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  • Ali al-Taher: What Israel’s ‘operational control’ of the hill really means for Hezbollah and Lebanon

    Ali al-Taher: What Israel’s ‘operational control’ of the hill really means for Hezbollah and Lebanon

    For months after Hezbollah launched its war with Israel on 2 March, the militant group adhered to a revised guerrilla doctrine: abandon rigid defense of fixed frontline positions to avoid the crippling casualties that marked its 2024 campaign. One critical outlier broke this pattern: the windswept hill of Ali al-Taher in southern Lebanon.

    Hezbollah’s shift to flexible, maneuver-based warfare grew directly from hard-won lessons of earlier 2024 fighting. When the group attempted to hold static border positions against Israeli incursions, it suffered severe troop losses without stopping Israeli forces from pushing into southern Lebanese territory. Prolonged brutal battles for towns like Khiam convinced Hezbollah’s leadership that tying fighters to specific terrain played into Israel’s advantages in firepower and air dominance. Instead, the group prioritized preserving its fighting force, enabling continued operations even after Israeli advances. Even Bint Jbeil, long mythologized by Hezbollah as the site of the “mother of all battles” against Israel, was not deemed a position that required defense to the last fighter by April.

    Ali al-Taher was different. In June, just days before a temporary ceasefire took hold, a senior Hezbollah official speaking to Middle East Eye confirmed the group would defend the strategic ridge “until the last man” rather than cede it to Israeli control. The official emphasized that tactics shift with changing battlefield conditions, noting the commitment reflected the demands of full-scale war at that time.

    The ridge’s unique strategic value cannot be overstated. Sitting roughly 15 kilometers from the Israeli border at an elevation of 600 meters, Ali al-Taher overlooks the densely populated Nabatieh region and Iqlim al-Tuffah, holding dominion over key travel routes and military approaches across southern Lebanon. The hill is widely suspected to house Hezbollah’s underground command centers and weapons stockpiles, and Israeli military officials have confirmed they discovered hidden tunnel routes and extensive military infrastructure dug beneath its slopes.

    For Hezbollah, the site’s importance stems from three interconnected factors: the extensive underground facilities carved into the ridge, the network of connections these tunnels share with other key Hezbollah positions across the south, and the unrivaled geographical surveillance advantage the high ground provides. The Hezbollah official explained that losing the ridge would flip the strategic balance of threat: for years, Hezbollah has used territory north of the Litani River to maintain pressure on northern Israel, but Israeli control of Ali al-Taher would give Jerusalem a forward base to surveillance and pressure the entire Nabatieh and Iqlim al-Tuffah regions.

    This calculation explains why Hezbollah continued to fight for the hill long after the June ceasefire paused most hostilities across other parts of the front. For weeks after the ceasefire agreement, Ali al-Taher remained the site of daily Israeli airstrikes and Hezbollah drone counterattacks, even as the U.S. pushed a proposal that would see Hezbollah hand control of the outpost to the Lebanese military as part of a broader Hezbollah disarmament framework.

    What followed was a grinding war of attrition. Israel maintained constant aerial surveillance of the ridge, carried out repeated targeted strikes, and gradually tightened its blockade around the underground complex. By August, Israeli officials were openly discussing plans to expand air and ground operations around the hill, with Israeli media reporting that dozens of Hezbollah fighters remained hunkered down in the hill’s tunnel network.

    After Israel announced on 3 September that it had secured “operational control” of Ali al-Taher, the Hezbollah official pushed back against framing the withdrawal as a decisive defeat. “The hill stood for nearly three months with total aerial and operational oversight from Israel, constantly bombarded, and yet our men stood their ground,” he said. He added that the eventual decision to pull out was a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis, not a rejection of the hill’s strategic significance.

    The Israeli military says its forces cleared Hezbollah fighters from two key underground passageways and established full control of both the surface and subterranean sections of the ridge. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz framed the capture as a key step in consolidating Israel’s new security buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

    But the term “operational control” does not equate to permanent, uncontested occupation. Hezbollah has not issued an official public response to Israel’s announcement, but anonymous group members rejected Israel’s claim the day after it was made, asserting no permanent Israeli force is present on the ridge and that Hezbollah fighters remain deployed in the area ready to repel any deeper Israeli advance.

    This dispute over terminology carries major strategic weight. Israel has proven it can operate on and beneath the ridge, while Hezbollah works to deny that this achievement amounts to a irreversible strategic defeat. The question now turns to how Israel will use its new advantage. Israeli officials have stated they intend to hold their southern Lebanese security positions until Hezbollah is fully disarmed, turning Ali al-Taher from a battlefield win into a key bargaining chip in future negotiations with Lebanon.

    For Hezbollah, the core challenge is to absorb the loss of one critical strategic outpost without allowing it to trigger a wider erosion of its military presence north of the Litani. The group’s next move will likely focus less on an immediate attempt to retake the hill, and more on containing any Israeli expansion from the outpost into surrounding territory. The Hezbollah official stressed that Ali al-Taher remains within surveillance range of other strategic hills still controlled by the group, noting that any Israeli attempt to use the ridge as a launching pad to push further north toward the Litani will be met by both Hezbollah and its key backer Iran.

    This brings the conflict to its next critical turning point: will the loss of Ali al-Taher remain a contained tactical setback for Hezbollah, or will Israel turn control of the ridge into a broader military and political advantage across southern Lebanon?

    The outcome hinges on two competing forces: whether Israel can solidify its hold on the outpost, neutralize the remaining Hezbollah underground network, and use the ridge to restrict Hezbollah’s ability to move and operate across the south, while Hezbollah works to prove that withdrawing from one key position does not mean the collapse of its wider military network in southern Lebanon.

    Recent on-ground reporting confirms the contest is far from over. Israeli strikes around Nabatieh have continued unabated, and reports of Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces in the area persist. In the end, Ali al-Taher’s true significance may lie not in who holds the hill itself, but in what the battle for it sparks across the surrounding region.

    Israel’s declaration of operational control closes out a months-long battle for one of Hezbollah’s most important fixed positions. But whether it marks a full strategic defeat for Hezbollah, the start of a new Israeli offensive north of the Litani, or simply a transition from conventional frontline combat to a more dispersed, low-intensity confrontation remains unresolved. While the hill has changed military hands in the manner Israel claims, the larger struggle for control of southern Lebanon’s terrain, underground military networks, and long-term security architecture is still unfolding.

