标签： Asia

In a dramatic late-Tuesday announcement on his Truth Social platform, former and current U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed he has authorized a two-week suspension of all U.S. bombing raids and offensive military operations against Iran, framing the move as a bilateral ceasefire that hinges on Tehran reopening the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz to global maritime traffic. The pivot away from imminent large-scale conflict came directly after a last-minute diplomatic appeal from Pakistan’s top leadership, which had stepped in as a neutral mediator between the two adversarial nations.

Trump detailed that the decision to hold off on a planned major offensive, which he had threatened would destroy Iran’s “whole civilization” by the 8 p.m. EST deadline earlier that day, came out of consultations with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir. “Based on conversations with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir, of Pakistan, and wherein they requested that I hold off the destructive force being sent tonight to Iran, and subject to the Islamic Republic of Iran agreeing to the COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz, I agree to suspend the bombing and attack of Iran for a period of two weeks. This will be a double-sided CEASEFIRE,” Trump wrote in his post.

The U.S. leader added that the bulk of outstanding disputes between Washington and Tehran have already been resolved, noting that a 10-point peace proposal submitted by Iran serves as a viable foundation for formal negotiations. “The reason for doing so is that we have already met and exceeded all Military objectives, and are very far along with a definitive Agreement concerning Longterm PEACE with Iran, and PEACE in the Middle East. We received a 10 point proposal from Iran, and believe it is a workable basis on which to negotiate,” he added.

Shortly after Trump’s announcement, Iran’s Supreme Security Council confirmed that formal bilateral talks with the U.S. will kick off this Friday in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, with the negotiations scheduled to run for up to 15 days. The Iranian body noted that Tehran shared its 10-point proposal with Washington via Pakistan’s diplomatic channel, and the upcoming discussions will cover core sticking points including unimpeded transit through the Strait of Hormuz, relief for crippling U.S. and international sanctions on Iran, and the full withdrawal of U.S. military forces from regional bases.

In its official statement, the Supreme Security Council framed the outcome as a “historic” victory for Iran in the ongoing conflict, saying the country’s resistance forced the U.S. to accept Tehran’s 10-point framework. The council emphasized that the launch of negotiations does not mark the formal end of hostilities, and laid out key terms of Iran’s proposal: binding guarantees of non-aggression from the U.S. and its allies, permanent full Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, and immediate sanctions relief. The statement also noted that Iranian forces and their allied armed groups have inflicted heavy losses on opposing forces, and urged domestic unity among Iranians as the details of a final agreement are negotiated.

Pakistan’s push for a ceasefire and negotiated settlement came as an 11th-hour intervention, after Trump gave Iran a stark deadline to cede control of the critical waterway, which carries roughly 20% of the world’s total global energy supplies. Just days earlier on Easter Sunday, Trump issued a profane, aggressive threat against Iran on social media, writing: “Open the fucking strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in hell…Praise be to Allah.” He doubled down on that warning Tuesday morning, reiterating that “a whole civilization will die tonight” if Tehran refused to meet his demands. Prior to the ceasefire announcement, multiple independent Iranian media reports confirmed that Israeli forces had launched strikes targeting Iranian steel and petrochemical facilities, amplifying tensions ahead of the deadline.

Before Trump’s announcement, Sharif publicly shared his appeal for a two-week negotiation window on the X social media platform, urging both sides to pause hostilities to give diplomacy a chance to resolve the crisis. “To allow diplomacy to run its course, I earnestly request President Trump to extend the deadline for two weeks,” Sharif wrote, adding that he also called on Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to all commercial traffic during the ceasefire period. “We also urge all warring parties to observe a ceasefire everywhere for two weeks to allow diplomacy to achieve conclusive termination of war, in the interest of long-term peace and stability in the region,” he added. When the Pakistani appeal was first made public, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told AFP that Trump had been briefed on the proposal and a response would be forthcoming.

