Global Pulse

标签： Asia

亚洲

  • Shanghai cancels 1,300 flights as China prepares for Typhoon Dolphin

    Shanghai cancels 1,300 flights as China prepares for Typhoon Dolphin

    As Typhoon Dolphin tracks toward eastern China after drenching northern Taiwan over the weekend, regional authorities have enacted sweeping emergency measures, including mass evacuations and widespread flight disruptions, to mitigate the impact of the powerful storm.

    The storm’s outer rain bands first reached northern Taiwan, including the island’s capital Taipei, on Saturday, dumping heavy downpours across the region. In response, multiple Taiwanese air carriers scrapped all scheduled flights bound for mainland China on Sunday, leaving hundreds of passengers stranded at airports across the island.

    As of Sunday morning, official meteorological data placed the typhoon’s maximum sustained wind speeds at roughly 162 kilometers per hour (101 miles per hour), marking it as a significant weather event capable of causing widespread damage. Forecasters projected the storm would make landfall along the coasts of Zhejiang province and the northern section of neighboring Fujian province by late Sunday, bringing torrential rainfall that raises major risks of flash flooding and dangerous landslides.

    In the most hard-hit forecast zones, accumulated rainfall over the coming days is expected to reach between 200 and 400 millimeters (7.9 to 15.7 inches), according to Chinese national meteorological services. Officials in Zhejiang have issued repeated urgent warnings about elevated landslide risks across the province’s mountainous and hilly areas, urging residents to heed evacuation orders immediately.

    In Shanghai, the country’s busiest aviation hub, both of the city’s major international airports – Pudong and Hongqiao – have canceled more than 1,300 flights scheduled for Sunday, accounting for roughly 60 percent of the day’s planned operations, per reports from Shanghai-based state media outlet The Paper.

    Emergency evacuation efforts have been underway across the region since Saturday evening. In the Zhejiang city of Taizhou alone, officials have relocated more than 390,000 residents from low-lying and high-risk areas. Shanghai authorities have also evacuated more than 30,000 people from coastal and flood-prone zones, bringing the total number of relocated residents across the affected regions to more than 720,000.

    In additional safety measures, Zhejiang provincial authorities have suspended all water-based recreational and commercial activities, including inter-island ferry services and passenger cruise operations, until the storm passes and safety inspections can be completed.

  • How a schoolteacher’s son became Kashmir’s first India Test cricketer

    How a schoolteacher’s son became Kashmir’s first India Test cricketer

    Decades of systemic challenges, harsh climatic conditions, and limited sporting infrastructure have long stood between Jammu and Kashmir’s aspiring cricketers and the highest levels of the sport. But for 29-year-old all-rounder Auqib Nabi, a childhood promise of greatness has turned into history, as he becomes the first cricketer from the region to earn a call-up to India’s men’s Test cricket squad.

    Auqib’s inclusion replaces star fast bowler Jasprit Bumrah for India’s upcoming two-match Test series against Sri Lanka, which is scheduled to kick off on 15 August. The milestone is more than a personal win: it marks a watershed moment for cricket development across a region that has spent decades battling systemic and environmental barriers to professional sport.

    Growing up in a remote village in Jammu and Kashmir’s Baramulla district, Auqib cut his teeth playing cricket on uneven local grounds with almost no formal infrastructure. His father, Ghulam Nabi Dar, a local schoolteacher, initially pushed his son to prioritize academic study and pursue a career in medicine, echoing the widespread local belief that professional cricket offered no viable future for young people from the region. “There was no scope in cricket. We used to think playing sport was a waste of time, so I insisted that Auqib focused on his studies,” Ghulam explained in reflections on his son’s early journey.

    But Auqib’s relentless passion for the game eventually changed his father’s mind. After years of watching his son dedicate every spare moment to training, Ghulam reversed his position and became one of Auqib’s strongest supporters. “After seeing his passion for cricket, I accepted it. I realised that, as a parent and a teacher, I shouldn’t force him to do something he didn’t want to do. I started supporting him,” he said.

    Even childhood friends recalled how out of reach a professional cricket career seemed for young players in the region. Junaid Dar, Auqib’s childhood companion, remembers questioning Auqib’s unwavering commitment at a time when professional sport was barely a concept in local communities. “Auqib was obsessed with cricket from childhood. I used to ask him, ‘Why are you doing all this? There’s no future in it.’ We came from a place where there was no concept of playing sport professionally and hardly any infrastructure,” Junaid said.

    To access the training facilities he needed to develop his skills, Auqib made a grueling 70-kilometer round trip to Srinagar nearly every day just to practice on regulation cricket pitches. When he attended his first formal cricket trials, he did not even own a proper pair of spiked cricket shoes. For a full decade, he stuck to a brutal daily routine: rising before dawn for gym work, then spending the rest of the day honing his craft on the pitch. “Auqib is very hardworking and consistent. He knows how to fight obstacles and make a way for himself. He would wake up early to go to the gym and then practise for the rest of the day. He did that almost every day for 10 years,” said Auqib’s cousin Bilal Ahmad Dar.

    That decade of grind began to pay off in 2020, when Auqib made his debut in the Ranji Trophy, India’s elite domestic first-class cricket competition, representing Jammu and Kashmir. He announced his arrival with a stunning five-wicket haul against Jharkhand in his first outing, signaling the arrival of a promising new fast-bowling talent.

    Parvez Rasool, Jammu and Kashmir’s first-ever international cricketer and Auqib’s long-time captain, has watched the all-rounder’s progress from the early days of his career. He says Auqib’s extraordinary work ethic and discipline have always set him apart from his peers. Success, however, did not come overnight. Even after finishing as the leading fast bowler in the 2024–25 Ranji Trophy season with 44 wickets, Auqib remained largely overlooked by national selectors, a snub that stung for the player and his support system. “When you do well but don’t get recognition, it hurts. But we should never lose hope. Hope is what keeps the world intact. I always believed his time would come,” Ghulam said.

    That patience paid off in the following season, when Auqib delivered one of the most dominant bowling campaigns in modern Ranji Trophy history. He claimed 60 wickets across 10 matches, finishing as the tournament’s top wicket-taker and leading Jammu and Kashmir to their first-ever Ranji Trophy title, a historic win that ended a 67-year wait for the region.

    That standout performance earned Auqib a blockbuster INR 84 crore (approximately £730,000 or $982,000) contract with the Delhi Capitals in the Indian Premier League. While he received limited playing time in the high-profile T20 league, his red-ball form had already caught the attention of India’s national selection panel, paving the way for his historic Test call-up.

