标签： Europe

The small Balkan nation of Kosovo is heading back to the polls this weekend, marking its third parliamentary election in just 18 months, as widespread public frustration builds over a seemingly intractable political crisis that threatens the country’s long-held goals of deeper integration with the European Union and NATO.

This latest early vote, scheduled for Sunday, was triggered when Kosovo’s major political blocs failed to reach a consensus on a successor to former President Vjosa Osmani, whose term of office expired at the end of March. Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s center-left Vetevendosje party already holds a solid majority in parliament following the last early election held in December. However, Kosovo’s constitution requires a presidential appointment to be approved by at least 80 of the 120 sitting lawmakers – a supermajority that neither Kurti’s governing faction nor the united opposition has been able to secure.

As key political players trade blame for the ongoing gridlock, their repeated failure to broker a compromise has sparked deep disappointment among Kosovo’s roughly 2 million eligible voters, who overwhelmingly prioritize economic growth and improved living standards over endless partisan infighting.

Vlora Kryeziu, a 52-year-old business owner based in the capital Pristina, summed up the widespread public cynicism, noting that the same political standoff is playing out on repeat. “We will for sure have the same result,” she said. “As a citizen, I have a lot of dissatisfaction, and I think that we as a society are not doing enough to change these things.”

This cycle of inconclusive elections stretches back to a first vote in February 2024, which left Kosovo without a fully functioning government for most of the year and forced a second snap election in December 2024.

As one of Europe’s youngest and poorest countries, Kosovo carries a complex geopolitical backdrop: the majority ethnic Albanian state declared independence from Serbia in 2008, following a 1998-1999 armed conflict that ended with a NATO bombing campaign that forced Serbia to withdraw its forces from the territory. While the United States and most European Union member states recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty, Serbia refuses to acknowledge the declaration, backed by its key allies Russia and China. Both Belgrade and Pristina have made clear that normalizing bilateral relations is a non-negotiable requirement for advancing their respective EU membership bids.

European Council President Antonio Costa traveled to Pristina this week to issue a clear call for Kosovar political leaders to resolve the stalemate and unify around the shared national goal of EU integration. “The European Union can support Kosovo, but it cannot do Kosovo’s own homework,” Costa stated. “Kosovo needs strong, stable and functioning institutions capable of delivering reforms and seizing the opportunities the European Union offers.”

On the campaign trail, Kurti has urged voters to grant him a new mandate, arguing that opposition parties manufactured an artificial crisis to force repeated elections despite what he calls the “strong and clear will of the people.” In response, Kosovo’s two main opposition parties – the Democratic Party of Kosovo and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) – have accused Kurti of pushing to consolidate absolute control over all of the country’s governing institutions. Notably, former President Osmani, once Kurti’s political ally, is now running on the LDK’s party list against the prime minister after he refused to support her nomination for a second presidential term.

Political analyst Artan Muhaxhiri predicts little substantive change will come out of Sunday’s vote, pointing to Vetevendosje’s capture of more than 50% of the vote in the last election. He expects the political deadlock to reemerge after ballots are counted, noting “there are no indications that political leaders are willing to change their actual stances and narrow the existing gap.”

The prolonged political crisis has already left tangible damage on Kosovo’s already fragile economy, which has been battered by the global energy crisis and soaring fuel prices in recent years. The recurring institutional vacuum has also delayed the country’s access to critical EU and international development funds earmarked for Kosovo, putting key infrastructure and reform projects on hold.

As Armenians head to the polls on Sunday for nationwide parliamentary elections, the small Caucasus nation stands at an unprecedented turning point in its modern history. For the first time, the entire election campaign has centered on one existential question: whether Armenia will formally shift its long-standing geopolitical orientation away from Moscow and toward closer integration with the European Union and the United States. Incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who leads the Civil Contract party widely forecast to retain its parliamentary majority, has already set the country on an unmistakable Western-facing trajectory, drawing fierce pushback from pro-Russian opposition blocs and direct economic pressure from the Kremlin.

