标签: Asia

亚洲

  • Taiwan opposition leader meets Xi Jinping in Beijing

    Taiwan opposition leader meets Xi Jinping in Beijing

    In a landmark meeting that marks the first high-level engagement between China’s ruling Communist Party and Taiwan’s main opposition Kuomintang in a decade, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Kuomintang chair Cheng Li-wun in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People on Friday, with both leaders centering their dialogue on a shared commitment to cross-strait peace. This meeting breaks a long period of limited formal interaction between Beijing and major Taiwanese opposition figures, and it comes at a time of heightened regional tensions over the Taiwan Strait status quo.

    Cheng Li-wun’s visit is the first by a sitting Kuomintang leader to mainland China since 2016. That same year, Beijing cut off all high-level official communications with Taiwan after Democratic Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ing-wen took the Taiwanese presidency, a move driven by Tsai’s refusal to publicly acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, the one-China principle that forms the baseline of cross-strait dialogue for Beijing. Cheng has framed her current trip as a mission for peace, but the ruling DPP in Taiwan has already lashed out at the visit, accusing Cheng of bowing to Beijing’s demands to undermine Taiwan’s sovereign status.

    Beijing has long maintained that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and has repeatedly declined to rule out the use of military force to bring the self-governing island under its control if formal independence is declared. Speaking during the meeting, President Xi emphasized that the historic gathering of leaders from the two parties was intended to protect peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, advance the peaceful development of cross-strait ties, and build a prosperous shared future for generations on both sides of the strait. He added that Beijing remains open to strengthening exchanges and dialogue with all major Taiwanese parties, including the Kuomintang, as long as both sides uphold the shared political foundation of opposing Taiwan independence. Xi also reiterated that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are ethnic Chinese who all share a common desire for lasting peace.

    In her response, Cheng echoed Xi’s remarks, noting that the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is a common goal shared by people across both sides of the strait, and that stable cross-strait relations would represent a positive contribution to global peace and human progress. Political analysts note that while the Kuomintang has a long history of maintaining friendly, open ties with Beijing, Cheng’s willingness to pursue this high-profile meeting marks a departure from the more cautious approach taken by recent KMT leaders, who have sought to balance cross-strait engagement with domestic political pressure to protect Taiwan’s autonomous status.

    Beijing has refused to enter into any formal official dialogue with current Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, who took office earlier this year, labeling Lai a committed separatist. Lai has repeatedly stated that he will maintain the current cross-strait status quo, but Chinese authorities and state-run media have launched relentless verbal attacks against him, referring to him as a troublemaker and a warmonger who risks dragging the region into conflict. Public opinion data from recent surveys in Taiwan shows that while a majority of Taiwanese residents identify as citizens of a sovereign nation, a large plurality still favors maintaining the current status quo—avoiding both immediate formal unification with China and a formal declaration of full independence that would trigger a strong response from Beijing.

  • What’s in a name? It’s succession, legacy and celebration in Japan’s Kabuki theater

    What’s in a name? It’s succession, legacy and celebration in Japan’s Kabuki theater

    In the heart of Tokyo, a centuries-old cultural ritual is unfolding that reaffirms the enduring legacy of Japan’s iconic traditional theatrical art, Kabuki. For generations, passing down revered stage names through family lines has stood as the cornerstone of Kabuki tradition, celebrated every few years at major theaters and special ceremonies across the country. This year, the iconic title of Kikugoro transfers to its eighth holder, 48-year-old Kazuyasu Terajima, who inherits the honor from his 83-year-old father, the seventh Kikugoro — continuing an unbroken line of succession that stretches back multiple generations.

    For Terajima, accepting the legendary name means far more than adopting a new stage title. “Taking on the name is about taking on the spirit and responsibility that’s created and passed down over generations by those who came before us,” he told reporters recently. “The job of the Kabuki actor is to carry on and develop in the present what we have inherited from our predecessors, and make sure it gets passed on to those who come after us.” This is not an unfamiliar practice for Kabuki: just two years ago, in 2022, the field saw another major succession when the 13th holder of the other iconic Kabuki family name, Danjuro, formally took on his title.

    Dating all the way back to the 1600s, Kabuki remains a vibrant, widely beloved art form in modern Japan, and recent cultural milestones underscore its ongoing popularity. The hit domestic film *Kokuho*, which earned an Oscar nomination this year for best makeup and hairstyling, became the highest-grossing live-action domestic film in Japanese cinema history — a clear sign that the centuries-old theater still resonates deeply with contemporary audiences.

    What makes Kabuki unique is its distinct, stylized performance language that sets it apart from realistic Western theatrical traditions. All roles, including female parts, are played by male actors: those who specialize in women’s roles are called onnagata, while artists like the Kikugoro line perform both male and female roles. The art form blends sweeping dramatic narratives, live music, dance, and song, with stories ranging from tales of wronged samurai seeking vengeance to tragic romances and supernatural tales of maidens who transform into serpents. Actors wear elaborate, vibrant costumes and striking stylized makeup, and deliberately reject realism to emphasize emotional and thematic core. Key dramatic moments are punctuated by striking poses called mie, emphasized by the rhythmic clack of wooden claves that freeze the performance to highlight courage, fear, or other intense emotions. Lines are often delivered in a melodic, poetic cadence, while live music serves as an integral narrative tool: thundering large drums evoke stormy weather, soft drumbeats mimic falling snow, and tinkling bells can conjure the image of floating butterflies. Performances utilize dynamic revolving sets — for example, cherry blossom trees that shower audiences with pink paper petals — and even incorporate acrobatic elements, such as wire-work for supernatural character dance sequences. One of the form’s most celebrated theatrical tricks is on-stage costume and character transformation, where stagehands called kurogo, cloaked in unobtrusive black robes, help actors shift from a human character to a demon right in front of the audience’s eyes.

