博客

Hong Kong’s upcoming Legislative Council elections, scheduled for Sunday, are occurring under extraordinary circumstances as the city grapples with the aftermath of its deadliest fire in over seven decades. The tragic blaze that claimed 159 lives in a high-rise complex has intensified scrutiny on Beijing’s governance model and cast a pall over an electoral process already marked by significant political transformation.

The electoral landscape has undergone substantial restructuring since China’s 2021 electoral overhaul, which reduced directly elected seats from 35 to 20 while expanding appointed positions. The current election features notable demographic shifts among candidates, with nearly 40% of incumbents declining to seek reelection—including both prominent figures and moderately vocal politicians. Their replacements demonstrate increased connections to mainland China, with at least 26 candidates holding positions in Chinese-state enterprises and 16 serving as delegates to China’s national legislature—more than double the previous election’s representation.

Political analysts interpret these changes as signaling Beijing’s preference for politicians who align closely with national agendas rather than local interests. Professor John Burns of the University of Hong Kong observes that central authorities appear to be implementing informal criteria regarding age limits and vocal independence while prioritizing candidates with national perspectives. The pro-democracy camp has completely vanished from the legislature following arrests under the 2020 national security law, creating a political environment where voter apathy has reached record levels.

The government’s extensive efforts to boost participation—including extended voting hours, additional polling stations, and corporate voting time-off—now confront the complicating factor of public sentiment regarding the fire tragedy. While some residents may express gratitude for official response efforts, others harbor concerns about systemic governance failures revealed by the disaster. The final turnout figures will serve as a crucial barometer of public engagement with a political system that has undergone fundamental restructuring in recent years.

A comprehensive investigation conducted by the Pentagon’s Inspector General has revealed that Secretary of War Pete Hegseth potentially endangered American military personnel by utilizing the encrypted messaging application Signal to deliberate strike operations against Yemen earlier this year. The findings, disclosed in an official report published Thursday, determined that Hegseth’s actions “created a risk to operational security that could have resulted in failed US mission objectives and potential harm to US pilots.”

The scrutiny focused on Hegseth’s utilization of a personal mobile device for governmental communications, transmitting non-public Defense Department intelligence through unofficial channels. This practice, according to the report, “risks potential compromise of sensitive DoD information, which could cause harm to DoD personnel and mission objectives.” The inquiry identified that certain information disseminated by the secretary via Signal on March 15, 2025, corresponded with operational details classified as SECRET/NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals) by the US Central Command (USCENTCOM).

Notably, the investigation did not establish that Hegseth unlawfully disclosed classified information, a distinction the secretary highlighted in a social media post declaring “total exoneration.” This characterization was immediately contested by the Democratic National Committee, whose rapid response director Kendall Witmer described Hegseth’s conduct as “a major national security threat that puts our troops in harm’s way.”

The controversy, dubbed “Signalgate,” originated when Atlantic Magazine editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg revealed he had received advanced notification of the Yemen strikes through a Signal group chat including Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance. Goldberg subsequently published message transcripts containing operational specifics including weapon systems, targets, and attack chronology. The group, titled “Houthi PC small group,” allegedly included senior national security officials, though its inappropriate inclusion of a journalist triggered the exposure.

Following the incident, national security advisor Michael Waltz resigned but was subsequently appointed US ambassador to the United Nations. The March 15 airstrikes resulted in significant civilian casualties according to Yemeni health officials, with over 100 women and children reported among the dead and wounded across multiple regions including Sanaa and Sa’ada Governorate.

In a significant geopolitical pivot, Burkina Faso’s security minister embarked on a strategic mission to Tehran on November 12, 2025, resulting in substantial bilateral advancements. The West African nation officially reopened its Iranian embassy while finalizing new security cooperation agreements and initiating talks to strengthen agricultural and industrial ties.

This diplomatic engagement transcends routine bilateral relations, representing Iran’s calculated response to mounting international pressures. Following the 2023 Gaza conflict initiation by Hamas—a Tehran-aligned Palestinian group—Iran faced escalating political and economic crises. The nation’s regional proxy network, termed the ‘axis of resistance,’ faced extreme strain from Israel’s military campaigns against Hamas and Hezbollah, compounded by the collapse of Syria’s Assad regime in late 2024.

Tehran’s challenges culminated in a devastating 12-day war with Israel in June 2025, involving direct U.S. participation, followed by reinstated EU-imposed UN sanctions under the nuclear deal snapback mechanism. Concurrently, Iran confronts an environmental emergency with severe drought conditions affecting the capital.

Amid these multidimensional crises, Iranian officials are pursuing geostrategic diversification through intensified African outreach. According to Iran foreign policy experts, the nation is strengthening ties with historically reliable partners like Burkina Faso, creating opportunities for security cooperation, critical mineral access, and sanctions-bypassing export markets.

Beyond Burkina Faso, Iran has accelerated engagement with Sahel region nations including Mali and Niger—countries that have experienced military coups since the early 2020s and distanced from Western influence. Facing significant security threats from rebel groups and jihadists, these nations view Iran as a potential security partner for arms, drones, and military equipment.

The economic dimensions are equally strategic: Iran seeks access to Burkina Faso and Mali’s gold reserves and Niger’s uranium resources—the latter being particularly crucial should Tehran decide to reconstitute its nuclear program after wartime damages. Recent months have seen flurries of diplomatic activity: Iranian and Malian foreign ministers held successive meetings in May 2024 and October 2025, committing to strengthened bilateral relations and mutual support in international forums.

In April-May 2025, Iran and Niger signed comprehensive economic and security agreements, including a landmark deal for Tehran to acquire 300 tons of uranium for $56 million. From February to October, Iran pursued deepened relations with Sierra Leone, seeking both uranium access and diplomatic support in multilateral institutions, though Freetown ultimately voted against lifting Iran sanctions at the UN Security Council due to British aid dependencies.

Iran’s African strategy extends beyond West Africa, encompassing partnerships with Malawi for sanctions-circumventing aircraft imports, strengthened security ties with South Africa (its largest continental trading partner), and multifaceted agreements with Zimbabwe covering economic, environmental, and medical tourism cooperation.

During October’s Non-Aligned Movement foreign ministers meeting in Kampala, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, thanking Uganda for condemning U.S.-Israeli actions during the recent conflict. The discussions highlighted Iran’s interest in Ugandan uranium and cobalt resources, vital for lithium batteries and industrial manufacturing.

Despite this expansive outreach, Iran faces substantial constraints including trade competition from Middle Eastern rivals like the UAE—a major trading partner for multiple African nations. The reinstated UN sanctions and ongoing global economic pressures may give African governments pause when considering deeper ties with Tehran. Additionally, the transactional nature of Iran’s engagements risks generating distrust among partners, exemplified by reported drone supplies to Eritrea during tensions with Ethiopia—potentially complicating Tehran’s relations with Addis Ababa.

As Iran navigates domestic and international crises, its African pivot represents both strategic opportunity and complex challenge, with time determining whether the benefits will outweigh the inherent constraints of this geopolitical reorientation.