标签： Asia

In a fiery televised address this week, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has issued a stark pledge to protect neighboring Tunisia from what he frames as coordinated external threats, warning that any aggression against Tunis would be treated as an attack on Algeria itself. During the Monday interview, the Algerian leader emphasized that his nation has no hostile intentions toward any regional state, but will not stay idle when the security and stability of its close ally is put at risk. Using a vivid colloquial Algerian Arabic turn of phrase, Tebboune warned that any actor that brings terrorism to Tunisia or its border regions would face overwhelming, decisive retaliation. Tebboune went on to claim that unnamed parties are pursuing a deliberate strategy to first cut diplomatic and economic ties between Tunis and Algiers, before moving to undermine the Tunisian government itself. Though he stopped short of naming all the actors he accused of plotting against the bilateral alliance, he renewed existing allegations that the United Arab Emirates has actively worked to destabilize Algeria in recent months. Tebboune’s remarks arrive at a moment of profound crisis for Tunisia, both domestically and internationally. The North African nation is currently grappling with one of the most severe electricity shortages it has seen in a decade, with extended rolling blackouts cutting power to residential neighborhoods, commercial operations and public services across the country amid record summer high temperatures. The crippling outages have sparked widespread public anger, forcing renewed scrutiny of the government’s management of national infrastructure five years after President Kais Saied’s 25 July 2021 power consolidation, when he suspended the elected parliament, dismissed the sitting government and began ruling by executive decree. Since Saied seized full executive authority, dozens of politicians, legal professionals, judges, journalists and grassroots activists have been detained or prosecuted in a crackdown that international human rights organizations have labeled an unprecedented attack on political pluralism and civil liberties in the country. Saied has consistently rejected claims of political persecution, maintaining that Tunisia retains an independent judicial system and that all defendants facing charges are being tried for standard criminal violations, not their political beliefs. When Saied first moved to consolidate power in 2021, Algeria initially called for an immediate return to constitutional governance. However, Algiers has since evolved into Saied’s most critical regional backer, providing consistent political support as Tunisia has become increasingly isolated from Western governments over its documented democratic backsliding. Over the past several years, the relationship between the two North African leaders and their respective administrations has deepened dramatically, with both framing their partnership as a strategic alliance rooted in overlapping regional security priorities. Last year, the two governments signed a landmark new defense cooperation accord covering areas including joint military training, cross-border intelligence sharing, border security coordination and combined military exercises. Only limited details of the agreement have been released to the public, a lack of transparency that sparked sharp criticism from Tunisian opposition groups, who accuse the Saied administration of hiding the treaty’s terms from the public. Speculation around an unauthorized leaked draft of the agreement also fueled claims that Tunis is surrendering key elements of national sovereignty to its larger neighbor. The growing bilateral alliance has also reignited long-running domestic debate in Tunisia over the country’s increasing economic and political dependence on Algeria. The two neighbors already maintain close collaboration on counterterrorism operations, border management and energy trade, and Algeria has emerged as one of Tunisia’s most important economic partners in recent years. But critics argue that the power imbalance in the relationship has grown sharply since Saied consolidated authority, with the Tunisian president aligning Tunisian foreign policy almost entirely with Algeria’s regional positions. In a notable break from decades of Tunisian neutrality on the Western Sahara dispute, Saied hosted Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front, in Tunis in 2022, a move that triggered a major diplomatic dispute with Morocco. Human rights groups have also raised concerns about expanding judicial cooperation between the two governments, pointing to the extradition of Tunisian opposition figure Seif Eddine Makhlouf from Algeria earlier this year, which took place despite formal objections from multiple international rights organizations.

With just three months remaining until Israel’s most consequential election of his decades-long political career, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Washington D.C. for a urgent closed-door meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump — a trip analysts say was only made possible by a sudden, unexpected death that opened a rare window for the Israeli leader to court Trump’s endorsement ahead of the vote.

The core of Netanyahu’s re-election strategy hinges on cementing his reputation as the only Israeli politician who can command unwavering backing from the U.S. president, and safeguard the critical strategic and security alliance that forms a lifeline for Israeli leadership. The opportunity for this White House meeting arose after prominent pro-Israel advocate and Trump confidant Lindsey Graham passed away suddenly earlier this month, according to Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. State Department senior advisor on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and current senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The visit would not be taking place, had Lindsey Graham not passed,” Miller told Middle East Eye.