  • Tate brothers to remain in US jail as they fight extradition to UK

    Tate brothers to remain in US jail as they fight extradition to UK

    In a major legal development for polarizing social media influencers Andrew and Tristan Tate, a U.S. federal judge in Miami has rejected their bid for pretrial release, ruling the brothers must remain in a Florida jail throughout their upcoming extradition process to face serious criminal charges in the United Kingdom.

    U.S. Magistrate Judge Lauren Louis sided with prosecution arguments Wednesday, finding that the dual U.S.-UK citizens’ documented wealth, history of frequent cross-border travel and extensive international connections classify them as “quintessential flight risks” who cannot be safely released into the community. Even noting that the pair may not actually hold the extravagant wealth they often showcase in their online content, Louis emphasized court records still prove they retain an extraordinary ability to flee U.S. jurisdiction. She added that their minimal formal ties to the U.S. and deep connections to foreign nations further cement the unmitigated flight risk, which the Tate’s legal team has failed to offset.

    The brothers have been held in U.S. federal custody since their arrest in July, shortly after the UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) upgraded the charges against them. UK authorities have until September 16 to file a complete formal extradition request to U.S. officials, kicking off what legal analysts warn could be a months-long legal process.

    Across two charging documents, the Tate brothers now face a total of 59 criminal charges in the UK, including allegations of rape, sex trafficking, and possession of indecent images of children. The CPS initially brought 21 charges related to alleged offenses between 2010 and 2017, but added 38 additional counts in July to expand the case.

    The legal woes for the pair extend far beyond the UK: just last weekend, Romanian prosecutors formally indicted the brothers on a separate set of trafficking and sexual offense charges. The former professional kickboxers had been based primarily in Romania since 2017, where they built a massive global following of mostly young men through their viral online content, which pushes controversial views about gender and promotes an opulent, high-status lifestyle. Andrew Tate first entered the public spotlight in 2016, when he appeared on the UK iteration of the reality television show *Big Brother* and was removed from the house after old controversial comments resurfaced; he has repeatedly described himself as a misogynist in public remarks.

    The brothers were first charged with sex trafficking offenses in Romania back in 2022, and remained subject to a Romanian travel ban until 2025, when they were granted permission to travel to the U.S. Their arrival in the U.S. drew immediate pushback from several high-profile American politicians, including Florida’s Republican Governor Ron DeSantis, who publicly opposed their entry.

    Throughout all ongoing cases in three separate jurisdictions, the Tate brothers have repeatedly denied all charges and allegations against them. In a statement following Wednesday’s ruling, their legal team said the pair will “continue to defend themselves against the allegations” and “engage with the appropriate legal processes in each jurisdiction.”

    During an August detention hearing, Andrew Tate told the court he “never committed the crimes I’m accused of.” His legal team argued the brash, controversial persona he presents online is merely a marketing character, not a reflection of his true identity. “I’ve said some stupid things (in the past), but sometimes you have to shake the internet to get noticed,” Andrew Tate testified, according to reporting from CBS News.

    Tristan Tate spoke publicly about the harsh conditions of his detention, describing his cell as small, overheated, and offering almost no access to natural sunlight or regular exercise. He told the court he has lost 14 pounds (6.4 kilograms) since being taken into custody, and that his detention is already hindering his ability to assist in his own legal defense: “It’s beginning to grate on me because I can’t partake in helping with my defence,” he said, per CBS reporting.

    The Tate’s legal team had pushed for bail, arguing the brothers were not a flight risk or a danger to the public, noting they had fully complied with all release conditions during earlier phases of their criminal cases in both the UK and Romania.

    But multiple foreign entities pushed the court to keep the pair detained. The British Embassy in Washington submitted court filings backing the extradition request, arguing the brothers remain flight risks and would attempt to intimidate and interfere with witnesses if granted release. The Romanian government also filed documents noting the pair had allegedly attempted to influence witness statements during the early stages of their Romanian investigation, though it also acknowledged the brothers had complied with all court-ordered obligations as the Romanian case moved forward.

    Wednesday’s ruling closes one chapter of the high-profile legal saga, but sets the stage for a prolonged battle over the brothers’ extradition, with their legal team expected to consider next steps to challenge the detention ruling.

  • Apple unveils its first folding iPhone

    Apple unveils its first folding iPhone

    Tech giant Apple has officially pulled back the curtain on its long-awaited first foldable smartphone, the iPhone Duo, marking one of the most high-profile product launches in the company’s recent history. The device carries a starting price of $2,000 (£1,475), with its maximum storage configuration jumping to $3,200 (£2,360), placing it among the most expensive mass-produced smartphones currently available on the global market.

    The iPhone Duo adopts a book-style folding design, a concept Apple says draws direct inspiration from the iPad line. When fully unfolded, the device delivers a screen experience comparable to a compact iPad, while when folded in half, it takes on the form of a wider traditional iPhone. Speaking at the launch event, Apple CEO John Ternus — who just stepped into the role two weeks prior following Tim Cook’s departure — emphasized that the company intentionally deviated from the design language used by existing foldable devices from competitors. Ternus argued that many rival foldables “feel like two phones stuck together… making a larger screen feel much smaller,” and framed the iPhone Duo as the outcome of cumulative technological breakthroughs that will redefine the foldable user experience.

    Ternus is no outsider to the project: before being tapped as Cook’s successor earlier this year, he spent years leading Apple’s hardware division, and played a direct hands-on role in the development of the foldable iPhone, a project that has been in the works inside the company for more than half a decade. Industry analysts note that the timing of Ternus’s promotion was no coincidence. Ben Wood, chief analyst at technology research firm FDM, pointed out that the leadership handover was deliberately aligned with what is widely viewed as one of Apple’s most impactful iPhone launches in over a decade. “Nothing happens by accident at Apple,” Wood noted.

    For Apple, the launch of the first foldable iPhone comes as the company works to push back against long-running criticism that it has not delivered a truly transformative, standout product innovation since the debut of the original iPhone in 2007. The iPhone line remains Apple’s core revenue driver, accounting for more than half of the company’s annual total sales, and the firm has recently reported strong demand for its latest conventional iPhone models, which marked Apple’s most successful product launch to date.