    Surprisingly, Kabuki shares striking thematic parallels with William Shakespeare’s Elizabethan theater, despite developing completely independently. One of Kabuki’s most famous tragic works, *The Love Suicides at Sonezaki*, tells the story of young lovers who choose death together over a life apart — often described as the Kabuki equivalent of *Romeo and Juliet*. The parallel is entirely coincidental: the play’s writer, Chikamatsu Monzaemon, created the work for Japan’s Bunraku puppet theater in the 18th century during Japan’s isolationist Tokugawa period, and never had access to Shakespeare’s works, which were written decades earlier.

    Like all Kikugoro titleholders before him, Terajima was born into this legacy and trained from childhood to carry the art form forward. Far from resenting the predetermined path, he speaks of it only with gratitude and dedication. “I totally adored and admired my predecessors,” he shared during an appearance at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club in Tokyo last month. “First of all, I am filled with gratitude to our predecessors who created great works that continue to be loved by generations that came after. So I am grateful to be born into the family of such ancestors.”

    The chain of succession already extends to the next generation: Terajima’s 12-year-old son Kazufumi will one day inherit the previous family title Kikunosuke, a name passed to the younger generation of the Kikugoro line. Like his father, Kazufumi has already begun his training, which requires intense physical and mental discipline: daily morning running, strict dietary rules, and early bedtimes. Though he shares interests with other children his age — including video games and Japanese rock band Mrs. Green Apple — he has already developed a calm, disciplined bearing far beyond his years. “It’s not only hard physically. It’s also pretty hard mentally, and I sometimes took it out on my parents,” he admitted with a smile. The multi-year shumei (name succession) ceremony, which launched last year with a series of performances across Japan, will continue through 2024.

    Renowned American Kabuki scholar James R. Brandon describes the art form as centered on a strict cultural code: “a theater in which the art of acting is central, and in which playwright and actor cooperate to achieve the unique style of performance found only in Kabuki.” Central to this tradition is kata, the established “correct way” of performing each role and scene that serves as a model for all future generations of actors.

    While some cultural observers have raised concerns about Kabuki’s long-term survival in an era of modern digital entertainment, Terajima says he remains confident in the art form’s enduring relevance, arguing that its core traditions do not need radical change. “By using kata, what we want to truly communicate the most in the tradition of Kabuki is human compassion, that spirit of caring for others,” he explained. For the eighth Kikugoro, that timeless message ensures that Kabuki will continue to thrive for generations to come.

  • German leader says he does not want Nato to ‘split’ over war on Iran

    German leader says he does not want Nato to ‘split’ over war on Iran

    A growing rift is tearing at the foundations of the 76-year-old NATO alliance, after U.S. President Donald Trump escalated threats to impose consequences on member states that refuse to deploy military forces to the Strait of Hormuz amid America’s ongoing war with Iran, with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly pushing back against any potential fragmentation of the bloc.

    In a press briefing Thursday, Merz stressed that maintaining NATO unity remains a top priority for Berlin, emphasizing the alliance’s non-negotiable role as the cornerstone of European security. “We do not want — I do not want — NATO to split. NATO is a guarantor of our security, including and above all in Europe,” Merz told reporters. His remarks underscore the unprecedented strain Trump’s push to drag the alliance into a Middle Eastern conflict has placed on the transatlantic security bloc.

    Tensions boiled over shortly after Trump held a White House meeting Wednesday with new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, with the U.S. president launching a blistering public attack on the alliance in a social media post. “NATO WASN’T THERE WHEN WE NEEDED THEM, AND THEY WON’T BE THERE IF WE NEED THEM AGAIN. REMEMBER GREENLAND, THAT BIG, POORLY RUN, PIECE OF ICE!!! President DJT,” the post read.

    Rutte, a former Dutch prime minister who took the alliance’s top job earlier this year, drew widespread backlash earlier this year after referring to Trump as “daddy” in a public remark. When pressed on the comment Thursday, the secretary general framed the choice of wording as a translation error, but did not back away from his warm stance toward the U.S. leader, adding “I like him so much.”

    Long labeled a “Trump whisperer” for his consistent approach of appeasing the U.S. president, Rutte faced renewed criticism this week for his response to questions about Trump’s public vow to destroy Iran’s civilization. Asked by CNN for his reaction, the NATO chief declined to criticize the remark, saying only: “I’m not commenting. I support the president.”

    Foreign policy analysts argue Rutte’s accommodating stance stems from a desperate bid to preserve the alliance amid broader tensions, as the Trump administration openly toys with cutting off U.S. military support for Ukraine amid Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion. In comments after the White House meeting, Rutte acknowledged the discussions were tense, describing the talks as “very frank” and “very open” when addressing Trump’s long list of grievances against NATO members. “He is clearly disappointed with many NATO allies, and I can see his point,” Rutte told CNN.