Earlier on Tuesday, a diplomatic development at the United Nations also shaped the crisis: Russia and China jointly vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution put forward by Bahrain that would have authorized international military action to end Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. Multiple conflicting reports emerged through Tuesday about the status of Pakistan-mediated talks, leading to initial uncertainty in global markets before Trump’s ceasefire announcement. U.S. stock markets traded mixed following the news of the diplomatic breakthrough, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average closing down 0.2% for the day while the Nasdaq Composite posted a small 0.1% gain.

The ongoing six-week conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran in the Middle East has pulled back the curtain on long-simmering energy and security vulnerabilities for Taiwan, with regional and global analysts warning that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities’ overreliance on Washington for defense and energy security has left the island in an increasingly precarious position. This crisis has also amplified growing skepticism among Taiwan’s public and policy experts about the reliability of the United States as a purported “security guarantor” for the island.

Analysts across academic and policy circles consistently trace Taiwan’s current vulnerabilities to the deliberate policy choices of the DPP administration, which has prioritized alignment with external forces and stoked regional tensions over constructive engagement. Experts uniformly argue that the only sustainable path to stable, peaceful development for Taiwan lies in open, consistent communication and cooperation with the Chinese mainland.

The most immediate and visible impact of the Middle East conflict has fallen on Taiwan’s energy sector, a system already structurally weakened by overreliance on imported resources. Official data confirms that more than 96 percent of all energy consumed on the island is sourced from foreign markets, leaving it acutely exposed to any disruption of global supply chains. At an early April press briefing, Ho Chin-tsang, deputy head of Taiwan’s economic department, acknowledged that roughly 34 percent of the island’s oil shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint that has become a major flashpoint amid escalating Middle East tensions. Currently, Taiwan holds approximately 150 days of strategic oil reserves, while liquefied natural gas (LNG) stockpiles can only sustain current consumption levels for around 11 days, with existing supply forecasts projecting stability only through June.

In a belated attempt to reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern energy supplies, the DPP administration has pushed to restructure its import portfolio, targeting a rise in U.S. LNG shipments from 10 percent to 30 percent of total imports, with Australia and Qatar each accounting for an additional 30 percent. Even with these adjustments, Ho admitted that significant uncertainty remains if Middle East tensions are sustained over the long term.

Chen Guiqing, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Taiwan Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, explains that Taiwan’s extreme energy vulnerability is rooted in the DPP’s longstanding ideological opposition to nuclear power, which led to the complete phase-out of all nuclear energy generation on the island. Last May, Taiwan’s leader Lai Ching-te formally declared the island had entered a “nuclear-free” era, a policy shift that forced the island to rapidly expand gas-fired power generation as renewable energy capacity failed to scale quickly enough to fill the resulting supply gap. Today, natural gas accounts for 47.8 percent of Taiwan’s power generation mix, followed by coal at 35.4 percent and renewables at just 13.1 percent, cementing fossil fuels as the backbone of the island’s energy system.

Rising global energy costs triggered by Middle East tensions have already filtered through to industrial and consumer markets on the island. On March 31, Taiwan’s largest oil and gas supplier announced a 41.58 percent increase in natural gas prices for power sector users, including state-run Taiwan Power Company and independent power producers, to offset spiking global commodity costs. Chen warned that even a minor disruption to LNG shipments would cripple power generation across the island, posing catastrophic risks to Taiwan’s economy and the daily livelihoods of its residents.

A separate analysis from global investment bank Morgan Stanley echoed these warnings, noting that any extended disruption to shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz would also cut off access to critical chemical inputs required for Taiwan’s flagship advanced semiconductor manufacturing sector. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) controls more than 90 percent of the global market for cutting-edge chips, and its revenue alone makes up more than 10 percent of Taiwan’s total gross domestic product, meaning a supply disruption would send shockwaves through both the island’s economy and global tech supply chains.

Amid growing public and political pressure, Lai has recently softened his rigid anti-nuclear stance, confirming that authorities are currently evaluating the restart of two idled nuclear power plants. He cited rising electricity demand driven by economic growth and the need to strengthen energy resilience amid a shifting geopolitical landscape, but the reversal has drawn sharp criticism from opposition legislators who decry the move as evidence of a fundamentally flawed long-term energy strategy. A March public opinion poll found that 63.2 percent of Taiwanese respondents already believe the benefits of nuclear power outweigh its risks, a level of public support that has forced the DPP to confront the failure of its core energy policy. Chen notes that any concrete move to restart nuclear facilities would effectively mark the collapse of one of the DPP’s long-held core ideological positions.

