标签： Asia

In a televised interview with CBS’s iconic news program *60 Minutes* that aired Sunday evening, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has raised the possibility of deploying United States ground forces inside Iranian territory, confirming that the ongoing Middle East crisis is far from over. Netanyahu argued that on-the-ground military operations would be required to seize and secure Iranian nuclear material, though he declined to share any specific timeline for when such an operation might be launched.

“I’m not going to discuss specific military tactics, but what President Trump told me is that he is prepared to go in,” Netanyahu stated in the interview, adding that he believes a ground incursion is physically achievable. This current conflict, widely viewed as having been orchestrated by Netanyahu, first erupted in late February when a joint surprise strike by U.S. and Israeli forces targeted multiple sites across Iran, including Iranian political leadership hubs, a girls’ school, and key military infrastructure.

According to reporting from multiple U.S. media outlets, U.S. President Donald Trump did not anticipate the initial wave of attacks would fail to force Iran to surrender. Contrary to Trump’s expectations, Tehran mounted a fierce resistance campaign against the U.S.-Israeli coalition: it targeted American military bases across the Persian Gulf, struck Israeli military infrastructure, and blocked all commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical energy chokepoint that carries roughly 20% of global oil supplies.

Trump negotiated a ceasefire with Iran on April 8, but subsequent talks have failed to produce a permanent end to hostilities. Iranian public and political sentiment remains deeply skeptical of the U.S. and Israel, with widespread belief that the coalition will resume attacks once it has regrouped and replenished its military capabilities.

In a surprising announcement during the interview, Netanyahu also said he favors ending the long-standing annual U.S. military aid package to Israel, which currently stands at $3.8 billion per year and balloons substantially during periods of open conflict. In place of traditional aid, Netanyahu proposed a new bilateral military partnership under which the U.S. would share advanced weapons technology with the Israeli military.

This proposal comes amid growing criticism within the U.S. over Israel’s outsized influence over American foreign policy and its decades-long reliance on U.S. military funding. While establishment politicians on both sides of the aisle continue to express unwavering support for Israel, American public opinion has shifted sharply against the country in recent months. A Gallup poll conducted in February found that 41% of U.S. adults now hold more sympathetic views of Palestinians, compared to just 36% who sympathize more with Israel. This marks a dramatic reversal from 2023, when 54% of respondents sympathized more with Israel and only 31% leaned toward Palestinians.

On social media and in public discourse, three key factors are most frequently cited to explain the shift in U.S. public opinion: the ongoing humanitarian crisis and allegations of genocide in Gaza, Israel’s extensive lobbying efforts to influence U.S. political decision-making, and Israel’s long track record of pushing the U.S. to enter into foreign wars that primarily serve Israeli interests.

As Washington prepares for a high-stakes official visit to Beijing this week, U.S. President Donald Trump is set to be accompanied by an unprecedented roster of 17 chief executives from America’s most influential business and technology sectors, according to a senior White House official familiar with the travel itinerary who spoke to the BBC.

The lineup of corporate leaders joining the presidential delegation includes some of the most high-profile names in global industry: Apple CEO Tim Cook, Tesla and SpaceX founder Elon Musk, and BlackRock Chairman and CEO Larry Fink, alongside senior representatives from other major American firms spanning technology, finance, aviation, and agriculture. These additional companies include tech giant Meta, global payments processor Visa, leading investment bank JP Morgan, aerospace manufacturing leader Boeing, and agribusiness conglomerate Cargill, among others.

The four-day state visit comes at a particularly consequential juncture for bilateral relations between the world’s two largest economies, with mounting frictions over trade, market access, and technological competition creating heightened tensions in recent months. During the trip, President Trump is scheduled to hold formal bilateral talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, with the business delegation’s presence widely interpreted as a signal of Washington’s priority on expanding commercial opportunities for U.S. companies in the Chinese market while addressing longstanding bilateral economic and trade concerns.

Analysts note that the inclusion of so many top C-suite leaders from key sectors underscores the depth of American corporate interest in stabilizing U.S.-China economic ties, even as geopolitical and technological disagreements continue to test the bilateral relationship. For both governments, the meeting is seen as a critical opportunity to ease escalating tensions and open new pathways for constructive engagement on shared economic and trade priorities.

