分类: World

  • Antigua and Barbuda and the Republic of Rwanda sign historic visa waiver agreement and cooperation MoUs in health and tourism

    Antigua and Barbuda and the Republic of Rwanda sign historic visa waiver agreement and cooperation MoUs in health and tourism

    Antigua and Barbuda and the Republic of Rwanda have scored a landmark diplomatic achievement with the signing of a visa waiver exemption agreement and two Memoranda of Understanding spanning the sectors of Health and Tourism.

    The signing ceremony, which took place at the Permanent Mission of Antigua and Barbuda to the United Nations in New York on Thursday 17th July, underscores the deepening ties between Africa and the Caribbean.

    The historic accords were executed by Antigua and Barbuda’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, H.E. Walton Webson, and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Rwanda to the United Nations H.E. Mr. Karoli Martin Ngoga.

    The visa waiver agreement eliminates entry, transit, and visitor visa requirements for the nationals of the two countries on a reciprocal basis, allowing for people-to-people and cultural exchanges as well as the promotion and expansion of trade and business opportunities.

    The exemption from visa procedures and related costs, excluding the right to work, is being seen by the two countries as a powerful expression of their commitment to advancing friendly relations, removing barriers to travel, and promoting inclusive, people-centered diplomacy.

    “This agreement marks a profound step forward in forging Transatlantic alliances between two dynamic nations that share common goals in innovation, resilience, and global engagement. It opens new opportunities for tourism, trade, education, and cultural exchanges, enabling deeper connectivity between the peoples of Africa and the Caribbean,” Ambassador Webson remarked.

    He also expressed the view that it establishes a model for South-South cooperation, which is rooted in mutual respect and shared development objectives.

    During the signing ceremony, the two diplomats also committed their countries to two Memoranda of Understanding to expand cooperation in both the Health and Tourism sectors.

    Both MOU’s cover a broad range of areas and introduce considerable opportunities for knowledge sharing, capacity building and economic development that will benefit their respective nations.

    In the area of health, Antigua and Barbuda can expect support in the areas of prevention and control of communicable and non-communicable diseases, HIV/AIDS Control programs, Epidemiological surveillance systems, experience sharing on health insurance systems, pharmaceutical cooperation and maternal and child health enhancement among others.

    Ambassador Webson is also hoping that Antigua and Barbuda’s public health system, its nurses and other medical professionals can benefit from Rwanda’s successful health care delivery model.

    The Tourism MOU further explores opportunity for shared development initiatives in the vital sector.

    The two countries have affirmed that the multifaceted agreement not only represents a practical advancement in travel facilitation, but also a bold diplomatic signal of intent to collaborate on health innovation, tourism excellence, and sustainable development.

  • Belgium denies bail for Mehul Choksi as extradition process advances

    Belgium denies bail for Mehul Choksi as extradition process advances

    Belgium’s Court of Cassation has rejected Mehul Choksi’s request for bail, in a decision that could see the fugitive diamantaire remain behind bars for months as India pursues his extradition.

    Choksi, who holdsAntiguan and Barbudan citizenship, was arrested in Antwerp on 11 April following a request from India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). He has been in custody for nearly three months.

    A senior official told Hindustan Times the court found Choksi’s bail arguments unconvincing, and said a decision on extradition is unlikely before late September. Choksi’s lawyers declined to comment.

    Indian authorities accuse Choksi of offences including criminal conspiracy, destruction of evidence and cheating, under laws mirrored in Belgium’s legal system.

    The case also invokes provisions of the UN Conventions against Corruption and Transnational Organized Crime.

    Choksi had cited ill-health in his bail plea and offered to wear a GPS tracker, but Belgian judges rejected the proposal over flight risk concerns.

    Indian officials argued that Choksi has previously tried to evade extradition in both the U.S. and Antigua and Barbuda.

    A CBI team recently travelled to Belgium to submit further evidence. Indian prosecutors are also working with a European law firm to assist in the ongoing legal process.