    Trump first publicly demanded earlier this year that NATO contribute military forces to joint U.S. operations to seize control of the Strait of Hormuz from Iran. The U.S. president has repeatedly argued that since the U.S. imports very little Gulf energy, with Asian and European economies accounting for the vast majority of the region’s oil and gas exports, those states should take primary responsibility for securing the waterway. “You’ll have to start learning how to fight for yourself, the USA won’t be there to help you anymore, just like you weren’t there for us. Iran has been, essentially, decimated. The hard part is done. Go get your own oil!” Trump wrote in a social media post last month.

    The U.S. call for involvement has been met with sharp pushback from multiple major European NATO members, revealing deep divisions within the bloc. Spain has closed its airspace to U.S. warplanes bound for the Middle East, while Italy has denied U.S. military aircraft permission to land at a key Sicilian base en route to the region. According to Trump, France has also barred U.S. planes carrying military equipment to Israel from accessing its airspace. French President Emmanuel Macron has publicly rejected Trump’s push for NATO to join offensive operations in Hormuz, directly calling the proposal “unrealistic.”

    The Trump administration’s anger at reluctant members has grown in recent weeks, with senior U.S. officials already signaling breaks with long-standing NATO security commitments. Last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declined to explicitly reaffirm U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5, the core collective defense provision that states an attack on one member is an attack on all.

    White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt doubled down on the administration’s criticism Wednesday, arguing that the Iran war has put NATO to the test — and that the alliance has failed. “NATO allies have turned their backs on the American people,” Leavitt said.

    Ian Lesser, vice president of the German Marshall Fund in the U.S., previously told Middle East Eye that the White House’s grievances are largely disconnected from the perspective of most European capitals. “There is a basic concern that Europe is being asked to contribute to and approve of operations they had no role in shaping and a strategy they had no role in shaping,” he explained. “That’s not a good recipe for cooperation.”

    Not all European states have rejected the U.S. push, however. The White House has singled out several members that have offered full cooperation, with Greece granting U.S. forces access to its airspace and strategic Mediterranean ports. After the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier departed the Red Sea following an unexplained fire, the vessel docked for repairs at Greece’s Souda Bay naval base in Crete. Similarly, Romania has allowed the U.S. to use key military facilities for operations targeting Iran, according to a Stars and Stripes report.

    A Wall Street Journal report published Wednesday evening revealed the Trump administration is now planning a system of rewards and punishments for NATO members based on their support for the Iran war. The report stated the U.S. could withdraw American troops from uncooperative states and reposition those forces in allied countries that have backed the campaign. Poland, Romania, Lithuania and Greece are expected to see increased U.S. military presence under the plan, while Spain and Germany could face full closure of existing American military bases.

    For most European governments, particularly Eastern European states that share a border with Russia, the U.S. military presence on their territory has long been viewed as a critical security guarantee against Russian aggression. Trump has spent years pressing European capitals to increase their own defense spending, arguing the U.S. carries too much of the alliance’s cost burden.

  • North Korea and China agree to deepen cooperation in talks between foreign ministers

    North Korea and China agree to deepen cooperation in talks between foreign ministers

    On Friday, state media outlets from both China and North Korea released details of a high-profile diplomatic meeting between the two nations’ top foreign policy officials, where the sides committed to expanding bilateral exchanges and holding extensive, targeted discussions on pressing global affairs.

    The meeting marked a key milestone for China-North Korea diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi arrived in Pyongyang on Thursday for his first visit to the country in seven years. According to China’s official Xinhua News Agency, Wang and his North Korean counterpart Choe Son Hui held in-depth talks on major current international and regional issues, though the specific subjects covered were not disclosed in the official readouts. North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency added that the two ministers also agreed to reinforce strategic communication between their respective foreign affairs institutions. Notably, neither official release mentioned whether discussions touched on the United States or ongoing conflicts such as the Middle East war.

    Wang’s visit comes ahead of a widely anticipated rescheduled summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, scheduled to take place in Beijing this May.

    The bilateral relationship between China and North Korea has long been framed by the iconic description “as close as lips and teeth,” but the stability of their ties has faced increased scrutiny in recent years. Over the course of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea has moved to deepen its partnership with Moscow, reportedly providing troops and ammunition to support Russia’s military campaign. By contrast, China has signaled reluctance to enter a formal anti-Western alliance alongside North Korea and Russia.

    Despite these shifting geopolitical currents, both Pyongyang and Beijing have made visible efforts to reinforce their bilateral alignment in recent months. Last September, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Chinese President Xi Jinping held their first bilateral summit in more than six years, during which the two leaders issued a formal pledge of mutual support. Just last month, the two countries also restored direct passenger flight and train services between their territories, which had been fully suspended after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

  • US military bases in Gulf ‘useless’ after Iranian strikes, experts say

    US military bases in Gulf ‘useless’ after Iranian strikes, experts say

    A group of leading Middle East policy experts warned Thursday that extensive damage to over a dozen U.S. military installations across the Gulf region from Iran’s retaliatory strikes has flipped the strategic calculus of America’s decades-long military presence in the area – turning long-held security assets into major liabilities that create more risk than they mitigate.

    Details of the severe damage to the bases, which multiple outlets have described as effectively uninhabitable, were first revealed in a New York Times report last month, but the Trump administration has still not publicly confirmed the full scope of the destruction.

    Speaking at the Arab Center Washington DC’s annual conference, Marc Lynch, director of George Washington University’s Project on Middle East Political Science, called the bases the physical foundation of decades of American primacy in the Middle East, noting Iran effectively rendered that infrastructure useless in just one month. Lynch emphasized that U.S. officials have failed to release a full, transparent accounting of the damage sustained across the installations, which are tightly restricted by both the Pentagon and host Gulf nations including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman.

