作者： admin

In a notable departure from its longstanding low-profile, cautious engagement in Somalia, China has recently announced a significant expansion of military backing for Mogadishu’s ongoing counterterrorism campaign against al-Shabaab militants. The new commitment includes provision of military equipment, specialized training for Somali security forces, and deeper bilateral security collaboration, a shift analyzed in depth by Brendon J. Cannon, an associate professor at Khalifa University whose research focuses on external power engagement in sub-Saharan Africa.

Cannon breaks down China’s interests in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa into two interconnected core strands, the first rooted in broad geopolitical strategy and the second tied specifically to Beijing’s priorities around Somalia and Somaliland. Geopolitically, the Horn of Africa has long held massive strategic value for China as a critical crossroads connecting the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and Mediterranean. This strategic importance has already driven China to establish a permanent military base in Djibouti and roll out extensive infrastructure investments across neighboring regional states including Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan, all aimed at expanding Beijing’s political influence and embedding it within existing regional security frameworks.

The second, Somalia-specific driver of China’s growing engagement centers on its long-running diplomatic campaign over Taiwan. Beijing claims the self-governing island of Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory, and has viewed with deep concern the formal diplomatic ties established between de facto independent Somaliland and Taipei in 2020. Somaliland withdrew from its voluntary union with Somalia in 1991 and has since pursued international recognition, making its diplomatic alignment with Taiwan a direct challenge to Beijing’s “One China” policy. Today, Somaliland and the southern African kingdom of Eswatini are the only two African entities that maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, putting them squarely in Beijing’s diplomatic crosshairs.

To counter Somaliland’s recognition of Taiwan, China has aligned itself closely with the federal government in Mogadishu, which also rejects Somaliland’s independence claim and asserts territorial control over the entire region. Beyond diplomatic backing and development aid, China has now added counterterrorism-focused security and military cooperation to its support package for Mogadishu. Even with this expanded security engagement, however, China’s overall economic footprint in Somalia remains modest: unlike neighboring Ethiopia, which has received billions in Belt and Road Initiative funding for railways, ports, and airports, Somalia has not attracted large-scale Chinese infrastructure investment. This makes Chinese engagement in Somalia a fundamentally selective, strategic project rather than a transformative economic undertaking, Cannon argues.

Tensions escalated further in late 2025, when Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognize Somaliland’s independence, with U.S. policymakers also signaling growing support for Somaliland’s bid for international standing. In response, Beijing doubled down on its public affirmation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This alignment has created a natural convergence of interests between China and the Mogadishu government: both have publicly reaffirmed their commitments to “One China” and “One Somalia” respectively, uniting their opposition to the self-determination claims of Taiwan and Somaliland. Unlike Somalia’s federal government, which has failed to establish effective sovereign control over large swathes of its territory and struggles to field a capable national military against al-Shabaab, Somaliland has built a relatively functional security apparatus and enjoys broad domestic political legitimacy for its independent government.

Cannon draws a clear distinction between China’s approach to the region and that of other external actors. Western powers have historically prioritized direct counterterrorism operations, governance overhauls, and security sector training in Somalia. Meanwhile, regional actors such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates have combined military engagement with large-scale infrastructure investment and commercial activity, often becoming deeply entangled in Somalia’s internal clan and political dynamics. China, by contrast, has centered its engagement on propping up the Mogadishu regime to reinforce Somalia’s claimed territorial integrity, with its assistance tied closely to diplomatic objectives rather than overt military expansion or commercial gain. Across much of Africa, China has prioritized building technological and institutional dependency in sectors ranging from telecommunications to surveillance, a pattern it is now replicating in Somalia.

Looking ahead, Cannon warns that deeper Chinese involvement carries significant risks for the already fragile Horn of Africa region, adding a new layer of great power geopolitical competition to existing local conflicts. Rather than acting as a stabilizing force, Beijing is likely to find itself pulled into the same complex local political dynamics that have derailed the engagement of past external powers. There is little evidence to suggest China’s military assistance will deliver better results than the decades of support provided by other external actors, with most of its impact expected to be political rather than operational on counterterrorism.