    For Rasool, Auqib’s achievement carries significance that extends far beyond the player himself. “Playing Test cricket is the ultimate dream for any cricketer. It was my dream too. Seeing Auqib earn that call-up fills me with immense pride. In a way, it feels like a dream many of us in Jammu and Kashmir carried has finally been realised through him. It is a historic moment not just for Auqib and his family, but for cricket across the region,” Rasool said.

    He emphasized that breaking into the Indian national team requires an extra level of resilience for players from Jammu and Kashmir, where decades of underdevelopment, conflict, and limited access to facilities create barriers that players from other parts of India rarely face. “Making it to the Indian team is incredibly difficult for any player, but the challenge is even greater when you come from Jammu and Kashmir. For years, we have had limited infrastructure, fewer opportunities and many obstacles that players from other parts of the country don’t necessarily face. To reach this level, you need exceptional consistency, mental strength and the determination to keep believing in yourself. Auqib has shown all of those qualities, which is why this achievement is so special,” Rasool explained.

    Jammu and Kashmir first gained affiliation with the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) in 1957, but to this day the region only hosts two major cricket stadiums, both with limited facilities. Long, snow-heavy winters and decades of regional instability have further slowed the growth of organized cricket in the area. “This is a landmark moment for cricket in Jammu and Kashmir. For a long time, people questioned whether someone from our region could make it to India’s Test team. Auqib has answered that question. His selection shows players from Jammu and Kashmir can compete with the best if they are given the opportunity,” Rasool said.

    Rasool believes Auqib’s journey will inspire a new generation of young cricketers across the region, filling a gap that has long existed for local sporting role models. “When I started playing, there weren’t many role models from Jammu and Kashmir. Today, things are changing. Auqib becoming the first player from the region to earn an India Test call-up will give countless youngsters the belief that they can dream big too. His journey proves that no matter where you come from or what challenges you face, hard work and perseverance can take you to the highest level,” he said.

    Back in Auqib’s home district of Baramulla, Ghulam Nabi Dar has become a local celebrity overnight, recognized everywhere he goes by community members celebrating his son’s achievement. “People come up to me, hug me and say, ‘This is Auqib’s father.’ It makes me immensely proud,” he said. The milestone caps a remarkable journey that began with a young boy’s bold promise to his cousin: that one day, cricket’s biggest stars would be asking *him* for a selfie. That day has now arrived.

  • A Tibetan cooperative keeps a centuries-old weaving tradition alive

    A Tibetan cooperative keeps a centuries-old weaving tradition alive

    High on the windswept Tibetan Plateau, 12,100 feet above sea level in Shannan, more than a dozen skilled artisans sit hunched over traditional wooden looms, their hands moving in steady, practiced rhythm. They guide shuttles through tight rows of locally sourced wool yarn, pulling each thread into place with careful precision—a repetitive motion that has kept a centuries-old Tibetan cultural tradition alive against the odds. This is the art of weaving Pulu, the thick, durable wool fabric that has clothed plateau communities for hundreds of years, and at the Ethnic Huaji Handwoven Cooperative, this craft is getting a new lease on life.

    Founded in 2008 by third-generation Tibetan artisan Pasang, the cooperative does more than just produce handwoven textiles: it is on a dual mission to safeguard one of Tibet’s oldest endangered weaving traditions and create stable, inclusive employment for local residents. Today, the workshop employs more than 100 people from surrounding communities, including artisans living with disabilities, while passing down rare skills to younger generations of Tibetans who might otherwise never learn the craft. For Pasang, the work is personal—when he was learning the trade from his parents decades ago, fewer than 10 people across the region still knew how to produce Zeter, the cooperative’s specialty and the rarest, most refined variant of Pulu.

    Unlike ordinary Pulu, Zeter is spun from the exceptionally soft wool harvested from the necks and backs of local Shannan sheep. This finer material makes the spinning and weaving process far more technically demanding than standard Pulu production, but the result is a textile that is lighter, softer, and far more delicate than its everyday counterpart. According to historical records preserved by Pasang and local communities, Zeter was so highly prized that during China’s Ming Dynasty, it was sent as a tribute from Tibetan leaders to the imperial court in central China. Today, the craft holds even greater significance: it has been formally recognized as part of China’s national intangible cultural heritage, a designation that has helped bring new attention to Pasang’s work to keep it alive.

    The history of the craft is woven into the very space of the cooperative. At the center of the workshop, two statues stand framed by rows of wooden looms: one of 7th-century Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo, and the other of his Chinese bride Princess Wencheng. Local tradition holds that Princess Wencheng introduced advanced weaving techniques to Tibet after her marriage to the king, merging cultural practices from across the region into the craft still practiced today. In official Chinese historical narrative, the royal union symbolizes deep, long-standing cultural and historical ties between Tibet and the rest of China, a connection Pasang says is reflected in the blended cultural heritage of Pulu weaving. “It integrated Tibetan and Chinese cultures,” he explained of the fabric’s centuries-long history.

    All wool used in the cooperative’s workshop is sourced locally from sheep herds that graze the high-altitude grasslands surrounding Shannan, keeping supply chains local and supporting regional herding communities. Finished products—including soft scarves, warm shawls, tailored jackets, handwoven bags and other textiles—are displayed in a small showroom adjacent to the workshop, with most sales going to customers across Tibet, followed by buyers from other regions of China.

    For the artisans who work at the cooperative, the craft is far more than a job—it is a connection to their cultural identity and a lifeline to stable income. Eighty-year-old Tsering Yangchen, who has woven at the workshop for seven years after relocating to Shannan from another county, says she struggled to find steady work before joining the cooperative. Instructors at the workshop taught her the craft from scratch, and today she calls Pulu far more than just a product to sell. “We usually wear them,” she said of the handwoven textiles. “They are made from pure wool.”

    This report comes from an Associated Press reporter who participated in a government-organized reporting trip to Lhasa and Shannan last month, which included access to the cooperative, cultural heritage sites, Buddhist temples, tourist destinations, a local eldercare center, and other regional businesses. Associated Press video producer Olivia Zhang contributed to this reporting.

  • France shuts mosque over Quran verses and Islamic texts used in Muslim worship

    France shuts mosque over Quran verses and Islamic texts used in Muslim worship

    A French administrative court has given its backing to a six-month shutdown of a suburban Paris mosque, a ruling that has reignited long-simmering debates over the French state’s regulation of Islamic religious practice and worship in the country.