Tightening global oil supplies have already begun to disrupt daily life for ordinary Taiwanese residents, with reports of shortages of plastic bags and other petrochemical products, alongside broad price increases for consumer goods. At an April 1 press conference, Zhang Han, spokeswoman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, dismissed the DPP’s claims of secure energy supplies as nothing more than “self-comfort” and “misleading reassurance.” She criticized the DPP authorities for lacking both the willingness and capacity to address pressing livelihood challenges, accusing them of systematically evading responsibility for the island’s current crisis.

As energy resilience comes under growing public scrutiny amid rising geopolitical instability, the Lai administration has doubled down on its push to expand what it calls “defense resilience,” prioritizing massive arms purchases from the United States. A special $40 billion defense budget proposed by Lai in November 2025 remains stalled in Taiwan’s legislative yuan, with opposition parties raising widespread concerns over a lack of transparency in spending allocations. The budget is specifically earmarked for U.S. arms purchases, including development of the controversial T-Dome air defense system.

However, the conflict in the Middle East has amplified longstanding concerns over the reliability and timeliness of U.S. arms deliveries, as Washington already faces a backlog of more than $20 billion in undelivered weapons to Taiwan due to limited U.S. domestic production capacity, a constraint that has been further tightened by U.S. military support for Israel amid the current conflict. Lu De-yun, a former senior official at Taiwan’s defense department, recently noted in a public online forum that U.S. weapons systems included in the proposed procurement plan, such as the Patriot missile defense system and the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, have demonstrated limited effectiveness in recent Middle East combat operations. He labeled the planned purchases a misguided investment that would do little to actually improve Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, instead wasting the island’s limited financial resources.

The underperformance of U.S. defense systems in the current conflict has also drawn widespread attention from Taiwanese media. Reports have highlighted high-profile failures, including Patriot systems failing to intercept Iranian missiles, the destruction of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) radar system, and the downing of multiple U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones. The penetration of Israel’s Iron Dome defense system by Iranian missiles has also sparked intense public debate on the island over the value of the proposed T-Dome system, which is modeled on the Israeli technology.

While Lai has pushed to increase Taiwan’s defense budget to 3.32 percent of GDP, with a stated goal of reaching the 5 percent benchmark set by NATO by 2030, independent experts uniformly reject the idea that reliance on U.S. military support can deliver long-term peace and security for the island. Chen argues that the so-called U.S. security commitment to the Taiwan Strait is nothing more than a “one-sided illusion” held by a small group of separatist figures who rely on external interference to advance their political agenda. “No amount of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will alter the current military balance across the Taiwan Strait,” Chen explained, adding that these purchases only drain the hard-earned financial resources of Taiwan’s people and can never deliver genuine security for the island.

Prominent U.S. economist Jeffrey Sachs reinforced this assessment during a recent interview with Taiwanese broadcaster CTITV, arguing that viewing the United States as Taiwan’s security guarantor is a dangerous mistake, and urged the Taiwanese public to reevaluate whether U.S. arms sales can truly deliver meaningful protection. “Taiwan’s security ultimately lies in peace, understanding and dialogue with the Chinese mainland,” Sachs said. “The U.S. is not a source of security; it is a magnet for war.”

Despite widespread criticism from both domestic and international experts, Lai has continued to prioritize military buildup and frame his policy as “pursuing peace through strength,” while repeatedly emphasizing what the DPP frames as a “threat from the Chinese mainland.” Last week, four sitting U.S. senators visited Taiwan and publicly urged the island’s legislature to approve the special $40 billion defense budget. On March 26, Raymond Greene, head of the American Institute in Taiwan, the U.S.’s de facto diplomatic mission on the island, reaffirmed that Washington would continue to support Taiwan’s efforts to acquire what it calls critical defense capabilities, according to reporting from Reuters.