    Even with the hype surrounding the launch, industry observers hold mixed expectations for the iPhone Duo’s market performance. Dipanjan Chatterjee, an analyst at research firm Forrester, warned that the high-priced foldable risks becoming nothing more than a “premium-priced ornament” — a product that delivers brand cachet but fails to drive meaningful new revenue growth for Apple. Chatterjee noted that the device could follow the trajectory of Apple’s Vision Pro headset, a $3,699 spatial computing device that has failed to gain mainstream traction with consumers, or it could mirror the success of the Apple Watch, which has carved out a steady, profitable niche selling millions of units annually despite never matching the iPhone’s volume.

    Market data also underscores the limited current size of the foldable smartphone segment. FDM data shows that foldable devices from existing players including Samsung and Huawei currently make up just 2% of total global smartphone sales. Even with Apple’s entry expected to boost overall consumer interest in the category, FDM projects that foldables will only account for roughly 4% of total global smartphone sales by the end of the next decade.

  • How Nicaragua defended its ICJ case accusing Germany of complicity in Israel’s genocide

    How Nicaragua defended its ICJ case accusing Germany of complicity in Israel’s genocide

    On a Tuesday hearing at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, Nicaragua laid out a forceful case against Germany, accusing Berlin of deliberately evading legal accountability for its ongoing large-scale military exports to Israel despite full awareness of the documented grave risks of genocide and systemic human rights violations against Palestinians in occupied territories.

    Nicaragua first initiated this legal proceeding in March 2024, arguing that Germany has not only facilitated potential genocide through sustained arms transfers but also breached international obligations by cutting funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the key UN body providing life-saving aid to Palestinian communities. Tuesday’s session centered entirely on addressing Germany’s preliminary objections to the court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of Nicaragua’s claims, with Nicaragua urging judges to reject these procedural hurdles and move the case forward to a full hearing on its substantive merits.

    Germany’s core preliminary arguments rest on three main claims: that no formal legal dispute existed between the two nations when Nicaragua filed the suit, that portions of the claims fall outside the temporal bounds of Germany’s acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction, and that the case cannot proceed under the long-standing “Monetary Gold principle” because Israel — an absent non-consenting third party — would have its legal adjudicated in its absence. Nicaragua refuted each of these points, emphasizing that the suit targets Germany’s own independent conduct and obligations under international law, not the actions of Israel.

    In his opening address to the court, Nicaragua’s ambassador to the Netherlands Carlos Arguello Gomez noted that the current violence and destruction inflicted on Palestinians is publicly documented and widely streamed in real time, making Germany’s claim of ignorance of the risk of grave violations impossible to sustain. “Over the past three years, every single day people around the world bear witness to horrible scenes of brutality, suffering and destruction,” Arguello stated. “Schoolchildren in Germany are probably more aware today of what is happening in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and particularly the Gaza Strip, than their ancestors were of the horrors during the Nazi regime.”

    Arguello stressed that Germany’s deep political, economic and military ties to Israel mean Berlin cannot plausibly claim it is unaware of the serious risk of genocidal acts, adding that as Israel’s second-largest arms supplier and one of its most critical trading partners, Germany holds significant leverage to alter Israel’s conduct. According to data presented by Nicaragua to the court, Germany has authorized more than €1.15 billion ($1.34 billion) in military exports to Israel between early April 2024 and the end of June 2026, with nearly €800 million approved in the first half of 2026 alone. Of that 2026 first-half total, some €508.8 million covers direct weapons of war, including licenses for a major maritime defense project widely reported to involve a submarine, plus ammunition, tank components and other critical military hardware. German-made engines and transmission systems for Israel’s Merkava tanks, which have been deployed extensively across Gaza and the occupied West Bank, are also included in these exports. In total, Nicaragua calculates that the value of German military equipment approved for export to Israel since October 7, 2023, has surpassed €1.5 billion ($1.75 billion).

    Nicaragua also dismissed Berlin’s 2025 announcement of a suspension on new military export licenses for equipment that could be used in Gaza as a largely symbolic gesture, noting that deliveries under previously approved licenses were allowed to continue, and new approvals resumed just three months later in November 2025. Germany’s assertion that it reviews each export license individually and receives guarantees from Israel that all equipment will be used in compliance with international humanitarian law does not fulfill Berlin’s binding international obligations, the delegation argued.

    Arguello further highlighted the growing bilateral military trade between the two states, pointing to Germany’s expanded purchase of Israel’s Arrow 3 missile defense system, which now carries a total value of approximately $6.6 billion, making it the largest defense export contract in Israel’s history. These deep, mutually beneficial commercial and military ties have effectively insulated Israel from international pressure and sanctions, Nicaragua argued.

    The Nicaraguan delegation also pushed back against Germany’s justification for its unwavering support for Israel, which Berlin frames as a core national interest rooted in Germany’s historic responsibility for the Holocaust. “The trial of the war criminals at Nuremberg was for multiple crimes against humanity as a whole and not only for the Jewish Shoah,” Arguello said. “If there is a sincere moral imperative justifying this raison d’état, it must be for the responsibility for all these crimes against humanity, and it should involve the obligation to do all possible to stop this from happening to other human beings. A sincere raison d’état would see Germany doing everything possible to stop the crimes being committed by Israel against the Palestinian people.”

    Responding to Germany’s Monetary Gold principle objection, senior counsel Alain Pellet explained that Nicaragua is not asking the court to issue any binding ruling on Israel’s responsibility or adjudicate Israeli conduct. Instead, the suit only requests that the court determine whether Germany itself breached its own independent international obligations, and order Berlin to provide full reparation for any harm resulting from its wrongful acts. While Israel’s actions form the factual context for the case, no formal ruling on Israel’s responsibility is required, Pellet noted.

    For most of Nicaragua’s claims, it is sufficient to establish that a serious risk of genocide and other grave violations exists, rather than requiring conclusive pre-judgment of Israeli culpability. The obligation to prevent genocide activates as soon as a state knows, or should reasonably know, that a serious risk of genocide exists, at which point the state is required to use all reasonably available means to deter or prevent the harm. This is an obligation of conduct, not a guarantee of a specific outcome, Pellet argued.

    While the ICJ ruled in a 2007 case that a state can only be held responsible for failing to prevent genocide if genocide is ultimately proven to have occurred, Pellet contended that the duty to act arises far earlier, the moment a serious risk becomes known. “Waiting until genocide or crimes against humanity had been completed before addressing a failure to prevent them would be absurd,” he said, as it would defeat the core preventive purpose of the Genocide Convention. Tragically, Pellet added, the risk has already materialized: “genocide has occurred and continues to occur, not only in the Gaza Strip but throughout the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. The gravest violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, which all states have the duty – the legal obligation – to prevent, are continuing; and the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination is being denied more than ever.”

