作者： admin

In the wake of its recent strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the United States is fast-tracking the development of a next-generation penetrator (NGP) to address the evolving challenges of modern warfare. The June 2024 operation, codenamed Midnight Hammer, saw the first combat use of the 13,000-kilogram GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) against Iran’s Fordow and Natanz sites. While the strikes demonstrated precision, they also highlighted operational limitations, particularly with the B-21 Raider’s reduced payload capacity. This has spurred the US Department of Defense to prioritize the creation of a more advanced penetrator capable of overcoming hardened and deeply buried targets. The NGP, expected to weigh under 9,900 kilograms, will feature enhanced precision, propulsion systems for standoff capability, and improved terminal effects. Its development is driven by lessons from the Iran strikes and the growing global proliferation of fortified facilities in nations like China, North Korea, and Russia. The US Air Force aims to deploy initial prototypes within two years, integrating the NGP into the Long Range Strike system alongside platforms like the B-21 bomber and the AGM-181A Long-Range Stand-Off missile. However, the strikes on Iran’s Fordow facility, which lies 80 meters underground, raised questions about the MOP’s effectiveness. Satellite imagery revealed only six craters despite the deployment of 14 bombs, suggesting incomplete destruction of critical infrastructure. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth downplayed these concerns, calling leaked reports preliminary and emphasizing the complexity of battle damage assessments. The lessons from Iran could foreshadow greater challenges in potential conflicts with China, where deeply buried command centers and missile silos pose significant threats. Analysts warn that conventional strikes on such targets might be misinterpreted as nuclear decapitation attempts, escalating tensions. As the US refines its penetrator technology, the broader strategy of deterrence by denial remains critical, though it faces practical limitations amid China’s expanding missile capabilities and anti-access systems.

The United States is actively pursuing economic decoupling from China, implementing measures such as increased tariffs on Chinese goods, restrictions on advanced technology exports, and subsidies to bolster domestic manufacturing. This strategy aims to reduce reliance on China for critical products and safeguard US intellectual property from theft, particularly state-sponsored cyber-economic espionage. Former US Trade Representative Katherine Tai emphasized that China-specific tariffs were intended to counter harmful cyber intrusions and theft, echoing earlier Trump administration efforts to address intellectual property theft. However, the effectiveness of decoupling in protecting US innovations remains questionable. Political scientist William Akoto, who specializes in state-sponsored cyberespionage, argues that decoupling may not deter cyber theft and could even exacerbate it. His research highlights that industrial similarity, rather than reliance, drives cyberespionage. Countries with overlapping advanced industries, such as aerospace and electronics, are more likely to target each other with cyberattacks due to intense competition. For instance, the 2012 cyberattack on US solar panel manufacturer SolarWorld, attributed to Chinese entities, exemplifies this dynamic. Cutting trade ties does not eliminate technological rivalry; instead, it may intensify espionage efforts. Historical examples, such as South Africa’s covert acquisition of nuclear technology under sanctions and Israel’s clandestine military tech efforts during embargoes, illustrate how isolation can fuel desperation. To mitigate cyberespionage, Akoto suggests investing in cyber defense, building resilience, and accelerating innovation. Strengthening network security, training employees against phishing, and adopting robust encryption can make hacking attempts less successful. Additionally, businesses can focus on faster product development cycles to stay ahead of competitors. Rather than relying on tariffs and export bans as solutions, US leaders should prioritize resilience and stress-test cybersecurity measures to make espionage less rewarding for adversaries.

In a surprising turn of events, former President Donald Trump has seemingly retracted plans for the U.S. State Department to scrutinize and revoke visas for Chinese students studying in the United States. On June 11, 2025, Trump took to his social media platform, TruthSocial, to announce that Chinese students remain welcome in the U.S., stating their presence ‘has always been good with me!’ This declaration came weeks after Secretary of State Marco Rubio revealed intentions to review and potentially cancel visas for Chinese nationals with ties to the Chinese Communist Party or those pursuing studies in critical fields. The conflicting messages have left Chinese students and prospective applicants in a state of uncertainty. Historically, Chinese students have faced barriers to studying in the U.S., with efforts to restrict their access dating back decades. Since the late 1970s, millions of Chinese students have been granted visas to study in American universities, contributing significantly to the U.S. economy and academic institutions. However, the proposed visa restrictions have reignited concerns about anti-Chinese discrimination and the broader implications for U.S.-China relations. The Trump administration’s contradictory moves highlight the complexities of balancing national security interests with the benefits of international educational exchange.