    On Friday, the Montreuil Administrative Court turned down a legal request to suspend a closure order first issued in July for the Chanteloup mosque, located in Aulnay-sous-Bois, a northeastern suburb of the French capital. The site will remain shuttered to worshippers through January of next year.

    Human rights attorney Rafik Chekkat, who is representing the mosque in the legal battle, has raised sharp questions over whether imams across France still retain the basic freedom to recite core Islamic sacred texts in their own places of worship. “In France, can an imam still quote the Quran in the mosque where he preaches?” Chekkat asked in comments to reporters.

    Chekkat explained that a significant portion of the authorities’ case against the mosque centered on the imam’s decision to quote seven passages from the Quran, alongside references to two foundational works of traditional Islamic scholarship: *The Garden of the Righteous* and *The Forty Hadiths*. Both texts are compiled from the work of Imam al-Nawawi, a 13th-century Syrian scholar universally recognized as one of the most influential theological thinkers in the history of the Muslim faith.

    French officials also raised objections to portions of the mosque’s sermons that referenced “hell” and the “punishments of the grave” described as being reserved for “unbelievers” — a notable point of criticism, given that similar eschatological teachings are a standard part of religious preaching in Christian churches and other faith communities across the country.

    In their ruling, the judges determined that Julien Charles, the prefect of Seine-Saint-Denis (the department where Aulnay-sous-Bois is located), had not “committed a serious and manifestly illegal infringement of either the freedom of worship or the freedom of expression”, clearing the way for the closure to stand.

    Speaking to Agence France-Presse after the ruling was released, Chekkat expressed deep disappointment and surprise at the court’s decision, noting that key sections of the judgment run directly counter to fundamental guarantees of religious freedom. “We are very disappointed by the decision and very surprised by its content. We will obviously go before the Council of State,” he said, referring to France’s highest administrative court. Chekkat added that he believes the lower court’s ruling was driven in part by political alignment with the regional prefect, rather than strict legal principle. “I understand that the administrative judge did not want to contradict the prefect of Seine-Saint-Denis, now I think that before the Council of State we will have a little more chance, it will be a little more legal and a little less political,” he explained.

    The Friday ruling comes amid years of steadily growing state pressure on Muslim religious institutions across France. By April 2022, French authorities had already shuttered 22 mosques over an 18-month period, with many of the closures relying on classified intelligence documents whose sources have never been made public.

    Beyond mosque closures, the national government has also moved to dissolve a number of prominent Muslim organizations, including the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, a leading anti-discrimination group, and BarakaCity, a large Islamic charity. These actions have deepened widespread fears among French Muslim communities that the government is leveraging national security legislation to systematically restrict the right to religious belief for the country’s 5 million Muslim residents, the largest Muslim minority population in the European Union.

  • Unpacking the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey defense pact

    Unpacking the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey defense pact

    On August 7, 2026, a landmark trilateral defense agreement was signed in the Saudi holy city of Mecca by the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. Named the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement, this pact formally enshrines a collective defense principle: any armed aggression against one signatory will be treated as an attack against all three nations. It builds on the 2025 bilateral Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, expanding cooperation to include joint military drills, defense industrial partnerships, cross-border technology sharing, and coordinated intelligence exchange. While the framework for deeper collaboration is publicly established, details of operational protocols, specific military commitments, and implementation timelines remain undisclosed. This new pact represents one of the most consequential shifts in Middle Eastern and South Asian geopolitics in recent years, driven by overlapping but not identical national priorities across the three countries.

    ### The Strategic Drivers Behind the Pact
    The timing of the agreement is far from coincidental, rooted in a deeply unstable Middle Eastern security landscape. Decades-long tensions between the United States and Iran have yet to produce a lasting ceasefire, while Iran-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen have stepped up attacks and threats against Saudi territory and Saudi-linked commercial and infrastructure assets. A recently finalized U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement remains tied to ongoing negotiations over Saudi-Israeli normalization, with Washington conditioning the deal’s implementation on Riyadh formally joining the Abraham Accords. At the same time, shifting dynamics in the ongoing Gaza crisis and stalled talks over a regional peace framework have put new pressure on major Muslim-majority nations to take more active roles in regional security and diplomacy.

    For Saudi Arabia, the pact addresses growing anxieties over its vulnerability to regional threats as it pursues its ambitious Vision 2030 economic transformation agenda. Recent disruptions to Red Sea shipping and heightened risks of closure to the Strait of Hormuz, through which a quarter of global oil trade passes, have underscored how quickly regional conflict can derail Saudi economic goals by disrupting energy exports, scaring off foreign investment, and disrupting core trade routes. Riyadh thus needs strategic partners that can supplement its own defense capabilities with manpower, intelligence, advanced technology, and geographic depth.

    Pakistan brings a long-standing defense partnership and a large, battle-tested military establishment to the alliance, while Turkey answers Saudi Arabia’s need for a second, ideologically aligned partner with expanding regional influence. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara has actively pursued a policy of expanding its strategic footprint far beyond its Anatolian heartland, positioning itself as a leading power across the entire Muslim world. Turkey has deepened political, military, and industrial ties across the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia, driven by Erdoğan’s goal of elevating Turkey to a top-tier global power. Its active military involvement in Syria, long-running confrontation with Kurdish militant groups, and expanding partnerships across the Muslim world confirm its broad extra-regional ambitions.

    ### Pakistan’s Dual Calculus: Benefits and Hidden Risks
    For Pakistan, the pact offers immediate tangible benefits at a time of deep economic and political uncertainty. Islamabad has long been dependent on external financial assistance and bailout packages to stabilize its economy, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has failed to resolve the country’s deep structural economic weaknesses. Beijing has also grown more cautious about extending new large-scale financing to Islamabad and has pushed for repayment of outstanding loans, while Pakistan has struggled to secure sufficient financial support from other global and regional partners.

    Under the new trilateral framework, Saudi Arabia is expected to provide much-needed financial aid, discounted energy supplies, and new foreign direct investment, while Turkey will offer access to advanced defense technology, military training, intelligence sharing, and defense industrial collaboration. Domestically, Pakistan’s military establishment can frame the agreement as proof that the country has regained its status as a strategically critical global player, strengthening Field Marshal Asim Munir’s domestic legitimacy and consolidating the military’s long-held political influence.