    Nicaragua also defended the ICJ’s jurisdiction over its claims related to racial discrimination, racial segregation and apartheid, noting that these prohibitions are not only enshrined in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination but also form part of customary international law and binding international humanitarian law. The ICJ has previously recognized the prohibition of racial discrimination as an obligation owed to the entire international community, and a core component of humanitarian law, meaning these claims fall squarely within the scope of Germany’s optional declaration accepting the court’s jurisdiction.

    In response to Germany’s argument that some claims fall outside the temporal scope of its jurisdiction declaration, which only covers disputes arising from facts or situations after April 30, 2008, Nicaragua countered that the core of the case stems from Germany’s conduct after October 2023, specifically its ongoing arms export approvals and support for Israel, with the long-standing bilateral relationship only serving as historical background.

    Nicaragua is scheduled to present its second round of oral arguments and deliver final submissions to the court on Thursday. If the ICJ rules in Nicaragua’s favor and accepts jurisdiction, the case will proceed to a full merits hearing, a process that typically takes multiple years to reach a final judgment. This case runs parallel to a separate ongoing ICJ proceeding brought by South Africa against Israel, which accuses Tel Aviv of breaching the Genocide Convention in its military campaign in Gaza that began in October 2023.

    Multiple independent international bodies have already backed the core claims of alleged genocide: a panel of senior UN experts, as well as the world’s largest association of genocide scholars, have both concluded that Israel’s military campaign in Gaza amounts to the crime of genocide. A fragile US-brokered ceasefire has been in place since October 2025, but even during this lull in active fighting, Israeli forces have killed at least 1,300 Palestinians in Gaza, bringing the total confirmed death toll from the campaign to more than 73,651, with thousands more still missing and presumed dead under the rubble of destroyed buildings.

  • British MPs respond defiantly to Israel sanctioning them

    British MPs respond defiantly to Israel sanctioning them

    A major diplomatic clash between the United Kingdom and Israel erupted this week after Jerusalem unveiled a package of retaliatory measures against London, including a entry ban on 11 British MPs, following the UK’s historic decision to sanction illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The escalation, which marks one of the most significant rifts between the two allies in recent years, unfolded on Tuesday as Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar announced a series of punitive steps in response to London’s policy shift.

    Alongside the entry ban on lawmakers, Saar confirmed Israel would shut the British consulate in occupied East Jerusalem, withdraw British representatives from the International Gaza Support Center, and end all British training programs for Palestinian security forces. The banned British parliamentarians include high-profile critics of Israeli policy: former Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, independent MP Zarah Sultana, Labour MPs Naz Shah, Diane Abbott, John McDonnell and Richard Burgon, and all sitting Green Party of England and Wales MPs – Carla Denyer, Adrian Ramsay, Ellie Chowns, Sian Berry and Hannah Spencer. The list also extends to Fahad Ansari, an Irish-born lawyer who has represented legal efforts to reverse Hamas’ proscription as a terrorist organization in British courts; Ansari, who is not a UK citizen or MP, noted he already considered himself persona non grata in Israel and called the ban a badge of honor.

    The retaliatory measures came hours after the British government made a landmark policy announcement: it formally recognized ongoing ethnic cleansing of Palestinians by settlers in the occupied West Bank, declared Israel’s decades-long occupation of Palestinian territory illegal under international law, and imposed sweeping sanctions on entities linked to illegal Israeli settlements. The government also enacted a full ban on all arms licenses and exports that could materially contribute to Israel’s occupation. France and Canada quickly joined the UK’s initiative by announcing their own bans on trade with Israeli settlements, a move widely seen as a major diplomatic win for London. Eleven additional nations – Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden – signed a joint statement with the UK affirming their plans to introduce national trade restrictions or support European-level measures against settlement goods, in line with international legal obligations.

    The UK’s formal adoption of the International Court of Justice’s 2024 advisory opinion, which ruled the Israeli occupation unlawful and required all states to act to end it, was laid out by Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband in parliamentary remarks Tuesday. Miliband emphasized that the British government confirms settler-perpetrated ethnic cleansing is occurring in parts of the West Bank, adding that the Israeli government has not only turned a blind eye to the violence but has repeatedly supported forced displacement of Palestinians through official statements and policy.

    Rather than being intimidated by the entry ban, the targeted British MPs have responded with open defiance, vowing to double down on their advocacy for Palestinian rights. In a statement following the announcement, Corbyn, who has made multiple visits to Palestinian territories to document conditions on the ground, said he had directly witnessed the violence of occupation and the systemic apartheid that curtails Palestinian freedom. He called Israel’s pattern of barring UN investigators and international journalists a deliberate attempt to hide its actions from the world, stressing that critics would never abandon efforts to expose the truth. “They are the ones who suffer from Israel’s apartheid. It is their freedom which is egregiously curtailed, alongside thousands of Palestinian refugees who are denied the right of return,” Corbyn said.

    Naz Shah, one of the banned Labour MPs, described the selection of banned lawmakers as “rather random and, frankly, bizarre,” but added she was proud to back the UK government’s new sanctions, which align with the country’s international legal obligations. She reaffirmed her longstanding commitment to upholding international law, peace, security, and equal rights for both Palestinians and Israelis. Richard Burgon, another banned Labour MP who has campaigned for stronger action against Israeli policies and presented evidence of alleged war crimes to the International Criminal Court, said the ban would not silence him. “The decision by the Israeli government to sanction me today will not intimidate me into silence. I will continue to do what is right, speak out in defence of international law and stand up for justice for the Palestinian people,” Burgon said.

    Zarah Sultana, the independent MP who left the Labour Party last year in protest over Keir Starmer’s refusal to take stronger action against Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, called the ban from the “fascist government presiding over genocide, apartheid and an illegal occupation” a badge of honor. She echoed other lawmakers in saying the punitive measure would only strengthen her resolve to speak out. “If anything, this ban only strengthens my resolve to keep speaking out against Israel’s genocide and against the UK’s complicity,” Sultana said.