Since Trump’s return to the presidency in January 2025, no other foreign leader has secured more one-on-one time with the U.S. commander-in-chief than Netanyahu. But this 90-minute closed-door meeting carried far greater urgency than previous encounters: it came on the heels of a series of high-profile meetings Trump held with other regional leaders, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.

Disagreements between the two leaders have bubbled into public view in recent weeks, centered on Netanyahu’s push for continued U.S. military involvement targeting Iranian nuclear-linked facilities, a position Trump has openly pushed back against. When asked by Fox News about Netanyahu’s public warnings about activity at Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain nuclear-related site, Trump made his frustration clear. “I don’t need Bibi to tell me that. Bibi is telling me that because he wants me to stay involved. I mean, I don’t necessarily [want to],” Trump said in a Tuesday phone interview. He added, “I heard Bibi announce that [and] I said, ‘Why don’t you just tell it to me? Why do you have to announce it to the world?’ I know exactly what’s going on at Pickaxe. It’s not a big problem. We took out their nuclear sites, and we’ll have to take out Pickaxe if we don’t make a deal.”

Nizar Farzakh, a former advisor to Palestinian leadership in Ramallah and current lecturer at George Washington University, argues Netanyahu’s renewed focus on the Iranian threat stems from a lack of tangible progress on Israel’s campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon. “Only Netanyahu wants the war [in Iran]. Everybody – literally everybody else – does not want escalation. So I guess he’s coming to fix what all the others have ruined,” Farzakh explained to Middle East Eye.

Tensions also emerged over Trump’s open consideration of resuming F-35 fighter jet sales to Turkey, a move Netanyahu has publicly opposed. When asked about Netanyahu’s disapproval aboard Air Force One, Trump reaffirmed his close ties to Erdogan and pushed back on any Israeli interference in U.S. foreign policy. “Nobody tells me what we should be selling. And now Turkey has been a tremendous ally for me… Turkey’s not a big fan of Israel. You know that, right?” Trump said.

While both the White House and Netanyahu attempted to frame the meeting as positive and productive — with Netanyahu calling it “one of the best conversations I’ve ever had with a president of the United States, our friend Donald Trump” — analysts say the closed-door format signals far more underlying disagreement than public statements acknowledge. Miller noted that Trump has broken with decades of U.S. presidential precedent by openly criticizing and challenging Netanyahu, leaving him with unprecedented leverage over the Israeli leader just as he faces a make-or-break election that could determine not just his political future, but his personal freedom.

“[Trump] has said things about an Israeli prime minister that no American – none of his predecessors – has ever said… He has mocked the prime minister. He has allowed his profanity-laced phone conversations to be leaked. He opened a dialogue with Hamas without Israel’s knowledge. He did a deal with the Houthis over and above the objections of the government of Israel,” Miller recounted. “And right now, 90 days before the most consequential election in Benjamin Netanyahu’s political life, which could involve his personal freedom, [Trump] has more leverage over this Israeli prime minister than any of his predecessors have ever had at any given moment.”

Netanyahu has faced ongoing corruption investigations in Israel since 2019, and could face up to 10 years in prison if convicted on current charges, which he denies. Compounding his vulnerability is the fact that the U.S. remains one of the only major world powers where he can travel without risk of arrest, after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for him on war crimes and crimes against humanity charges linked to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza nearly two years ago.

Netanyahu’s motorcade through Washington D.C. was met by large crowds of anti-Israel protesters, who waved Palestinian flags and chanted calls labeling the prime minister a war criminal. New polling released this week underscores deep public division in the U.S. over Netanyahu’s visit: a joint Economist/YouGov poll of 1,559 U.S. adults released Tuesday found 49% of respondents believe Netanyahu should be arrested if he stays on U.S. soil, compared to just 27% who oppose arrest and 23% who are undecided. Support for arrest is strongest among respondents under 50 and non-white Americans.

Separate polling from YouGov and CBS News, released last week, further highlights broad public opposition to continued conflict. The poll found 67% of Americans want the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran to end immediately, with overwhelming support for a ceasefire among adults under 30. Broken down by party affiliation, 92% of Democratic voters, 73% of independent voters, and 30% of Republican voters support an immediate end to the war.

