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For nearly a decade, the United States has maintained sweeping tariffs on Chinese imported goods, launching an aggressive economic campaign that was meant to curb China’s industrial and export growth. But eight years on, the policy has failed to weaken China’s manufacturing dominance — instead, it has simply redirected the flow of Chinese exports away from the U.S. and toward open markets across Europe and Asia, setting the stage for a new era of global trade friction.\n\nLast year, despite sweeping U.S. sanctions and tariffs, China notched a staggering $1.2 trillion global trade surplus, a record high that underscores its unshaken position as the world’s top exporter. Chinese goods that once flooded American store shelves and manufacturing facilities are now heading east and west to other major economies, a shift that economists are warning could spark a repeat of the 2000s “China Shock” that gutted hundreds of thousands of U.S. manufacturing jobs and fueled the political upheaval that carried Donald Trump to the White House twice.\n\nEuropean leaders have already sounded the alarm. Earlier this year, French President Emmanuel Macron openly acknowledged that surging cheap Chinese exports are “literally killing a large part of the European industry”, admitting the bloc was slow to recognize the growing risk. That risk will top the agenda when G7 leaders gather this week in the French alpine resort of Évian-les-Bains, with French officials indicating ahead of the summit that they aim to finalize a coordinated plan to address the challenge of unbalanced Chinese trade.\n\nOne of the most likely outcomes of the summit is a push for the European Union and other aligned economies to follow the U.S. example and erect higher trade barriers against Chinese imports. Currently, the EU adheres to relatively low baseline tariffs on Chinese goods under World Trade Organization rules, though it has already imposed targeted higher levies on specific products, reaching up to 35% on Chinese electric vehicles. That limited action could soon expand to broader tariffs if leaders agree on a unified front this week.\n\nThe warnings of coming friction are widespread among top trade economists. “China’s export surge, unless its leaders rein it in, will provoke a protectionist wave against Chinese imports worldwide,” said Maurice Obstfeld, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. “All the more so if the current disruptions around the Iran war persist and cause a sharper global slowdown.”\n\nHSBC economist Taylor Wang echoed that concern this month, noting that a full-blown China-EU trade dispute would hit a critical segment of Chinese exports: Europe is one of the largest markets for Chinese electric vehicles, solar panels, and lithium-ion batteries, all of which have seen explosive export growth in recent years. European leaders are also hoping to convince Trump to drop his punitive tariffs on U.S. allies including the EU and Canada, and instead build a coordinated transatlantic bloc to counter Chinese trade practices.\n\nExperts say this new “China Shock 2.0” is far different — and far more disruptive — than the wave of Chinese import competition that hit the U.S. in the 2000s. The first shock came after China joined the WTO in 2001, gaining low-tariff access to Western markets and flooding the U.S. and Europe with low-cost textiles, furniture, and basic electronics. A landmark study by economists David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson found that first China Shock eliminated 2.4 million American manufacturing jobs alone.\n\nToday’s version of the shock unfolds against a vastly changed global trade landscape. In 2000, China held just 4% of global goods exports; today, that share has jumped to 16%, the largest of any country in the world, making Beijing’s trade policies far more impactful across the global economy. Unlike 20 years ago, when China was still an emerging manufacturing power, China now dominates global manufacturing across every tier, from low-cost basic goods to high-value advanced technology that directly competes with the core industries of wealthy Western economies.\n\nFed research published last month found that Chinese exports now compete with nearly 58% of all exports from the 21 Eurozone countries, up from just 46% in 2000. “The second China shock is characterized by its companies running the board on manufacturing exports — from low-tech, low-wage to high-tech high value-added industries,” said Cornell University economist Eswar Prasad. “This is directly hitting advanced economies where it now hurts the most — high tech industries such as EVs and high-end robotics that many countries had been counting on for a manufacturing revival.”\n\nGermany, long Europe’s industrial powerhouse and export giant, has already felt the sharpest pain. For decades, German automakers and industrial firms grew rapidly on demand from Chinese consumers; today, the trade balance has flipped: China now exports more goods to Germany than Germany exports to China, and German firms are struggling to compete with Chinese rivals in core sectors including industrial machinery, construction equipment, automobiles, and chemicals. That competition has been a key factor dragging Germany’s economy into stagnation, with the country contracting in both 2023 and 2024 and posting just 0.2% growth last year.\n\nFor the U.S., the risk of the new China Shock is far lower than it was two decades ago. Trump’s eight years of tariffs have already blocked a large share of Chinese goods from entering the U.S. market: U.S. Commerce Department data shows Chinese goods exports to the U.S. dropped 37% between January and April of this year, compared to the same period in 2025. The U.S. is also better positioned economically: it is energy independent, unlike the EU and Japan, and is currently enjoying a boom in productivity and investment driven by artificial intelligence.\n\nEven with falling sales to the U.S., China has still managed strong export growth thanks to surging global demand for its low-cost electric vehicles, and booming AI investment worldwide that has driven up sales of Chinese-made electrical components and data center machinery. Between January and May of this year, Chinese exports to the 27-nation EU climbed 16.4% year-over-year, pushing France’s trade deficit with China up to $5.3 billion from $3.3 billion just a year earlier, according to Chinese customs data.\n\nEconomists point to long-standing Chinese domestic policies as the root of the global overcapacity problem. State-owned Chinese banks offer artificially low-interest loans to state-backed manufacturing firms, encouraging overproduction, while a underdeveloped social safety net pushes Chinese households to save heavily instead of spending on domestic goods and services. These policies are designed to keep factories operating and unemployment low, but they create a massive excess of domestic manufacturing supply that must be dumped onto global export markets at cutthroat prices.\n\nBeijing has also fostered intense domestic competition between manufacturing firms, creating highly efficient, low-cost exporters that Western markets are ill-prepared to compete against. “The rest of the world is ill prepared to compete with these apex predators,” Autor and Hanson wrote in a 2024 New York Times column.\n\nFor decades, China has promised Western leaders that it would reform these policies, cutting overproduction and boosting domestic consumer spending — a shift that would reduce China’s reliance on exports, raise living standards for Chinese households, and open up a larger market for Western exports to China. But experts say Beijing has been slow to follow through on those promises. “The leadership has long said this is a goal,” Obstfeld said, “but they have been slow to act as if they mean it.”\n\n“Beijing has been relying on the rest of the world to address its overcapacity problem,” said Wendy Cutler, a former U.S. trade negotiator now serving as senior vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute. “However, this unsustainable situation may soon change if the EU and others take steps to halt Chinese imports, following the U.S. lead.”