    However, the pact carries significant long-term risks for Pakistan that could undermine its national sovereignty and security. Unlike the earlier bilateral Saudi-Pakistan arrangement, which was built on Saudi financial support in exchange for Pakistani military capabilities, Turkey’s entry adds a broad new geopolitical and defense industrial dimension to the alliance. Turkey already has a deep defense partnership with Pakistan: the two countries cooperate on drone development, naval platform manufacturing, and joint defense projects, and their partnership expanded dramatically during the 2025 India-Pakistan border confrontation, when Ankara provided open political support to Islamabad and Turkish defense systems and advisors reportedly played a role in Pakistani military operations.

    The new trilateral framework will accelerate this cooperation, giving Pakistan greater access to Turkish defense technology, including participation in Ankara’s cutting-edge KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet program. But for Turkey, this partnership is more than a commercial defense arrangement: it is a core component of Ankara’s “Asia Anew Initiative,” which seeks to expand Turkish geopolitical influence across South and Southeast Asia. Recent high-level military visits from Bangladesh and Pakistan to Ankara confirm this expanding strategic push, which includes a growing Turkish maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.

    The greatest long-term risk for Pakistan is what analysts term “strategic entrapment.” If the pact’s collective defense commitments require Pakistani military deployments beyond Saudi territory, Islamabad could find itself drawn into conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and other regional hotspots that serve no core Pakistani national interest. Pakistan already stretched its military resources during the 2026 Iran conflict, when it deployed approximately 8,000 troops, a full fighter jet squadron, and advanced air defense systems to Saudi Arabia under its 2025 bilateral pact.

    Most critically, closer alignment with Saudi Arabia and Turkey threatens to severely damage Pakistan’s historically delicate relationship with Iran. Pakistan shares a 900-kilometer porous border with Iran, and Tehran has already issued sharp criticism of the new trilateral pact, warning that it will not deliver greater security to Saudi Arabia. If Iran views Pakistan as an active participant in Saudi and Turkish efforts to counter Iranian regional interests, Islamabad could face rising diplomatic pressure and increased militant activity along its western border, particularly in Balochistan, where the Pakistani military is already fighting a long-running separatist insurgency and countering militant violence.

    Pakistan currently finds itself balancing multiple competing strategic demands: securing Saudi financial support, deepening defense ties with Turkey, maintaining its all-weather alliance with China, managing its complex relationship with the United States, and avoiding open confrontation with Iran, all while positioning itself as a neutral mediator in the ongoing Iran crisis. This balancing act is growing increasingly unsustainable, and once Pakistan commits military and logistical resources to Saudi and Turkish security goals, withdrawing from those commitments will become progressively more difficult.

    ### New Strategic Challenges for India
    The Makkah Pact creates a new set of complex security challenges for India, which cannot afford to dismiss the trilateral alliance as a purely Middle Eastern development. For New Delhi, the core concern is not just that Pakistan will receive additional military support from Saudi Arabia and Turkey: it is that Pakistan will act as a gateway for Turkey to expand its strategic footprint into South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

    At the same time, Indian policymakers need not view Saudi Arabia’s participation in the pact as a sign that Riyadh intends to abandon its deepening strategic and economic ties with New Delhi. Saudi Arabia holds massive economic, energy, and investment interests in India, and its primary motivation for joining the trilateral pact is to counter Iranian-aligned threats closer to home, not to undermine Indian security interests.

    The real risk for India lies in the combined capabilities the three allies bring to the table: Saudi Arabia’s financial resources can bolster Pakistan’s military capacity, Pakistan provides geographic access, manpower, and military infrastructure across South Asia, and Turkey contributes advanced defense technology, training, and intelligence coordination. This creates a far more capable military ecosystem in Pakistan than the earlier bilateral Saudi-Pakistan arrangement.

    Turkey’s long-standing open support for Pakistan on Kashmir and its expanding maritime and defense presence in the Indian Ocean mean that New Delhi cannot treat the Turkey-Pakistan partnership as a purely bilateral matter. Shared ideological alignment on political Islam also creates opportunities for greater cross-regional strategic coordination that could run counter to Indian interests.

    To protect its national security, India will need to closely monitor the implementation of the pact, particularly with regard to practical cooperation on intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, defense industrial collaboration, technology transfer, and cross-regional military deployments. New Delhi should also deepen strategic engagement with other nations that share concerns over expanding Turkish influence, strengthen its own defense, maritime, and intelligence capabilities, and deepen security and economic cooperation with other Gulf Cooperation Council members.

    Notably, India should not abandon its own expanding strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has repeatedly signaled that it values its ties with New Delhi, and New Delhi can work to make clear that the trilateral defense pact need not derail bilateral cooperation between India and Saudi Arabia. India’s goal should not be to force Saudi Arabia to choose between India and Pakistan, but rather to make Riyadh aware of the potential risks of enabling the buildup of Pakistani military capabilities that could eventually be used against Indian interests.

    As regional geopolitical alignments grow increasingly complex, Pakistan has gambled that the pact will restore its strategic relevance in the Middle East and South Asia. But by entering this trilateral alliance, Islamabad has stepped into a far larger geopolitical game whose long-term consequences it may ultimately be unable to control.

  • The political black hole over the Strait of Hormuz

    The political black hole over the Strait of Hormuz

    Uncertainty over the status of Iran’s supreme leader and deepening internal power rifts have pushed the country to the brink of state failure, sending ripple effects of instability that reach all the way to China’s doorstep and leaving Beijing facing a tricky diplomatic dilemma. At the center of current regional tensions is a newly emerging Iran-Oman agreement that regime-affiliated media in Iran claims will formalize Tehran’s continued control over the Strait of Hormuz, the critical chokepoint through which roughly a fifth of global oil supplies pass daily. From Washington’s perspective, any international recognition of Iran’s full control over the strait would deliver a major blow to U.S. and global commercial interests, granting Tehran a powerful strategic tool to blackmail the international community during future political disputes by threatening to block traffic through the waterway.

    With U.S. midterm elections approaching and high-stakes multilateral negotiations underway with Beijing across a range of issues, the Biden administration is strongly motivated to block international recognition of Iran’s claim, a move that carries major stakes for U.S. global influence. But behind what appears to be a political win for Tehran lies a far more concerning, underreported transformation inside Iran’s ruling regime that points to accelerating fragmentation of central power and looming systemic chaos.

