分类： politics

In a significant development for activist movements and UK-Israel defense relations, three prisoners affiliated with Palestine Action have terminated their prolonged hunger strike following the British government’s decision to withhold a multi-billion-pound contract from Elbit Systems UK, the British subsidiary of the Israeli arms manufacturer. The cessation marks the conclusion of the longest hunger strike in British penal history.

Heba Muraisi and Kamran Ahmed, who had abstained from both food and water for over sixty days, alongside Lewie Chiaramello—who managed his Type 1 Diabetes while engaging in an alternating-day hunger strike for 46 days—agreed to end their protest late Wednesday. This decision coincided with urgent medical warnings that the strikers were nearing fatal organ failure.

Simultaneously, four additional protesters—Teuta Hoxha, Jon Cink, Qesser Zuhrah, and Amu Gib—who had previously suspended their strikes in late 2023, formally agreed not to resume their action. The collective resolution brings a close to a highly publicized campaign that highlighted intersections of activism, incarceration, and international arms trading.

The advocacy group Prisoners for Palestine condemned the ongoing detention of these individuals, labeling it a permanent stain on Britain’s democratic credentials. The organization asserted that Britain is effectively holding political prisoners in service of a foreign regime engaged in genocide, a statement that underscores the deeply polarized perspectives on the Gaza conflict.

Family members expressed both relief and unresolved anger. Audrey Corno, a relative of Teuta Hoxha, described the ordeal as a ‘painfully traumatic experience’ for loved ones, noting that while victory is declared, critical refeeding processes and long-term health impacts for Muraisi and Ahmed remain a serious concern.

Nida Gib, related to protester Amu Gib, sharply criticized the Labour government’s silence throughout the crisis, accusing ministers of attempting to isolate dissidents who challenge Britain’s complicity in overseas conflicts. She highlighted the harsh treatment prisoners endured, including being handcuffed to hospital beds during refeeding, and vowed that the movement built around this case would continue to demand accountability and expose perceived injustices.

A profound internal power struggle is threatening the unity of Afghanistan’s Taliban government, pitting the reclusive supreme leader against powerful cabinet ministers in a clash over the country’s future direction. The conflict, revealed through a BBC investigation based on leaked audio and over 100 interviews with Taliban insiders, exposes two competing visions for the nation.

At the center stands Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, who rules from Kandahar with absolute religious authority. Surrounding himself with hardline ideologues, he advocates for a strictly isolated Islamic Emirate severed from modern global systems. His faction has implemented sweeping bans on girls’ education beyond primary school and women’s employment, enforcing rigid religious interpretations across Afghan society.

Opposing this vision stands the so-called ‘Kabul group’—influential ministers including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob, and political leader Abdul Ghani Baradar. While still conservative Islamists, these figures advocate for international engagement, economic development, and limited modernization. They particularly disagree with Akhundzada’s education bans and isolationist policies.

The tension reached its climax in September 2025 when Akhundzada ordered a nationwide internet blackout, citing anti-Islamic content concerns. In an unprecedented act of defiance, Kabul-based ministers collectively pressured Prime Minister Mullah Hassan Akhund to restore connectivity just three days later—an act described by insiders as ‘nothing short of rebellion.’

This direct challenge to Akhundzada’s authority marked a seismic shift in Taliban dynamics. While the movement has historically valued obedience to leadership, the pragmatic ministers recognized that governing a modern state requires internet access for both administration and commerce.

The power struggle reflects deeper ideological divisions. Akhundzada, a former Sharia court judge, believes himself accountable only to God and has consolidated power by moving key government functions to Kandahar. Meanwhile, the Kabul faction—many of whom negotiated with the United States and have international experience—seeks a governance model resembling Gulf states while maintaining Islamic principles.

Despite the confrontation, open rupture remains unlikely. Both factions recognize that visible division could threaten their hold on power. As 2026 begins, the question remains whether these internal tensions will translate into meaningful policy changes for the Afghan people, particularly regarding women’s rights and international relations.

What began as merchant-led demonstrations in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar on December 28, 2025, has transformed into Iran’s most significant protest movement in decades. The government initially perceived these protests as manageable economic grievances from traditionally conservative bazaar merchants seeking currency stabilization and inflation control. In an unprecedented move, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei openly acknowledged the merchants’ concerns, marking the first time he had ever legitimized any demonstration.

