标签: Asia

亚洲

  • Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong’s first post-colonial leader, dies at age 89

    Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong’s first post-colonial leader, dies at age 89

    Tung Chee-hwa, the shipping magnate who made history as Hong Kong’s first chief executive after the territory’s 1997 handover from British to Chinese rule, has passed away at the age of 89. In an official statement released this week, his office confirmed that Tung died peacefully on Tuesday, surrounded by his immediate family.

    Before taking the top post in Hong Kong’s new post-colonial government, Tung had virtually no formal political experience. A pro-Beijing panel of local elites selected him for the role ahead of the handover, a choice widely attributed to Beijing’s perception of him as a trusted loyalist who would align with the central government’s directives. His ties to Beijing ran deep: in the 1980s, state-owned Chinese banks stepped in to bail out his family’s struggling shipping firm, Orient Overseas Container Line, during a global industry downturn.

    The early years of Hong Kong’s handover were an unprecedented, sensitive period. The framework of “one country, two systems” — which guaranteed the territory would retain its existing civil liberties and separate governing systems for 50 years, while Beijing reserved authority over constitutional change and foreign affairs — had never been put to the test when Tung took office.

    While Tung earned praise for his relentless work ethic, earning him the affectionate nickname “7-11” for his habit of working 12-hour, seven-days-a-week schedules, his tenure was marked by repeated crises that eroded public support. His awkward political handling and perceived indecision during emergencies turned public opinion against him, and a less flattering, mocking nickname, “Old Dumb Tung,” began to circulate among residents.

    Within months of assuming office in 1997, two major crises struck. Hong Kong reported the world’s first documented human cases of H5N1 avian influenza, followed quickly by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that sent the territory’s economy into a deep recession. Tung’s administration drew widespread criticism for its response to both crises, and his well-documented distrust of the media left him unable to rebuild public trust or rehabilitate his image. Frequent policy missteps also turned him into a common target of public jokes and satire.

    Despite the deep unpopularity of his first term, Tung was re-elected unopposed in 2002 by a pro-Beijing electoral committee, the only body tasked with selecting the chief executive at the time. In 2003, he faced an even greater challenge when the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak hit Hong Kong, killing nearly 300 people and bringing the city’s already fragile economy to a near-standstill. His government was widely accused of a slow, disorganized response that worsened the outbreak’s impact.

    Later that same year, Tung sparked mass public anger when his administration introduced draft national anti-subversion legislation, known locally as Article 23. Critics argued the bill would erode Hong Kong’s core civil liberties guaranteed under the handover framework, prompting an estimated 500,000 Hong Kong residents to join a mass street protest against the legislation. The bill was eventually shelved in the wake of the public backlash.

    In 2004, another large-scale pro-democracy rally was held to demand full universal suffrage for the selection of the chief executive and the entire Legislative Council. Tung aligned firmly with Beijing’s Communist leadership, which rejected the demand, and the rally became an annual tradition for pro-democracy activists for more than a decade. Political analysts widely view these mass demonstrations as a signal to Beijing that Tung had lost traction with the Hong Kong public and was no longer able to maintain political stability in the territory.

    In March 2005, Tung announced his resignation from the post of chief executive, insisting that declining health was the sole reason for his departure, rather than pressure from Beijing. “If I continue as chief executive, I won’t be able to handle it,” he stated at the time. Many observers and residents remained skeptical of the explanation, as no obvious serious health issues had been reported in the months leading up to his resignation.

    Born in 1937, Tung’s early life traced the trajectory of many prominent Hong Kong families. His family moved from Shanghai to Hong Kong in 1947, two years before the founding of the People’s Republic of China. He earned a bachelor’s degree in marine engineering from the University of Liverpool in the United Kingdom in 1960, then worked for General Electric in the United States and gained experience in his family’s shipping business before returning to Hong Kong permanently in 1969.

    After stepping down as chief executive, Tung founded a pro-Beijing think tank in Hong Kong and remained a vocal loyalist to the central government through all major political turning points, including the massive 2019 pro-democracy protests and the subsequent national security crackdown. During the height of the 2019 protests, Tung was among 42 public figures awarded national medals and honors by Chinese President Xi Jinping at a Beijing ceremony, recognized for his contributions to advancing the implementation of the “one country, two systems” policy.

    Following the passage of Beijing’s national security law for Hong Kong in 2020, the large-scale pro-democracy protests that defined much of Tung’s tenure were eliminated from the city’s public sphere. Earlier this year, Hong Kong’s current government finally passed the long-delayed Article 23 anti-subversion legislation first proposed during Tung’s tenure. Tung had not appeared at any public events in Hong Kong or mainland China for several years before his death.

  • Qatar and Pakistan carry Trump’s message to Iran: He won’t return to the MoU

    Qatar and Pakistan carry Trump’s message to Iran: He won’t return to the MoU

    As regional tensions reignite and the United States has reimposed its naval blockade on Iranian ports, a fresh diplomatic crisis has unfolded across the Middle East, rooted in the collapse of a fragile ceasefire agreement between Washington and Tehran. On August 24, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir traveled to the Iranian capital to carry a high-stakes message from US President Donald Trump, just hours after the Trump administration launched a sweeping new campaign of economic pressure against Iran.

    In Washington that same day, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent introduced what he called a “D-Day” economic pressure initiative, issuing a stark warning to any sovereign state that continues to maintain commercial trade with Tehran: those countries will face harsh secondary sanctions for violating Washington’s restrictions.

    During his visit to Tehran, Munir held closed-door talks with top Iranian leadership, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and newly appointed Supreme National Security Council Secretary General Mohsen Rezaei. According to two anonymous sources with direct ties to the Iranian government, Munir delivered one clear, uncompromising message from Trump: the US will not honor the June 17 Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding.

    That original MoU was designed to create a foundational framework to end months of open conflict between the two nations and reopen the strategic Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for 20% of the world’s daily oil shipments. It was also meant to set the stage for more comprehensive negotiations down the line, even though it intentionally left several divisive core issues unresolved to get the ceasefire over the line.