Zhang Han, the Taiwan Affairs Office spokeswoman, countered that the Lai administration has deliberately whitewashed what she describes as blatant exploitation by external forces, misleading Taiwanese public opinion and willingly acting as a “cash machine” for U.S. arms dealers. The Chinese mainland has consistently attributed rising cross-Strait tensions to the DPP authorities’ pursuit of a separatist political agenda and overreliance on external interference, labeling Lai Ching-te a “troublemaker” and a “warmonger.” On March 26, Jiang Bin, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of National Defense, confirmed that the Chinese mainland will continue to strengthen combat readiness and use all necessary capabilities and measures to resolutely oppose “Taiwan independence” separatist forces and external interference in cross-Strait affairs.

Growing disillusionment with U.S. reliability among Taiwan’s public is already visible in opinion polling. A January 2026 poll conducted by Taiwan’s Academia Sinica found that only 34 percent of respondents view the United States as a trustworthy partner, a sharp 11 percentage point drop from 45 percent in 2021. Recent trade policy actions have further eroded trust: after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a prior reciprocal tariff arrangement, Taiwan had pledged $500 billion in investment to secure a reduction in U.S. tariffs from 20 percent to 15 percent, only to be subsequently placed under a new Section 301 trade investigation by Washington. Despite this, Lai reaffirmed at a late March event that the U.S. is now Taiwan’s largest export market and top destination for outbound investment, and that the island will continue to deepen political and economic alignment with Washington.

Chen notes that unconditional political and economic alignment with the United States will only invite greater demands and exploitation from Washington, adding that the only viable path for Taiwan to achieve genuine long-term security and peaceful development is to improve cross-Strait relations based on the 1992 Consensus and the one-China principle. Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at U.S.-based think tank Defense Priorities, has also called on Washington to adopt a nonintervention policy on the Taiwan question and allow cross-Strait issues to be resolved peacefully by people on both sides of the Strait. Ahead of a six-day visit to the Chinese mainland that began April 7, Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang party, said both sides of the Strait can build peaceful, stable cross-Strait relations through dialogue and people-to-people exchanges, a step that would contribute to both regional stability and global peace.

The global ripple effects of the United States and Israel’s joint military campaign against Iran have extended across continents, reaching deep into Asian geopolitics – and nowhere is this indirect influence more consequential than for Taiwan’s security amid ongoing cross-Strait tensions with mainland China. This analysis explores two core, interconnected questions that sit at the center of regional security calculations: first, how the Iran conflict alters perceptions of U.S. willingness to intervene militarily to defend Taiwan, and second, how it shifts Beijing’s calculus of whether to launch an invasion of the island.

Critics of the U.S. campaign against Iran have raised a host of objections: they argue the operation was unnecessarily aggressive, that Washington skipped over ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Tehran without cause, that Iran posed no immediate threat justifying a large-scale attack, that U.S. leaders failed to consult allies before moving forward, and that they underestimated Iran’s capacity to sustain retaliatory action even after heavy damage to its conventional military forces. But for Taiwan, the central concern runs in the opposite direction: whether the current U.S. administration is bold enough to commit American troops to the island’s defense, rather than stepping back from a cross-Strait conflict.

For years, many foreign policy observers have framed former President Donald Trump’s approach to global affairs as leaning toward isolationism. Prominent commentators, including Temple University Tokyo campus Professor Robert Dujarric, former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, and The Guardian foreign affairs analyst Simon Tinsdall, have all argued that Trump prioritizes avoiding a major war in Asia over blocking China from annexing Taiwan.

It is true that China would be a far more formidable opponent than Iran, so willingness to engage in large-scale operations in the Middle East does not automatically translate to willingness to fight a great-power conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Even so, the Iran campaign demonstrates that this U.S. administration is willing to rule out the option of deploying large conventional forces in distant conflicts outside of the Western Hemisphere – a key shift that Beijing cannot ignore.