    All of the UK Green Party’s sitting parliamentary representatives were included on the banned list, a reflection of the party’s uncompromising stance calling for full sanctions on Israel, recognizing allegations of genocide in Gaza, and supporting proscription of the Israeli military as a terrorist organization. A party spokesperson said the Israeli government’s threats would not force the Greens into silence, praising the party’s MPs for standing up for Palestinian rights and demanding an end to British complicity in illegal occupation and violence. The Green Party called on the British government to go further than its current limited measures, imposing a full arms embargo and wide-ranging sanctions against Israel. Green Party leader Zack Polanski added that the party’s MPs had consistently stood “on the right side of history” by opposing ethnic cleansing, occupation and genocide, a position he said all British lawmakers should adopt.

  • South Koreans protest over possible plan to send forces to back US in Hormuz

    South Koreans protest over possible plan to send forces to back US in Hormuz

    Mass public protests have erupted across South Korea in fierce opposition to the Seoul government’s potential plan to deploy military forces to support U.S.-led security operations in the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz, deepening a domestic and international debate over the country’s role in escalating tensions between the U.S. and Iran.

    South Korean officials confirmed on Friday that the administration is actively evaluating options for what it frames as “contributions” to U.S. security initiatives in the strait, a chokepoint that handles nearly a fifth of the world’s daily oil trade. Just days later on Tuesday, a South Korean fact-finding military delegation was dispatched to the region to assess on-ground conditions, according to government statements.

    The prospect of a South Korean military deployment has already drawn a sharp rebuke from Tehran. Iranian officials have issued a clear warning that any introduction of South Korean forces to the region would be “regarded as direct support for the party responsible for that aggression and will have serious consequences,” a statement that has amplified anxieties over potential retaliation against South Korean interests.

    On Wednesday, hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside the U.S. Embassy in central Seoul, carrying hand-painted placards that called on the South Korean government to reject participation in what organizers labeled a “war of aggression” against Iran. Video footage shared widely across major social media platforms showed local police moving to push back dozens of protesters who had gathered close to the embassy compound, leading to minor scuffles in some instances.

    Jung Kyung-jik, a representative of leading South Korean civic group People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, told reporters from Agence France-Presse that he fully understood Iran’s perception of any foreign military intervention as a direct threat to Iranian national security. “As Iran has said, the deployment of our troops to the region would amount to direct participation in an illegal war,” Jung stated. He added that “there have been numerous violations of international law arising from US attacks on Iran, including the bombing of an elementary school and energy infrastructure.”

    South Korea has been subjected to mounting diplomatic pressure from Washington for months to formally join the U.S.-led coalition operating in the Strait of Hormuz. Former U.S. President Donald Trump had previously publicly criticized Seoul for failing to back U.S. policy toward Iran, tying the disagreement to broader frictions in the bilateral alliance that have persisted in years since.

    For South Korea, the strategic stakes of any decision are exceptionally high: the country’s entire economy relies heavily on energy shipments that pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Data from 2023 shows that 61 percent of South Korea’s total crude oil imports and 54 percent of its naphtha imports traveled through the waterway last year alone, making stability in the region a core national economic priority.

    According to reporting from The Guardian, the specific deployment options currently under review by South Korean military planners include sending a P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and a naval logistics support vessel. Local South Korean broadcasters have additionally reported that an elite navy explosive ordnance disposal team is also being considered for deployment.

    South Korea’s presidential office has clarified that any final decision to deploy new military forces to the Strait of Hormuz would require a multi-step domestic approval process: first a review by the country’s National Security Council, followed by a cabinet resolution, and ultimately formal approval from the unicameral National Assembly.

    This is not the first time Seoul has adjusted its military posture in the region amid U.S. pressure. Back in 2019, the South Korean government expanded the operating area of an existing anti-piracy naval unit deployed off the coast of Somalia to cover waters surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, a move that fell short of full participation in the U.S. coalition.

    In a recent development, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung held talks with French President Emmanuel Macron this week on Tuesday to discuss the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. However, Seoul’s presidential office emphasized that the discussions focused exclusively on potential South Korean contributions to broader international efforts to uphold freedom of navigation, not any specific plan to deploy combat troops to the region.

  • Iran signaling it has incentive to escalate the war

    Iran signaling it has incentive to escalate the war

    Six months after the United States and Israel launched a military campaign aimed at forcing Iran into political submission, a dramatic shift in the dynamics of the Middle East conflict has emerged: Tehran is no longer just reacting to external pressure, it is actively escalating tensions to shift the balance of bargaining power in its favor. The most visible sign of this new approach is Iran’s recent threat to target American warships operating in regional waters with its upgraded solid-fuel Qassem Basir ballistic missile, a development that marks a potentially more dangerous phase of the ongoing standoff.

    Tehran has framed the Qassem Basir as a game-changing capability that allows it to “take action against any threat, even before it is carried out.” Multiple intelligence reports point to this weapon being used during claimed Iranian tests targeting US vessels near the Strait of Hormuz on September 5. While Washington confirmed that an attack targeted its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington and a nearby guided-missile destroyer, US officials have not confirmed whether the new advanced missile was deployed, and noted that all American ships successfully evaded the strike.

    Beyond the missile test, Tehran has also announced plans to sign an agreement with Oman to establish a new shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz extending into the Persian Gulf, a move that remains unconfirmed as of press time. Taken together, these moves signal a clear break from the largely retaliatory strategy that defined Iran’s actions in the first half of the conflict. Today, the Islamic Republic is increasingly willing to raise the stakes on its own terms.

    This shift does not mean Iran holds military superiority over the US – far from it. But Iranian leadership has concluded that prolonging and expanding the conflict increases the economic and strategic cost of the standoff for Washington and the global community, strengthening Tehran’s hand at any future negotiating table. This represents a stark reversal of the original goals of the US-led campaign, which was framed to force major changes in Iranian policy and even open the door to regime change. Despite massive military superiority that has inflicted severe damage on Iranian infrastructure and military capabilities, the US and Israel have failed to achieve their core political objectives.

    Today, Iran’s political regime remains intact, its missile programs are still operational, the status of its nuclear program remains unresolved, and its network of regional proxies retains full offensive capability – a fact demonstrated by recent attacks on Saudi targets carried out by Houthi rebels. Most critically, Tehran has turned the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most vital energy chokepoints, into a powerful tool of economic leverage.

    Over the past six months, the conflict has settled into a repeating cycle: escalation, diplomatic outreach, tentative agreements, renewed coercive action, and a return to diplomacy. Far from forcing Iranian capitulation, this pattern has taught Tehran that sustained resistance to US pressure ultimately yields better negotiating terms. The latest escalation is a direct result of that lesson.