    A conservative source familiar with US negotiating positions confirms that Trump is pushing for an entirely new agreement, rather than moving forward with the existing MoU. For Iran, however, the original deal delivers substantial, non-negotiable benefits, according to an anonymous Tehran-based political analyst. These benefits include a critical oil waiver that lets Tehran access its oil sales revenues directly in US dollars, a full end to active conflict across all regional fronts including Lebanon, and the most consequential win for Iran: formal US recognition of its sovereign authority over the Strait of Hormuz.

    The analyst explains that Trump has faced growing pressure from hardline opponents inside Washington, particularly neoconservative factions and allies of Israel, who have waged a public campaign accusing the president of “surrendering” to Iranian demands. Over the course of the summer, the US military unilaterally established a new commercial shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz, opening a southern channel for tankers along the Omani coast. The analyst says this unilateral move was calculated to undermine the existing MoU, which Tehran views as a clear violation of the agreement’s terms, in order to provoke an Iranian response that would give Trump a pretext to withdraw from the deal entirely.

    Over the past six months, the conflict has followed a frustrating pattern: long stretches of relative calm punctuated by sudden, unpredictable outbreaks of sporadic fighting. The battle for control of the Strait of Hormuz flared up again just last week, with Iranian forces and the US military exchanging retaliatory strikes on commercial and military vessels over the weekend. By the start of this week, commercial shipping traffic through the strait slowed dramatically, after Tehran issued new threats to retaliate against any additional US attacks.

    The unraveling of the 2026 MoU actually began in early July, when bitter disputes emerged over implementation, particularly centering on the terms for reopening the strait. After Iran targeted vessels transiting through the waterway in response to Washington’s unilateral corridor establishment, the US revoked key oil export sanctions relief on July 7, effectively eliminating the single most important economic concession the agreement granted Iran. The two sides have also clashed repeatedly over Iran’s legal authority to regulate maritime traffic through the strait, as well as the timeline and scope of lifting the US naval blockade.

    Just three days after Munir’s August 24 visit to Tehran, senior Qatari officials led by the Qatari Prime Minister traveled to Iran, and they too conveyed Trump’s refusal to reaffirm the original MoU. According to regional sources, Iranian officials made their position clear to both the Pakistani delegation and the Qatari envoys: Tehran will only accept the existing MoU, and no alternative arrangement. At present, both Oman and Qatar, two key regional mediators that have helped facilitate talks between Iran and the US for years, are continuing diplomatic efforts to break the current deadlock, including exploring a revised version of the original MoU that could address some US concerns.

    On September 6, a second unannounced Qatari delegation arrived in Tehran, led by influential minister without portfolio Ali Al Thawadi, a veteran backchannel negotiator who is widely credited with bringing Iran and the US to the original June agreement in the first place. Sources confirm that Thawadi delivered Trump’s formal response to Iran’s repeated commitment to the original MoU, with the US president once again reiterating that Washington will not return to the existing agreement. For its part, Iran once again reaffirmed its position to the Qatari delegation: it will not abandon the MoU, nor will it enter negotiations for an entirely new deal, leaving the region in a tense diplomatic standoff.

  • Singapore man pleads guilty to orchestrating $240 million bitcoin theft from DC resident

    Singapore man pleads guilty to orchestrating $240 million bitcoin theft from DC resident

    WASHINGTON — In a landmark step forward for one of the most substantial cryptocurrency theft investigations in U.S. history, a 22-year-old Singaporean national has admitted to orchestrating a brazen scheme that stole nearly a quarter-billion dollars worth of bitcoin from a Washington, D.C., resident before blowing the laundered funds on an extravagant month-long spending spree.

    Malone Lam, an eighth-grade dropout who relocated to the United States from Singapore, entered a guilty plea on Tuesday to a single federal count of racketeering conspiracy. The charge carries a maximum possible penalty of 20 years in federal prison, though U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly has not yet set a date for his sentencing hearing in the District of Columbia.

    Prosecutors outline that Lam served as a key organizer for a transnational network of young criminals that launched a series of coordinated cryptocurrency fraud schemes beginning in 2023. His case is part of a larger investigation that has brought charges against 18 total defendants, with Lam marking the 11th person to change their plea to guilty. Legal observers note that his conviction represents a critical breakthrough for the U.S. Department of Justice’s multi-year probe into large-scale digital asset theft.

    The brazen heist that sits at the center of the case unfolded in August 2024. According to prosecution filings, Lam and his co-conspirators leveraged common “social engineering” tactics to trick the unidentified Washington-based victim into turning over access to his digital assets. Two of the group’s members posed as trusted representatives from Google and major cryptocurrency platform Gemini to gain the victim’s confidence. The ruse worked, convincing the man to grant the scammers access to his Google Drive account and share critical two-factor authentication security codes. With that access, Lam was able to siphon more than 4,100 bitcoin from the victim’s wallet, a haul valued at more than $245 million at the time of the theft.

    Once the digital assets were stolen, Lam took point on coordinating money laundering efforts to convert the illicit crypto into untraceable cash, authorities say. Instead of hiding the funds, he and his co-conspirators embarked on a lavish, unchecked spending spree that grabbed national attention.

    Federal investigators from the FBI document that Lam splurged the stolen funds on a fleet of high-end luxury sports cars, short-term rentals of multi-million dollar mansions in Miami, Florida, and exorbitant nights out at elite nightclubs across the country. One single evening at a Los Angeles nightclub cost the group more than $569,000, according to court records. Lam’s personal purchases included a single luxury watch valued at $2 million and more than 30 high-performance vehicles, including custom-built Porsches, Lamborghinis, and Ferraris. During his plea hearing, when Judge Kollar-Kotelly asked Lam to confirm which of the dozens of vehicles he had purchased personally, he acknowledged he could not immediately list them. “I would need some time,” he told the court.

