A major breakthrough by Houthi forces has upended military control along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, after a week-long offensive that began on September 3 captured key strategic sites including the vital Bab al-Mandab Strait and the coastal city of Mocha. The assault targeted multiple districts across southern Hodeidah — Hays and Al-Khawkha — and western Taiz governorate: Jabal Habashi, Maqbana, Mowza’a, and Al-Wazeyaha. These districts form a critical geographic link between Taiz’s mountainous interior and the Red Sea coastal plain, making them a high-priority objective for advancing forces.
Initially, troops aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized government successfully repelled Houthi advances across both governorates, halting the group’s push toward Mocha for nearly seven days. But a surprise rapid overnight assault on Wednesday broke government lines, allowing Houthi fighters to seize Mocha in less than 24 hours. Pro-government units including the National Resistance Forces (NRF), the Nation’s Shield Forces (NSF), and the Giants Brigades (Al-Amaliqah) launched counterattacks to retake the city, but were ultimately forced to withdraw, falling back toward the Bab al-Mandab Strait and neighboring Lahj governorate.
By the following morning, Houthi forces had extended their gains to capture the Bab al-Mandab Strait itself and Mayyun Island, the strategic outpost that overlooks the critical waterway. Government troops pulled back further to the Ras al-A’ara area of Lahj, ceding full control of the strait to the Houthi movement. Throughout the fighting across Hodeidah and Taiz, Houthi forces held the initiative, leaving pro-government troops largely on the defensive, able to hold ground only in scattered sectors while ceding key territory elsewhere. Since the capture of Bab al-Mandab, Houthi forces have launched multiple missile strikes against remaining government positions past the strait, with the most intense clashes continuing to center on western Taiz, where fighters are pushing to secure additional territory across the governorate.
A pro-government fighter who escaped Mocha for Aden and spoke to Middle East Eye outlined the structural challenges that led to the government retreat. “We fought the Houthis for a week, but they received continuous reinforcements and relentless support from ground and air forces,” he explained. “We were divided into separate units, with each group taking orders from its own commander, leaving us scattered across the battlefield.” The fighter emphasized that his unit held its position for a full week before withdrawing, pushing back against public criticism of pro-government forces. “I am deeply hurt by the criticism directed at us. We were accused of fleeing by people who have no idea what actual battle entails,” he said. “When communication broke down amid the heaviest fighting, the retreat began. I am not trying to blame anyone, but when one group pulled back, the rest followed suit. We retreated to Mocha, and from there toward Bab al-Mandab and Ras al-A’ara.”
While minor clashes have erupted across six Yemeni governorates — Al-Jawf, Al-Bayda, Marib, Al-Dhale, Hodeidah, and Taiz — the most severe fighting remains concentrated in Taiz and the adjacent Red Sea coast. In response to the Houthi advance, the Yemeni Armed Forces announced it would deploy all available ground and air assets to target Houthi movements across an operational zone covering the Taiz–Mocha road, Jabal al-Nar, and Mocha itself, releasing a public target map alongside its statement. On September 10, official military spokesperson Colonel Majed al-Nuzaili urged civilians to avoid the Taiz–Mocha road until further notice and steer clear of all Houthi military concentrations. Since the announcement, government forces have launched air strikes against Houthi positions in Mocha and along the western coast to support a planned counteroffensive to retake the city, though no territorial gains have been reported to date.
Houthi officials have accused the Saudi-led coalition of conducting more than 100 air strikes across Yemen within a 48-hour period following the Houthi advance, though Saudi authorities have not yet claimed responsibility for the operations. The human cost of the offensive has already been severe: the NRF has confirmed more than 500 of its fighters were killed and over 1,500 wounded in the clashes. For civilians, the fallout has been even more widespread: the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that more than 82,000 people have been displaced from their homes since fighting resumed on the west coast in early September. Thousands have fled beyond Yemen’s borders, with IOM confirming that over 2,000 people have reached the northern coast of Djibouti, landing at scattered sites near the town of Obock.
Despite the Yemeni government’s plans for a counteroffensive, morale among pro-government forces that retreated from the west coast remains severely damaged, creating major barriers to halting further Houthi advances in the near term. Yemeni political analyst Professor Abdulsattar al-Shamiri, CEO of the Johood Center for Studies and Research, attributed the government’s military setback to deep-rooted coordination failures among competing pro-government factions. “There are no explicit disagreements in the literal sense, but there are clear discrepancies in coordination methods,” al-Shamiri explained. “As for the setback that occurred in Mocha and the rest of the coastal areas, it stems from central factors — chief among them weak command and control, as the command structure within the Yemeni army units was not functioning as it should.”
Al-Shamiri added that multiple additional factors undermined government defenses, including a lack of effective air support. Today’s air operations do not match the scale and impact of the Saudi-led coalition’s support for ground forces a decade ago, he noted. Other contributing factors include critical supply shortages, rapid depletion of ammunition stockpiles, poor battlefield communication, and a complete lack of unified central oversight. Despite these challenges, al-Shamiri said he remains confident that Yemeni government forces can eventually recapture the lost territory, though the process will be long and difficult. “Recapturing areas is possible, but it will not be easy or quick. It will require organised effort, high readiness, and more time — especially given that these areas were previously under Houthi control before they were forcefully expelled,” he said. The coming phase of conflict will likely follow a strategy of deep attrition, he predicted, relying on targeted air strikes and small-scale surgical ground operations to weaken Houthi control. “This attrition may force them to withdraw from certain areas, despite Iran having secured a major strategic gain and potentially pushing further support to the Houthis,” al-Shamiri said. “The government forces are, therefore, facing a long-term war of attrition.”
Dr Mohammed al-Shuaibi, a professor of strategic planning at the University of Aden, echoed al-Shamiri’s assessment, noting that recapturing the Red Sea coastal areas remains achievable if pro-government forces implement structural reforms. “The government forces can unify their leadership and militarily recapture Mocha,” he said. “To achieve this, it requires forming a unified operations room, a single political decision, and subsequently selecting a unified field command — specifically from among those leaders who enjoy acceptance and possess sufficient battleground experience there.”
By seizing key sites along Yemen’s Red Sea coast including Mocha, Dhubab, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and Mayyun Island, the Houthi movement — officially known as Ansar Allah — has gained unprecedented leverage over one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, which connects the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Suez Canal, carrying roughly 10 percent of global trade annually. Al-Shuaibi noted that control of Bab al-Mandab is an intermediate strategic objective, not the group’s final goal. “If the Houthis manage to consolidate their presence in Mocha and Bab al-Mandab, they will gain massive strategic leverage against Saudi Arabia, the United States, and international powers,” he explained. Beyond local military gains, the offensive is part of a broader push to reshape regional power dynamics, al-Shuaibi said, as the Houthis recognize the strait’s enormous global economic and political significance. “The more capable they become of threatening the strait, the more enabled they are to transform Yemen from an internal battleground into an influential player in global energy security and trade,” he added.
In response to growing international concern over maritime security in the region, Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam sought to reassure global powers in a post on X. “As for the freedom of navigation and international trade movement in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, it is safe and orderly, and there is no cause for any international concern regarding it,” he wrote.