  • COMMENTARY: Weaponized Drones Could Threaten Caribbean Security: Early Action Necessary

    COMMENTARY: Weaponized Drones Could Threaten Caribbean Security: Early Action Necessary

    The Caribbean faces a new and urgent threat: weaponized drones in criminal hands are rapidly proliferating into the hands of criminal actors, non‑state militias, and private contractors.

    What began as experimental tools for law enforcement has become instruments of murder, assassination, and terror across Latin America—and now in Haiti.

    CARICOM governments must adopt firm, enforceable measures to restrict these devices before our region drifts into becoming a battlefield.

    Marguerite Cawley is a researcher and writer at the think-tank, Insight Crime. When she surveyed Latin America’s drone landscape in 2014, she documented that multiple regional states operated unarmed UAVs without legal frameworks to govern their use.

    Cawley warned that such platforms, though unarmed, carried latent dangers: in the wrong hands, their intelligence‑gathering advantages could swiftly be converted into strike missions.

    In late 2024 and early 2025, those latent dangers have become realities.

    In September 2024, insurgents lobbed a forty‑pound explosive drone into Ecuador’s La Roca prison near Guayaquil, illustrating how smuggling tools become siege weapons.

    In March 2025, a Colombian soldier in the Catatumbo region was killed by a kamikaze UAV launched by the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).

    ELN is a far-left guerrilla insurgency group involved in the continuing Colombian conflict. This incident marked one of the first confirmed drone‑related fatalities attributed to a non‑state actor.

    In February, Brigadier General Jorge Alejandro Gutiérrez Martínez of Mexico survived an attempted drone assassination in Chihuahua when an explosive‑laden craft targeted his convoy.

    Haiti’s rapid descent illustrates how swiftly control can slip from governments into criminal hands. Haiti’s security crisis starkly warns of what could happen in other Caribbean countries.

    The Transitional National Council in Haiti has confirmed that it has engaged private operatives to deploy kamikaze drones against leaders of gangs that are besieging the country.

    These strike missions, shrouded in secrecy, have driven gangs to embed within civilian populations, threatening the lives of innocent residents.

    Moreover, the UK Guardian Newspaper reports that first‑person‑view drones, equipped with commercial mining explosives, have damaged buildings in gang‑controlled districts. The same report warns that gangs are already seeking to retaliate by acquiring and adapting drones.

    This rapid weaponization of commercial UAVs is not confined to Haiti. Online marketplaces now offer platforms capable of carrying improvised explosives, reconnaissance sensors, and facial‑recognition software.

    The barrier to “weaponizing” a drone has collapsed: any individual with modest technical skills and internet access can transform a civilian drone into a precision strike asset.

    If the Caribbean allows these devices to flow unimpeded, the countries will become proving grounds for airborne violence.

    In September 2023, in an invited address to a seminar organised by the CARICOM Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), I outlined four critical steps: ban, impose, distinguish, and secure.

    First, ban the importation of any drone capable of sustained flight, payload delivery, or autonomous operation—except those owned and operated by national law‑enforcement agencies under strictly defined controls.

    Second, impose severe penalties on anyone who imports, manufactures, or deploys weaponizable drones: hefty fines, asset forfeiture, and prison sentences.

    Third, differentiate civilian‑grade drones from security‑grade systems, permitting only fixed‑blade, single‑camera models for benign tasks such as aerial photography or mapping.

    Fourth, use the collective voice of CARICOM’s 14 member states at the United Nations to secure a legally binding treaty by 2026 banning lethal autonomous weapons systems without meaningful human oversight.

    CARICOM states should now seriously and swiftly move to legislate these measures and close every loophole. While some may argue these actions impede innovation, our security imperative overrides such concerns.

    Customs officers require training and equipment to inspect and identify illicit drone shipments.

    National security forces should be mandated to register every UAV in a centralized, digital database that links each aircraft to its lawful owner and permitted use.

    Any deployment by government agencies must be subject to oversight by an independent civilian body, with detailed after‑action reports made available to the public.