    The month-long spending spree came to an abrupt end when FBI agents moved to arrest Lam in Miami. Court documents reveal that an off-duty law enforcement officer tipped Lam off that authorities were en route to take him into custody, though the warning did not allow him to evade arrest. Even after being detained, Lam’s reaction to his capture, captured in a recorded jailhouse call shared in the indictment, highlighted the surreal nature of his scheme and downfall. “We always talked about what it would be like if I were to go down, but never thought it would be this crazy,” Lam told a contact during the call.

    The case remains ongoing, with seven other defendants still awaiting trial or resolution of their charges in the sprawling conspiracy case.

  • Under siege: Iran faces strategic dilemma as war of attrition drags on

    Under siege: Iran faces strategic dilemma as war of attrition drags on

    Tensions between Iran and the United States have slid into a new, limited but deeply dangerous phase of confrontation, with mounting military and economic pressure leaving Tehran caught between two high-stakes options: ramp up hostilities, or pursue a rapidly narrowing path to a negotiated resolution.

    The latest cycle of escalation was sparked by a U.S. strike on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in southern Iran, per Iranian accounts. In the aftermath of the attack, U.S. officials claimed they had intelligence indicating Iranian forces planned to deploy mine-laden rockets in the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical global energy chokepoint through which nearly a fifth of global oil supplies pass daily. Iran retaliated quickly, launching missile strikes against U.S. military bases hosted by the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain.

    This military uptick comes on top of weeks of a de facto U.S. naval and economic siege on Iran’s ports, adding crippling new pressure to an Iranian economy that was already teetering long before the latest crisis erupted. The Iranian rial has plummeted in value, now trading at roughly 2.2 million rials to the U.S. dollar, down from around 1.8 million before the siege began. So far, the government has managed to avoid the widespread shortages of essential goods that could spark a full-blown domestic crisis, but one growing vulnerability has become impossible to ignore: gasoline.

    Iran is struggling to secure consistent, adequate gasoline supplies as domestic consumption rises and foreign supply chains grow increasingly unreliable. The government has publicly called on citizens to cut back on fuel use, and reports indicate it is weighing a steep increase in domestic gasoline prices to curb demand. Compounding this challenge is disruption tied to the war in Ukraine: Russia has long been a key potential supplier of refined petroleum products to Iran, but repeated Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have drastically reduced Moscow’s capacity to export gasoline to Tehran.

    The combination of cross-border military tensions, crippling U.S. sanctions, disrupted trade routes, and rising domestic consumption has created an intractable policy dilemma for Iran’s leadership. While Tehran has so far kept basic economic functions running, maintaining that level of stability is becoming exponentially more costly. This strain has intensified a fierce internal debate over how to respond to the ongoing confrontation with the U.S.

    Among Iran’s conservative factions, a growing consensus argues that absorbing endless pressure from Washington cannot resolve the standoff. Instead, these voices argue the U.S. strike gives Iran justification to impose far steeper costs on Washington and its regional allies in the Gulf. “To break the deadlock, Iran is in a good position since the US attack has given Iran a right to answer disproportionately,” an anonymous conservative political activist told Middle East Eye. “By raising the costs, such as an attack on US allies’ oil and water infrastructure, we can break the siege.” The activist added that regional states helping Washington enforce the pressure campaign, including the UAE, should also face consequences for their cooperation, reflecting a core belief among conservative circles that effective deterrence requires demonstrating that any attempt to weaken Iran will carry severe, unavoidable costs.

    A professor of international relations aligned with the conservative camp went even further, arguing Iran should adopt what he called an “offensive preemptive doctrine.” “In my view, our experience has shown that power can deter power,” he explained. “We carried out a preemptive operation in Jordan, inflicted casualties, and the Americans did not continue. We therefore have no choice but to adopt an offensive preemptive doctrine, both militarily and through intelligence capabilities, to prevent future shocks and interventions like the 12-day and 40-day wars.” The professor added that recent conflicts have shifted Iran’s strategic calculations, with years of military and diplomatic experience leaving Tehran’s foreign policy more sophisticated than ever. He called for actions beyond conventional deterrence, even suggesting Iran should consider conducting its first nuclear test, arguing a demonstrated nuclear capability would give Tehran far stronger deterrence against future U.S. or Israeli intervention. He also framed economic pressure as a legitimate extension of military conflict, saying Iran must impose tangible economic costs on the U.S. to level the playing field.

    These arguments lay bare the central dilemma now facing Tehran. If Iran responds with excessive caution, conservatives warn Washington and its allies will conclude they can impose ongoing military and economic pressure without facing meaningful consequences. But if Tehran escalates too aggressively, it risks turning a limited standoff into a full-scale regional war that would cause catastrophic further damage to Iran’s already fragile economy. A conservative source close to Iran’s core leadership circles described the current moment as a potential “war between wars,” a transitional period where both sides are analyzing past confrontations and preparing for potential future open conflict. He noted the U.S. is pursuing multiple overlapping goals: ratcheting up economic pressure, eroding Iran’s regional influence, conducting periodic targeted strikes, shifting the regional strategic balance, and rebuilding its regional military and intelligence capabilities. “The key question is who benefits from time,” the source observed. From this perspective, Washington is not seeking a single decisive military victory; instead, it aims to hold the strategic initiative, keep Tehran trapped in constant strategic uncertainty, and prevent Iran from rebuilding its military capabilities or initiating escalation on its own terms. Even so, the source acknowledged that no simple solution exists for the standoff: neither negotiations alone nor military action alone can resolve the core disputes between the two sides, requiring Iran to adopt a completely new regional strategy adapted to a Middle East that has been fundamentally transformed in recent years.