As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to touch down in Beijing this week for high-stakes talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, the choreographed opening moments of the summit are already predictable: firm, photographed handshakes, sweeping rhetorical claims, carefully staged symbolic gestures, and mutual declarations of unlocking new “historic” economic cooperation. But behind this carefully curated diplomatic spectacle lies a far more consequential shift reshaping the geopolitical future of the Indo-Pacific.

Donald Trump’s second term in office has not delivered a cohesive new U.S. doctrine for the Indo-Pacific. Instead, it has amplified longstanding American strategic anxieties into a louder, purely transactional approach that departs sharply from the frameworks built by his two immediate predecessors. For more than a decade, successive U.S. administrations have framed the Indo-Pacific as the global center of geopolitical gravity. Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” was designed to reassure regional allies that Washington recognized the region’s growing strategic weight. Joe Biden built on that foundation, expanding the framework through minilateral security pacts, technology alliances, and targeted diplomatic engagement crafted to balance China’s rise without triggering open conflict.

Trump’s second term marks a clear break from this trajectory. While the current administration has retained most of Washington’s hard-line rhetoric toward Beijing, it has abandoned the broader diplomatic and institutional architecture that once sustained U.S. credibility across the region. Instead, the Trump 2.0 approach relies heavily on economic nationalism, repeated tariff threats, and demands for increased defense burden-sharing from allies already navigating mounting geopolitical and financial volatility. Despite the administration’s claims of strategic renewal, this strategy largely repackages long-running U.S. anxieties about China into a more confrontational doctrine centered on trade escalation, economic coercion, and increasingly inflammatory rhetoric around global great-power competition.

This shift has left regional governments viewing Washington through an increasingly transactional lens. U.S. allies and partners face repeated calls to decouple their supply chains from China, even as they confront new American tariffs, industrial policy disputes, and growing uncertainty about the durability of long-term U.S. commitments to the region.

This ambiguity matters deeply, because most middle powers in Asia have no interest in being forced to choose between Washington and Beijing. The vast majority of regional governments seek to retain strategic flexibility, diversified trade relationships, and stable security arrangements that avoid dividing the region into rigid, opposing blocs. Vietnam offers a clear illustration of this common regional dilemma. Over the past decade, Hanoi emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of global supply chain diversification, as manufacturers shifted production out of China amid escalating U.S.-China tensions. American firms were major drivers of this shift. Yet today, Washington increasingly frames Vietnam’s export growth through a narrative of “overcapacity” and industrial imbalance, even though most of Vietnam’s manufacturing sector is powered by multinational investment, not state-directed dumping. This contradiction has not been lost on regional capitals, nor has the growing gap between Washington’s military posture and its diplomatic messaging.

The U.S. continues to carry out freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, deepen defense ties with regional allies, and strengthen deterrence frameworks around Taiwan. But military posturing alone does not add up to a cohesive regional strategy. Diplomatic engagement, economic integration, and institutional trust remain equally critical pillars of influence in Asia. That power vacuum is an opening Beijing has been quick to exploit. China’s leadership understands that regional influence today depends not just on naval power, but on infrastructure financing, deep trade relationships, development assistance, and increasingly, environmental diplomacy and ocean governance.

Beijing’s bid to host the secretariat for the new UN High Seas Treaty is a perfect example of this broader strategy. China has positioned itself as a responsible steward of the global maritime commons, pledging financial support for marine conservation projects while expanding its diplomatic footprint across developing coastal states. To be sure, many regional governments remain deeply cautious of China’s strategic intentions, particularly in the South China Sea, where gray zone tactics, maritime coercion, and unresolved territorial disputes continue to erode trust. But Beijing does not need to be fully consistent in its own policies to displace American influence; it only needs to capitalize on growing perceptions of inconsistency in U.S. policy. Trump’s return to the White House has only amplified these perceptions. The administration’s focus on tariffs and economic confrontation risks undermining the very partnerships Washington needs to sustain long-term strategic competition with China.