The rift between Armenia and its traditional ally Russia opened dramatically in 2023, when Azerbaijan reclaimed full control over the disputed Karabakh region after three decades of de facto control by ethnic Armenian forces backed by Yerevan. Pashinyan’s government accused Russian peacekeepers deployed to the region of failing to fulfill their security mandate and halt Azerbaijan’s military offensive. With Moscow heavily engaged in its ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the Kremlin rejected the accusations, noting its peacekeeping contingent was never authorized to intervene in the offensive. That episode shattered long-held public trust in Russia as a reliable security guarantor for Armenia. “Russia’s image as a guarantor of Armenian security was not grounded in reality, and it all collapsed after the 2023 Karabakh war,” explained Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Yerevan-based Caucasus Institute.

“These are the first elections in Armenia’s history where geopolitical orientation has become a decisive issue,” Mikayel Zolyan, an analyst and former Armenian MP, told the Associated Press from Yerevan. “Until now, Armenia has remained within Russia’s sphere of influence, and this was taken for granted, but now, for the first time, this status quo is being called into question.”

Over the past two years, Pashinyan has moved cautiously but deliberately to loosen Russia’s grip on Armenian politics and policy. In 2023, Armenia joined the International Criminal Court, a move that angered the Kremlin, and in 2024, it suspended its participation in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, a post-Soviet military alliance. Yerevan has also formally declared its aspiration to join the European Union and hosted the high-profile European Political Community summit in its capital in early May. A clear election victory would give Pashinyan a popular mandate to lock in this geopolitical shift and finalize a long-awaited peace agreement with neighboring Azerbaijan.

Western powers have already moved to demonstrate the tangible benefits of closer alignment with Armenia. In August, former U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to sign a landmark declaration ending decades of cross-border hostilities, which includes provisions to establish a new transit corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave. A preliminary agreement reached in February could clear the way for a U.S. firm to construct a new nuclear reactor to meet Armenia’s domestic energy needs. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has also pledged that the EU is ready to invest heavily in Armenia’s energy sector and its fast-growing digital economy, and has publicly endorsed Pashinyan’s reform agenda. Trump has personally backed Pashinyan, calling him a “great friend” and a leader who is building a “strong, wealthy, and very secure” Armenia.

Against this Western outreach, Armenia’s fragmented political opposition remains dominated by staunchly pro-Russian groups that broadly oppose the normalization of ties with Azerbaijan and blame Pashinyan for the loss of Karabakh. Nineteen separate political forces – two electoral blocs and 17 individual parties – are contesting the 100 parliamentary seats. Pashinyan’s main challenger is the Strong Armenia Party, led by Armenian-Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who is currently on trial on charges of calling for the overthrow of the current government, charges he firmly denies. Strong Armenia advocates for deepening economic and political ties with Moscow and accuses Pashinyan of intentionally provoking conflict with Russia. Another prominent contender is the Hayastan Bloc, led by former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, who has repeatedly accused Pashinyan of “seriously undermining” Armenia’s historic relationship with Russia.

The Kremlin has gone far beyond rhetorical support for the opposition to apply direct economic pressure on Armenia in an attempt to derail Pashinyan’s Western pivot. Russian President Vladimir Putin has openly compared Armenia’s current trajectory to that of Ukraine, warning that pursuing EU membership carries the same dire consequences. In recent weeks, Moscow has imposed sweeping new import restrictions on Armenian agricultural and manufactured goods, citing unsubstantiated sanitation violations to block shipments of Armenian flowers, select grades of cognac and wine, eggplants, potatoes, dried fruit, fish and other key exports. Armenia’s membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a post-Soviet customs union, has been placed under formal review following a May member summit in Kazakhstan, with explicit threats to fully suspend Yerevan’s membership by the end of 2025. The EEU’s four other member states – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – also demanded Armenia hold a public referendum on whether to remain in the bloc or pursue EU membership, a demand Pashinyan has flatly rejected.

Official Armenian government data shows that 38% of the country’s total exports went to EEU member states in 2025, with the overwhelming majority bound for Russia, compared to just 8% of total trade directed to the EU. In response to Russia’s trade restrictions, von der Leyen announced last Thursday that the 27-nation EU would provide 50 million euros ($58 million) in emergency financial support to Armenia, calling Russia’s actions blatant “economic coercion” that weaponizes interdependent trade ties to achieve political goals.

