In debates over U.S. military engagement in Iran, a core argument from critics has gained widespread traction: that the ongoing conflict erodes American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, undermines the confidence of U.S. allies and partners, and drastically increases the risk of a violent confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan.
There is no question that this premise rests on tangible, observable facts. The U.S. military, particularly its naval branch, is already smaller than strategic analysts argue it needs to meet global defense demands, and a large share of Washington’s available combat power is currently tied down in the Middle East amid the Iran campaign. Currently, no deployable U.S. aircraft carrier is positioned in the Western Pacific, and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit — the only forward-deployed Marine amphibious task force in the region — has been reallocated to support operations related to Iran.
Equally concerning for defense planners is the pace at which the Iran conflict is depleting U.S. weapons stockpiles, especially long-range precision strike missiles and air defense ordnance. While the full severity of the stockpile shortfall remains unconfirmed, it is widely assessed that the U.S. currently does not maintain the reserve of munitions that defense leaders would deem sufficient for a major conflict with China. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo recently alluded to this very gap in public remarks, lending official weight to these concerns.
Against this backdrop, a critical question has emerged: does this moment create a tempting window for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to launch aggressive action against Taiwan, or against other U.S. partners in the region including the Philippines and Japan?
On paper, the opportunity seems clear. China has carried out the largest and fastest military expansion since World War II, building a modern, capable force focused heavily on its primary near-term objective: seizing control of Taiwan. For more than 50 years, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has planned and trained for this mission. Today, it has the naval and air power to establish a full blockade around the island, and its combined amphibious and airborne lift capacity is sufficient to move a large invasion force across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing’s massive rocket force can strike key targets across Taiwan, and years of subversion and cognitive warfare have cultivated pro-unification fifth column elements within Taiwan’s population to support an invasion.
For Xi, the math could seem compelling — particularly if he believes any conflict over Taiwan could be contained to the Taiwan Strait and concluded quickly, within a matter of weeks. But a successful seizure of Taiwan is far from a guaranteed outcome, even with U.S. forces tied down in the Middle East, and Xi faces a host of major strategic risks that could give him serious pause.
First, the U.S. retains significant latent military capability in the Indo-Pacific even amid the Iran deployment, and can quickly reinforce regional positions from other global command areas. Beyond force numbers, the U.S. has demonstrated its operational proficiency in recent conflicts in Venezuela and Iran, as well as in ongoing efforts to intercept Houthi missiles and drones in the Red Sea. Notably, Chinese-made air defense systems and missiles supplied to Iranian and other proxies have performed poorly against U.S. and allied systems, a reality that cannot be lost on Chinese military planners.
Another key factor: the PLA has not fought a major conventional conflict in more than 50 years, leaving it untested in large-scale, high-intensity combat against a modern adversary. If the conflict expands beyond a short, contained operation, China has openly acknowledged that its military is not prepared to protect China’s global interests. The PLA lacks the capability to operate far from Chinese shores or project power more than 1,000 miles beyond the mainland, even as its longer-range missiles can hit targets much farther out.
A prolonged conflict would also bring catastrophic economic consequences for Beijing. China’s international trade would almost certainly come to a complete halt, along with its imports of critical energy and food supplies. Chinese manufacturers would be cut off from access to Western components and technology, and finished Chinese goods would lose access to major global markets. Losing export revenue denominated in hard currency, primarily U.S. dollars, and being cut off from the global dollar-based financial system would create an unprecedented economic crisis. While Beijing could attempt to rely on its own currency, the renminbi is not freely convertible, and it is not widely held or desired by global trading partners — making it nearly impossible to purchase critical imports from Australia, the Middle East, and other suppliers that require hard currency payment.
Domestically, a prolonged, costly conflict could also erode Xi’s domestic standing. For years, Xi has urged Chinese citizens to “eat bitterness” and prepare for hardship, but more than 600 million Chinese people live on $5 or less per day. If thousands of young Chinese soldiers are killed in an invasion that becomes bogged down, public anger could build, even after an initial wave of nationalist sentiment. Xi’s existing political opponents would almost certainly capitalize on public discontent to challenge his rule.
Finally, any unprovoked invasion of Taiwan would accelerate a global shift toward balancing against Chinese aggression, uniting more countries in cooperation with the United States to counter Beijing. This shift is already underway, driven by Xi’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy. Japan, which resisted major defense expansion for decades under successive U.S. administrations, has now significantly bolstered its military capabilities in response to Chinese threats. The Philippines, Indonesia, and even New Zealand have grown increasingly alarmed by Beijing’s expansionism and deepened security cooperation with the U.S. In Washington, the U.S. government and military now openly recognize the severity of the Chinese threat, a marked shift from a decade ago when public warnings about China were effectively banned in policy and military circles.
Even Europe, long hesitant to confront China, has begun to recognize the importance of strengthening defense, spurred by Russian aggression in Ukraine and a more tough-minded U.S. approach under the Trump administration. In the Global South, public backlash against Chinese aggression would grow if the PLA launched deadly attacks on Taiwan, and Chinese investment and influence in the region would collapse. Even Russia would likely only offer symbolic pro-Beijing statements rather than concrete support, happy to let China and the U.S. exhaust one another.
If China attacked U.S. military bases in Guam, the Northern Marianas, Hawaii, or anywhere on U.S. territory, it would kill American citizens — uniting even deeply divided U.S. public opinion against Beijing, and eliminating any chance that pro-China leftist groups in the U.S. could soften Washington’s response. Even the traditional pro-engagement business community on Wall Street, which has long prioritized economic ties with Beijing, would likely rethink its support for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after an invasion.
Ultimately, only Xi Jinping knows what decision he will make. It remains possible that he will judge the current moment, with U.S. forces occupied in Iran, as too good an opportunity to pass. But any decision to launch an invasion of Taiwan would be one of the largest gambles in modern military history. For all their ambitions, Xi and other senior CCP leaders are not suicidal — a fact underscored by their long pattern of moving personal wealth and family members overseas to safety ahead of any potential crisis. Retired U.S. Marine Colonel Grant Newsham, author of *When China Attacks: A Warning to America*, contributed this analysis.