Regional leaders hear constant demands to align with Washington against Beijing, even as they watch the U.S. withdraw from many of the multilateral trade frameworks and regional agreements that once anchored American economic leadership in Asia. At the same time, Xi Jinping enters the upcoming summit with key advantages that extend far beyond diplomatic positioning. While China’s economy is experiencing slower growth, Beijing retains enormous leverage across regional supply chains, manufacturing networks, and infrastructure financing. It can restrict exports of critical rare earth minerals, which are essential for defense systems, electric vehicles, and a wide range of everyday modern products. It continues to invest heavily in advanced technologies, maritime capabilities, and strategic industries that will define future great-power competition.

Xi has projected consistent policy continuity in Asia, anchored by long-term planning and institutional discipline – qualities that many regional governments value greatly, even when they remain wary of Beijing’s long-term ambitions. For instance, the Belt and Road Initiative, for all the criticism it has drawn, projects permanence through ports, railways, energy projects, and long-term financing commitments that unfold over decades. Chinese diplomacy also prioritizes patience and gradualism. Even when Beijing acts assertively in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, it typically frames those actions within a broader narrative of historical continuity and national rejuvenation. This consistency holds unique weight in Asia, where political stability and policy predictability are often valued as much as ideological alignment. While many regional governments still do not fully trust Beijing, a growing number are questioning whether U.S. policy can remain durable beyond U.S. electoral cycles and the shifting priorities of individual political leaders.

Against this backdrop, Trump’s Beijing visit carries significance that stretches far beyond bilateral U.S.-China relations. The summit will serve as a critical test of whether Washington can still articulate a broad, cohesive Indo-Pacific vision that goes beyond tariffs, confrontation, and occasional displays of military strength. It will also reveal whether the U.S. still understands that regional influence depends not just on containing China, but on offering regional partners a credible, stable, and economically attractive alternative to Beijing’s model. The core risk for Washington is not that Asia will suddenly align fully with China. It is that the region will gradually adapt to a new order where U.S. policy appears unpredictable, excessively transactional, and increasingly disconnected from the long-term economic and political realities shaping the Indo-Pacific. This kind of strategic drift would benefit Beijing far more than any joint summit communique or carefully staged diplomatic performance.

Trump will arrive in Beijing seeking to project American strength. But most regional observers will be watching for a far more critical marker: whether the U.S. still possesses the strategic patience and political coherence required to sustain leadership in the Indo-Pacific. Right now, the answer to that question remains deeply uncertain. This analysis is contributed by James Borton, editor-in-chief of the South China Sea NewsWire, co-author of the recently released SCSNW Indo-Pacific Report, with contributions from managing editor David Hessen.

As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares for his high-stakes summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping this week, growing ambiguity around his approach to Taiwan has sparked intense speculation across global capitals about the future of long-standing U.S. policy toward the self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own.

Trump’s actions and public comments have painted a contradictory picture in recent months. In December last year, he approved a historic $11 billion arms package for Taiwan – the largest single weapons deal the U.S. has ever concluded with the island. To date, however, no delivery timeline has been finalized, and Trump has publicly confirmed he has already discussed the proposed sale with Xi. Beyond the arms deal debate, the U.S. leader has publicly complained that Taiwan “stole” American semiconductor industry business, and has repeatedly pressured Taipei to compensate Washington for its security commitments. Using the threat of steep new tariffs as leverage, Trump has also pushed Taiwan to commit to large-scale investments in U.S.-based advanced semiconductor manufacturing, and to purchase billions of dollars in American crude oil and liquefied natural gas.

This inconsistent approach has left policymakers and analysts in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington questioning the durability of the U.S.’s long-held commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense. Critics, particularly among Washington’s foreign policy circles that back strong U.S. support for Taipei, warn that Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy could leave Taiwan vulnerable to concessions during the summit. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, now a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, noted that supporters of Taiwan are growing increasingly concerned that the island could become a bargaining chip in talks between the two global leaders.

For its part, Beijing has made clear that the Taiwan issue will be a central topic of discussion during this week’s meetings. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi raised the island’s status during a pre-summit call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, urging Washington to “make the right choices” on Taiwan policy to preserve bilateral stability, according to an official statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. While Rubio reaffirmed in a press briefing in Rome that long-standing U.S. policy has not shifted – stating Washington opposes any forced changes to the cross-strait status quo that would threaten global stability – he did acknowledge that Taiwan would feature on the summit’s agenda, even if it is not a formal centerpiece.

