In late February, when US President Donald Trump ordered military strikes against Iran, Turkish leadership found itself unexpectedly sidelined from major decision-making. Ankara’s repeated diplomatic efforts to head off the conflict fell on deaf ears, with senior Turkish officials concluding that Trump prioritized advice from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over their own input. Just three months later, the geopolitical landscape shifted dramatically: Trump publicly named Turkey, alongside Pakistan and Qatar, as one of the key countries that helped broker a breakthrough memorandum of understanding with Iran, while adopting a sharply more confrontational stance toward Israel.
The 60-day ceasefire agreement reached between Tehran and Washington over the weekend comes with two core provisions: it extends the fragile pause in hostilities between the two nations and reopens the Strait of Hormuz, the critical global energy chokepoint that Iran had blocked after the US-Israeli military campaign began. Speaking to Middle East Eye this week, senior Turkish officials have struck a cautious tone about the deal, emphasizing that the memorandum represents only an initial step toward resolving the long-running US-Iran dispute and does little more than temporarily ease shipping pressure on the strait.
“The 60-day window to negotiate a final agreement on the nuclear file and other outstanding disputes will be far more complex and challenging than any prior stage of negotiations,” one senior Turkish official said. “This will be the true test of whether this current calm can be sustained.” Many policy experts based in Ankara share concerns that Israel could take provocative action in the coming months to derail the fragile agreement. Even amid these lingering uncertainties, one outcome is already clear: Turkey has emerged from the US-Iran war largely unharmed, and in many respects, strategically strengthened.
When the conflict first erupted, Ankara harbored deep fears about the stability of the Iranian government and potential spillover that could threaten Turkish national security. To date, none of these worst-case scenarios have materialized. Turkish officials immediately activated pre-planned contingency measures along Turkey’s eastern border with Iran to prepare for a possible mass refugee influx, successfully keeping border crossings calm and avoiding a humanitarian crisis. A second major threat also emerged early on: Israeli officials pushed for a plan to arm Iranian Kurdish groups to lead an insurgency in western Iran.
Ankara viewed this proposal as a direct threat to its own domestic security, arguing that empowering Kurdish armed groups in western Iran could derail ongoing peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and drag Turkey into a scenario similar to the Syrian conflict, where Kurdish groups based along the border seized control of territory and posed a persistent security challenge. As US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets intensified, hardline members of Netanyahu’s cabinet began openly stating that “Turkey is next after Iran,” amplifying Ankara’s fears that a collapse of Iranian state authority would spread chaos directly to its borders.
Despite these significant risks, Ankara managed to retain political influence and convince the Trump administration that a Kurdish insurgency in western Iran was not in US interests. Several external factors worked in Turkey’s favor: deep internal divisions within Iraqi Kurdistan over how to approach Iranian Kurdish groups, including public rifts between the powerful ruling Barzani and Talabani political dynasties, and the fact that very few Iranian Kurdish fighters had access to the heavy weaponry required to lead a large-scale insurgency. Top Trump administration officials, including CIA Director John Ratcliffe and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, also openly expressed deep skepticism about the feasibility of the Israeli plan.
One unforeseen crisis that tested Ankara’s crisis management came when Iran fired four ballistic missiles into Turkish territory. The strike was part of a broader barrage targeting Gulf states and regional countries hosting US military forces, and analysts believe the missiles targeted the US-operated Incirlik Air Base and the Kurecik Radar Base, a critical installation used to track Iranian ballistic missile launches. The attack triggered fierce pushback from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who held multiple angry conversations with Iranian authorities to make clear that Ankara would not tolerate strikes on its territory, especially any that risked civilian casualties.
At the time, Ankara insiders widely expected that if the missiles had hit a populated area and caused civilian deaths, Turkey would have been forced to launch retaliatory strikes, creating a dangerous cycle of escalation that could have dragged the country directly into the war. By limiting the strikes to military installations hosting US assets and avoiding civilian casualties, Iran avoided a full rupture of bilateral ties with Ankara. Ironically, the missile attacks ultimately strengthened Turkey’s position within the NATO alliance: the US, Germany, and Italy all quickly deployed additional anti-ballistic missile systems to Turkey to support an ally under threat, warming previously strained ties between Ankara and these major Western powers.
Beyond strategic gains, Turkey has capitalized on the conflict to expand its economic and commercial influence across the Middle East. In the wake of Iranian long-range drone and missile strikes on Gulf states, many regional governments began seeking large-scale purchases of air defense systems, allowing Ankara to step in as a reliable new supplier. Turkey has already signed hundreds of millions of dollars worth of arms contracts with Gulf states including Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, establishing itself as a growing player in the global arms market. While Turkey still lacks domestic long-range anti-ballistic interceptor technology, it has an active domestic development program and has proposed joint investment partnerships that have drawn increasing interest from Gulf capitals.
At the same time that Turkey expanded arms sales to Gulf allies, it managed to preserve its longstanding diplomatic and economic ties with Iran, a relationship that proved critical during ceasefire negotiations. The Iranian missile strikes also shattered long-held assumptions that Gulf monarchies and their major financial centers were immune to regional attack, creating an opening for Ankara to position itself as an alternative regional investment hub for global businesses looking to de-risk their exposure. The project remains a long and difficult bet, requiring extensive domestic legal reforms and large-scale infrastructure investment, but the conflict has already helped boost Turkey’s reputation as a stable safe haven outside the range of direct Iranian strikes.
Of course, the conflict has not come without costs for Turkey. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted global shipping and pushed up global energy prices, exacerbating Turkey’s long-running battle with high inflation. A leading energy research think tank estimates that higher energy costs stemming from the strait closure will add nearly $14 billion to Turkey’s annual national energy bill. Inflationary pressures were already visible in April and May economic data, though the Turkish government has so far managed to mitigate the worst economic impacts of the price shock.
Even amid these economic headwinds, Ankara has turned the energy crisis into an opportunity to advance its long-term goal of becoming a central Eurasian energy and connectivity hub. Turkish officials have proposed a slate of new infrastructure projects that leverage the country’s unique geographic position, including reviving the historic Hejaz Railway, expanding the existing Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline to reach the southern Iraqi port of Basra, and building a new direct natural gas pipeline linking Qatar to Turkey.
Finally, domestic political analysis shows the conflict has produced a clear “rally-around-the-flag” effect for Turkish leadership. Recent independent polls reviewed by Middle East Eye indicate that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s domestic popularity has risen during the conflict, even after his government launched a widespread crackdown on the country’s main opposition party. “Turks are now experts on turning regional crisis into opportunities for themselves,” one senior European diplomat summed up the outcome.