    Lynch shared that regional contacts have shared on-the-ground imagery of damage to Naval Support Activity Bahrain, the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet that hosts roughly 9,000 U.S. military personnel. He argued that the widespread damage to regional bases has made the strategic position of the Fifth Force in Bahrain untenable, saying the risk of further attacks is too great to reestablish a full permanent presence there. “So in a sense, the entire purpose of ‘America’s Middle East’ has come crashing down [and] we don’t have an alternative way yet of articulating or thinking about what might replace it,” Lynch added.

    In total, 19 publicly acknowledged U.S. military sites are spread across the broader Middle East, stretching from Egypt to Iraq and from northern Syria to southern Oman, holding up to 50,000 total U.S. service members. The U.S. military presence in the region dates to the late 1950s, but the large-scale network of active bases in the Gulf took shape after the 1990 Gulf War, built on a long-standing core agreement: the U.S. would provide security guarantees to Gulf states in exchange for access to energy resources and a stable petrodollar system.

    That decades-old arrangement has now collapsed following the recent wave of Iranian strikes that came in response to U.S. and Israeli attacks, experts say. Gulf states have been forced to drain their air defense interceptor stockpiles, shut down civilian airports and schools, and suffer major damage to key energy production facilities, eroding any remaining benefits of the security agreement for host nations.

    Shana R Marshall, associate director of George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies, told the conference that as the benefits of the transactional relationship between the U.S. and Gulf states have eroded sharply, the bilateral relationship is inevitably fraying. Marshall noted that tensions over U.S. basing are not new, pointing to the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 U.S. service members in Saudi Arabia, and al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden’s long-stated core grievance over the permanent presence of U.S. troops in the Gulf. “Close relations with the U.S., whether it’s U.S. military bases or promoting normalisation with Israel, or enforcing U.S. sanctions or maintaining the dollar peg of their currencies, is less a benefit now than actually a liability,” Marshall explained.

    Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, added that the seven-week escalation has made clear Gulf states can no longer count on the U.S. as a reliable security partner, a sentiment amplified by the recent ceasefire deal that failed to explicitly end Iranian attacks on U.S.-linked assets across the Gulf. The omission has left many Gulf leaders feeling betrayed, Parsi said.

    “Those bases were not a deterrent against Iranian attacks. Instead, they became the target of those attacks. They became magnets for those attacks, and as a result, reliance on the American security umbrella really seems to be in shatters,” Parsi explained.

    Parsi outlined one likely outcome of this shift: disillusioned Gulf states that cannot reach a new security accommodation with Iran may pivot toward Israel as an alternative security partner. Unlike the 2020 Abraham Accords, which were anchored by explicit U.S. security guarantees, Parsi said this potential shift could happen even without major new concessions from the U.S., driven purely by Gulf states’ loss of faith in American security commitments. “There may be some sort of a gravitation towards Israel among some of these [Gulf] states, if they believe that they either cannot or do not want to find a new relationship with Iran,” he added.

  • China’s K-pop worries: The reasons why a ban on Korean entertainment has lasted a decade

    China’s K-pop worries: The reasons why a ban on Korean entertainment has lasted a decade

    When global K-pop phenomenon BTS kicked off its long-awaited world tour this week after more than three years on hiatus, one of the group’s largest historical fan bases was notably absent from the 12-month schedule: mainland China. For industry analysts and K-pop fans alike, the exclusion comes as no surprise — it has been nearly a decade since China enacted an unofficial ban on most South Korean cultural content, ranging from music and television dramas to feature films, and the restrictions have remained largely in place ever since.

    The origins of the ban stretch back to a 2016 geopolitical dispute. After South Korea approved the deployment of the U.S.-built Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system on its territory, China retaliated with sweeping informal trade and cultural restrictions. While China frames THAAD as a security threat, arguing its radar technology can be repurposed to monitor Chinese territory, experts say the longevity of the entertainment ban stems from deeper domestic concerns that go far beyond the THAAD dispute.

    Unlike other temporary trade restrictions China has deployed during geopolitical standoffs, this ban has endured for eight years, driven in large part by Beijing’s growing concern over the overwhelming popularity of South Korean pop culture among Chinese youth. When the “Korean Wave” first swept into China, officials welcomed it as an alternative to Western popular cultural imports, according to a 2024 report from South Korea’s state-run Korea Creative Content Agency. But by the 2010s, the explosive growth of K-pop fandom and viewership for South Korean TV dramas pushed the Chinese government to frame the cultural influx as a threat to its domestic cultural sovereignty.

    “The Chinese government had never experienced anything like that before,” explained Dong-ha Kim, a professor at Busan University of Foreign Studies. “While the dispute over THAAD happened to coincide with that period, Beijing’s fundamental concern goes deeper. It cannot allow foreign culture to shape the thinking of its young people, especially when its government has no control over the content.”

    This concern has translated into concrete policy: in 2021, China banned “effeminate-looking” male entertainers from state television, a trend many observers trace to influence from South Korean and Japanese pop idols. Beijing has also made expanding its own domestic pop culture and soft power a top policy priority, from the global breakout of collectible Labubu dolls to the expansion of Chinese food and beverage brands worldwide. If the ban on South Korean entertainment were fully lifted, experts say a flood of K-pop content would directly undermine that goal by siphoning audience attention and revenue from domestic creators.