One of the most visible flashpoints of this new geopolitical dynamic is Las Anod, a contested city in eastern Somaliland that has become the base for the SSC Khatumo political entity, which is backed by Mogadishu and labeled illegitimate by Somaliland. Multiple reports indicate SSC Khatumo has received arms from external actors including China. In January 2026, Abdikhadir Firdhiye was inaugurated as the first president of the Northeast State recognized by Mogadishu, with Las Anod designated as its capital. Diplomats from China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, and Sudan all attended the inauguration, a clear signal that the contest over Las Anod has become intertwined with broader regional and global geopolitical rivalries. For Somaliland, the development makes clear that its decades-long bid for independence is now fully entangled in a much larger geopolitical struggle centered on China’s diplomatic campaign over Taiwan.

BANGKOK, April — For the first time since assuming the presidency earlier this month, Myanmar’s military-aligned head of state Min Aung Hlaing has extended an invitation to the country’s sprawling network of armed resistance groups to join a new round of peace negotiations, state-run media confirmed Tuesday. The proposal to resume talks forms a core pillar of the administration’s newly unveiled 100-day policy agenda, which Min Aung Hlaing outlined during a Monday cabinet gathering in the national capital of Naypyitaw, with peace, stability, and national development named as the plan’s top priorities, according to state-owned publication Myanma Alinn.

Min Aung Hlaing took office on April 10 following a general election that was widely dismissed by international and domestic critics as neither free nor fair. The poll was widely viewed as a calculated maneuver to cement the military’s ongoing control over Myanmar’s political system, half a decade after the armed forces seized power from Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratically elected civilian government in 2021. Min Aung Hlaing, who served as the military’s top commander, led the 2021 coup and headed the unelected junta that governed the country for four years before the recent election.

The 2021 coup reignited and escalated long-running tensions between the military and armed opposition forces across Myanmar. Pro-democracy activists aligned with the ousted civilian government joined forces with decades-old ethnic armed groups that have fought for greater regional autonomy for generations, spurring a widespread civil conflict that currently impacts the majority of the country’s territory. Between 2022 and the present, the junta held multiple rounds of in-person peace negotiations with ethnic armed leaders, a strategy designed to split anti-military opposition alliances. Those talks failed to deliver any tangible, lasting progress toward ending the conflict.

Under the terms of Min Aung Hlaing’s new offer, all ethnic armed organizations — both those that signed the 2015 and 2018 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), and those that rejected the deal — are invited to participate in new discussions before the July 31 deadline. The invitation also extends to the People’s Defense Force (PDF), the network of pro-democracy guerrilla groups formed after the 2021 coup to restore civilian rule. Min Aung Hlaing called on all participating groups to lay down their arms and enter the country’s formal legal political framework within the 100-day window of his administration’s plan. The rest of the 100-day agenda focuses on social welfare reforms, economic recovery initiatives, and infrastructure development projects across the country.

Myanmar has cycled between temporary ceasefires and resumed conflict for more than 70 years. No previous negotiation process has resulted in a comprehensive, lasting political settlement that addresses the core demand of ethnic armed groups: meaningful autonomy for the border regions where they hold majority control.

The latest peace overture comes at a moment when the military has regained the strategic upper hand in the nationwide civil conflict. After a series of China-brokered temporary ceasefires with key rebel coalitions and a surge in troop numbers following the implementation of a mandatory conscription law in early 2024, the military has retaken large swathes of territory from opposition forces. This includes territory seized by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a coalition of major ethnic armed groups that launched large-scale coordinated offensives in 2023 along the Chinese border in northeastern Myanmar and in western Rakhine State.

Despite the new invitation, opposition leaders have rejected the offer outright. Nay Phone Latt, spokesperson for the National Unity Government (NUG) — the ousted civilian administration-in-exile that coordinates most of the country’s anti-military resistance — confirmed Tuesday that the NUG and all PDF units under its command will continue their armed struggle alongside allied resistance forces until their goal of restoring civilian democratic rule is achieved. “We all already understood that the military’s fake invitations are aimed at prolonging people’s subjugation under military rule,” Nay Phone Latt said.

Of Myanmar’s 21 active ethnic armed organizations, 10 signed the NCA during previous administrations. However, four of those 10 signatories abandoned the agreement and returned to armed conflict immediately after the 2021 coup. Not all opposition groups have rejected the new talks, however. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army, a core member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, released a statement last Wednesday congratulating Min Aung Hlaing on his presidency and saying it is open to participating in new peace negotiations.