    Civilian drones – for agriculture, disaster assessment, and infrastructure surveys – must meet strict technical criteria, rendering them irreversibly non‑weaponizable.

    Legislation should prescribe proportional but punitive sanctions. Unauthorized importation or use of a weaponizable drone should trigger a mandatory minimum fine, asset forfeiture, and up to ten years’ imprisonment.

    Trafficking in critical components, such as batteries, motors, or guidance modules, should carry equivalent penalties.

    CARICOM must also establish a technical working group to develop unified standards for drone identification, detection, and interdiction, and to coordinate joint training exercises among regional agencies.

    Where the local expertise does not exist, seek it from organizations like the Organization of American States while training local persons.

    At the UN General Assembly this October, Caribbean delegations must press for a robust treaty—securing at least 20 co-sponsoring states—that mirrors existing bans on chemical and biological weapons.

    We should demand global restrictions on dual‑use drone technologies and secure capacity‑building assistance to strengthen our detection and counter‑drone defences.

    Can Caribbean countries allow the possibility of children growing up under the shadow of unseen killers overhead? The age of the weaponized drone has arrived.

    From Catatumbo to Chihuahua, from La Roca to Port‑au‑Prince, we are witnessing how rapidly unarmed UAVs become tools of terror. CARICOM nations should unite in decisive legislative action to ensure that their skies do not become corridors of terror.

    If our political leaders act now—with import bans, strict registries, transparent oversight, and punitive enforcement—they can set a global benchmark for drone governance, protect our citizens, and preserve the rule of law.

    CARICOM governments should not wait for calamity before they act.

  • Antigua and Barbuda Renews Call for Stronger Air Connectivity Between Africa and the Caribbean

    Antigua and Barbuda Renews Call for Stronger Air Connectivity Between Africa and the Caribbean

    Montego Bay, Jamaica – 8 th July 2025 – The Government of Antigua and Barbuda has renewed its call for the establishment of direct air links between the Caribbean and the African continent, urging fellow CARICOM member states to collectively support this transformative initiative at the upcoming Second Africa-CARICOM Summit, scheduled for September 7, 2025, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

    Speaking during the final plenary session of the 49th Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM, Prime Minister the Honourable Gaston Browneunderscored the immense potential for enhanced collaboration and economic partnerships between Africa and the Caribbean.

    “There are tremendous opportunities for our region to deepen cooperation with Africa—particularly in trade, e-commerce, agriculture, and sports. But most critically, the establishment of direct air links will serve as the catalyst for unlocking these possibilities,” Prime Minister Browne stated.

    The Prime Minister emphasized that air connectivity remains a critical enabler for strengthening economic, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges. He reflected on Antigua and Barbuda’s past efforts to initiate direct flights through a partnership with Air Peace, which faced operational challenges.

    “We must ensure that any future attempt to bridge the Caribbean and Africa by air is better managed, with the risks mitigated through proper planning and collective support,” he cautioned.

    To this end, Prime Minister Browne proposed astrategic investment—both public and private—in the acquisition or leasing of at least two wide-body aircraft to facilitate regular passenger and cargo movement between the two regions.

    “This is not only an economic imperative but an historical and cultural one. We must invest in the infrastructure that connects our people and builds a stronger transatlantic partnership rooted in shared heritage and mutual advancement,” he concluded.

    Antigua and Barbuda will continue to champion this initiative leading up to the Africa-CARICOM Summit, positioning regional air connectivity as a cornerstone of future cooperation with the African continent. (Ends)

  • Haiti Is Bleeding—And the Caribbean Cannot Look Away

    Haiti Is Bleeding—And the Caribbean Cannot Look Away

    Haiti continues to wallow in deep crisis as criminal gangs entrench their violent control over nearly 90 per cent of Port-au-Prince and other parts of the country. These armed groups have become a de facto regime of terror.

    Especially chilling is the rampant sexual violence being used as a twisted reward for gang members, some as young as 14. As I noted in my previous commentary, young women and girls are being raped with impunity in areas under gang rule. Kidnappings for ransom are an everyday fear, and normal life is grasped in the brief moments that it comes. The trauma inflicted on Haitian society is incalculable.