    Inside Iran, reformists and government-aligned moderate figures argue the latest escalation should not be used as a pretext for more conflict, but rather as an opening to return to diplomatic negotiations. A reformist analyst who contributes to Iranian media framed the conflict as having entered a cycle of mutual attrition, with the Strait of Hormuz increasingly weaponized as an instrument of economic pressure. He explained that Iran can leverage its geographic control of the strait to impose costs on its adversaries, while Washington uses military pressure to neutralize that geographic advantage – a dynamic that carries severe risks for both parties. “Any prolonged disruption in the Strait could push energy prices higher, increase inflationary pressure and accelerate the economic damage already being inflicted on Iran,” he warned. “The greatest danger is miscalculation: a single incident in the Gulf could push both countries beyond the point where diplomacy remains capable of controlling events.” The analyst noted neither side is capable of securing a decisive outright victory, and without a political off-ramp, both Washington and Tehran risk being trapped in an endless cycle of unresolvable escalation. “If the current trajectory continues, the window for negotiations will soon close, giving way to a decisive confrontation,” he said. “The ultimate winner will not necessarily be the side capable of delivering the most destructive military blow, but the side that can extract a strategic concession while there is still time to prevent the diplomatic window from closing.”

    This view of grinding attrition is shared by other reformist sources close to the Iranian government. In recent days, U.S. drones, missiles, and bombs have struck again in southern Iran, killing civilians and turning a wedding celebration in the town of Kuhestak into a mass funeral, while Iran has retaliated with missile strikes on U.S. bases across the Middle East. One reformist source told MEE the core question for Iran is no longer who can win the next exchange of fire, but how long the confrontation can be sustained and what political outcome can ultimately end the crisis. He noted Washington has sent contradictory signals: simultaneously ramping up pressure to weaken Tehran while claiming military pressure is intended to force Iran back to the negotiating table. The current Iranian government continues to emphasize the possibility of reviving a preliminary understanding reached with Washington in June, demanding the U.S. honor its earlier commitments, while ultra-conservative factions advocate for prolonging conflict and even launching preemptive offensive operations. The result is an increasingly ambiguous standoff, where neither side has the capacity to sustain the current level of confrontation indefinitely. “A dramatic event is therefore likely to change the course of the war,” the source said. “But by its very nature, such an event cannot be predicted; any forecast would be little more than a shot in the dark.” For now, he added, Iran is navigating this constant uncertainty with no clear path forward.

    A university professor of geopolitics aligned with the reformist camp laid out the clearest case against further escalation. He framed the latest round of Iran-U.S. conflict as a clash that ended without a decisive result, forcing both sides to shift their tactics. Washington moved to prioritize economic pressure, a de facto naval blockade, and periodic targeted strikes, while Iran leaned more heavily on its geographic advantage around the Strait of Hormuz to project leverage. But that advantage comes with major costs: “Keeping the Strait closed also hurts Iran’s economy and its main oil partner, China,” he noted. For Tehran, the strategic goal is not to close the strait indefinitely, but to demonstrate that U.S. military superiority does not give Washington unlimited freedom to act in the region. The professor argued the conflict is too deeply entrenched to ever be resolved through military means. “The only viable path is a return to the 14-point memorandum, or a modified version, with simultaneous, verifiable steps and credible external guarantees,” he said. A framework overseen and backed by the United Nations Security Council, he argued, would make it far costlier for either side to unilaterally abandon any eventual agreement.

    Tehran now stands at a crossroads: it can respond to the U.S. siege by escalating, imposing greater costs on the U.S. and its regional allies, and formalizing an openly offensive military doctrine. Or it can use its remaining leverage to pursue a negotiated settlement while the diplomatic window remains open. The harsh reality is that both paths carry substantial, inherent risks. As the geopolitics professor noted, escalation could strengthen Iran’s deterrence posture but would also deepen Tehran’s economic isolation and drastically increase the risk of a full-scale regional war. Negotiations, by contrast, would ease crippling economic pressure but leave the government open to fierce criticism from conservative factions who argue past diplomatic efforts failed to deliver meaningful security guarantees for Iran.

    For Iran, the core question now is whether leadership can turn the current pressure into usable political leverage before economic and military costs become unsustainable, and whether Washington is willing to offer an exit that Iranian leaders can accept without appearing to surrender to U.S. demands. For now, neither side has found that balanced off-ramp, leaving the region in a state of precarious, unpredictable tension.

  • RSF drone strikes shatter sense of optimism in Sudan’s el-Obeid

    RSF drone strikes shatter sense of optimism in Sudan’s el-Obeid

    On the early morning of August 12, a deceptive calm hung over the war-battered Sudanese city of el-Obeid. Children streamed toward school along packed streets, the calls of street vendors selling fresh fruit drowned out the low rumble of idling buses, and workers ducked into tree shade for a quick cup of tea or coffee before starting their workdays. A fragile wave of optimism had spread through the capital of North Kordofan state, rooted in two long-awaited shifts: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had partially broken a months-long siege imposed by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the annual rainy season had arrived, bringing hope of both agricultural relief and a turning point for a population that had endured crippling shortages of food and clean water.

    That fragile calm shattered in minutes. Crowds scattered in panic as residents pointed to the sky, where RSF drones had reappeared, bringing with them a flood of familiar, crippling fear. The thunderous roar of SAF anti-aircraft fire echoed across the city; on-the-ground reporting from Middle East Eye documented at least four drones shot down from the sky, drawing shouts of “Allahu Akbar” from watching bystanders. A young woman was struck and wounded by falling drone debris, and was rushed immediately to a nearby hospital for emergency care.

    This morning drone strike marked the first major RSF response to its recent significant defeat in Bara, a city located roughly 60 kilometers north of el-Obeid, and surrounding nearby towns.

    For el-Obeid, which has stood on the frontline of Sudan’s three-year civil conflict between the SAF and RSF, drone attacks are nothing new. The scars of constant bombardment are visible across every corner of the city: craters pockmark paved roads, vital oil and electricity infrastructure lies in ruins, and hospitals, public markets, and residential neighborhoods have been reduced to bombed-out shells. Yet, for the estimated one million people still calling the city home, the population has refused to surrender to chaos, clinging as tightly as possible to the rhythms of ordinary life.