    “China wants cultural governance — to grow its own music industry,” said Hyunji Lee, a financial analyst covering the global entertainment sector. “If K-pop floods back in, there’s a direct conflict.”

    The ban is not an absolute prohibition, however. Non-Korean members of K-pop groups have been allowed to stage performances in mainland China, and pop-up stores selling official K-pop merchandise regularly draw hundreds of loyal fans who wait hours for entry. Diehard fans can access South Korean dramas via informal streaming, though most available content is at least four years old and often distributed through unlicensed pirated platforms. The restrictions also do not apply to China’s special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao, which are set to host BTS tour stops in 2027 — a development already greeted with relief by many mainland Chinese fans.

    “I’m already really grateful that they can perform in places like Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan,” said Tian Xin, a fan who traveled to Seoul earlier this year for BTS’s free pre-tour comeback concert. “The rest is a matter of national policy. Of course I still hope they can come closer to us — fans always want that.”

    For many mainland Chinese fans, the current arrangement means bearing the high cost and inconvenience of traveling abroad to see their favorite groups perform. Yu Sang, a Beijing-based K-pop fan and event organizer, traveled to Seoul five times last year to attend K-pop events, and says fandom in mainland China remains remarkably committed even amid the restrictions. “The fans in China are incredibly devoted,” she said. “If you go to the Arctic, I’ll go to the Arctic with you.”

    Chinese officials have never publicly acknowledged the existence of the ban. In 2022, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated that China has “never imposed any so-called bans on the Republic of Korea,” and later officials have repeated that Beijing welcomes “healthy and beneficial” cultural exchange with South Korea. Still, hopes for a partial or full easing of restrictions have grown in recent months, after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (corrected from the original text’s misnomer Lee Jae Myung) met twice with Chinese leader Xi Jinping to discuss bilateral relations improvement. During Yoon’s January 2024 visit to Beijing, the two sides signed an agreement to expand cultural exchange, though the initial opening is limited only to soccer and the traditional board game go.

    In comments carried by South Korean officials, Xi used two traditional Chinese idioms to frame the trajectory of cultural normalization: “Three feet of ice does not form in a single day” and “Fruit falls only when it ripens.” The remarks signal that any full lifting of restrictions will likely take years, and will only proceed when Beijing determines political and strategic conditions are right. On Chinese social media, public opinion remains divided: some users argue K-pop’s suggestive choreography and cultural influence are inappropriate for young people, while others warn a full return of South Korean entertainment would overwhelm the domestic industry. K-pop fans, meanwhile, have expressed hope that the ban will eventually be lifted, eliminating the need for costly overseas travel to see concerts.

    For the South Korean entertainment industry, the eight-year ban has already permanently shifted global market strategy. Drama producers have been hit hardest, as pirated streaming of their content in China generates no revenue, unlike legitimate global distribution on platforms like Netflix and Disney+ — both of which are blocked in mainland China. For the K-pop sector, however, the industry has already restructured to reduce reliance on the mainland Chinese market. Japan has become the K-pop industry’s stable anchor market, while North America has emerged as the primary growth frontier, meaning companies no longer see the reopening of China as an existential need.

    Seung-Youn Oh, a Bryn Mawr College professor who is currently writing a book on China’s use of informal economic sanctions, argues that the ban serves core strategic goals for Beijing beyond just cultural protection. “From China’s perspective, these actions go beyond symbolism,” she said in a written interview. “They are strategic tools to shape the international environment,” she added, noting that trade and cultural restrictions clarify what actions China deems unacceptable, reinforce domestic nationalism, and signal Beijing’s political resolve.

    “China matters,” analyst Hyunji Lee said of the current market dynamic. “But it’s not something companies are desperately waiting on anymore.”

    This reporting features contributions from journalists based in Seoul, Beijing and Washington, D.C.

  • India proposes new rules to regulate news and political posts on social media

    India proposes new rules to regulate news and political posts on social media

    India’s federal Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) has tabled controversial amendments to the country’s digital governance framework that would extend government oversight of news and current affairs content far beyond traditional registered publishers to include independent influencers, podcasters, and ordinary social media users on platforms including Facebook, YouTube, and X. The proposal, which has already triggered sharp backlash from digital rights advocates and independent content creators, would require major social media platforms to adhere to the same code of ethics currently mandated for formal news outlets when hosting news-related content from non-publisher users. To retain their safe harbour protection — the legal immunity that shields platforms from liability for content posted by third-party users — platforms would be required to strictly comply with all government takedown and content removal orders under the new rules.

    The government frames the amendments as a necessary update to outdated digital regulation. Officials argue that as news and current affairs content is now widely shared by non-journalist users, a unified regulatory framework is needed to curb the spread of harmful content including disinformation, hate speech, and manipulated deepfake media. MeitY has opened a public comment period on the proposal, with feedback set to close on April 14. MeitY Secretary S Krishnan has defended the plan, emphasizing that the new guidelines align with India’s existing constitution and legal structure, and that evolving content sharing practices demand updated rules.

    Critics, however, warn the changes amount to a dramatic expansion of state power over online speech that will enable widespread censorship targeting political dissent. Digital rights activists point to a steady pattern of incremental regulatory changes stretching back to 2021 that have steadily eroded online free speech protections while expanding government control. A 2021 amendment first brought formal digital news outlets under government oversight, while a 2025 revision strengthened the federal Home Ministry’s Sahyog portal, a centralized platform that allows multiple state agencies to issue takedown notices to social media platforms with minimal transparency and few procedural safeguards for affected users. Early 2026 brought another change that cut the compliance window for platforms to execute government blocking orders from 36 hours to just three — a reduction that eliminates virtually all time for legal review before content is removed.