Beijing’s longstanding strategic approach to territorial expansion follows a framework of cautious aggression: it first probes for weakness, only advancing further if it encounters minimal resistance. This aligns with the classic strategic guidance often attributed to early Soviet leaders Josef Stalin and Vladimir Lenin: “If you hit mush, keep going; if you hit steel, pull back.” For a Chinese leadership that relies heavily on gray zone tactics to advance its interests without open war, the pattern of bold actions taken by the Trump administration – from the targeted strike that killed Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani during his first term, to the political intervention in Venezuela, the tightening of Cuba’s oil blockade, the large-scale bombardment of Iran, and even public discussions of seizing Greenland – comes as a striking departure from previous expectations of U.S. restraint.

Given this track record of unilateral, forceful action, it is now effectively impossible for Chinese planners to confidently conclude the U.S. would refuse to militarily intervene to defend Taiwan.

This uncertainty around U.S. intervention leads to the second critical question: how the Iran conflict changes the likelihood that China will choose to launch an invasion of Taiwan.

Some analysts have argued that Washington’s adoption of a “might makes right” approach, visible in its actions against Iran and Venezuela, gives Beijing a green light to pursue its own territorial goals by force against Taiwan. But this argument misses key realities of Chinese strategic planning. Beijing does not tie its policy decisions to a normative standard set by the United States. The Chinese government has long maintained it will use force against Taiwan if its leadership deems it necessary, a threat formalized in the 2005 Anti-Succession Law.

For years, Chinese state propaganda has emphasized the narrative that the U.S. is a declining “paper tiger,” pointing to the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan as proof of American weakness. But the U.S. military’s smooth, successful execution of the complex large-scale operation in Iran, thousands of miles from the American homeland, offers a stark counterpoint. Meanwhile, Chinese-supplied military equipment – particularly air defense systems – performed poorly in both Venezuela and Iran, offering Chinese leadership an unvarnished reminder that the U.S. armed forces remain the most capable in the world.

While Chinese officials and state media publicly condemned the U.S. campaign as illegal and brutal, many independent and state-aligned Chinese analysts openly acknowledged American operational competence. Prominent Chinese foreign affairs scholar Zheng Yongnian concluded the U.S. “still [ranks] number one” in global military power. Analyst Niu Tanqin noted he “cannot but admire” the U.S. military’s performance, and leading international relations scholar Shi Yinhong confirmed that the tactical success of American forces “strongly impressed the leaders [in Beijing].” This clear demonstration of coordinated, advanced military capability carries tangible deterrent weight for Beijing’s Taiwan planning.

At the same time, Chinese observers have also noted that the Iran campaign has diverted U.S. military focus and depleted stockpiles of key weapons that would be used to counter Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. officials have insisted the conflict has not delayed pre-planned weapons deliveries to Taiwan that the island has already purchased, noting that munitions used in Iran are drawn from existing U.S. military stockpiles rather than from production lines allocated for foreign sales. Even so, the U.S. has temporarily reallocated significant military capabilities from Asia to the Middle East for the Iran campaign, including Patriot interceptors, THAAD anti-missile systems, the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, two additional guided-missile destroyers, and two Marine expeditionary units.

U.S. forces have also expended large stockpiles of high-value precision weapons, most notably Tomahawk cruise missiles – a system that would play a critical role in any Indo-Pacific conflict thanks to its long range, powerful warhead, and newly developed anti-ship variant. To date, the U.S. has fired between 850 and 1,000 Tomahawks in the Iran campaign, and replacing the entire stockpile will take two to three years at a cost of roughly $3.5 million per missile. This has led some analysts to speculate that the diversion of forces and depletion of munitions creates a new window of opportunity for China to attack Taiwan, arguing that U.S. military stockpiles were already stretched thin before the Iran conflict, and China could now count on U.S. forces running out of critical munitions far more quickly in a cross-Strait war.

This window-of-opportunity argument holds weight only if one accepts the premise that Chinese leader Xi Jinping has already decided to forcibly annex Taiwan as soon as the odds of success appear favorable. But that premise fails to account for the massive risks and downsides that a full-scale invasion would pose for China’s leadership.