    “ We adapted ourselves to these RSF attacks on civilians that happen from time to time. We won’t leave this city whatever happens,” Ahmed al-Mardi, a local taxi driver, told Middle East Eye as the drone strikes unfolded around him that August morning.

    A local market trader, who asked to remain anonymous out of fear of retaliation, questioned why the RSF consistently targets civilian infrastructure and populations rather than SAF military positions. “The RSF doesn’t care about the civilians or the life of the people of el-Obeid,” he said.

    Osman Abdullatif, who leads a civilian committee backing SAF and the auxiliary Popular Resistance units, accused the RSF of intentionally targeting civilian communities as part of a deliberate strategy to force mass population displacement. “We have seen in el-Genena, Khartoum, el-Jazira and el-Fasher that the RSF strategy is dependent on forcing people into displacement,” he explained. Abdullatif noted that el-Obeid residents have already witnessed the RSF’s tactics firsthand: the paramilitary group carried out massacres of Masalit communities in West Darfur’s el-Geneina in summer 2023, after which RSF supporters seized occupied abandoned homes and land belonging to displaced community members. “We understood the lesson and would never leave,” he stressed.

    Over the course of three years of war, el-Obeid has spent most of that time trapped under siege and under constant attack. While residents have displayed extraordinary resilience to maintain daily life, the city itself bears the heavy weight of prolonged conflict: streets lie uncleaned, public services are disjointed, basic goods are exorbitantly priced, and essential necessities are often completely unavailable.

    While hundreds of thousands of residents have fled the city to seek safety elsewhere, hundreds of thousands more have flooded into el-Obeid as a refuge after being displaced from their homes across other conflict zones in Kordofan, Darfur, and surrounding regions. Displaced person camps ring the city’s outer boundaries, yet daily life persists against all odds: markets stay open, universities and classes remain in session, and even wedding celebrations continue to be held, even as the threat of attack hangs overhead.

    One local activist, who also requested anonymity for security reasons, warned that the outward appearance of normalcy hides deep underlying tensions. The city is heavily populated by SAF troops, former Darfuri rebel fighters integrated into joint military units, and mobilized Popular Resistance civilians, a widespread armed presence that many residents find deeply intimidating. “We have seen more than 40,000 military personnel in the city, destruction and the wide deployment of the undisciplined Joint Forces of the former Darfur rebels. This situation has to be organised, or it will lead to serious consequences,” he warned.

    El-Obeid is surrounded by military barricades and checkpoints, with only one primary paved route connecting the city to the capital Khartoum through neighboring White Nile State. The stretch of road runs more than 700 kilometers, requiring roughly 10 hours of travel under the best of conditions. SAF is currently working to secure and reopen the Export Road, the historic strategic trade route connecting Kordofan to Khartoum that, before the war, carried the region’s valuable exports including gum arabic to global markets.

    SAF retook Bara and other key towns along the route in July 2026. But the RSF has launched a series of counterattacks in response, leaving control of the critical Export Road still contested. Drone strikes on el-Obeid have increased sharply over the past month, directly tied to these RSF counteroffensives. The RSF has claimed it inflicted heavy casualties on SAF and its allied forces in Gabrat al-Shiekh, Geraigikh, and Girfa – a claim SAF has repeatedly denied.

    El-Obeid holds unique strategic importance: it is the largest and most significant city in western Sudan still under full SAF control. For months, it has been the central frontline between the army and the RSF, which currently controls all of Darfur in western Sudan. Its strategic location previously made it a key humanitarian hub during United Nations peace operations in South Sudan and Darfur, a role it could step into again if fighting stabilizes. This status means both sides are desperate to hold full control of the city, to position themselves as the legitimate governing authority the international community must engage with.

    According to a senior SAF military source based in el-Obeid, the recapture of Bara has been a transformative turning point for the city’s future. “Our victory in Bara is very strategic, we seized a lot of weapons and military vehicles, lifted the siege of el-Obeid and opened access for more supplies to ourselves,” he said. The source, who spoke on condition of anonymity as he was not authorized to speak to media, added that the RSF is now at its weakest position since Kordofan became the main theater of Sudan’s war, after the RSF seized el-Fasher in October 2025. “We cut the supplies coming from Libya to Kordofan through Darfur, which had been the lifeline for the RSF in North Kordofan,” he said. “We are now ready to move from North to West Kordofan, more specifically al-Nuhud, Mazrob, al-Kwai and Babanousa. If SAF seizes these areas during this rainy season, the way to Darfur would be opened. This is why we have seen the RSF trying to counterattack us in North Kordofan, but we repulsed all their attempts and kept the new areas that we liberated.”

    A retired military expert with decades of experience operating in North Kordofan told Middle East Eye that the conflict is currently at a critical juncture, entirely shaped by Kordofan’s strategic geographic position. “We have seen how the two sides have tried to gain more territory in Kordofan as international pressure has grown to stop the fighting and cease fire across the country. SAF wants to liberate the greater Kordofan region and be closer to the RSF capital in Nyala, while the RSF wants to remain a threat to el-Obeid and even Omdurman,” said the expert, who also requested anonymity for security reasons.

    He explained that el-Obeid is a critical supply hub for both sides, supporting the movement of fighters and materials. “SAF has managed to secure Omdurman and el-Obeid by seizing Bara and Gabrat al-Sheikh, where the drones were coming from,” he added. “However, the RSF is opening a new front and seized new areas in the Blue Nile State, but I think it is doing so to distract SAF, because the main battle is in Kordofan rather than anywhere else.”

  • In a major policy shift, Britain is expected to ban goods from Israeli settlements

    In a major policy shift, Britain is expected to ban goods from Israeli settlements

    On Tuesday, the British government is preparing to implement a historic ban on imports of goods produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, a policy shift that has drawn sharp retaliatory threats from Israel while enjoying broad public support across the United Kingdom.

    Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband will lay out the full package of updated measures related to Israel-Palestine before parliament during Tuesday afternoon’s session, following months of behind-the-scenes planning. A senior anonymous Labour Party source confirmed to reporters on Monday that the step marks a comprehensive reset of the British government’s long-standing approach to the escalating tensions between Israel and Palestine.

    This policy was first confirmed by Middle East Eye (MEE) in an exclusive August report, which revealed that Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s administration had made the final decision to ban settlement goods. Whitehall insiders told MEE this announcement is only the opening phase of a broader reorientation of British foreign policy in the region, with additional restrictive measures expected to be rolled out in coming months.

    Notably, Burnham has not held any direct conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since taking office in July, and Downing Street confirmed Monday that the prime minister had briefed U.S. President Donald Trump on his administration’s plans for targeted measures against Israeli settlement activity ahead of the official announcement. MEE has also learned that U.S. officials have privately lobbied the British government to abandon the planned measures, over concerns about escalating regional tensions.

    Domestically, the ban enjoys robust public support: new polling from Opinium, commissioned and published by the European Council on Foreign Relations, shows 46% of all British adults back the ban on trade with Israeli settlements, while just 18% actively oppose the policy. When respondents who declined to state an opinion are excluded from the calculation, support for the ban rises to nearly 75% of the voting public.

    The new policy comes at a defining moment in the region, as Israel advances its new E1 settlement expansion project east of Jerusalem that would permanently split the occupied West Bank into two disconnected segments, eliminating any possibility of a contiguous future Palestinian state.

    Palestinian solidarity advocates have framed the ban as a long-overdue step toward ending British complicity in violations of international law. “Such a ban has been a core demand of the Palestine solidarity movement for many years, as a key basic step towards ending UK complicity with Israel’s violations of international law,” said Ben Jamal, former director of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign. Alistair Carmichael, chair of the Council for Arab-British Understanding and a sitting member of UK parliament, welcomed the announcement but called for further action: “A UK ban on settlement trade is welcome, but it is the minimum of what is needed in the face of a frenzy of settlement expansion. This sanction requires teeth. Israel has to be held to account for its flagrant violations of international law, and hopefully this is the start.”

    The United Nations’ top human rights official for occupied Palestinian territories also backed the move, urging it to be the start of a broader systemic shift. Francesca Albanese, UN special rapporteur on the occupied territories, noted Monday that a settlement trade ban must be part of “a true paradigm shift to Israel-Palestine that ultimately seeks to implement the International Court of Justice advisory opinion in 2024”.

    The move has sparked fierce anger in Jerusalem, with senior Israeli officials issuing unprecedented retaliatory threats against the UK. Last week, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar warned: “If Britain acts against Israel, Israel will act against Britain.” On Monday evening, two extreme-right cabinet ministers escalated the threats, weaponizing the long-running Falkland Islands sovereignty dispute between the UK and Argentina to pressure London. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called for the expulsion of the British ambassador to Israel, delivering an angry diatribe claiming: “We will not be a trampled doormat of an antisemitic government, in a country conquered by radical Islam, trying to save itself from economic and social decline by attacking Jews and the State of Israel. The British Mandate in the Land of Israel is over.”

    National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir went further, publishing a post on social media platform X calling on Netanyahu to formally recognize Argentina’s claim to the Falkland Islands (referred to as the Malvinas Islands by Argentina) and impose sanctions on the UK over what he called the “occupation” of the archipelago. While Argentina and the UK have both laid formal claim to the remote South Atlantic archipelago for decades, the vast majority of the territory’s 3,600 permanent residents overwhelmingly support continuing British rule. The dispute has seen renewed attention in recent weeks after Argentine President Javier Milei doubled down on his country’s claim, saying last week that Argentina’s national sovereignty had been “violated” and vowing to defend the country’s claim “tooth and nail, no matter who it bothers”. Milei has also threatened to sanction international oil companies that pursue exploratory drilling in waters surrounding the islands, claiming “the winds of change” favor Argentina’s long-stated sovereignty claim.

  • UAE president ‘personally told Netanyahu’ of Hamas plans for major ‘event’ ahead of 7 October

    UAE president ‘personally told Netanyahu’ of Hamas plans for major ‘event’ ahead of 7 October

    A bombshell investigation tied to a forthcoming investigative book has pulled back the curtain on a previously undisclosed warning that the United Arab Emirates president delivered to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu weeks before the devastating October 7 Hamas attacks — a alert that Netanyahu reportedly dismissed and hid from his nation’s top security and military command. The findings were first published Tuesday by Israeli newspaper Haaretz, drawing from three senior international sources with direct knowledge of the 45-minute confidential phone call that took place between the two leaders in late September 2023. According to a Gaza-born advisor to UAE leader Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, bin Zayed made clear in the call that his intelligence assessment pointed to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar preparing a large-scale, high-impact operation against Israel. The UAE president urged Netanyahu to put Israeli security forces on high alert, while also advising that Israel pursue an economic relief plan for the Gaza Strip and de-escalate tensions in the West Bank to head off the coming crisis. This warning was rooted in direct threats Sinwar issued through a Palestinian Fatah intermediary, later identified by Middle East Eye sources as Sufyan Abu Zayda, a veteran Fatah leader born in Gaza’s Jabalia refugee camp and a former Palestinian Authority cabinet minister. Sinwar explicitly told Abu Zayda, who is known to Israeli intelligence under the alias “black eyes”, that Israel would face an unprecedented “earthquake” if no progress was made toward a negotiated deal. The investigation also reveals that this exchange was not the first unheeded warning: prior international and Israeli media reports have already confirmed that Egyptian intelligence also issued an urgent alert to Netanyahu just days before the attacks, with then-Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel warning of “something unusual, a terrifying operation” in the works. In both cases, Netanyahu downplayed the threat, telling both leaders that Hamas’ actual target was the West Bank, not Gaza, and that Israeli forces already had full control of the situation in Gaza. Following the October 7 attacks, the investigation uncovered another staggering detail: Hamas offered to release all civilian captives it had seized immediately after the assault, with no concessions demanded in return. The offer was rejected outright by Israeli officials, the report claims. The investigation also shines new light on secret, indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas that took place in early 2023, focused on a gradual deal that would end the years-long blockade of Gaza, expand economic access for Gaza residents, and facilitate a prisoner exchange: four Israelis held in Gaza since 2014 and 2015 (including the remains of two Israeli soldiers) would be released in exchange for dozens of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. The talks collapsed entirely in August 2023, after Netanyahu indefinitely postponed a required committee meeting to approve the prisoner release that would have kept the process moving. It was after the delay that Sinwar issued his explicit earthquake threat, which was passed along to both Israeli officials and bin Zayed, forming the core of the UAE president’s final warning to Netanyahu. Netanyahu has issued a full denial, claiming the phone call with the UAE president never took place and that he never received such a pre-attack warning. These new revelations, published ahead of the release of the book *Hostages: 843 Days of Abandonment* by veteran journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval, are already fueling new criticism of Netanyahu’s leadership and the multiple intelligence and policy failures that preceded the October 7 attacks.