    Widespread concern that the rules will be used to target government critics gained fresh traction after a high-profile blocking incident in March. Acting on orders issued under Section 69A of India’s existing IT Act, X blocked roughly a dozen accounts, most of which hosted satirical or critical content about Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Among those affected was Kumar Nayan, whose satirical X account @Nehr_who? boasted more than 242,000 followers. Nayan told the BBC he received no prior warning or explanation when his account was blocked, and while a court order restored his account this week, 10 of his posts critical of Modi and the BJP remain blocked in India pending review by a government-appointed panel. All 10 posts are either satirical commentary or political criticism, none of which meet the official criteria for restricted content that threatens national security or communal harmony, Nayan argues. Challenging the blocking in court forced Nayan to reveal his public identity, forcing him to relocate over safety concerns and robbing him of the anonymity that protected him and other critics from harassment.

    Sandeep Singh, an activist whose 100,000-follower X account @ActivistSandeep was also blocked in March, has not yet regained access. Singh began posting critical content after concluding mainstream Indian media was disproportionately biased in favour of the BJP. “I stand for the truth and blocking my accounts or posts will not stop me from continuing speaking truth to power,” Singh told the BBC.

    Prominent independent creator Akash Banerjee, whose political commentary YouTube channel The Deshbhakt counts more than 6 million subscribers, warned the new rules will create a pervasive climate of self-censorship that will silence independent political discourse. Banerjee notes that despite India already having a raft of laws governing online content, levels of hate speech and disinformation have not declined — but critical content, even satirical criticism of the government, is increasingly targeted for removal. Digital rights activist Nikhil Pahwa, who co-authored an analysis of the regulatory changes for the *Times of India*, argues the proposed amendments only reinforce what is already a fully built “infrastructure for mass censorship” in India. Platforms typically comply with government orders quickly to protect their access to India’s large market, while affected users are left without notice, explanation, or any meaningful avenue to appeal, he explained.

    A recent U.S. government report has echoed these concerns, noting that since 2021, American social media companies have seen a steady rise in takedown requests for content and accounts that appear to be politically motivated. Even when users are able to challenge blocking orders in court, Nayan points out, most ordinary users lack the resources or willingness to go through the lengthy legal process to recover their content. “In a democracy, people should have the liberty to post what they want, with certain limitations of course, without fear. India is a democracy, so why has it become so difficult to do so?” Nayan asked. The BBC has submitted a list of questions to MeitY for comment on the specific blocking incidents, and the ministry has yet to issue a formal response beyond its broader defense of the new regulatory framework.

  • For Chinese visa-seekers in the US, the path to good fortune lies in … Chick-fil-A?

    For Chinese visa-seekers in the US, the path to good fortune lies in … Chick-fil-A?

    In a packed northern Virginia venue hosting a Chinese-language comedy show on a recent weekend afternoon, a host threw a casual question out to the crowd: “What food do you all love the most?” The loudest, most unanimous answer that bounced off the hall walls was not a traditional Chinese dish — it was Chick-fil-A. Grinning, the host shot back with a joke that landed perfectly with the audience: “You all still haven’t won the H-1B lottery, huh?”

    That quick quip resonates deeply across Chinese student and immigrant communities across the United States, where a growing number of visa applicants have turned to an unexpected good luck charm: the popular American fast-food chicken chain. The trend has nothing to do with the taste of Chick-fil-A’s signature sandwiches, and everything to do with a clever phonetic pun. The brand name “Chick-fil-A” sounds strikingly similar to the Mandarin phrase meaning “check files” — a connection that, for applicants navigating the complicated, often arbitrary U.S. visa application process, has transformed the chain into a symbol of good fortune. It doesn’t hurt that Chick-fil-A has no locations in mainland China, making the little ritual feel like an inside tradition unique to Chinese immigrants in the U.S.

    For many applicants, the ritual goes far beyond just grabbing a meal. Zhou Yilu, a 38-year-old AI software engineer based in Wilmington, Delaware who has navigated four different visa categories over his 14 years in the U.S., says eating at Chick-fil-A makes him feel one step closer to securing permanent residency. After years of last-minute approvals and endless rounds of extra paperwork, he turned to the chicken chain superstition when his stress over visa status hit its peak.

    The trend has been circulating in Chinese immigrant circles for years, gaining particular traction around the annual H-1B work visa lottery — a random selection process that has grown increasingly competitive as caps remain fixed while demand surges. To channel good luck, some creative applicants 3D-print Chick-fil-A logos on custom coasters, others embroider the brand mark into small cross-stitch keychains, and many swap their social media profile pictures to the chain’s iconic red logo — often turning the graphic green, a nod to the ultimate goal of a U.S. green card. Chick-fil-A has not responded to multiple requests for comment on the grassroots trend.

    This fondness for pun-based good luck rituals is nothing new in Chinese culture. The tradition of eating apples on Christmas Eve grew from the phonetic link between “pingguo” (apple in Mandarin) and “ping’an” (peace), while brides often carry bouquets of lettuce at weddings because “shengcai” (lettuce) sounds identical to the phrase for “gaining wealth.” Conversely, the number four is widely avoided because its pronunciation matches the word for death. What makes the Chick-fil-A trend different is what it reveals about the extraordinary stress and uncertainty facing skilled Chinese immigrants navigating the U.S. immigration system.