White House officials have pushed back against concerns over shifting policy, pointing out that Trump has already approved more military sales to Taiwan in the first year of his second term than former Democratic President Joe Biden approved across his full four-year term. In addition to the $11 billion arms package, Trump greenlit a $330 million deal for military aircraft parts for Taiwan in November. The Trump administration has also long pressured Taipei to increase its own defense spending, a goal that saw partial progress Friday when Taiwanese lawmakers ended months of legislative gridlock to approve a $25 billion arms purchase budget. That figure fell far short of the $40 billion proposal put forward by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, a gap that a senior anonymous Trump administration official called disappointing.

Taiwanese officials have publicly acknowledged concern over Beijing’s intensified rhetoric ahead of the summit, though they have drawn some reassurance from Rubio’s recent comments. National Security Bureau Director-General Tsai Ming-yen told reporters that while Beijing may attempt diplomatic maneuvering during the talks, Washington has repeatedly confirmed through both public and private channels that its Taiwan policy remains unchanged.

China analysts note that Xi’s core goal will be to pressure Trump to roll back elements of U.S. support for Taipei, aligned with Beijing’s long-standing position that Taiwan is a breakaway province that must eventually be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary. Since 1979, the U.S. has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity”: it acknowledges Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of China, but does not explicitly endorse that position, opposes Taiwanese independence, rejects unilateral changes to the status quo, and provides informal security support and arms to Taipei.

Analysts say Xi will likely push Trump to curb U.S. arms sales and impose informal restrictions on high-level U.S. official visits to the island, taking advantage of Trump’s already demonstrated willingness to deviate from traditional diplomatic norms. In February, Trump made headlines by confirming he consults Xi on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, breaking with decades of established policy. Patricia Kim, a China expert with the Brookings Institution’s Assessing China Project, warned that even if no formal policy shift is announced, Trump’s well-documented tendency to make off-the-cuff remarks could create unintended shifts that upend cross-strait stability.

Uncertainty over the U.S. commitment has also been amplified by Trump’s muted response to a recent diplomatic rift between U.S. ally Japan and China over Taiwan. In November, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said a Chinese attack on Taiwan would constitute a regional security threat that could qualify as a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, justifying a military response. Trump spoke with both Takaichi and Xi that same month, but has largely avoided taking a public stance on the dispute, noting in March talks with Takaichi that he would “be speaking Japan’s praises when I’m in China with President Xi.” Additional scrutiny came after the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy omitted any direct mention of Taiwan.

Still, many analysts point to one key factor that may protect Taiwan from major policy shifts: its dominant position in the global semiconductor industry, a sector critical to U.S. technological competitiveness in its race with China. Lev Nachman, a political science professor at National Taiwan University, noted that Trump is well aware of Taiwan’s central role to U.S. economic and technological growth, creating a baseline that makes drastic policy shifts unlikely.

Edgard Kagan, a former senior State Department official who worked on East Asia policy for both the Trump and Biden administrations and now holds the China Studies chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, added that while Trump approaches diplomacy from a transactional perspective, his administration has never treated core U.S. interests in the region as negotiable trade-offs. “The president understands leverage. My experience of being in meetings with him, he has a very, very acute sense of how to use it,” Kagan said. “And so I think that the idea that there’s going to be a trade where the president sort of sacrifices U.S. interests in Taiwan in order to get other things — I think it’s unlikely based on my own experience of how he operates.”

In the end, the outcome of the summit for Taiwan will likely be measured by the public statements the two leaders release. After Trump’s last in-person meeting with Xi in October, he claimed the Chinese leader had not raised the Taiwan issue, and that Chinese officials “know the consequences” of any military action against the island. For Taipei, Nachman noted, the best possible outcome is that the issue is not discussed publicly, or addressed only in passing.

In a major development reshaping Philippine politics, the House of Representatives has approved a second impeachment vote against Vice President Sara Duterte, clearing the way for a Senate trial that could permanently end her presidential ambitions for the 2028 election.

