to Taiwan have registered consistent growth, with the tangible benefits of the easing measures continuing to emerge for people on both sides of the Strait. The policies have not only made entry and exit procedures safer and more convenient for Taiwan residents around the globe seeking to travel to the mainland, but have also removed longstanding barriers to family reunions for cross-Strait families.

    Looking ahead, Lyu confirmed that China’s immigration authorities will continue rolling out additional targeted measures to further facilitate cross-Strait travel, support deeper integrated development across the Taiwan Strait, advance people-to-people exchanges and practical cooperation, and better serve the interests and needs of residents on both sides of the Strait.

  • What’s behind Péter Magyar’s ascent from a government insider to Orbán’s top challenger

    What’s behind Péter Magyar’s ascent from a government insider to Orbán’s top challenger

    Hungary stands on the cusp of a political earthquake this Sunday, as a one-time insider to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s long-ruling political machine has emerged as the most credible threat to the nationalist leader’s 16-year hold on power. For 45-year-old Péter Magyar, leader of the upstart opposition Tisza Party, the path to the precipice of national office has been nothing short of meteoric — a rapid ascent that has redefined the country’s political landscape in less than two years.

    Magyar’s political roots stretch deep into Orbán’s orbit. Born in 1981, just a few years before the collapse of Hungary’s communist regime, he developed an early fascination with politics, cutting his teeth watching parliamentary debates as a grade schooler and joining pro-democracy demonstrations alongside his parents. Like many young Hungarian conservatives of his generation, he admired Orbán’s early anti-Soviet liberal firebrand, and joined Orbán’s Fidesz party in 2002 at just 21 years old, quickly building connections with the party’s rising stars — including Gergely Gulyás, who would go on to become Orbán’s chief of staff.

    After earning a law degree from a leading Catholic university in 2003, Magyar built his legal career, gaining public profile in 2006 by providing pro bono representation to anti-government protesters arrested during violent unrest against the ruling Socialist government, when Fidesz was still in opposition. That same year, he married Judit Varga, a fellow lawyer who would later rise to become one of Orbán’s most prominent cabinet ministers. The couple relocated to Brussels in 2009, where Varga served as an advisor to a Hungarian Member of the European Parliament; while abroad, Magyar balanced work as a diplomat with Hungary’s permanent EU mission and a stint as a stay-at-home parent to the couple’s three children.

    Returning to Hungary permanently in 2018, Magyar stepped into senior leadership roles at multiple state-affiliated institutions, as Varga’s political star ascended within Fidesz: she was appointed justice minister in 2019, and alongside then-president Katalin Novák, was widely tipped as a potential future successor to Orbán. But a 2024 political upheaval would upend Magyar’s life and reshape Hungarian politics forever.

    By 2023, Magyar and Varga’s marriage had ended in divorce, and the following year, a sweeping pardon scandal brought down Hungary’s highest office. Novák was revealed to have issued a pardon to a convicted accomplice in a high-profile child sexual abuse case, a decision that sparked national outrage and forced Novák’s resignation. Varga, who had endorsed the pardon, also stepped down from her positions. Within 24 hours, Magyar delivered a viral bombshell: a lengthy public interview with Hungary’s leading independent YouTube channel Partizán, where he formally cut ties with Fidesz and accused Orbán’s government of systemic corruption and rule by and for a tiny clique of political and economic insiders.

    In a country of fewer than 10 million people, the interview racked up more than 2 million views, catapulting Magyar from a little-known political insider to a household name overnight. In the weeks that followed, he ramped up his criticism of the Orbán administration and organized mass public gatherings; on March 15, Hungary’s national independence holiday, he addressed thousands of cheering supporters in central Budapest and announced the launch of a new political movement that would soon become the Tisza Party. Just three months later, Tisza captured 30% of the national vote in the 2024 European Parliament elections, earning Magyar a seat as an EU lawmaker and cementing Tisza’s status as a major national political force. In the wake of the split, Varga has accused Magyar of abusive conduct during their marriage, claims Magyar has vehemently denied, framing them as a coordinated smear campaign by Fidesz to discredit him.

    With just 48 hours remaining before Sunday’s national election, nearly all public opinion polls show Tisza holding a double-digit lead over Fidesz — a milestone no opposition party has achieved since Orbán returned to power in 2010. For many of Magyar’s supporters, his decades inside the Fidesz system are his greatest strength: only someone who has seen Orbán’s governing model from the inside, they argue, can dismantle it. Others remain wary of his past ties to the ruling elite, a divide that underscores the unusual nature of his challenge.

    Magyar has framed his political career as a story of internal dissent, arguing that he pushed for reform and critical debate within Fidesz for years before his public split. His rise has energized a broad cross-section of Hungarian society, which has grown disenchanted with decades of fragmented, ineffectual opposition parties that failed to mount a credible challenge to Orbán. While Orbán has centered his re-election campaign on warning of external threats — chief among them the ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine — Magyar has deliberately pivoted to domestic pocketbook issues that resonate with everyday Hungarians: sky-high inflation, stagnant low wages, crumbling public healthcare and transportation infrastructure, and widespread systemic corruption.

    Though he has united Orbán critics from across the ideological spectrum, support for Magyar is not always rooted in strict ideological alignment. Many liberal voters remain cautious of his combative political style and socially conservative background. To avoid the missteps that allowed Fidesz to discredit previous opposition challengers, Magyar has intentionally declined to take firm public stances on some of Hungary’s most divisive policy issues, including Orbán’s harsh anti-LGBTQ+ legislation and the question of whether Hungary should increase military and humanitarian support for Ukraine.

    Beyond policy, Magyar has cultivated a level of mainstream political celebrity unmatched by any Hungarian figure outside of Orbán. After his campaign rallies, crowds regularly surge toward the stage to snap selfies with the candidate, who waits for hours to pose with every supporter who wants a photo. His unprecedented political journey has even become a box office hit: a domestic documentary titled *Spring Wind — The Awakening*, which chronicles his rise from obscure insider to opposition leader, has topped Hungarian cinema box offices in 2025.