    In 2024 alone, more than 46,000 Chinese students and workers received H-1B visa approvals, accounting for 11.7% of all approved visas — making China the second-largest country of origin for the program, behind only India at 70%. Even with high-level education and in-demand professional careers, applicants face arbitrary odds and growing barriers. Fan Wu, a data scientist based in Indianapolis, did everything right: he changed his social media profile to the Chick-fil-A logo and even traveled to a Japanese Taoist temple in Hawaii to pray for a winning lottery slot. He still didn’t get picked. “The lottery is pure chance, it all depends on luck,” he explained. “We need another bit of luck-based ritual to match that.”

    The demand for good fortune around visa lotteries has even spawned a new cross-border service industry. On the Chinese social platform Xiaohongshu, 24-year-old Beijing-based Meng Yanqing receives requests from visa seekers in the U.S. to pray on their behalf at Beijing’s popular Lama Temple. For each client, he lines up for entry, holds a paper with the applicant’s personal details — including passport number and birth date — for “precise positioning” of the prayer request, and often arranges to ship consecrated temple bracelets back to clients across the Pacific. “I respect what they believe, they have a real need, and I provide the service,” Meng said. “I truly hope they get the results they want.”

    Anxiety around U.S. visa status has only grown in recent months. Earlier this year, the Trump administration’s abrupt announcement of a new $100,000 fee for H-1B visas sent waves of panic through Chinese immigrant communities, before officials clarified the rule only applies to new applicant categories. The whiplash added to an already stressful environment that already includes language barriers, cultural adjustment challenges, and a tight competitive job market.

    Experts note that the H-1B program has long been a pipeline for the U.S. to attract top global talent, benefiting both the American economy and innovation ecosystem. “This is a real talent pipeline,” said Juliet Gelatt, associate director of the U.S. Program at the Washington-based Migration Policy Institute. “As a country and an economy, we have really benefited from bringing in smart, young people from all over the world, including from China.”

    But growing suspicion of Chinese immigrants, particularly those working in high-tech sectors, has added extra layers of difficulty, and experts warn this trend is eroding the U.S.’s ability to attract the world’s best talent. One 28-year-old manager at a U.S. new energy company, who only agreed to speak on condition of anonymity using just his surname Yang over fears of jeopardizing his visa, finally changed his social media profile to the Chick-fil-A logo after months of waiting. “It feels like living under someone else’s roof,” he said of his uncertain immigration status.

    Current U.S. rules limit access to the H-1B lottery. F-1 student visa holders can only work for a limited time through the Optional Practical Training (OPT) program — three years for STEM majors, just one year for all other fields — before they need to secure an H-1B visa to stay and work in the country legally. With odds stacked against them, many turn to any small ritual that might tip the scale in their favor.

    For Harriet Peng, a data analyst based in northern Virginia, eating Chick-fil-A sandwiches and keeping a Chick-fil-A T-shirt draped over her office chair wasn’t enough. After losing the H-1B lottery multiple years in a row, she traveled to a temple in upstate New York to pray in person, joking that she was “making efforts using scientific materialist methods in metaphysics.” The temple houses deities dedicated to nearly every aspect of life, from fortune to childbirth — but there is no god of visas. Still, Peng knelt at nearly every altar just in case. “I prayed to all of them, you never know — they all know each other, right?”

  • Beijing calculates its next steps in Iran ceasefire ahead of Trump’s trip to China

    Beijing calculates its next steps in Iran ceasefire ahead of Trump’s trip to China

    Amid a still-fragile temporary ceasefire between the United States and Iran, Beijing is carefully calibrating its next diplomatic moves to help forge a durable resolution to the spiraling Middle East conflict, according to senior diplomatic sources and global policy analysts.

    U.S. President Donald Trump told Agence France-Presse earlier this week that he credits China’s behind-the-scenes influence with pushing Iran to accept the temporary truce that has halted open hostilities this week. Three anonymous diplomats familiar with Beijing’s private negotiations confirmed the assessment, noting that as the world’s largest buyer of Iranian crude and a nation far more dependent on Persian Gulf energy supplies than the U.S., China holds significant economic leverage over Tehran that it deployed to urge Iranian leadership back to the negotiating table. Prior to this direct diplomatic push, Beijing had already publicly decried U.S. and Israeli military operations against its key economic partner Iran as misadvised. Formal talks between the conflicting parties are scheduled to kick off this coming weekend in Pakistan, which took the lead in brokering the two-week ceasefire.

    The current precarious truce leaves China at a diplomatic crossroads, as its leadership weighs the costs and benefits of deeper engagement in Middle East peacemaking against its core domestic and global priorities. A prolonged full-scale war in the region runs directly counter to Beijing’s core economic interests, but successful mediation could also elevate China’s global standing and grant it valuable leverage ahead of Trump’s state visit to Beijing next month, a meeting that was delayed from its original schedule to allow Trump to oversee U.S. military strikes on Iran.

    China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning confirmed to reporters this week that Beijing has “worked actively to help bring about an end to the conflict.” The country has already felt tangible economic pressure from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz — the critical shipping chokepoint through which roughly 20% of the world’s global crude oil supplies pass. The blockade has sent shockwaves across Asian energy markets, a key factor that pushed Beijing to work with Pakistan to facilitate the current ceasefire agreement.