  • Singapore ministers, among world’s highest paid government officials, get first raise in 15 years

    Singapore ministers, among world’s highest paid government officials, get first raise in 15 years

    SINGAPORE — After 15 years of frozen salaries for top political officeholders, Singapore has approved a phased adjustment to ministerial pay, a controversial policy shift framed by the nation’s leadership as a critical step to retain and attract skilled talent for public service. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong outlined the revised salary framework during a parliamentary address on Tuesday, laying out the details of the most significant change to political remuneration since deep cuts were implemented more than a decade ago.

    Under the new framework, the annual benchmark salary for an entry-level minister will climb from S$1.1 million ($868,330) to S$1.8 million ($1.42 million). For the prime minister, the benchmark pay will jump from S$2.2 million ($1.7 million) to S$3.6 million ($2.8 million). Allowances for non-cabinet members of Parliament will also see upward adjustments to align with the updated structure. Unlike previous salary transitions, the full new benchmark will not take effect immediately. Starting October 15, officeholders will receive a one-time incremental increase of up to 9%, with the exact rise tied to individual performance levels and the scope of their governing responsibilities. By the end of the current parliamentary term, most entry-level ministers are projected to earn approximately S$1.35 million ($1.06 million) annually, and future salary progression will be performance-based rather than an automatic step up to the full benchmark. While Wong did not confirm his own adjusted salary under the new policy, a 9% increase would bring his current pay to roughly S$2.4 million ($1.89 million) – the prime minister announced he will donate the entirety of his salary increment to charity over the next five years.

    Ministerial pay has long been a politically sensitive topic in Singapore, where top government salaries already far outpace the median income of ordinary citizens, and the prime minister’s pay ranks among the highest for any national leader globally. For decades, the ruling government has defended its transparent pay model as a core pillar of maintaining a corruption-free, high-capacity public sector, arguing that competitive salaries are necessary to draw experienced professionals from the private sector and senior civil service who might otherwise opt for far higher private sector earnings.

    Wong emphasized that Singapore’s approach to political remuneration is intentionally transparent, with no undisclosed perks or hidden income outside the published salary framework. “Good government did not come naturally to Singapore. It was built deliberately over many years. And there is nothing automatic about sustaining this,” he told lawmakers, framing the pay adjustment as an investment in preserving the country’s long-standing tradition of effective, clean governance.

    Acknowledging public scrutiny of the policy change, Wong noted that the government recognizes the discomfort many Singaporeans feel over rising political pay, but argued that delaying the adjustment was no longer feasible. Over the past 15 years, ministerial salaries have steadily fallen behind comparable compensation packages for senior roles in both the private sector and the top ranks of the civil service, creating a growing gap that threatened the government’s ability to recruit top talent, he explained.

    The new salary framework is tied to the median income of Singapore’s top 1,000 citizen earners, with a mandatory 40% discount built into the benchmark to reflect the public service nature of political office. Going forward, the full framework will undergo a formal review every five years to ensure it remains aligned with economic conditions and private sector earnings. This policy change, Wong argued, will give current and future prime ministers a far stronger hand to persuade capable Singaporeans to enter public service and build the strongest possible governing team for the country.

    The current salary structure was first implemented after a 2011 independent review, and approved by Parliament in 2012, when public backlash over excessive political pay led policymakers to cut ministerial salaries by roughly 36%. While a 2017 review recommended small adjustments, the government chose to hold off on implementing changes. A scheduled 2023 review was also deferred before the current policy update was brought to Parliament this week.

  • Zheng Qinwen comes through an injury and qualifying to make a run to the US Open quarterfinals

    Zheng Qinwen comes through an injury and qualifying to make a run to the US Open quarterfinals

    NEW YORK — For 23-year-old Chinese tennis star Zheng Qinwen, fighting through the US Open qualifying draw was more than a series of matches — it was a psychological test few elite athletes are ever forced to take. Reserved for rising prospects or veterans on the decline, the qualifying tournament is not a space designed for players with Zheng’s decorated resume: a former world Top 4, Olympic gold medalist, and Grand Slam finalist who has competed on the sport’s biggest stages for years.

    “Psychologically, it is very difficult to accept,” Zheng said in an interview after booking her spot in the US Open quarterfinals. “I mean, I used to be top 10, Olympic champion. I’ve played in the big stadiums since the beginning.”

    Today, that unlikely qualifying run has turned into one of the most compelling stories of this year’s tournament. After rallying from staggering 5-0 deficits in two consecutive main-draw matches — first against 22nd seed Madison Keys, then against world No. 8 Iga Swiatek — Zheng has surged into the final eight, rekindling the form that made her one of the sport’s most promising talents just a few years ago.