    On August 5, China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency published remarks from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who openly acknowledged that communication with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has become extremely difficult in recent weeks. Analysts say this unusual public comment, amplified by a major Chinese state media outlet, may be a quiet signal that Beijing itself is struggling to establish reliable lines of communication with Tehran’s top decision-makers, raising questions about who actually holds power in the country. Iranian media reports have further fueled these doubts, claiming Pezeshkian was only granted a brief meeting with a figure presented as Khamenei, held in a dark, tinted-window vehicle at a secret location outside the capital.

    It remains unclear whether Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Iran’s late long-time supreme leader Ali Khamenei, even exercises full control over his own circumstances, let alone the affairs of the entire country. These disclosures from Iran’s own elected president confirm long-running rumors of bitter, intractable splits at the highest levels of Iran’s leadership. The most radical factions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are widely believed to have seized de facto ultimate power, using Mojtaba as a largely powerless figurehead to legitimize their rule. This arrangement has isolated both Mojtaba and the hardline IRGC leadership, creating a cascade of disruptive internal power dynamics that threaten to unravel central governance.

    To compound this instability, Iran’s military command structures were deliberately decentralized and devolved to local regional units years ago to pre-empt the risk of U.S. decapitation strikes on top leadership, and there is little sign these structures can be re-centralized any time soon to restore clear top-down command. Unconfirmed but persistent rumors also suggest Israeli intelligence has cultivated close contacts with senior Iranian officials who are prepared to launch a coup against the current hardline regime, fueling a culture of pervasive paranoia and mutual suspicion across all levels of government. Under this climate, any official, for any reason, can be targeted and purged on accusations of treason, making it nearly impossible to build consensus or implement consistent policy.

    The result is a broken decision-making system: any proposed compromise with external powers can be immediately vetoed by radical factions that dismiss any deal as a “traitor’s surrender,” while the official supreme leader remains a distant, opaque figure controlled by unelected hardline factions behind the scenes. Despite this political chaos, Iran still retains active production capacity for missiles and drones, as well as large stockpiles of these weapons, creating a dangerous scenario: a fractured state with plentiful tools to project destabilizing force across the region.

    This portrait adds up to a country mired in deep institutional disarray, on the edge of full state failure. Yet history shows that failing states can survive for years while remaining a major threat to regional security, as seen in Myanmar, where years of brutal civil conflict have failed to unseat the ruling military junta. A collapsed, failing Iran would expand a broad arc of instability stretching from Central Asia all the way to the Mediterranean coast. The U.S. has thus far avoided being drawn into the messy Iranian quagmire, but even if Tehran retains de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz, the country’s political fragmentation poses unique new risks to regional security and global oil markets.

    One potential path to de-escalation that has been floated by geopolitical analysts involves offering security guarantees to Mojtaba Khamenei and other top Iranian leaders in exchange for Tehran rolling back its claims to full control over the strait. On a more positive note, Iran’s growing internal instability has paradoxically helped unify regional states that were once deeply divided over how to address Tehran’s expansionist threats. Middle Eastern nations are now converging on coordinated strategies to limit Tehran’s harmful regional influence, building new medium- and long-term pressure campaigns to constrain the regime. This has also accelerated regional plans to build oil and gas export pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely, a shift that will ultimately restrict Iranian trade and further isolate the country’s hardline religious leadership.

    For China, the current situation creates a tricky diplomatic balancing act. While Beijing would likely welcome any setback to U.S. interests in the region, its demonstrated inability to intervene and mediate the dispute for Gulf allies has left China sidelined from evolving regional political dynamics, which are increasingly dominated by the U.S. and Israel. Finding common ground with Washington and Jerusalem to address the Iranian crisis would be a major challenge for Beijing, in large part because it is not clear what strategic benefits Beijing would gain from such collaboration. However, the emergence of a large, unstable political black hole along China’s western border will almost certainly create new security and economic risks for Beijing in the near term. The Iranian meltdown is unfolding at the same time that Russia faces ongoing military setbacks and struggles to hold its position in Ukraine, meaning China could soon find itself bordered by multiple zones of active instability – a outcome that Beijing has long sought to prevent.

  • Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s rocky relations: A brief history

    Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s rocky relations: A brief history

    In a moment laden with religious and geopolitical symbolism, the leaders of three major Muslim nations gathered this week in Islam’s holiest city of Mecca to perform Friday prayers together, capping years of gradual reconciliation and marking a new chapter in regional security cooperation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif joined the collective worship at the site, a public display of unity that follows years of strained ties between Ankara and Riyadh.

    The symbolic prayer service comes on the heels of a landmark breakthrough: the signing of a historic trilateral joint defense agreement between the three countries, which for the first time places the three regional powers under a unified security framework. While Pakistan has long maintained warm, stable diplomatic and economic ties with both Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the relationship between Ankara and Riyadh has been defined by centuries of rivalry and decades of alternating détente and open rupture.

    To understand the gravity of this week’s developments, it is necessary to trace the long, fraught history of relations between the two nations. Tensions over claims to leadership of the global Sunni Muslim community date back to the founding of both modern states in the early 20th century, with roots stretching even further to the 19th-century Ottoman-Saudi war, when Ottoman forces crushed an early Saudi expansion across the Arabian Peninsula. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed after World War I, the House of Saud defeated local rivals to seize control of Mecca and Medina in 1925, ending more than 350 years of continuous Ottoman rule over Islam’s two holiest sites. Formal diplomatic relations between the newly established Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Republic of Turkey were not established until the 1930s, and the two sides maintained generally cordial ties for decades after: both backed Iraq during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War (with Saudi support far more public) and aligned with the United States during the 1991 Gulf War.

    Even during this period of calm, however, low-level frictions persisted. Turkey repeatedly criticized Saudi Arabia for demolishing historic Ottoman-era sites across the kingdom, including fortresses, cemeteries, and 19th-century railway infrastructure. The most high-profile dispute came in 2002, when Turkey’s culture ministry condemned the demolition of the 220-year-old Al-Ajyad Fortress, which overlooked Mecca’s Grand Mosque. Turkey’s then-parliament speaker called the destruction “sinful behaviour in breach of the moral values of Islam”, but Saudi Arabia defended the move as a exercise of its sovereign right to redevelop the site to accommodate growing numbers of religious pilgrims. The site was later redeveloped to house the Mecca Clock Tower, one of the tallest structures in the world.