Many analysts warn that even with Western backing, Armenia faces a deeply uncertain path as it seeks to reduce its reliance on Moscow. Russia retains extensive leverage over the country, controlling large portions of Armenia’s key energy and infrastructure networks and continuing to supply heavily discounted natural gas. “It’s completely unrealistic to say that Armenia can somehow overcome Russian influence in a short period of time,” Zolyan noted.

Armenian civil society groups and international election monitors have also documented widespread attempts at foreign interference in the lead-up to the vote. Independent Armenian election watchdog the Union of Informed Citizens has recorded multiple instances of Russian meddling, including coordinated social media disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks against government and civil society targets, illicit vote buying, and bribes paid to pro-Russian journalists. The Kremlin has repeatedly denied any interference in Armenia’s electoral process. These findings align with a recent assessment from a delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which visited Yerevan in May. The delegation confirmed that foreign interference includes illicit political financing, cyber operations, economic coercion, and direct attempts to manipulate vote outcomes. “These hybrid tactics aim not only to sway public opinion but to secure long-term geopolitical leverage over Armenia,” the delegation said.

Across provincial France, a viral trend of massive communal feasts has quickly escalated from a popular pastime into one of the country’s most heated pre-election political flashpoints. Last weekend, 3,500 attendees gathered in a sprawling hangar on the outskirts of Colmar, the picturesque medieval Alsace town famous for its half-timbered city center, for the latest installment of these massively popular banquets géants organized by events company Le Canon Français.

For an €81 (£70) ticket, guests get a four-course menu of regional Alsatian specialties, unlimited local wine, and hours of collective sing-along camaraderie. Many male attendees adopt an unofficial uniform of berets and braces, while some women wear traditional local dress. Platters of charcuterie and choucroute are followed by regional cheeses and the iconic kougelhopf pudding, and between courses, crowds pause to belt out mid-20th century French classics from artists like Michel Delpech and Joe Dassin – songs that younger attendees in their 20s and 30s know by heart.

But what started as a post-pandemic revival of communal dining has drawn fierce condemnation from France’s radical left party La France Insoumise (LFI), which claims the events have a hidden far-right agenda. LFI points to multiple red flags: documented allegations of racist chanting, insults directed at immigrant staff, and a menu centered heavily on pork, which the party argues is intentionally designed to exclude Muslim diners and vegetarians.

Most notably, LFI highlights the financial backing of Pierre-Edouard Stérin, a billionaire ultra-conservative entrepreneur who made his fortune in the experience gift voucher sector. Stérin funds a prominent right-wing think tank that pushes an agenda of cutting immigration, rolling back abortion rights, and promoting France’s Christian heritage. Emma Fourreau, an LFI Member of the European Parliament, argues the involvement of Stérin is no coincidence. “If they were acting in good faith, Le Canon Français would never have accepted Stérin as an investor,” Fourreau explained. “That is because they share the same political ecosystem, whose aim is to bring the far right to power.” LFI calls the events a backward-looking caricature that does not reflect modern France’s diverse identity, and has successfully lobbied local authorities to cancel one planned banquet in the Brittany town of Quimper. French police have also opened a preliminary investigation into allegations of racial provocation at an April banquet held in Caen.

Organizers and attendees reject these claims out of hand, dismissing the controversy as a politically motivated overreaction ahead of next year’s national elections. Le Canon Français was founded during the COVID-19 pandemic by two young entrepreneurs, Pierre-Alexandre de Boisse and Géraud de la Tour, who first began selling wine online to support a struggling vintner friend before expanding to small fundraisers for French heritage projects. The massive banquets, de Boisse argues, are just a revival of a centuries-old French tradition of communal popular feasts that once existed in every village across the country.

“Nowadays people waste so much of their time alone, in their homes, on social media. They’ve lost the habit of being together and talking. What gives us the most pleasure is when we see the lawyer sitting next to the baker, chatting away,” de Boisse said. He denies all allegations of exclusion or extremist ties, noting the events have a publicly posted code of conduct all attendees agree to when purchasing tickets. He refutes claims the menu exclusively serves pork, and calls allegations of Nazi salutes at events completely unfounded. De Boisse also says he has never even met Stérin, who purchased a 30% minority stake purely because the events are profitable. While he acknowledges most attendees lean conservative, matching shifting voting patterns in rural France, he argues the events are focused solely on food and community, not political organizing.