In a landmark shift that marks the end of decades of ultra-loose monetary policy, Japan’s central bank has raised its benchmark policy rate to 1%, the highest level the country has seen since 1995. The 25 basis point hike, announced on Tuesday, comes amid mounting global inflationary pressures driven by skyrocketing energy costs linked to ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East.

Japan’s journey to this rate adjustment stretches back more than 30 years. After a massive collapse in property and equity asset prices in the early 1990s, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) slashed interest rates aggressively to counter economic fallout. For nearly two decades, rates held near zero as the country grappled with persistent deflation and stagnant economic growth. It was not until March 2024 that the BOJ initiated its first rate hike in 17 years, kicking off a gradual process of policy normalization that continues today.

“After twenty years of deflation, Japan is now in an inflationary upcycle,” Jesper Koll, a veteran Japan economist, told the BBC. “Emergency/crisis management monetary policy is no longer needed and the BOJ wants to get back to a normal monetary policy.”

The push for higher rates has been fueled largely by surging global energy prices, which have hit Japan particularly hard as a nation heavily reliant on imported oil and gas from the Middle East. Data shows Japan’s wholesale prices jumped more than 6% year-on-year in May, marking the fastest pace of increase in three years. Curiously, though, the country’s core consumer inflation rate stands at 1.4% as of April, still below the BOJ’s official 2% inflation target.

This dynamic leaves the central bank navigating a delicate balancing act. While raising interest rates can help cool overheating inflationary pressures, higher borrowing costs also create new burdens for the Japanese government and private businesses, which have grown accustomed to decades of cheap credit. Adding an unusual element to this week’s decision, BOJ Governor Kazuo Ueda – the leading architect of the bank’s recent policy shifts – was absent from the monetary policy meeting as he recovers from treatment for an infected liver cyst in hospital.

Despite his absence, Ueda has already signaled his support for incremental rate hikes in recent public remarks. Earlier this month, he noted that if upside risks to inflation were judged to outweigh downside risks to economic growth – even amid an uncertain outlook – policymakers would need to thoroughly debate the merits of raising the policy rate. Ueda and other BOJ leaders have increasingly backed higher rates in recent months.

The adjustment also puts the central bank at a quiet crossroads with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, a leader who has campaigned for continued expansionary government spending and previously opposed rate hikes. Though Takaichi faces growing public pressure to rein in rising living costs, she has not publicly criticized the BOJ’s policy shift since taking office last year. This latest rate increase is the second since Takaichi assumed office, following a December 2025 hike that brought rates to 0.75% – a move that had already signaled the BOJ’s intention to continue tightening.

Another key driver behind the decision is the BOJ’s goal of stabilizing the Japanese yen, which has faced sustained downward pressure against major global currencies including the U.S. dollar and euro. “There has been a sense that the yen is too cheap and that raising its currency will not hurt,” explained Ulrike Schaede, a business professor at the University of California San Diego.

Even after the latest hike, Japan’s 1% policy rate remains far lower than interest rates in other major advanced economies. For context, both the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England currently hold rates above 3%, though both central banks are widely expected to hold rates steady at their upcoming policy meetings this week. Still, Schaede argues that Japan’s gradual shift away from ultra-loose policy could signal a broader realignment in global monetary conditions.

“What we are seeing could signal a slow global realignment,” Schaede said.