    This era of cordiality, interrupted only by minor disputes, collapsed into deep strategic disagreement after the 2010 Arab Spring. While both Riyadh and Ankara backed efforts to oust longtime Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, their approaches to regional uprisings diverged sharply across the Middle East. In Egypt, Turkey openly supported the first democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi and fiercely condemned the 2013 military coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a close ally of Saudi Arabia. For years after the coup, Ankara hosted Egyptian opposition media outlets and dissident groups, and Erdoğan refused to recognize Sisi’s government, calling for the release of tens of thousands of political prisoners.

    Strategic rifts widened across the region in subsequent years. During the 2017 Saudi-led blockade of Qatar, which accused Doha of supporting terrorism and meddling in regional affairs, Ankara sided openly with Qatar and deployed military forces to the Gulf state. In post-revolution Libya, where power fractured into rival factions after 2011, Turkey backed the internationally recognized government in Tripoli, while Riyadh threw its support behind eastern-based warlord Khalifa Haftar. Tensions boiled over into open hostility in early 2018, when Mohammed bin Salman labeled Turkey part of a “triangle of evil” alongside Iran and extremist religious groups.

    Relations hit their modern lowest point later that year, following the killing of veteran Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a former contributor to Middle East Eye, who was murdered by Saudi operatives inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. Turkish prosecutors indicted 20 Saudi citizens over the killing, building a case based on phone records, entry and exit logs, witness testimony, and analysis of Khashoggi’s personal devices. Erdoğan publicly stated the killing had been ordered at the “highest levels” of the Saudi government. In the years that followed, Riyadh imposed an unofficial boycott on Turkish goods that saw Turkish exports to Saudi Arabia plummet 92% year-on-year in 2021, after systematically pressuring local businesses to drop Turkish products from store shelves. Both sides also blocked each other’s state media outlets.

    After more than four years of open rupture, Ankara and Riyadh formally ended their dispute in 2022, as part of a broader wave of regional rapprochement led by Saudi Arabia. That June, Mohammed bin Salman traveled to Ankara for his first visit since Khashoggi’s killing, meeting Erdoğan at the presidential palace and agreeing to deepen cooperation across trade, defense, energy, and tourism. A key concession from Turkey that cleared the way for reconciliation was the transfer of the Khashoggi murder trial to Saudi courts, meeting a core Saudi demand for restoring ties.

    The reconciliation between Ankara and Riyadh fits into a broader regional shift: Saudi Arabia has moved to end disputes across the Middle East in recent years, including ending its three-and-a-half-year rift with Qatar, launching peace talks with the Houthi movement in Yemen, and restoring full diplomatic relations with Iran in a 2023 deal brokered by China. For Turkey, mending ties with oil-rich Gulf states was also an economic priority, as Ankara grappled with a collapsing national currency and widespread economic instability. Since the 2022 reconciliation, the two sides have signed a series of major deals on technology, defense, and renewable energy, highlighted by a 2023 Saudi agreement to purchase Turkish drones in what remains the largest defense contract in Turkey’s history.

    In recent months, growing strategic alignment on regional issues has pushed the two countries even closer. In Syria, both now back the new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa and have joined forces to lobby the United States to lift crippling sanctions on Damascus. In Libya, once a point of sharp division, both now back the internationally recognized unity government. In war-torn Sudan, both Riyadh and Ankara support the Sudanese Armed Forces led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, while the UAE backs the rival Rapid Support Forces. In Somalia, too, Ankara and Riyadh stand together in supporting the internationally recognized central government, while the UAE backs Somaliland’s bid for independence. Notably, a growing public rift has emerged between Saudi Arabia and its one-time closest Gulf ally the UAE, with Turkey increasingly aligned with Riyadh on these issues, even as Ankara avoids taking an open public stance to protect its own substantial financial ties with Abu Dhabi.

    This week’s joint prayer service and historic defense pact cement the completion of a years-long reconciliation process, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and creating a new trilateral security bloc connecting South Asia, the Anatolian Peninsula, and the Arabian Gulf.

  • Turkey says defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not aimed at Iran or any other country

    Turkey says defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not aimed at Iran or any other country

    ANKARA, Turkey – In a public clarification Saturday, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has pushed back against speculation that a newly signed trilateral defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey is crafted to target Iran or any other regional nation, framing the pact as a foundational step for strengthening collective security across the Middle East and South Asia.

    The landmark “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” was formally signed Friday by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif during a gathering in Islam’s holiest city, Mecca. Its core mutual defense clause mirrors NATO’s long-standing Article 5 framework, stipulating that any armed aggression against one signatory will be treated as an attack on all three nations.

    The agreement brings together three major regional players with complementary strategic strengths: energy-rich Saudi Arabia, Pakistan—a recognized nuclear weapons state, and Turkey, which boasts NATO’s second-largest standing military and one of the fastest-expanding defense industrial bases in the Eurasian region. The pact comes amid a period of heightened regional volatility, driven in part by escalating tensions linked to ongoing conflict across the broader Middle East.

    Speaking in an interview with Turkey’s state-owned Anadolu Agency, Fidan emphasized that the three signatory states have not pre-designated any country as a shared enemy. Hostile action against the alliance, he clarified, is the only threshold that would trigger the pact’s collective defense provisions.

    “We do not have any codified agreement, nothing we have signed, that identifies a specific common threat,” Fidan stated. “Any country that refrains from attacking us is not a target for our alliance.”

    Fidan further explained that the agreement’s mutual defense clause is operationally aligned with NATO’s Article 5, the cornerstone of the Western alliance’s collective defense posture that has been in place since the organization’s founding.

    When detailing how the alliance’s support mechanism would function in practice, Fidan noted that any affected member state must first submit a formal request for assistance. The nature of support provided by the other two nations would be scaled to match the severity of the threat, ranging from intelligence sharing and logistical backing to the full deployment of combat military forces.

    “These are multi-layered arrangements that adapt to the scale of any potential threat,” Fidan said. “This is the guiding framework we have established for our ongoing cooperation.”

    The foreign minister also revealed that multiple unnamed countries have already expressed interest in joining the new defense agreement. He specifically named Egypt as a “natural partner” for the alliance and stated that he expects Cairo to join the pact during its next expansion phase.

    To institutionalize ongoing cooperation, the agreement outlines regular coordination meetings between the three nations’ foreign ministers, defense ministers, and top military commanders. A permanent administrative secretariat for the alliance will also be established, with its headquarters set to be located in Saudi Arabia, Fidan confirmed.