Attendees echoed this sentiment during the Colmar event. Many told the BBC they came for the food, drink, atmosphere, and chance to connect with friends, and none interviewed supported LFI’s claims of political ulterior motives. “None of this was an issue, but then Stérin became a shareholder and that gave the LFI an excuse to attack. Don’t forget there are elections next year,” said Quentin, an attendee from Besançon. On the ground in Colmar, the BBC observed no offensive language or behavior, and noted the crowd, while predominantly white, was not exclusively homogeneous. For organizers, the controversy has only amplified calls for left-wing politicians to step back. “I create jobs, I create happiness for the people who come to the banquets,” de Boisse said. “Why can’t they just leave us alone?”

As Armenia prepares for its critical parliamentary election on June 7, the small South Caucasus nation of 3 million people finds itself caught in a sharp geopolitical standoff between Moscow and the Western bloc. At the center of the contest is incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who is seeking re-election on a platform of deeper European integration, a policy that has drawn escalating economic pressure from Russia, Armenia’s longstanding largest trading partner.

Pashinyan’s shift toward the West has defined his tenure since he rose to power in the 2018 revolution. Over his time in office, he has overseen a steady reorientation of Armenia’s foreign policy: passing legislation to launch the EU accession process, advancing a US-brokered peace deal with neighboring Azerbaijan that earned him an endorsement from former US President Donald Trump, and hosting a high-profile summit of EU leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Yerevan earlier this year. But his policy concessions to Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region have become his biggest domestic liability.

The mountainous enclave, once home to 120,000 ethnic Armenians, was seized by Azerbaijani forces in 2023. Pashinyan’s willingness to cede control of the region and his refusal to push aggressively for the release of detained former Nagorno-Karabakh leaders has left a deep rift in Armenian politics. Recent polling shows public opinion on the peace deal is deeply split, with 44% supporting the agreement and 41% opposing it. Pashinyan’s approval rating has plummeted from 54% in 2021 to roughly 30% today, opening the door for a fragmented but formidable opposition.

The opposition bloc is led by two former Armenian presidents, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, both fixtures of the pre-2018 political order that maintained close alignment with Moscow. Their core platform calls for a full restoration of deep military and economic ties with Russia, framed as the only guarantee of Armenia’s national security. Pashinyan’s most high-profile challenger is Russian-based billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who is currently under house arrest on charges of plotting to overthrow the government and is running his campaign through his nephew.

Latest polling from the International Republican Institute puts Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party ahead with 32% of the vote, while nearly 40% of registered voters report trusting no political candidate at all. While the combined opposition could match Pashinyan’s support if unified, their fragmented structure leaves them unlikely to defeat the incumbent on election day.

Looming largest over the vote is direct interference from the Kremlin. In the lead-up to June 7, Russian President Vladimir Putin has explicitly warned Armenia of the economic consequences of moving closer to the West, drawing a parallel to the crisis in Ukraine that he linked to EU accession efforts. Those warnings have been followed by tangible trade measures: in the two weeks before the election, Russia banned imports of key Armenian exports including flowers, cognac, mineral water, and fresh produce.

Russia remains Armenia’s top trading partner, accounting for 36% of the country’s total foreign trade in 2025. Haykaz Fanyan, a senior analyst at the Armenian Centre for Socio-Economic Studies, confirmed that Moscow’s actions are a deliberate attempt to sway the election outcome. “The only way Russia can impact Armenia now is economic,” Fanyan explained, noting that Armenia has already dramatically reduced its dependence on Russian military equipment, with 95% of recent military imports coming from India, France, China and other partners. Still, economic leverage remains a powerful weapon for the Kremlin: Russia supplies Armenia with natural gas at $177.50 per 1,000 cubic meters, far below the European market price of more than $600 that Pashinyan would face if ties with Moscow break down completely.

Putin has also publicly pressured Pashinyan to hold a national referendum on whether Armenia should leave the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) — a customs bloc that delivers significant economic benefits to the country — to pursue EU membership. Pashinyan has avoided the challenge, noting that Armenia has not yet secured EU candidate status and full membership remains a distant long-term goal. “We will continue to work within the EAEU until the choice between its current membership and the EU becomes unavoidable,” he said, framing the current referendum call as purely theoretical.

