A bombshell report from Reuters has triggered widespread condemnation and urgent warnings from global nonproliferation specialists and U.S. political leaders over a leaked proposal from former President Donald Trump’s administration that would greenlight a U.S.-Saudi Arabia nuclear cooperation agreement, raising severe risks of nuclear weapons proliferation across the Middle East.
According to reporting from anonymous sources familiar with the draft text, the framework crafted by the Trump administration would permit the transfer of sensitive U.S. nuclear power technology to Saudi Arabia, while omitting critical nonproliferation safeguards designed to prevent nuclear materials from being diverted to weapons development. Most notably, the proposal does not include the widely accepted “Gold Standard” provisions that would ban the kingdom from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel — two core capabilities that can be directly repurposed to build nuclear weapons.
Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the nonpartisan Arms Control Association, was among the first to publicly criticize the plan, issuing a warning in a Tuesday social media post that the draft agreement “sets a terrible precedent.” Davenport explained that the proposal breaks with decades of bipartisan U.S. policy that has required strict prohibitions on enrichment and reprocessing in all bilateral nuclear cooperation pacts. “If the deal is inadequate, which it seems to be, Congress should vote to disapprove it,” Davenport added.
Andrea Stricker, deputy director and research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Nonproliferation Program, echoed that call, urging Congress to immediately block the agreement. Stricker warned that the weak safeguards would not only put Saudi Arabia on a clear path to potential nuclear weapons development but could also trigger a regional nuclear arms race, prompting neighboring states to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs. If Congress fails to halt the deal, Stricker argued that any future U.S. administration should reverse the policy “before too much damage is done in terms of watering down safeguards, setting negative precedents for other states, and failing to contain the spread of enrichment and reprocessing.”
James Acton, co-director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program, went even further, arguing that the reported deal is “tantamount to the United States giving up on nonproliferation.” Acton noted that Saudi officials have publicly acknowledged their potential interest in developing nuclear weapons, adding that “the United States should do nothing to facilitate enrichment or reprocessing in the Kingdom.”
Emma Ashford, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, agreed that the agreement would effectively end decades of U.S. efforts to curb global nuclear proliferation, pointing to a striking policy contradiction at the heart of the Trump administration’s approach: the same administration pursued military pressure and airstrikes against Iran to block its nuclear enrichment program, while offering the same capability to Saudi Arabia.
Rosemary Kelanic, director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, also labeled the proposal a “terrible idea” that breaks with 70 years of U.S. nonproliferation policy, which has never permitted the transfer of enrichment technology to a country that does not already possess the capability. Kelanic warned that the deal could create long-term national security risks for the United States, empowering Saudi Arabia to hold Washington hostage to its demands.
“Aside from the proliferation risks, uranium enrichment would give Saudi Arabia a potent source of leverage to extract future concessions from Washington, including new security guarantees, by threatening to weaponize its program unless the United States promises enhanced military protection,” Kelanic explained, noting that this dynamic played out previously with U.S. allies South Korea and West Germany, where the U.S. exchanged expanded security guarantees to convince the nations to abandon their indigenous nuclear programs.
Top congressional Democrats have also joined the chorus of criticism. Rep. Gregory Meeks, D-N.Y., ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, voiced “deep concerns” about the reported deal, saying it “would significantly erode existing nonproliferation standards.” Meeks emphasized that any valid U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement must include strict limits on enrichment and reprocessing, as well as full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which grants the global nuclear watchdog enhanced inspection powers.