  • Malaysia seizes container suspected of carrying goods bound for Israel

    Malaysia seizes container suspected of carrying goods bound for Israel

    In a move that underscores Malaysia’s long-held policy opposing trade that supports Israeli actions in Palestinian territories, Malaysian border authorities have seized a container at Johor’s Port of Tanjung Pelepas that was suspected of being ultimately bound for Israel, local media has confirmed.

    The seizure was carried out Friday by the Malaysian Border Control and Protection Agency (AKPS), launched after intelligence sharing prompted officials to order a targeted inspection of the container. According to AKPS’s official statement, quoted by local outlet Berita Harian, initial checks suggest the shipment violates Malaysia’s 2023 Customs (Prohibition on Export) Order, which bans all direct and indirect exports of any goods to Israel, specifically falling afoul of Item No 15 in the order’s Second Schedule.

    AKPS officials confirmed the agency is now conducting a full investigation into the cargo, to clarify the goods’ nature, technical specifications, intended end use and official classification. A key line of inquiry is whether the shipment includes strategic goods that fall under regulation by Malaysia’s Strategic Trade Act. The agency emphasized that any attempt to move goods to Israel, whether through direct or indirect channels in violation of national law and government regulations, will face strict enforcement action.

    Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim publicly praised the operation, framing the seizure as clear proof of the country’s commitment to preventing its territory from being used as a transit hub for trade that benefits Israel. In a public statement shared on the social platform X, Anwar congratulated AKPS for its rapid response to the intelligence and seizure of the suspected cargo.

    “This action demonstrates Malaysia’s firm stance to ensure that our country will never serve as a conduit for trade that could support or contribute to the Israeli regime’s atrocities against the Palestinian people,” Anwar said, adding that the operation aligns with both Malaysia’s commitments as a member of The Hague Group and the trade restrictions the government implemented in December 2023.

    The Hague Group, the international coalition Malaysia helped found, issued its own statement welcoming the seizure, noting the action gives practical, on-the-ground effect to the obligations all United Nations member states hold under international law. The group referenced the International Court of Justice’s July 2024 Advisory Opinion, which was later affirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/24, that confirms all states have a legal obligation to not provide aid or assistance that supports Israel’s unlawful occupation of Palestinian territory.

    Varsha Gandikota-Nellutla, Executive Secretary of The Hague Group, highlighted the significance of enforcement at ports rather than just rhetorical commitments. “The defence of humanity is won at ports, courts, and factories, not from the podium. Law that goes unenforced is no law at all. By halting this cargo, Malaysia has upheld the obligations that bind every UN member state under international law. We invite all states to join The Hague Group and do the same,” she said.

    As a founding member of The Hague Group, Malaysia is part of a coalition of nations that have pledged to block transfers of arms, ammunition, military fuel, related military hardware and dual-use items to Israel when there is clear risk these materials could be used to violate international law. The group’s founding founding declaration also requires members to bar vessels transporting restricted Israeli-bound materials from docking at member state ports.

    Friday’s seizure is not an isolated policy move, but follows broader restrictions Malaysia implemented in December 2023, when the government banned Israeli-owned shipping firm Zim from docking at Malaysian ports and barred all Israeli-flagged vessels from entering the country’s territorial waters. At that time, Anwar also announced that any vessel with a final destination of Israel would not be permitted to load cargo at Malaysian ports. The government framed those initial restrictions as a targeted response to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza and a reflection of Malaysia’s longstanding public support for Palestinian sovereignty and human rights.

    What makes this latest seizure notable is that it expands Malaysia’s enforcement beyond just Israeli-owned or flagged vessels, now actively targeting any cargo transiting through Malaysian ports that is suspected of being ultimately destined for Israel, even if it is not carried on an explicitly Israeli-connected vessel.

  • What Pakistan’s defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey means for the Middle East

    What Pakistan’s defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey means for the Middle East

    A historic new collective defence agreement signed last Friday in Mecca is dramatically reshaping the strategic landscape of the broader Middle East, uniting three of the Muslim world’s most powerful and influential nations under a mutual security framework that echoes Nato’s core collective defence principle. Dubbed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, the landmark pact includes a binding clause stating that any armed aggression against one signatory will be considered an attack against all three – a provision that immediately elevates the agreement’s geopolitical weight, despite the joint statement leaving specific military commitments intentionally undefined.

    For Pakistan, the world’s only nuclear-armed Muslim-majority nation, the accord marks a sharp break from its longstanding policy of cautious neutrality as a regional diplomatic mediator. By aligning formally with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Islamabad is repositioning its well-trained, combat-proven armed forces as a potential security anchor for an emerging strategic axis stretching across South Asia and the Gulf Cooperation Council region.

    This new pact reflects a far broader shift in regional power dynamics. As the decades-old regional security order anchored by the United States faces mounting strain from ongoing wars, shifting alliances and escalating tensions, major Middle Eastern powers are increasingly moving to take control of their own security futures, with Pakistan’s unique combination of nuclear deterrence and conventional military strength offering a new regional stability pillar.

    The agreement emerges at a moment of unprecedented upheaval for the Middle East’s traditional security architecture. The ongoing US-Israeli confrontation with Iran has remade the regional strategic map, with direct strikes reaching Saudi territory and critical commercial shipping lanes – including the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea – suffering widespread, costly disruptions. A senior anonymous Pakistani security official with expertise in regional affairs explained to Middle East Eye that all three signatory nations share overlapping economic and security priorities focused on stopping further regional escalation, a common interest that directly drove the decision to formalize the pact. Disruptions to Hormuz shipping have already hit Saudi energy and fertilizer exports, sending ripples through global markets, while import-reliant economies like Pakistan and Turkey have faced particularly severe economic fallout from these disruptions.

    The strategic calculations behind the agreement run even deeper. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have suffered attacks tied to the broader regional conflict, while Pakistan and Turkey both face growing concerns over cross-border instability spilling over from their extensive shared borders with Iran. For Ankara, an additional risk looms: external backing for Iranian Kurdish militias threatens to unravel the years-long fragile peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The wider regional conflict has also emboldened Iran and its Houthi allies in Yemen, who have stepped up direct attacks on Saudi territory.