    Tehran does not need to destroy the US Navy or seize full control of the Strait of Hormuz to achieve its goals. It only needs to make commercial navigation through the waterway risky enough to force shipping companies to avoid the route, push up global marine insurance premiums, and embed persistent disruption risk into global oil prices. Recent shipping data already confirms that commodity traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen to its lowest level since May. Tehran has further warned it will implement wider navigation restrictions and launch what it calls “economic warfare” if Washington continues its campaign to strangle the Iranian economy via sanctions and blockades.

    This new approach upends the original logic of the conflict. Former US President Donald Trump’s strategy was designed to make continued Iranian resistance progressively more costly. Today, Iran is making continued US coercion progressively more costly for Washington and the world. While Iran can never match American raw firepower, it holds an unassailable geographic advantage that no military force can eliminate: control over the world’s most critical energy transit corridor.

    Measured against the original political goals of the US-led campaign – dismantling Iran’s political system, eliminating its nuclear program, destroying its long-range missile capability, and breaking its network of regional allies – the six-month conflict has fallen far short. None of these core objectives have been achieved decisively. The unresolved status of Iran’s nuclear program in particular highlights the fundamental limits of military power: airstrikes can destroy physical facilities, but they cannot eliminate the political incentives that drive states to pursue strategic nuclear deterrence.

    This dynamic carries significant ripple effects across the Middle East and beyond. If regional governments conclude that developing independent nuclear capacity offers protection against external regime change campaigns, global nuclear non-proliferation efforts could face new, growing pressure. Saudi Arabia, for example, has long sought domestic uranium enrichment capabilities. Ultimately, analysts note, the nuclear issue will inevitably return to the negotiating table, the same place it started.

    The costs of the ongoing stalemate are already being felt globally. Energy, marine insurance, and shipping costs have all risen, with inevitable political consequences for economies around the world. Meanwhile, the conflict has created unintended benefits for other major powers: Russia gains from higher global hydrocarbon prices, while China benefits strategically as US military assets, munitions, and political attention are diverted away from the Indo-Pacific region. For Gulf states, the conflict has delivered an uncomfortable reality: US military bases hosted to guarantee their security can also turn them into targets in a conflict they did not initiate.

    Again, this does not mean Iran is winning militarily. The Iranian economy and domestic infrastructure have suffered enormous damage, and the US retains the capability to inflict far greater destruction if it chooses to escalate further. But Iran does not need to defeat the US militarily to achieve its core goals. It only needs to prevent Washington from using military superiority to force it into political submission, while raising the cost of continued conflict incrementally for the US and its allies.

    This leaves Trump caught in an escalation trap partially of his own making. If he tightens the blockade on Iran, Tehran can further disrupt traffic through Hormuz. If he intensifies airstrikes and bombing campaigns, Iran can expand retaliatory strikes against US allies across the Gulf. If he chooses to enter negotiations, Iran now has every reason to demand stronger guarantees and better terms than it would have accepted six months earlier. Repeated cycles of escalation followed by a return to talks have also eroded the coercive power of US threats over time.

    Iran’s latest moves are therefore far more than just another exchange of fire in a long-running conflict. Six months after the US and Israel launched their campaign to force Tehran into submission, Iran has learned that the longer it withstands pressure, the greater the costs it can impose on its adversaries, and the stronger its bargaining position will be when talks eventually resume. While the US retains the capacity to escalate far beyond anything Iran can match, it can no longer take for granted that more escalation will bring victory closer. Iran’s latest actions make clear that Tehran now believes the opposite is true.

  • Trump gave $45,000 cash gifts to Natalie Harp and two other aides, public records show

    Trump gave $45,000 cash gifts to Natalie Harp and two other aides, public records show

    Newly released official financial disclosure documents from the Trump administration have thrown a spotlight on an unprecedented practice: sitting U.S. President Donald Trump has distributed six-figure cash gifts to four of his most trusted inner-circle White House staffers, a move that has sparked fresh debate over compliance with federal ethics rules.

    According to the disclosures, the total value of the gifts amounts to $157,000. Longtime loyal aide Natalie Harp and two other unnamed senior staff each received $45,000, while Walt Nauta, Trump’s long-serving aide and Director of Oval Office Operations, was given $22,000. Notably, none of the other 91 declared White House employees reported receiving any similar gifts from the president, a discrepancy that has yet to be explained by administration officials.

    All four gift recipients are widely recognized as members of Trump’s closest personal and political circle. Harp, a 35-year-old aide who has worked alongside Trump for years, is one of his most trusted confidantes, tasked with drafting his frequent posts on the Truth Social platform. She gained national media attention last month when it was revealed she was one of the handful of people who accompanied Trump during his unannounced plane swap while departing Turkey.

    Nauta, a U.S. Navy veteran, first served as Trump’s military valet during his first presidential term, and continued working as a personal assistant at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate after he left office in 2021. In 2023, he was indicted alongside Trump on charges related to the mishandling of classified national security documents, though the case against him was ultimately dismissed. The two other recipients include Margo Martin, a communications advisor who documents Trump’s public and private activities for social media, and 26-year-old Chamberlain Harris, Trump’s executive assistant who was appointed to the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts earlier this year, where he oversees construction projects at the White House and other Trump-aligned initiatives in Washington D.C.

    The White House has defended the cash gifts, framing them as personal holiday presents unrelated to the recipients’ official government duties, and fully compliant with U.S. federal law. “The president has a longstanding practice of giving Christmas gifts to people in his orbit, including at times employees and aides, both in government and in his time in the private sector,” a senior White House official said in a statement to the BBC. “The gifts at issue here have nothing to do with any of these individuals’ official government duties, and are entirely permissible under relevant legal and ethical standards.”

    Under current federal regulations, government employees are barred from accepting outside compensation tied to their official work, but the administration argues these gifts fall under the exception for personal social gifts. However, ethics experts have raised questions about the credibility of this explanation. Cassandra Burke Robertson, a law professor and director of the Center for Professional Ethics at Case Western Reserve University, noted that the gift amounts align closely with pay scales for the staffers’ roles, rather than reflecting the arbitrary nature of personal friendship gifts.

    “If it were compensation, it’s not allowed. Of course, that’s where the administration’s argument comes in, that it’s a social gift done out of friendship. Not compensation…the question is then whether that is a credible explanation,” Robertson told the BBC. She added that the amounts “seem to be standard” based on each recipient’s employee level, which suggests that the size of the gift was tied to their employment position, not their personal relationship with the president.

