On June 14, 2026, Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who acted as the lead mediator between Washington and Tehran, announced that the two long-warring adversaries had reached a tentative agreement to end open hostilities, with a formal signing ceremony scheduled for June 19 in Switzerland. US President Donald Trump quickly hailed the deal as a major diplomatic and national security triumph on his Truth Social platform, highlighting that the Strait of Hormuz—one of the world’s most critical global oil chokepoints—would reopen to all commercial traffic, the crippling US blockade on Iranian oil exports would be lifted, and global energy markets would see a resumption of Iranian crude flows. What Trump omitted from his celebratory announcement was any mention of Iran’s nuclear program and the size of its enriched uranium stockpile—the core casus belli cited by the US to launch the war in the first place. All of these contentious issues, along with other longstanding points of contention including Iran’s ballistic missile program and its regional allied proxies, have been pushed to future negotiations scheduled to unfold over a 60-day window. As an expert in international and nuclear security, I argue that this agreement delivers no meaningful resolution to the issues that sparked the war, and has left the United States with significantly eroded credibility as a reliable negotiating partner on the global stage.
To understand why the nuclear dispute remains the most intractable barrier to a lasting peace, we can turn to James Fearon’s foundational 1995 rationalist theory of war, which outlines three core barriers that push nations to armed conflict even when both sides would prefer a negotiated settlement: incomplete information about each side’s willingness to commit force and absorb damage, the inability to deliver credible, binding commitments to uphold a deal, and the “indivisibility problem” — when the disputed issue cannot be split or compromised to create a mutually acceptable middle ground.
This recent war has resolved only the first of these three barriers. Both sides have now seen the full scope of each other’s capabilities: how much military force the US was willing to deploy, and how much damage Iran could endure while remaining in active conflict. What even months of war could not fix is the long-running problem of broken commitments between the two nations, a rift that dates back decades.
Iran strictly abided by the terms of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the landmark international nuclear deal that placed strict limits on Tehran’s nuclear activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency repeatedly verified that Iran held its uranium enrichment level to 3.67% — a purity suitable only for civilian power reactor use, far below the threshold required for a nuclear weapon — and kept its total enriched uranium stockpile below 300 kilograms, in full compliance with the agreement. Yet in 2018, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, dismissing the pact as “the worst deal ever negotiated” over its sunset provisions and its failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile program from the start.
When Iran returned to the negotiating table in 2025, the US and Israel launched airstrikes against Iranian targets while talks were still ongoing. Then, in February 2026, as negotiators were closing in on a tentative agreement, another joint US-Israeli strike killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and lead nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani mid-negotiation. This pattern of reneging on diplomatic commitments and breaking off talks with military force is why Iran now demands concrete, enforceable guarantees and immediate sanctions relief before it will sign any final deal, rather than relying on unfulfilled promises of good faith. A nation that honored its nuclear commitments for years only to be attacked has little reason to trust future American promises of concessions. For that reason, the 60-day delay is best understood as a window for Tehran to observe whether the US and Israel will uphold the ceasefire across all regional fronts, including Lebanon.
The indivisibility problem is what makes the nuclear dispute fundamentally unresolvable in the short term. Most international diplomatic disputes can be split into incremental compromises: sanctions can be lifted in phases, for example. Even nuclear programs can be partially restricted, as the JCPOA proved: the deal counted operational centrifuges, capped enrichment levels, and strictly monitored stockpile sizes. What cannot be split is the core disagreement at hand: the US demands that Iran eliminate all uranium enrichment entirely, while Tehran insists uranium enrichment for civilian purposes is an inalienable sovereign right that it will not surrender.
The 2015 JCPOA centered entirely on the nuclear question, arranging for strict, verified limits in exchange for sanctions relief. But during 2025 and early 2026 talks, the US reversed its JCPOA position entirely. Instead of placing limits on an existing program, Washington demanded the full, permanent elimination of Iran’s entire nuclear enrichment infrastructure. US envoy Steve Witkoff insisted on zero enrichment and the permanent dismantling of Iran’s three core nuclear sites: Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. Iran rejected the demand outright, reaffirming that enrichment is a non-negotiable sovereign right. Both rounds of talks ended in US-Israeli airstrikes.
The upcoming June 19 agreement does not place any cap on Iran’s enrichment activities, nor does it require the elimination of Iran’s nuclear program. It only ends active fighting, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, and pushes all core disputes including enrichment, stockpiles, ballistic missiles, and regional proxies to 60 days of follow-up talks. In a recent interview with The New York Times, Trump claimed he faced no rush to remove Iran’s near-weapons-grade fuel stockpiles stored in facilities damaged by bombing, and asserted that Iran would voluntarily suspend enrichment for 15 to 20 years and only enrich for civilian purposes. This stands in stark contrast to the JCPOA, negotiated under the Obama administration, which physically removed 97% of Iran’s existing enriched stockpile from the country and enforced verified, binding limits on enrichment. Because it fails to address any of the core nuclear issues that sparked the war, the Trump-brokered deal is nothing more than a ceasefire, not a lasting nuclear agreement.
Returning to the rationalist theory of war, we see that the conflict resolved only the information problem, revealing what each side was willing to endure. The commitment problem remains entirely unsolved. Neither side can yet deliver a promise that the other will trust, particularly Iran after its lead negotiators and top leadership were killed mid-negotiation. Worse, the indivisibility problem has only grown more intractable since the war began. The standoff between zero enrichment and Iranian sovereign rights remains as uncompromising as ever, and the 60-day delay is not a step toward resolution—it is just the same unsolved problem with a deadline attached.
The only potential path forward relies on American restraint. If Washington can rein in Israeli strikes against Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, it can slowly begin to rebuild the credibility it lost through two rounds of broken negotiations and unprovoked attacks. This is an enormous test for the second Trump administration. Even as the current ceasefire deal was being finalized, Israel launched a strike on Beirut, an attack that could easily derail the upcoming talks. In my view, the 60-day window is not a path to a lasting settlement, but just a temporary pause before the next round of negotiations fails. I argued back in April that this conflict would never end in a clean, final settlement, and would instead unfold as a series of fragile, contested pauses. The June 19 deal is just the first of these pauses.
Iran has emerged from the war with its nuclear enrichment expertise fully intact, its existing stockpile secured, and a strengthened belief that only a fully operational nuclear weapon would deter future US-Israeli attacks. At the same time, Iran proved it could hold its ground against a superior military force, successfully strike US bases and regional allies, and discovered new strategic leverage it did not fully appreciate before the war: control over the Strait of Hormuz has proven to be a far more effective deterrent than a nuclear program ever could be.
Today, the strait is open, oil is flowing, and the core question that the war was fought to resolve remains exactly where it started. Thousands of lives were lost only to bring both sides back to square one. No one has won a meaningful victory, even though both sides will inevitably claim triumph.