In any invasion scenario, China would have to plan for a coordinated defensive response from Taiwanese, U.S., and Japanese forces. Even as the U.S. draws down its precision munition stockpiles, Taiwan is on track to assemble what it calls “the world’s highest density of anti-ship missiles” by the end of 2026. Japan has also begun mass production of its new Type 25 anti-ship cruise missile – a system with range covering the entire Taiwan Strait – and began deploying the weapon in March 2026.

A Chinese victory is far from guaranteed, and even a limited victory would likely be pyrrhic. The U.S. Navy would almost certainly interdict China’s seaborne energy imports, and a full-scale war in the Taiwan Strait would halt commercial shipping along most of China’s eastern coast for weeks or months. The resulting economic turmoil could trigger widespread social and political unrest within mainland China, and Beijing would face a generations-long challenge to pacify and govern a hostile Taiwanese population.

Beyond these immediate military and economic risks, Beijing has no pressing need to resort to force against Taiwan in the near term. Chinese strategic thinking holds that U.S. comprehensive power is in gradual decline, while China continues to advance in industrial and technological capacity. Over time, this shift improves Beijing’s relative position, increasing the likelihood that Washington will eventually choose to step back from competition for strategic leadership in East Asia on its own.

Domestically, Xi is still in the midst of a sweeping purge of roughly half of China’s senior military commanders, with a disproportionate share of those removed coming from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force – the service branch that would play a central role in any invasion of Taiwan. This ongoing leadership reshuffle creates significant internal uncertainty that discourages any high-stakes military gambit in the near term.

Politically, Beijing also has reason to wait for a more favorable outcome through peaceful means. Taiwan’s main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) accepts Beijing’s core position that Taiwan is part of a single China, and Beijing holds out hope that the KMT will regain control of Taiwan’s presidency in the 2028 election. Recent political developments have bolstered these hopes: KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s high-profile visit to mainland China in April 2025 underscored the party’s willingness to engage with Beijing, and the KMT holds a legislative majority in coalition with the Taiwan People’s Party. Incumbent President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has struggled with low approval ratings – his ratings were negative for most of 2025 and hover around 50 percent in 2026 – and the KMT successfully defeated a 2025 DPP recall campaign that attempted to remove 31 KMT legislators, with all 31 retaining their seats. While it remains far from certain that the KMT will win the presidency in 2028 and implement a more Beijing-friendly cross-Strait policy, current trends give Beijing ample reason to wait and watch rather than rush to war.

Diplomatically, Beijing also has incentives to avoid conflict this year. Trump and Xi are scheduled to hold two formal summits in 2026, and Beijing is eager to stabilize bilateral economic relations, which are currently under a temporary truce after a years-long trade war that saw the U.S. impose steep tariffs on Chinese imports and China threaten to restrict rare earth exports to the U.S. A sudden invasion of Taiwan would derail this economic stabilization effort. Additionally, Beijing will have the opportunity during the summits to push for limited U.S. concessions on Washington’s support for Taipei; the U.S. has already agreed to delay the announcement of a major new arms sale to Taiwan until after Trump’s first May 2026 meeting with Xi, creating an opening for Beijing to secure a limited political win without resorting to force.

Finally, the Iran conflict has drawn new attention to underrecognized vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s energy security: the island relies on seaborne imports for more than 95 percent of its oil and liquid natural gas (LNG), with LNG accounting for roughly half of Taiwan’s electricity generation. Taiwan’s strategic LNG reserve only covers 8 to 11 days of demand, and while its 100-day oil reserve is more robust, the island remains highly exposed to any disruption of maritime supply routes. Addressing these energy vulnerabilities, along with hardening Taiwan’s western coastline with mobile, survivable anti-ship and anti-air missile batteries, should be a top priority for Taipei’s security planners.

Even with these new challenges highlighted by the Iran conflict, the campaign does not create immediate additional risk of an invasion for Taiwan. Despite the depletion of U.S. precision munitions and the diversion of some regional forces to the Middle East, Beijing faces a host of compelling domestic, political, and strategic incentives to hold off from launching a high-risk invasion attempt for the foreseeable future.