Last week’s unprecedented joint military operation by the United States and Saudi Arabia against Iran-aligned militias based in Iraq has done far more than stoke fears of imminent retaliation. It has laid bare the deep fragility of Baghdad’s years-long balancing act, which has sought to nurture warmer ties with both Riyadh and Washington while keeping powerful Tehran-aligned armed factions in check — a delicate compromise that may now force Iraq to make hard choices its leaders have long evaded.
According to Iraqi and Iranian media reports, the strikes hit multiple bases belonging to Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) on July 29, leaving at least 20 PMF fighters dead alongside four military advisers from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The operation marks the first time Saudi Arabia has openly participated in coordinated military strikes alongside the U.S., and was framed as retaliation for recent drone attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure that were launched from Iraqi territory.
What is most notable, however, is that neither Riyadh nor the targeted Iran-linked militias appear to be seeking a prolonged, large-scale military confrontation at this stage. The Saudi foreign ministry characterized the joint action as an act of legitimate self-defense, while noting that further strikes would only occur if additional attacks against Saudi territory are carried out. For Riyadh, the priority remains addressing ongoing Houthi threats to its oil facilities and maritime trade routes from Yemen, and the kingdom has little interest in opening a new active front against Iran-aligned groups in Iraq.
Regional analysts broadly agree that the primary goal of the strikes was to reestablish deterrence against Tehran and its Iraqi proxies, rather than spark a full-blown conflict. “The strikes were targeted at specific militia sites linked directly to drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities, to deter these groups,” explained Dr. Hesham Alghannam, a Riyadh-based scholar with the Carnegie Middle East program, in an interview with Middle East Eye. “But killing Iranian military advisers alongside militia fighters was not accidental. This was a message to Tehran that Saudi Arabia holds Iran responsible for what its personnel direct from Iraqi soil, regardless of which formation pulls the trigger.”
A similar restrained posture can be seen on the side of the Iran-aligned militias. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), an umbrella coalition that includes the PMF, has publicly vowed retaliation for the strikes, but its rhetoric toward Saudi Arabia has been far more tempered than its sharp hostility toward the United States. In a July 29 statement posted to its official Telegram channel, the group emphasized that its “response to the American enemy is inevitable,” while only noting that it may target Saudi Arabia “if circumstances require.”
The IRI has given Iraq’s central government an August 7 deadline to respond to the joint strikes, but analysts argue this timeline and accompanying threats are aimed more at influencing Baghdad’s domestic policy than setting the stage for immediate military escalation. Multiple IRI-affiliated factions, including Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Saraya Awliya al-Dam, have already called on Baghdad to cut diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, indicating the pressure is intended to shape Iraq’s broader regional alignment rather than trigger immediate conflict.
Mustafa Alsaray, research director at the Al-Bayan Centre for Research and Planning, pointed out that armed factions in Iraq rarely publicize deadlines for retaliation, instead relying on surprise attacks. “When they set such deadlines, they intend to send a message and achieve something, perhaps politically or in terms of security,” he told Middle East Eye. A second possibility, he added, is that the militias are holding off on any retaliation to coordinate their response with Tehran, amid shifting currents in ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions.
In recent days, U.S.-Iran relations have shown tentative signs of de-escalation: former U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed that direct negotiations with Tehran are ongoing, though he also warned the latest talks represent Iran’s “last chance” to reach a new nuclear and security deal. A renewed breakdown in those talks could prompt Iran-aligned militias to launch new attacks against Saudi Arabia, and potentially even Jordan or other Gulf Arab states, observers warn.
Beyond regional tensions, the strikes come at an extraordinarily sensitive juncture for Iraq’s domestic politics and security agenda. Baghdad is currently working to bring all weapons held by non-state armed groups under formal state control, advance integration of the PMF (which is technically part of Iraq’s official security apparatus but hosts highly autonomous Iran-aligned factions), and implement a national disarmament plan with a September 30 compliance deadline for all armed groups.
The joint U.S.-Saudi strikes, and Baghdad’s widespread public perception as unable or unwilling to prevent the attacks on PMF bases, have already hardened resistance to the disarmament push among hardline factions. Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, secretary general of Kataeb Hezbollah, confirmed that the attacks have “reinforced the group’s commitment to retaining and developing its weapons.” To build popular support for their position, the IRI has explicitly tied the strikes to Baghdad’s disarmament initiative, challenging the government that has “called for the Resistance’s disarmament” to prove it can defend Iraqi territory.
As resistance to disarmament grows, the economic stakes of Iraq’s stalled security reforms are becoming impossible to ignore. During Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s official visit to Washington in mid-July, his government signed 48 new trade and investment partnerships with U.S. companies. But U.S. officials have made clear that deeper economic cooperation and larger investments will depend on Baghdad’s ability to rein in or disarm militias that have carried out dozens of attacks on U.S. military and diplomatic targets in recent months, a string of assaults the IRI claimed responsibility for during the U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran.
Saudi Arabia is expected to adopt a similar posture on investment in Iraq. Zaidi has repeatedly framed closer economic partnership with Riyadh as a core priority for his government, but failure to control Iran-aligned militias could derail those plans completely. “September 30 is the real test. If the disarmament process fails – on the same day U.S. forces are set to withdraw from Iraq – Riyadh and even Abu Dhabi will quietly conclude that Baghdad cannot deliver, and their willingness to invest in Iraq will be reconsidered accordingly,” Alghannam noted.
For Iraq, the aftermath of the joint strikes has turned a long-simmering internal tension into an unavoidable test: can Baghdad deliver on its security reforms, preserve its fledgling ties with Gulf Arab states, and avoid being dragged into a wider regional conflict that its war-weary population can ill afford?