Iran gets Trump concessions, empty promises in return for little

In a recent diplomatic development that has sent ripples across global geopolitics, the leaders of the United States and Iran have signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding (MOU) designed to end active hostilities between the two nations, as well as halt Israel’s ongoing military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon. But according to analysis from Jessica Genauer, Academic Director of the Public Policy Institute at UNSW Sydney, the agreement is rife with critical structural flaws, unfulfillable promises, and one-sided concessions that leave the U.S. with few tangible gains while abandoning key regional allies and endangering long-term regional stability.

Genauer frames the deal as a classic “emperor has no clothes” moment: despite the Trump administration’s loud claims of a historic diplomatic victory, the agreement delivers almost no new benefits to the U.S. that were not already in place before the outbreak of war. Even the limited nuclear concessions offered by Iran are nothing new, she argues, and the U.S. has given up significant leverage in exchange for almost no meaningful progress on core national security priorities. Beyond that, the MOU abandons long-standing U.S. partners, most notably Gulf Cooperation Council states, while sidelining core Israeli security interests and ignoring the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people. Worse, many of the core commitments laid out in the document are impossible for the U.S. to deliver on, particularly pledges around broad sanctions relief and the unfreezing of billions in Iranian assets held around the world.

Breaking down the most problematic provisions of the MOU, Genauer first examines the clause calling for an immediate and permanent end to all military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon. A glaring oversight here is that the agreement never mentions the two primary parties to the Lebanese conflict — Israel and Hezbollah — and neither side was consulted before the clause was added to the MOU. The text also fails to clarify whether the ceasefire requires a full withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, a step that is all but politically impossible for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to implement. A solid majority of the Israeli public supports continued military pressure on Hezbollah and retaining control over southern Lebanon to eliminate the group’s cross-border threat. While a temporary ceasefire may hold in the short term, Genauer concludes the underlying conflict will almost certainly reignite in the near future.

Next, the MOU includes a provision requiring Iran to allow unimpeded, fee-free safe passage for commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz for a 60-day period, a clause Genauer calls deeply problematic. In effect, the agreement explicitly concedes Iran’s right to begin charging shipping fees for passage through the strait once the 60-day window expires — a major win for the Iranian regime that upends decades of international consensus around free navigation through the critical global energy chokepoint. This provision places Gulf states and Oman in an extraordinarily difficult position: the agreement includes no binding security guarantees to protect these nations from Iranian aggression, leaving them with little choice but to accept Iran’s demand for fees to keep their energy and commodity exports flowing.

The MOU also includes a commitment from the U.S. and unspecified regional partners to develop a $300 billion fund for Iranian post-conflict reconstruction and economic development. Genauer notes the U.S. is highly unlikely to contribute any of its own funding to the initiative, meaning the entire burden will fall on Gulf regional partners. For Iran, this provision creates a powerful new coercive tool: Tehran can pressure Gulf states to fund the reconstruction plan, threatening to block the Strait of Hormuz and resume cross-border attacks if they refuse. Faced with a choice between paying billions or enduring sustained economic and security damage, most Gulf states will likely concede to Iran’s demands. This dynamic also pushes Gulf nations into a delicate position with the U.S.: while they remain dependent on Washington for military security and will not openly break with the U.S., they are almost certain to pursue deeper diplomatic and economic partnerships with other global powers, particularly China, to hedge their bets.

On the critical issues of sanctions relief and unfreezing Iranian assets, two core pledges laid out in points 7 and 11 of the MOU, Genauer highlights that the U.S. simply cannot deliver on most of its promises. Washington can only lift unilateral U.S. sanctions and unfreeze assets held directly on U.S. territory, which make up a tiny fraction of Iran’s total frozen assets globally. The agreement requires the U.S. to also cancel United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sanctions resolutions, a step that is completely outside Washington’s unilateral control. What’s more, the U.S. did not consult with its allies who hold the vast majority of Iran’s frozen assets before signing the MOU, leaving no clear path to pressure those allies to release the funds.

Finally, on the nuclear issue that has been at the center of U.S.-Iran tensions for decades, the MOU delivers almost no new progress. The agreement only reaffirms Iran’s existing pre-war commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, and deliberately omits any ban on Iranian uranium enrichment — a core long-standing red line for U.S. negotiators. The only concrete nuclear provision requires Iran to dilute its existing stockpiles of enriched uranium under IAEA supervision in exchange for sanctions relief, and the text only commits both sides to “discuss the issue of enrichment” at some future date. Genauer notes it is extremely unlikely that a more detailed, binding agreement on enrichment will be reached within the 60-day window outlined in the MOU; any future negotiations would take months at a minimum, and a final deal is far from guaranteed. Despite this lack of progress, the U.S. has already agreed to offer sweeping sanctions relief, representing a major one-sided concession to Tehran.

This analysis, originally published in *The Conversation* under a Creative Commons license, offers a critical, detailed breakdown of the gaps and risks of the new U.S.-Iran diplomatic agreement.