    Despite its role in securing the temporary truce, China has shown no appetite to offer the long-term security guarantee for Iran that Tehran has repeatedly requested as a core condition for any permanent peace deal, meant to deter future U.S. and Israeli strikes. Iran’s ambassador to China recently suggested that Tehran would look to China, Russia and the United Nations to jointly provide such a guarantee, a demand that Beijing has not publicly committed to. When pressed for comment on the proposal, Mao only reaffirmed that China “hopes that all parties will resolve their disputes through dialogue and negotiation.”

    Chinese leadership is acutely aware that an extended conflict would severely damage its domestic economic agenda, which is already facing headwinds from a slumping domestic property sector and global uncertainty. Earlier this year, Premier Li Qiang set a modest 2024 growth target of 4.5% to 5% — the lowest official growth projection China has released since 1991. One anonymous diplomat familiar with China’s internal deliberations on the conflict confirmed that Beijing’s top priority remains “growth and development,” and a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz undermines that goal on two fronts: it restricts critical crude imports to fuel China’s industrial economy, and blocks a key shipping route for Chinese exports bound for Middle Eastern markets.

    The developing Iran diplomacy is already shaping expectations for the high-profile upcoming Trump-Xi summit in Beijing. Experts note that Trump will almost certainly echo Beijing’s own concerns about the impact of continued conflict on energy markets and economic stability when he meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Ali Wyne, senior research and advocacy adviser for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group, argues that the temporary ceasefire already marks a subtle win for Beijing’s diplomatic framing. “That the United States and Iran have at least temporarily edged away from the precipice of a catastrophic escalation owes in part to China’s support for the ceasefire that Pakistan brokered,” Wyne said. “Even if short-lived, that breakthrough affords Beijing another opportunity to present itself as a stabilizing force and Washington as a reckless one.”

    China’s approach to the conflict is also shaped by deep-rooted strategic skepticism of U.S. intentions in the region, diplomatic sources say. Many in Beijing view Trump’s decision to launch military operations against Iran, as well as the earlier January incursion to capture former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, as at least partially driven by a broader strategy to contain Chinese global influence. Beijing has long been a major oil customer and investor in Venezuela’s energy sector, giving it direct exposure to U.S. actions in the Western Hemisphere.

    Privately, Chinese officials have made clear that both the U.S. and Iran will need to make substantive concessions for a permanent peace deal to take hold. Beijing is also pushing for the U.S. to roll back existing sanctions on Chinese companies that maintain commercial ties with Iran as a core condition of its continued participation in mediation, according to diplomatic sources. The current context already grants Xi significant leverage ahead of the summit. “Trump was in a crisis, and China helped,” said Sun Yun, director of the China program at the Washington-based Stimson Center think tank. “The optics of that alone helps to lighten the mood and sweeten the pot.”

    Danny Russel, a former senior U.S. diplomat under the Obama administration, noted that Beijing perceives Trump as weakened after he backed away from earlier threats to destroy Iranian power plants and critical infrastructure if Iran did not end its Hormuz blockade. The hashtag #HeChickenedOut trended on Chinese social media in discussions of the outcome, and China’s state-run media has pushed a narrative that Trump backed down in the face of Iranian resistance, Russel added.

    For his part, Xi has approached the moment with deliberate caution. Russel summed up Beijing’s current strategic calculation: “wait-and-see, safeguard Chinese energy and commercial interests, avoid direct confrontation with the United States, stay on good terms with its important Gulf partners like Saudi Arabia and UAE, and work with whoever ends up running Iran when the dust settles.”

    Former senior Trump White House adviser Steve Bannon argued in an episode of his “War Room” podcast this week that any durable peace deal will require Chinese buy-in. “Who can actually make a deal and enforce a deal? I know one group of people who can do it, and they live in Beijing,” Bannon said. “Let’s just go to Beijing and sit down with a guy who can actually make a deal — Xi — and enforce a deal.”

  • KMT chairwoman advocates for enhanced cross-Strait youth exchanges

    KMT chairwoman advocates for enhanced cross-Strait youth exchanges

    Amid ongoing cross-Strait people-to-people ties, the chairwoman of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT), Cheng Li-wun, has publicly advocated for lowering barriers and deepening exchange opportunities for young people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The call came during a Shanghai-Taiwan youth cultural exchange activity held at a riverside book garden along Yangpu Riverside in Shanghai, in a gathering that brought together young creators and cultural enthusiasts from both regions.

    In her remarks to participating young people who have built lives and careers on the Chinese mainland, Cheng emphasized the energy and potential of cross-Strait youth engagement. “Seeing that you are living a vibrant life in the Chinese mainland, I think that’s so great,” Cheng said. “If cross-Strait exchanges could be more open, with fewer barriers, I believe young people’s creativity can find like-minded partners and shine on a bigger stage.”

    The event marks part of Cheng’s working visit to Shanghai, which also included a stop at the headquarters of Chinese tech giant Meituan, highlighting the KMT’s focus on both youth cultural exchange and cross-Strait industry collaboration. The proposal for enhanced youth exchange aligns with long-standing calls from communities on both sides of the Strait to expand people-to-people connections, particularly among younger generations who will shape the future of cross-Strait relations. Proponents of expanded exchanges argue that greater interaction fosters mutual understanding, breaks down stereotypes, and creates new collaborative opportunities in culture, innovation, business and other fields that benefit young people across both sides.