    For Gulf leadership, the repeated failure of long-standing US security guarantees to deter these attacks has sparked growing doubts over Washington’s reliability as a security partner. The result has been a clear, decisive push by major regional powers to build new defence arrangements that reduce reliance on external security commitments. Former Pakistani ambassador Asif Durrani framed the pact as the “first concrete building block of an emerging regional security architecture”, noting that it signals a clear shift toward greater regional control over security affairs. On X, Durrani added that if this cooperative momentum holds, it could open the door to resolving decades-long conflicts – including the intractable Israeli-Palestinian issue – through a process led and driven by regional actors themselves.

    Regional analysts emphasize the pact is not an out-of-the-blue development, but rather the natural culmination of years of deepening trilateral cooperation between the three nations. Michael Kugelman, senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council, called the agreement “a logical outgrowth of deepening security ties” between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey that has accelerated over recent months. The new pact builds on pre-existing bilateral foundations: Riyadh and Islamabad signed a separate bilateral mutual defence agreement in late 2025, which saw roughly 8,000 Pakistani troops, fighter aircraft and advanced air defence systems deployed to the kingdom, while Turkey has long been a leading defence equipment supplier for both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Interestingly, Kugelman notes the pact is likely to be well-received in Washington, which has long pushed for greater security burden-sharing among its key regional allies, given the agreement’s core focus on collective deterrence focused on Iran.

    For Pakistan, however, the pact is about far more than just geopolitics – it is deeply tied to the country’s ongoing economic vulnerabilities, analysts point out. Islamabad spent months positioning itself as a neutral diplomatic bridge between Washington and Tehran, and even helped broker the June Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding to temporarily pause regional hostilities. But subsequent waves of escalation have squeezed the space for Pakistan’s neutral stance. For Pakistan’s ruling government, which is grappling with persistent high inflation and severe fiscal instability, strategic defence policy is now increasingly intertwined with pressing economic needs.

    Historically, Pakistan has leveraged its military strength to secure critical economic support, most notably from the United States and Saudi Arabia. This new collective defence framework formalizes that model, allowing Islamabad to monetize its decades of operational military expertise – from joint training exercises and troop deployments to arms exports – in exchange for much-needed Gulf investment, discounted energy access and diplomatic support. For Riyadh, the partnership grants access to a large, experienced military with decades of counterinsurgency and combat experience, while for Islamabad, closer security ties open the door to transformative investment, financial assistance and deeper economic integration with one of the region’s wealthiest and most powerful states. “In this sense, Pakistan’s military strength is becoming an economic asset as well as a strategic one,” the anonymous Pakistani security official told Middle East Eye.

    The emerging trilateral partnership brings together three complementary forms of national power, as political analyst Sheharyar Khan, senior adviser at Pakistan’s Ministry of Law and Justice, explained. Khan framed the dynamic as a division of complementary strengths: Saudi Arabia contributes the financial capital, Turkey brings cutting-edge defence technological innovation, and Pakistan provides core military capability. “Together, the three countries could form a security partnership whose capabilities extend far beyond traditional troop deployment,” Khan noted. Each nation brings unique, complementary assets to the table: Saudi Arabia, home to Islam’s holiest sites, offers vast capital reserves, outsized influence over global energy markets and significant regional diplomatic clout; Turkey, which commands Nato’s second-largest standing military, boasts a rapidly advancing, increasingly self-sufficient domestic defence industry with world-leading expertise in unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare and precision-guided munitions that reduces reliance on foreign suppliers; and Pakistan contributes a large, combat-hardened ground force and the Muslim world’s only operational nuclear deterrent.

    Despite these potential benefits, experts warn the agreement carries significant strategic risks for Pakistan. Iran’s response to the pact was swift and sharply critical. Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of Iran’s parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, dismissed the arrangement in a post on X, writing “The Saudis should know that a paper agreement with Turkey and Pakistan does not bring them security, just as years of unilateral milking of the Americans did not bring them security.” This reaction underscores Islamabad’s core strategic dilemma: deepening integration into Gulf security architecture risks damaging its delicate, long-cautious relationship with Tehran.

    Analysts also warn of the risk of “entrapment” – the very real danger that Pakistan could be pulled into foreign conflicts that do not align with its own national interests. Historically, Pakistan has intentionally avoided direct entanglement in Middle Eastern power rivalries: in 2015, the country’s parliament famously rejected a request to join the Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen over domestic political and sectarian concerns. Pakistan is also home to a large Shia minority, many of whom look to Iranian clergy for political and religious guidance, meaning the government must avoid having its closer alignment with Riyadh and Ankara perceived as an anti-Iranian stance that could reignite internal sectarian tensions.

    The agreement has already sparked widespread debate over whether it could eventually expand into a broader multi-national security bloc encompassing additional Muslim-majority nations across the globe. Retired senior Pakistani military official Muhammad Saeed has suggested that additional Muslim countries from the Middle East and beyond could eventually join the framework. But Saeed also cautioned that military strength alone will not determine the pact’s long-term success. “For Muslim states, the real and collective strength will not come only through military capabilities but primarily through long-term investments and collaboration in knowledge, innovation, discipline, character, and tolerant interpretation of sectarian sentiment,” he wrote on X.

    The prospect of a more cohesive Muslim-majority security bloc has already drawn sharp attention from Israel. In February, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett explicitly warned against Turkey forming what he described as a “hostile axis” leveraging Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities “to surround Israel”. Analysts note, however, that Pakistan’s nuclear status inevitably reshapes the strategic calculations surrounding the entire pact. For Saudi Arabia, closer defence ties with Islamabad add an extra layer of deterrence at a time when the kingdom faces persistent threats from Iran while navigating its fragile normalization process with Israel.

    The pact’s implications stretch far beyond the Middle East. For Pakistan, closer alignment with Saudi Arabia and Turkey creates a new strategic counterweight to neighboring India. While Saudi Arabia maintains extensive economic and trade ties with New Delhi, the new collective defence framework further solidifies Pakistan’s role as a core security partner for key Gulf powers. Though India’s Ministry of External Affairs has responded cautiously, saying only that New Delhi is “closely following developments”, Indian national security analysts are monitoring the shift with growing concern. “While most are obviously seeing this from a Middle East lens, it impacts other theatres as well. Pakistan’s conflict-laden relationship with India [is] at the top of that list,” Kabir Taneja, executive director of the Middle East programme at New Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation, wrote on X. Former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal went further, calling the pact “a very negative development for Indian interests” in an X post, and suggesting India should expand its own strategic partnerships with the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Afghanistan to counter the shift.