Monday’s vote crossed the required one-third threshold easily, with 255 out of 290 attending lawmakers backing the impeachment move. The case centers on two core allegations: unauthorized misuse of public funds during Duterte’s tenure as vice president, and public threats she made against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., First Lady Liza Araneta Marcos, and former House Speaker Martin Romualdez.

This is not the first time impeachment proceedings have been brought against Duterte on identical grounds. The first attempt in 2025 was derailed by the Philippine Supreme Court, which blocked the process on a technicality before it could reach the Senate for trial. The case was revived earlier this year, and last week a House investigative committee concluded there was enough credible evidence to support moving forward with impeachment.

Duterte has repeatedly dismissed the proceedings as a politically motivated sham. In a formal written statement responding to the committee’s ruling, she called the case “nothing more than a scrap of paper,” and refused to participate in the committee hearings, citing what she claims is a biased, partisan process.

The lopsided House vote is widely seen as a clear demonstration of Marcos’ retained influence over the lower chamber of Congress. Unlike House members, who are elected by individual legislative districts and typically align with the sitting president to secure patronage and resources for their constituencies, the 24-member Senate is elected nationally and has long served as a launching pad for future presidential and vice presidential candidates.

The path to a conviction remains far from certain, however. Half of the Senate seats were up for grabs in the 2025 midterm elections, and candidates aligned with Duterte outperformed those running under Marcos’ ruling coalition. In a political system defined by shifting dynastic alliances and flexible multi-party loyalties, forecasting the outcome of an impeachment trial is exceptionally difficult.

For Duterte, a conviction would result in immediate permanent disqualification from holding any public office, scrapping her well-publicized plan to run for president in 2028. The 47-year-old politician, daughter of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, currently holds a commanding lead in early presidential polling. A March 2026 survey by Manila-based pollster WR Numero placed her 17 percentage points ahead of her closest competitor.

The current rift between Duterte and Marcos marks a dramatic reversal of fortune for the once-powerful political alliance that swept both into office in the 2022 national election. Duterte was originally the frontrunner to succeed her father as president in 2022, but agreed to run for vice president alongside Marcos to unify their support bases and block a rising reformist opposition. The ticket won election by a landslide, but the partnership quickly fractured as the two leaders pursued conflicting political agendas.

Tensions boiled over after Marcos allies led by Romualdez launched an investigation into allegations of misappropriated funds in Duterte’s vice presidential office. During a fiery late-night online address at the height of the probe, Duterte openly stated she had instructed an associate that if she were killed, the associates should target Marcos, the first lady, and Romualdez.

The relationship deteriorated further last March, when Marcos granted authority to the International Criminal Court to arrest former President Rodrigo Duterte, who is currently detained at The Hague awaiting trial on crimes against humanity charges linked to thousands of deaths during his controversial war on drugs.

In a major political shakeup that has sent shockwaves through the Philippines, the country’s House of Representatives delivered a historic vote on Monday, approving the impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte by an overwhelming margin over a trio of serious allegations. The accusations leveled against Duterte include undeclared unexplained assets, the improper use of public government funds, and even threats to arrange the assassination of sitting President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

Dominance of Marcos Jr.’s political allies in the lower chamber shaped the final outcome, which landed at 255 votes in favor of impeachment to just 26 votes against, with nine lawmakers choosing to abstain from the historic ballot. Two separate impeachment complaints brought against the vice president will now advance to the Philippine Senate, where the upper legislative chamber will be convened as a formal impeachment tribunal to conduct Duterte’s trial.

Duterte, who is the daughter of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, one of the country’s most polarizing and influential modern political figures, has issued a general denial of all wrongdoing connected to the allegations. She has not, however, addressed the specific criminal claims brought against her in any public detailed response.

This is not the first time the vice president has faced an impeachment vote: in 2023, the House similarly advanced impeachment proceedings against her, but Duterte avoided a Senate trial after the Supreme Court ordered the attempt halted on a constitutional technicality. It remains unclear whether the new impeachment attempt will face similar legal challenges, or if the Senate tribunal will move forward to weigh the merits of the accusations against the country’s second-highest elected official.