A sophisticated network of exiled Syrian figures with close ties to former strongman Bashar al-Assad is actively working to undermine the country’s new government and seize control of strategic coastal regions, according to intercepted communications obtained by The New York Times.
The investigation reveals that former intelligence chiefs and military commanders, now primarily based in Russia and Lebanon, are quietly reconstructing loyalist networks within Syria’s Alawi community—the sectarian foundation that previously supported Assad’s regime. Central to these efforts are Suhail al-Hassan, the former special forces commander known as “The Tiger,” and Major-General Kamal Hassan, the former head of military intelligence. Both relocated to Moscow with Assad but maintain active involvement in Syrian affairs.
Intercepted text messages indicate al-Hassan has met with collaborators across Lebanon, Iraq, and inside Syria over the past year. These communications include detailed charts enumerating fighters and weaponry available in coastal villages, with claims of being able to mobilize tens of thousands of combatants. Al-Hassan has signed several messages as a “holy warrior,” indicating the ideological motivation behind these efforts.
The operation appears financially supported by Rami Makhlouf, Assad’s billionaire cousin who also resides in Moscow. Makhlouf has reportedly channeled funds to impoverished Alawi families along the coast while positioning himself as a community protector. Another key figure, Ghiyath Dalla, a former commander in the disbanded Fourth Division, is coordinating efforts from Lebanon. In an intercepted April 2025 phone call, Dalla stated: “We will not begin until we are fully armed.”
Financial records show Dalla distributing approximately $300,000 monthly to potential fighters and local commanders, with individual payments ranging from $200 to $1,000. He has also sought approval to acquire satellite communications equipment valued at over $130,000 to enhance operational capabilities.
The communications further reveal coordination with Iran-aligned Iraqi militia leaders to discuss weapons smuggling routes into Syria while avoiding detection by Israeli air strikes or Syrian authorities. Additional messages reference aborted assassination plots and efforts to procure drones and anti-tank missiles, including weapons allegedly hidden within Syria.
These developments follow April’s sectarian violence along Syria’s Mediterranean coast that resulted in over 1,600 fatalities, predominantly Alawi. The coordinated attacks by former security forces against new government troops served as a rallying point for ex-regime figures seeking to mobilize fighters.
Simultaneously, Hassan is backing the Beirut-based Foundation for the Development of Western Syria, which presents itself as an advocate for Syrian minorities and displaced Alawis. According to U.S. disclosure filings, the foundation hired lobbying firm Tiger Hill Partners and former Trump adviser Joseph Schmitz on a $1 million contract. The organization has publicized meetings with several U.S. lawmakers’ offices, though aides characterize these as routine staff engagements.
Associates indicate Hassan appears more focused on building long-term political leverage than launching an immediate insurgency, including promoting calls for “international protection” for Syria’s Alawi-majority coastal regions. Syrian officials monitoring former regime figures have downplayed the threat of a coordinated armed uprising, while diplomats express greater concern about overseas lobbying efforts that could normalize calls for fragmentation or semi-autonomy if Syria’s political transition falters.
Complicating the situation, Israeli authorities have intensified air strikes across Syrian territory, targeting military sites and key infrastructure while signaling openness to working with armed actors in southern Syria—a move analysts say compounds efforts by former government figures to destabilize the country.