    Robertson also pointed out that even if the gifts are technically legal, they add to growing public concern over perceived conflicts of interest within the Trump administration, coming on the heels of recent controversies tied to prediction markets and cryptocurrency dealings. “It does add to a generalised perception of really rampant conflicts of interest,” she said.

    Historically, there are no recorded instances of a sitting U.S. president giving large cash gifts to White House staff. While it is common for sitting presidents to give personal mementos and souvenirs to staffers, the practice has never involved large cash disbursements to a small group of inner-circle aides. For example, former President Barack Obama gave former press secretary Robert Gibbs a framed borrowed necktie as a personal gift ahead of the 2004 Democratic National Convention, a far cry from the five-figure cash gifts disclosed this week.

  • Google picks Finland for its largest single investment in Europe

    Google picks Finland for its largest single investment in Europe

    In a landmark move that underscores the global race to scale artificial intelligence capacity, Google has unveiled a €13bn ($15bn) investment in Finnish AI infrastructure — the largest single European investment in the company’s history. The massive spending package will fund construction of three brand-new data centres, expansion of an existing Google facility, and targeted energy projects designed to meet the surging global demand for AI-powered services.

    As a core component of the deal, Google signed a 22-year power purchase agreement with Finnish state-owned energy utility Fortum to acquire up to 50% of the total electricity output generated by the Loviisa nuclear power plant, one of Finland’s oldest and most productive nuclear facilities. The plant currently supplies roughly 10% of Finland’s total domestic electricity, and Google’s long-term commitment will provide Fortum with stable financial certainty to fund life-extension upgrades and capacity expansions at the site, securing its operation for decades to come.

    Google’s announcement comes just days after TikTok, the short-form video platform owned by ByteDance, revealed its own $1bn investment in a new Finnish data centre to be built in the southern city of Kouvola. Both global tech giants have cited Finland’s unique competitive advantages for large-scale data centre development: a consistently cool natural climate that cuts the energy required to cool heat-intensive server farms, an abundant supply of low-carbon energy, a largely uncongested national power grid, robust data governance frameworks, and a deep pool of skilled tech sector workers. These attributes have turned the Nordic nation into one of the most sought-after locations in Europe for AI and data infrastructure investment.

    The Google investment is projected to deliver substantial economic benefits to Finland over the development period: the company estimates it will support more than 37,000 construction jobs and add €3.6bn annually to Finnish gross domestic product during the 2027–2028 construction window. Beyond direct infrastructure development, the funding package also allocates resources to local clean energy projects, dedicated community and nature conservation funds, and initiatives to support biodiversity, education, academic research, and regional workforce development.

    The new data centres will be sited in the Finnish locations of Kajaani, Muhos, and Vaala, while Google will expand its existing facility in Hamina — a site first established in 2009, when the company converted a decommissioned paper mill into a data hub. The expanded and new infrastructure will underpin core Google services ranging from its flagship Search, Maps, and YouTube platforms to the company’s growing AI product line, led by its Gemini large language model chatbot.

    “This is Google’s largest single investment in Europe and a testament to Finland’s leadership in responsibly building AI infrastructure,” the company stated in its official announcement Wednesday. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo welcomed the deal, emphasizing the broader economic spillover benefits of the growing data economy. “Google’s decision is a clear testament to our strengths,” Orpo said in a statement. “The value of the data economy extends far beyond direct investment into spurring innovation, research and development. Deepening our collaboration with Google will deliver lasting benefits for both parties.”

    Ruth Porat, President and Chief Investment Officer of Google’s parent company Alphabet, framed the investment as aligned with Google’s goal of responsible, sustainable infrastructure growth. “Google is proud to deepen our roots in Finland,” Porat said. “This investment underscores Google’s commitment to grow our presence responsibly, pairing the expansion of our technical infrastructure with new energy capacity, grid enhancements, and energy affordability initiatives.”

    The deal comes as the global AI boom has sent demand for data centre capacity and reliable power supplies soaring, forcing big tech firms to lock in long-term energy contracts to support their expanding server networks. Earlier this year, Alphabet raised its total global capital expenditure budget to as much as $205bn, a move explicitly tied to expanding computing capacity to meet fast-growing AI service demand.

  • What Iran’s resilience tells China, Russia about US power

    What Iran’s resilience tells China, Russia about US power

    At the outbreak of the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, few policymakers in Beijing or Moscow predicted that Tehran would be able to sustainedly withstand coordinated military pressure from two of the world’s most militarily advanced powers. In the conflict’s opening phase, the overwhelming air, intelligence, and technological superiority of US and Israeli forces inflicted heavy losses on Iranian military and infrastructure targets. What was initially planned as a rapid operation to cripple Iran’s core military capabilities has however evolved into a protracted, increasingly costly conflict that has defied early expectations.

    Against all odds, Iran has retained intact its core governing political structure and a substantial portion of its operational military response capacity. This outcome delivers a clear demonstration that inflicting widespread physical damage does not equate to forcing a targeted state into unconditional surrender. Iran’s unexpected battlefield resilience is far more than a regional military development – it has become a real-world stress test for the outer limits of American global power for both China and Russia. While the two countries hold divergent core interests in the conflict, neither can dismiss a decisive Iranian defeat as a regional issue isolated from great power competition. Both Beijing and Moscow recognize that if the United States can leverage its military dominance to strategically neutralize one of West Asia’s most prominent independent powers, the regional balance of power will shift dramatically, with ripple effects extending into the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalry between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.

    ### China’s Balancing Act Between Economic Pain and Strategic Interests

    Of all major global powers, China faces the sharpest economic incentives to push for an immediate end to the conflict. Decades of deep energy trade ties have made China Iran’s largest crude oil buyer, so disruptions to energy transit and rising insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz directly impact Chinese economic performance. Data from Reuters confirms that China’s seaborne crude imports fell to roughly 7.14 million barrels per day in August 2026, a nearly 40% drop from pre-war levels. This supply disruption has cut off major Chinese refineries from a critical, low-cost source of crude oil.

    Yet this immediate economic pain sits at the heart of Beijing’s core strategic dilemma: while a prolonged war harms Chinese economic interests, Beijing cannot accept a outcome that leaves Iran strategically defeated. For China, Iran is far more than just an energy supplier – it is a core node in the broader web of political and economic partnerships China has built across West Asia to expand its influence without relying on the formal military alliances that underpin US power in the region. A strategic collapse of Iran would not only reshape bilateral relations between Tehran and Washington; it would entrench far greater US influence across West Asia and erode the strategic space China has painstakingly built in the region.

