Can soybeans save Taiwan?

A recently published provocative thesis from a U.S.-based China military specialist has sparked cross-sector discussion, drawing interest not just from national security circles but also global agricultural producers. Writing in the journal Foreign Affairs, Joel Wuthnow, a researcher at Washington’s National Defense University, posits that China’s heavy reliance on imported soybeans could act as an unexpected, underrecognized deterrent against a potential full-scale military assault to seize Taiwan.
Wuthnow’s core argument centers on the cascading supply chain disruptions that would unfold in the event of a Taiwan Strait armed conflict: U.S. soybean shipments to China would immediately face formal embargoes, while deliveries from major South American soybean exporters could be cut off via naval blockades. Even without formal military blockades, the analyst notes that skyrocketing maritime insurance premiums for commercial vessels operating in the high-tension Taiwan Strait region would almost certainly dissuade most global shipping operators from accepting soybean cargo bound for Chinese ports, effectively severing the vast majority of China’s overseas soybean supply lines.
The researcher acknowledges that Beijing has spent years building strategic stockpiles of soybeans alongside critical reserves of crude oil and other high-priority imported commodities. But unlike energy resources that can be stored for extended periods without degradation, Wuthnow emphasizes that soybeans are a comparatively fragile agricultural commodity, with hard limits on how long they can be held in storage before spoiling or losing nutritional value. In the scenario of a protracted Taiwan conflict, these soybean stockpiles would be rapidly depleted, forcing Chinese households to revert to a largely grain-based diet that would eliminate the large quantities of meat and cooking oil that have become staples of modern Chinese life, a shift widely viewed as deeply unpopular with the public. Wuthnow concludes that the most effective deterrence strategy for the U.S. and its partners is to clearly communicate to Chinese leadership that domestic food-related crises would emerge far faster than any achievable military victory over Taiwan.
The subsequent analysis from veteran Asia-based journalist and agricultural publication editor emeritus Urban Lehner puts Wuthnow’s untested thesis under rigorous scrutiny, raising a series of critical, unresolved questions that challenge the core assumptions of the soybean deterrence framework. First, Lehner notes that Wuthnow’s unsubstantiated claim that Chinese soybean stockpiles would only last a few months fails to account for Beijing’s longstanding practice of sourcing extra-dry soybeans for storage, a specification that, paired with modern advanced grain preservation technologies, can extend the usable shelf life of stored soybeans to 12 months or longer. Second, the thesis largely dismisses years of Chinese government policy efforts to diversify global soybean supplier networks, expand domestic soybean cultivation acreage, and develop modified low-soy animal feed formulas, all initiatives that could reduce China’s import dependence far more than Wuthnow has accounted for.
Lehner further questions whether the threat of a food consumption shift would actually deter Chinese leadership, pointing to widespread nationalist sentiment that Beijing has cultivated over decades, paired with the longstanding framing of Taiwan reunification as a core national priority. Drawing parallels to U.S. civilian food rationing during World War II, where American households accepted limits on meat and other staples as a necessary wartime sacrifice despite widespread grumbling, Lehner notes that it is entirely plausible Chinese citizens would similarly rally around national wartime efforts and tolerate reduced access to meat and cooking oil. The analysis also points to shifting U.S. strategic ambiguity under the second Donald Trump administration: while U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have continued, Trump has publicly framed these sales as potential negotiating chips for favorable trade deals with China, alongside repeated public complaints about the excessive financial costs of U.S. overseas security commitments. These shifts have already led many independent U.S. analysts to question whether Washington would actually deploy military force to defend Taiwan in the event of a cross-strait conflict, a calculation that Chinese leadership is almost certainly making as well.
Additionally, Lehner argues that Chinese military planners are far more likely to prioritize developing capabilities to deliver a rapid, overwhelming victory in a Taiwan conflict rather than planning for a prolonged drawn-out war, pointing to Beijing’s rapid naval expansion, massive stockpiles of precision-guided missiles, and military assessments that suggest U.S. conventional missile stockpiles would be exhausted within a week of large-scale conflict, a vulnerability exacerbated by recent drawdowns of U.S. munitions to support operations in the Middle East. Finally, the analysis highlights that both sides hold competing strategic vulnerabilities: while China relies on soybean imports, the U.S. and its allied high-tech manufacturing sectors are deeply dependent on Chinese exports of rare earth minerals and other critical industrial components, meaning a prolonged large-scale conflict would likely impose far more crippling industrial damage on Western economies than on China’s domestic food supply chain.
Lehner acknowledges that Wuthnow correctly identifies China’s soybean import dependence as a largely overlooked strategic vulnerability, but emphasizes that the actual deterrent value of this weakness remains highly unproven and open to fierce debate. The one point of clear consensus in the analysis is Wuthnow’s final policy recommendation: that the U.S., Taiwan, and allied regional governments must move rapidly to expand drone production, rebuild depleted national munitions stockpiles, and launch consistent public diplomatic messaging to make clear to Beijing that any attempt to seize Taiwan by force will inevitably devolve into a costly, extended conflict that cannot be won quickly.