    Zheng’s path to this quarterfinal run has been marked by setback, injury and relentless work to rebuild her career. Once ranked as high as 4th in the WTA rankings, she notched a string of landmark achievements in 2024: she reached the Australian Open final, secured a second consecutive trip to the US Open quarterfinals, and made history by winning China’s first Olympic tennis gold medal since the sport’s return to the Olympic program in 1988.

    But a devastating elbow injury that required surgery derailed her momentum. Between July 2025 and February 2026, Zheng competed in just one professional tournament, and her extended time off the court sent her ranking plummeting to 121th in the world — too low to earn an automatic main-draw spot at the sport’s four major championships.

    “I couldn’t perform well the last three, four months. I know people had a lot of doubt about me, and it’s just really hard for me,” Zheng recalled. “I just need to keep positive every single day, telling myself just keep working and let’s see when the result is going to happen. It is a really, really tough process. I suffered a lot, and I have been through a lot of pain every single loss that I have.”

    The turning point of her comeback came just one month ago in Toronto, where Zheng attempted to qualify for the city’s WTA 1000 Masters tournament. She exited in straight sets to Lanlana Tararudee, a defeat she describes as a career-low “disaster” performance. Instead of sinking into defeat, the loss sparked a critical reset.

    After the match, Zheng’s coach pulled her aside for a frank conversation. “He told me, ‘You can’t continue playing like this. You need to have a training block and find your tennis again,’” Zheng said. It took just five seconds for her to agree to the plan.

    The pair relocated to IMG Academy in Bradenton, Florida, for an intensive training block. For weeks, Zheng focused entirely on rebuilding her game: 12-hour days split between on-court practice and gym work, with no distractions from tournament travel or competition. “It was really tough, but this is how sport shows,” Zheng said. “If you don’t work hard, you don’t have it.”

    That grueling work translated immediately to results when Zheng arrived in New York. She won three qualifying matches to secure her main-draw spot, then pulled off two of the most dramatic comebacks in this year’s tournament. Against Keys, she trailed 0-5 in the deciding third set, saved a match point, and rallied to win 1-6, 7-6 (3), 7-5. Three days later against 2022 US Open champion Swiatek, she overcame another 0-5 opening set deficit, adjusting to the unique atmosphere of Arthur Ashe Stadium to oust the world No. 8 with a 7-5, 6-3 victory.

    Her next challenge will come Wednesday against second seed Elena Rybakina, who will rise to the top of the WTA rankings if she claims a win. Rybakina acknowledged the threat Zheng poses, noting that the Chinese star has clearly regained her top form and momentum after her recent winning streak.

    “Well, she definitely found her form, and I feel like she’s playing now with a lot of confidence after so many wins in a row,” Rybakina said. “So she’s very dangerous.”

    With her run to the quarterfinals, Zheng made history of her own: she is the first qualifier to reach the US Open quarterfinals at Flushing Meadows since Emma Raducanu’s fairytale title run in 2021. For Zheng, the result is far more than a tournament achievement — it is proof that her hard-fought comeback is real.

    Zheng said she never lost faith that she could return to elite tennis, even when progress was slower than she hoped. For every early loss and every moment of doubt, she leaned into the work, trusting it would pay off eventually.

    “I’m just really happy to be back again,” she said. “I mean, if that’s what God gives to me, all the losses before, I’m sure that he will give me something back, no?”

  • Japan protests as China slaps new measures against its exports of a key chipmaking material

    Japan protests as China slaps new measures against its exports of a key chipmaking material

    BANGKOK, AP – In a move that adds fresh friction to already tense bilateral ties, China has introduced provisional trade controls targeting Japanese shipments of dichlorosilane (DCS), a critical ultra-pure chemical compound indispensable to semiconductor manufacturing. The new rules, which took effect Tuesday, have drawn immediate pushback from Tokyo, which says it is assessing the potential fallout for domestic Japanese firms and preparing a calibrated response.

    Beijing’s decision stems from an ongoing anti-dumping investigation into Japanese DCS imports. Chinese authorities argue that Japanese exporters of the material have violated global anti-dumping norms by undercutting prices, inflicting measurable harm on China’s domestic DCS production industry. Under the new provisional measures, any company importing DCS from Japan is required to post cash deposits with Chinese customs, with deposit rates reaching as high as 99.2 percent of the shipment’s value. The regulation explicitly targets major Japanese DCS producers including Shin-Etsu Chemical and Denal Silane, and applies to all other Japanese exporters of the chemical as well.

    Beijing emphasizes that the current restrictions are temporary, pending the conclusion of its ongoing investigation, with a final binding ruling to be issued at a later date. The trade action comes against a backdrop of steadily worsening relations between Beijing and Tokyo that dates back to November last year, when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi provoked fierce Chinese ire by suggesting Japan’s military could intervene if China resorted to military force against Taiwan. China claims the self-governing island of Taiwan as an inalienable part of its sovereign territory, and has repeatedly condemned foreign and Japanese statements interfering in what it considers an internal affair.

    In Tokyo, Japan’s top government spokesman Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara issued a formal protest over the new controls Tuesday. Kihara confirmed that Tokyo would take what he described as appropriate action to prevent unfair economic harm to Japanese DCS producers and exporters. This latest trade measure is not Beijing’s only action targeting Japanese trade in recent months: the Chinese government previously rolled out separate export controls on dual-use goods with potential military applications for Japanese firms, adding to a growing list of economic frictions between the two neighboring Asian powers.

    For the global semiconductor industry, DCS fills a uniquely critical role: the chemical is a core input for the chemical vapor deposition process used to lay down thin layers of silicon, oxide and other specialized films on both logic and memory semiconductor chips. While the global DCS market as a whole is marked by tight competition, Japan has long held a dominant position as the world’s leading supplier of the ultra-pure grade DCS required for advanced chip manufacturing. This market position means the new Chinese import controls could have ripple effects across regional and global semiconductor supply chains, even as the final outcome of Beijing’s anti-dumping probe remains uncertain.