    China’s policy over years of maximum US pressure on Iran has reflected this balancing act. Beijing’s support for Tehran has never been limited to rhetorical political statements. China has consistently remained one of the largest buyers of Iranian crude, with independent Chinese teapot refineries continuing to import Iranian oil even amid threats of harsh US secondary sanctions. This persistence is why US officials have made Chinese crude purchases a central focus of their economic pressure campaign against Iran. This economic relationship has grown even more critical since the outbreak of full-scale war: as Washington moves to cut off Iran’s oil exports and global financial access, China stands as one of the only major economies capable of absorbing excess Iranian supply and easing economic pressure on Tehran. For Beijing, continuing to import Iranian oil is not merely a commercial transaction – it is a test case for resisting the ability of US sanctions to dictate the policy of major economies outside the American orbit, which explains why the issue has remained a persistent source of bilateral friction between Washington and Beijing.

    China’s engagement extends beyond energy trade. US intelligence reports in recent years have documented that Iran has gained access to certain dual-use technologies, including components critical to its drone and missile programs, through commercial networks linked to Chinese companies. While a clear line must be drawn between official Chinese government policy and the independent activities of these commercial networks, their operations demonstrate how sustained economic ties have helped preserve a large portion of Iran’s technological and industrial base even under strict international sanctions. Diplomatically, Beijing has also refused to back Iran’s full isolation from the international community. Alongside Russia, China has repeatedly called for a negotiated political resolution to the conflict and opposed what it views as unilateral US-led pressure campaigns against Tehran.

    This does not mean Beijing is prepared to commit to direct military defense of Iran. China’s core priority remains ending the war to restore stability to global energy trade routes. Yet there is a critical difference between ending the conflict and ending it on terms that leave Iran severely weakened and the regional balance of power decisively tilted toward Washington. It is here that Iran’s battlefield resilience carries the greatest strategic weight for China: the longer Tehran demonstrates it can retain operational military capacity after repeated heavy attacks, the more complex Beijing’s calculation of the consequences of an Iranian defeat becomes.

    Crucially, China does not need to enter the war directly to support Iran. Its existing toolkit of economic, commercial, technological, and diplomatic tools allows it to prevent Iran’s total isolation without becoming a formal belligerent in the conflict. Perhaps the most valuable outcome for China from the war, however, is not energy trade or preserved influence in West Asia – it is the opportunity to observe firsthand the operational performance of US military forces in a high-intensity conflict. Beijing has gained unfiltered insights into US long-range strike capabilities, air operations, ammunition consumption rates, logistics sustainment, and missile defense performance. For a country whose long-term strategic competition with the US centers heavily on the Taiwan scenario, this real-world observational data is strategically invaluable.

    ### Russia’s Divergent Strategic Calculations

    Russia’s core interests in the conflict differ substantially from China’s. Unlike Beijing, Moscow does not rely heavily on West Asian energy imports, and elevated global energy prices actually create short-term economic benefits for Russian export revenues. For the Kremlin, the Iran conflict is tied directly to Russia’s standing as a Eurasian power and its long-term goal of building a multipolar global order.

    For Russia, Iran is more than a regional partner: it is one of the few major powers openly locked in full-scale conflict with both the US and Israel, capable of drawing significant American geopolitical and military attention away from Europe and the ongoing war in Ukraine, easing pressure on Moscow. A 2026 analysis published in *Middle East Policy* argues that the conflict has created clear short-term strategic advantages for Russia, while also elevating Iran’s importance to both Russia’s regional influence and its bilateral partnership with China.

    Evidence of deep military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran extends far beyond rhetorical political alignment. Reporting from the *Financial Times* confirms that Russian military experts have participated in a secret collaborative program with Iran since 2023 to develop propulsion technology for hypersonic cruise missiles, a cooperation that has continued into 2026. Additional independent reporting has documented ongoing cooperation in satellite technology and transfers of complementary military equipment between the two states. This cooperation does not amount to a formal mutual defense alliance, and neither China nor Russia has offered Iran a binding security guarantee comparable to the commitments of a formal defense pact. But this informal, flexible cooperation has emerged as the defining feature of their current alignment: both powers can use economic, technological, and diplomatic tools to strengthen Iran’s defensive capacity and constrain US pressure without committing to open direct war with the United States.

    ### Contours of an Emerging Multipolar Global Order

    Ultimately, the long-term significance of the US-Israeli war on Iran does not depend solely on which side gains the upper hand on the battlefield. The larger, more consequential question is whether the United States still retains the ability to use its combined military and economic superiority to impose its preferred political outcome on a defiant regional power. For China and Russia, the answer to this question carries sweeping implications. If Iran can sustain its resistance despite intense military pressure and crippling economic sanctions, the conflict will confirm that US ability to inflict widespread damage does not translate into ability to dictate political outcomes – a lesson that carries particular weight for China as it prepares for long-term strategic competition with Washington.

    At the same time, the policy approaches of China and Russia demonstrate that challenging US hegemony does not require the creation of a formal anti-US alliance. Purchasing Iranian oil, sustaining bilateral trade, transferring dual-use technology, engaging in informal military cooperation, and wielding Security Council vetoes are all tools that raise the strategic and political cost of unilateral US power projection. Most recently, in April 2026, China and Russia jointly vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on the Strait of Hormuz, with Beijing explicitly arguing that the council should not legitimize unauthorized military operations by unilateral coalitions.

    This does not mean a cohesive China-Russia-Iran geopolitical axis is emerging. The three countries hold divergent interests on many regional and global issues, and none is willing to bear unlimited costs to advance another power’s goals. Even so, the war in Iran has accelerated a broader global shift: moving from a post-Cold War order where the United States unilaterally sets the rules and determines outcomes for international crises, toward a new order where competing great powers can systematically raise the cost of unilateral US power projection.

    The conflict has brought the contours of this emerging order into sharp relief. For Beijing and Moscow, Iran’s fate is not merely the future of a single regional partner. It is a critical test case: can the United States still unilaterally determine the outcome of a major regional war, or can other global powers use resistance, informal partnership, and counterpressure to raise the cost of US hegemony high enough to push the international system irreversibly toward multipolarity?