However, the situation rapidly escalated beyond governmental expectations. Protests spread to over 25 provinces, evolving into a nationwide challenge to the regime’s survival. The government responded with violent crackdowns that reportedly resulted in more than 6,000 protester fatalities.

The movement’s most significant development has been the incorporation of Iran’s ethnic minorities into the protest landscape. Iran’s population of 93 million includes substantial ethnic diversity: while Persians constitute 51% of the population, Azeris represent 24%, Kurds number between 7-15 million (8-17%), with Arabs and Baluch minorities comprising 3% and 2% respectively.

Kurdish communities initiated their involvement through protests in Malekshahi, Ilam province, on January 3. A subsequent security forces raid on wounded protesters at Ilam hospital generated widespread outrage and international attention. Kurdish leadership demonstrated strategic sophistication by calling for regional strikes rather than protests, remembering the brutal suppression during the 2022-23 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising.

The southeast Baluchestan region joined the movement on January 9, with protests emerging from Friday prayers, driven by longstanding ethnic and religious marginalization. Iranian Azerbaijan participated more cautiously and later, reflecting their relatively privileged position within Iran’s power structures.

The protest movement reveals fundamental divisions about political change. Urban Persian-majority protesters typically seek social freedoms, economic recovery, and Western normalization. Ethnic communities carry additional demands for decentralization, linguistic rights, cultural recognition, and genuine power-sharing—demands historically labeled as separatist by Tehran.

Complicating the opposition landscape, Reza Pahlavi—son of the last Shah—has positioned himself as a transitional leader. However, his published roadmap for transition proposes concentrated power resembling the current supreme leader’s authority and characterizes ethnic demands as national security threats, deepening skepticism in minority regions.

The future of Iran’s protest movement hinges on whether any political transition can address the fundamental tension between centralized power and ethnic pluralism. Lasting change will require incorporating diverse regional and community demands rather than perpetuating Persian-dominated power structures.

Foreign policy experts are raising alarms that President Donald Trump’s recent pattern of rapid military engagements is creating a dangerous precedent as his administration contemplates potential strikes against Iranian targets. This emerging ‘in-and-out’ intervention model, demonstrated in operations like the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, provides tactical successes with minimal political cost, effectively emboldening further military adventurism according to defense analysts.

The Stimson Centre’s Will Smith notes that swift tactical victories without significant domestic opposition have left Trump ’emboldened and confident’ in this approach. Recent reports indicate the administration is weighing strikes on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij paramilitary sites, while Qatar confirmed partial US personnel withdrawals from al-Udeid air base—a facility previously struck by Iran following US attacks on nuclear facilities.

Defense expert Andrew Curtis expressed concern that successful interventions spark thoughts of ‘what else can I do with this toy,’ creating potential momentum for additional conflicts. However, Trump appeared to moderate intervention rhetoric recently, stating protest-related killings had ceased and his administration would monitor Iran’s internal processes before deciding on military action.

Royal United Services Institute director Neil Melvin characterizes this as a ‘low-cost model of regime change’ that represents a significant shift in US foreign policy. Unlike traditional nation-building approaches requiring substantial troop commitments and financial assistance, the current strategy employs proxy forces and limited military engagement to achieve political objectives without extensive entanglement.

Regional power dynamics further complicate the situation. While Russia abandoned Syrian ally Bashar al-Assad due to Ukrainian commitments, and China remains focused on Taiwan with limited appetite for Middle Eastern adventurism, Iran presents a more formidable challenge than Venezuela. Years of US sanctions have crippled Iran’s economy and sparked widespread protests, with some reports indicating armed opposition groups receiving Israeli support.

The practical limitations of simultaneous operations present additional constraints. Curtis notes that while no practical military constraints exist, the US lacks capacity for concurrent planning of major operations against multiple targets, meaning any actions against Iran would need to occur sequentially rather than parallel to other engagements.

Potential Iranian strikes would likely focus on ballistic missile capabilities to prevent retaliation against US bases, building on previous successful operations including undetected B-2 bomber flights from Missouri and submarine-launched cruise missile attacks from waters south of Iran.