The EU has not remained on the sidelines in the face of Russian pressure. Shortly before the election, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pledged €50 million in new support for Armenia, explicitly accusing Moscow of “weaponising economic relations for political pressure” and announcing that the EU would ease trade barriers for the Armenian goods targeted by Russian import bans.

Pashinyan has centered his campaign around the slogan “Stand for Peace!”, but the election cycle has been marked by bitter domestic confrontation, most notably between the prime minister and displaced ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. One high-profile incident saw Pashinyan use offensive language against civil activist Artur Osipyan, who was subsequently arrested on charges of obstructing the campaign and launched a hunger strike in protest. Opposition figures have accused Pashinyan of increasingly authoritarian tactics, including misusing state resources to pressure civil servants into attending his rallies and spreading a climate of fear among voters. “I cannot remember any campaign as tense as this one,” said Artur Khachatryan, an opposition MP from the Armenia Alliance.

For Pashinyan, the campaign rests on his vision of a “Real Armenia”: a country at peace with Azerbaijan, integrated into European institutions, and free from the corruption and authoritarianism that marked the pre-2018 order. While his support has fallen sharply, many voters still see him as the only alternative to a return to the old Kremlin-aligned system. For ordinary Armenian voters heading to the polls, the core question transcends simple geopolitical framing: are they willing to bear the immediate economic costs of Pashinyan’s pro-Western shift, costs that Russia has deliberately amplified, for a European future that remains years or decades away? On June 7, Armenian voters will deliver their answer.

A deadly stabbing case in southern Britain has sparked a sharp diplomatic and political clash after a top United States official inserted inflammatory rhetoric into the domestic tragedy, drawing public rebuke from 10 Downing Street.

The tragedy dates back to December, when 18-year-old university student Henry Nowak was stabbed to death in Southampton by 23-year-old Vickrum Digwa. Digwa, who used an 8-inch (21-centimeter) Sikh dagger in the attack, falsely told responding police officers that Nowak — a white British man — had carried out a racist assault against him. In a tragic procedural misstep, officers initially treated the fatally wounded Nowak as a suspect before recognizing his critical injury and attempting emergency resuscitation. This week, Digwa, a British Sikh, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 21 years.

Despite the fact that both the victim and perpetrator are British citizens, anti-immigration and far-right groups in the UK have seized on the case to advance their divisive political agenda. Last week, a demonstration organized around the killing that drew far-right figures turned violent, with protesters pelting Southampton police officers with chairs, metal cans, rocks and flares.

The conflict escalated this week when U.S. Vice President JD Vance weighed in with incendiary comments on social platform X. Vance called for “righteous anger” over Nowak’s murder, and baselessly linked the killing to what he called a “mass invasion of migrants, many of whom despise the West and the people who love it.” The U.S. State Department doubled down on the divisive framing a day earlier, echoing unsubstantiated far-right claims of “two-tier” policing in the UK — an assertion that the justice system intentionally discriminates against white people — and framing the case as a “glaring symptom of civilizational decline.”

In a formal public statement released Friday, Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s office firmly condemned Vance’s remarks, accusing the U.S. vice president of attempting to interfere in British democratic processes and stoke sectarian division on UK streets. “The Nowak family are grieving after Henry’s horrific murder. They have said they do not want his death to be used to create further division, hatred or tension. We should be respecting their wishes,” the Downing Street statement read. “Our politics should bring people together even in the most terrible of circumstances. That is who we are as a country.”

Ed Davey, leader of the UK’s centrist opposition Liberal Democrats, joined the condemnation, arguing that all British leaders must reject efforts to politicize Nowak’s death for partisan gain, regardless of whether those attempts come from U.S. Make America Great Again-aligned politicians like Vance or their far-right allies in the UK. Hard-right UK figures including Reform UK leader Nigel Farage have already amplified the unsubstantiated “two-tier policing” claim, which British officials note has no backing in national crime or policing statistics.

The victim’s own family has repeatedly pushed back against attempts to co-opt the tragedy for political gain. Mark Nowak, Henry’s father, has emphasized that the killing is not a story about racism or religious division, echoing the family’s wish that his son’s death be used to push for safer public spaces rather than fuel more hatred and societal rift. Currently, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, the UK’s independent watchdog for police misconduct, is conducting a formal investigation into the initial response by Southampton officers to the stabbing.