Farzakh argues Trump is actively seeking an exit strategy from the Iran conflict, a goal that directly clashes with Netanyahu’s domestic political calculus. “Nothing is working with Iran. Iran keeps getting stronger,” Farzakh said. “[Trump is] way in over his head with this, and he’s trying to find an exit strategy.” That exit strategy, he added, is impossible if Netanyahu’s re-election depends on branding himself as Israel’s “Mister Security” by pushing for ongoing escalation. Netanyahu is next scheduled to return to the U.S. for the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Andy Burnham’s new UK administration has publicly pledged to uphold a long-stated policy of refusing formal engagement with the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the nation’s largest umbrella body representing British Muslim communities. But an in-depth investigation by Middle East Eye (MEE) has upended official claims, revealing the so-called non-engagement policy is effectively a phantom: no written government records confirm its existence as an official, codified measure.

Multiple government departments and agencies have disclaimed any ownership of the policy when responding to Freedom of Information (FOI) requests filed by MEE. In responses dated mid-June, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Home Office both confirmed they hold no documents that outline or reference a formal non-engagement policy with the MCB. A May response from the Cabinet Office echoed this conclusion, stating searches of both physical and digital archives turned up no matching records. To date, no government body has stepped forward to claim responsibility for the policy, nor has any official justification for the ongoing boycott been made public.

These questions around the policy’s shadowy origins come on the heels of a recent revelation that one UK mosque is targeted in an attack every five days, highlighting growing tensions around anti-Muslim hate across the country. The MCB, which remains the most expansive representative body for British Muslim groups, counts more than 500 affiliated organizations across the nation.

Contradictions in the government’s stance have already emerged publicly. The Telegraph reported this month that new equalities minister Sir Stephen Timms appeared on a discussion panel alongside an MCB representative last December, months before Burnham’s government took office. Despite this, an official government spokesperson reaffirmed the line that “there has been no change to our non-engagement policy regarding the Muslim Council of Britain, and there are no plans for ministers to meet with the group.”

When MEE reached out to the UK Office for Equality and Opportunity and its parent ministry for clarification on the policy’s basis and rationale, officials only repeated the standard non-engagement statement, adding that “the government recognises the importance of engaging meaningfully with faith and belief groups.”

MCB spokespeople have dismissed the policy as a relic of anti-Muslim politics. “This so-called policy of non-engagement is a historic relic. It was built to appease those who trade in Islamophobia, and it survives only by recycling decades-old allegations that have never withstood scrutiny,” the organization said in a statement.

Public records further unravel the official narrative of a long-standing policy dating back to 2009, a claim that circulates widely in UK political discourse. That year, Gordon Brown’s Labour government briefly boycotted the MCB after its then-deputy secretary general Daud Abdullah signed the Istanbul Declaration. The government at the time claimed the document endorsed attacks on Royal Navy vessels intercepting weapons shipments bound for Hamas in Gaza. Abdullah denied ever condoning attacks on British troops, and the MCB clarified he had signed the statement in a strictly personal capacity. After Abdullah stepped down from his role, the Brown government resumed formal engagement with the body.

Coalition government ministers held regular meetings with MCB leadership between 2010 and 2015, and civil servants continued routine engagement with the organization until 2020. That year, the MCB published a detailed dossier documenting alleged Islamophobia linked to more than 300 people, including Conservative MPs, party councillors, members and Downing Street special advisers. Shortly after the dossier’s release, civil servants cut off formal contact for reasons that were never publicly explained.

Even after 2020, low-key cooperation continued: the MCB served as a reference for imams applying to serve as military chaplains in partnership with the Ministry of Defence. This collaboration only became public in late 2023 via a Telegraph report, prompting ministers to order the MoD to immediately cut all ties with the organization.

In 2024, the Inter Faith Network, a major UK interfaith charity, was forced to shut down after the previous Conservative government pulled its public funding, solely because one of the charity’s trustees was an MCB member. Keir Starmer’s Labour government retained the non-engagement approach after taking office earlier in 2024. MEE reporting from July 2024 revealed that the Starmer administration ignored all communications from the MCB during the far-right riots that swept the UK that summer, and blocked a government working group tasked with developing an official Islamophobia definition from consulting the organization.

Multiple sources close to Burnham’s administration say the new prime minister is eager to repair ties with British Muslim voters, a large voting bloc that largely abandoned Labour during Starmer’s tenure. Burnham himself has a history of direct engagement with the MCB, including delivering a keynote speech at the organization’s 2015 Muslim Leadership Dinner, years after the policy was supposedly codified.

Today, the MCB retains substantial influence across British Muslim civil society, with a democratically elected leadership and a broad network of affiliates. Whether Burnham will choose to formalize a shift away from the shadowy non-engagement policy that no government department can claim or document remains an open question.