    The Transitional National Council (TNC), charged with governing Haiti until February 2026, has been unable to contain this descent into chaos. The Haitian National Police are both outmanned and outgunned. Meanwhile, the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission of mostly Kenyan troops—deployed in the absence of a UN Security Council-authorized force—is largely confined to barracks. Starved of funding and operating without a clear mandate to use force, their capacity to confront the gangs is essentially non-existent.

    Faced with these dire realities, the TNC has taken an extraordinary and controversial step: hiring a private mercenary group to combat the gangs. Until last week, this initiative remained unannounced and unexplained. The TNC had not identified the group involved, disclosed the financial terms, or described its rules of engagement. Surprisingly, this development has received scant international press coverage. But details are now beginning to emerge.

    According to the UK Guardian newspaper, the mercenary group has deployed “first-person view” (FPV) kamikaze drones—equipped with commercial mining explosives—to identify and kill gang leaders. But after three months of drone operations, not a single gang leader has been confirmed killed. Instead, several drone strikes have damaged buildings in gang-controlled zones and may have harmed civilians. These are dangerous occurrences in a fragile and densely populated environment.

    Yet the TNC’s decision is not without logic. With a paralysed MSS, a compromised national police force, and no external military assistance under UN authority, Haitian leaders are at the end of their tether. In this vacuum, the mercenaries appear to be the only actors taking the fight directly to the gangs. And this has led even some Haitian human rights defenders to reluctantly view the use of mercenaries as a “necessary evil.”

    But this course of action is fraught with risk. As I warned earlier, it is only a matter of time before the gangs strike back using the same technology. That time may be fast approaching. Reports surfaced last month of three alleged gang members being arrested in neighbouring Dominican Republic while attempting to purchase drones. Meanwhile, the mercenary group in Haiti is reportedly building a 150-person strike force from among overseas-based Haitians with prior service in the military forces of Canada, France, and the United States. A substantial weapons cache has already been moved into the country.

    I am not surprised at this development. More than two years ago, leaders in the Haitian diaspora in the United States told me they were willing to organize themselves into a military-style force under credible leadership to confront the gangs. They already had an organizational blueprint. That vision now appears to be taking form.

    Some voices—like that of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio—have suggested that, in the face of UN Security Council inaction, the Organization of American States (OAS) should take the lead. However, the OAS has no military capability, and its Charter forbids intervention in the domestic affairs of its Member States. Even if the Haitian government invited them, governments would still draw back in the absence of international authority.

    It is in this context that the OAS held its 55th Regular Session of the General Assembly on June 27, 2025, in Antigua and Barbuda. The Assembly adopted a resolution, “Calling for Concrete Solutions to Resolve the Grave Security and Institutional Crisis in Haiti.”

    The resolution acknowledges Haiti’s deep security, political, economic, and humanitarian collapse. It calls for urgent and coordinated international cooperation—multilateral, regional, and bilateral—to support Haiti; assistance to restore law and order, facilitate humanitarian aid, and organize free and fair elections; increased contributions to the MSS mission and the Haitian police; stricter enforcement of arms embargoes and illegal weapons control; judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts to tackle root causes of instability; and a 45-day deadline for the OAS Secretary General to present a consolidated Action Plan—developed in consultation with Haiti and the UN—to provide a structured roadmap for institutional support and national recovery.

    The problem with the resolution is that it is binding on no one, and the Secretary General cannot develop a plan that is not approved, mandated, and resourced by Member States. So, while the resolution is encouraging, it is still words on paper. Haiti needs action, not just the expression of commitments. It requires resources, not just rhetoric.

    Worse now, US President Donald Trump has called for slashing $9.4 billion in UN contributions. As columnist Jacqueline Charles pointed out recently in The Miami Herald, this would jeopardize programmes for Haiti, including the MSS mission.

    If this crisis escalates—as it now seems set to do—the consequences will not stop at Haiti’s borders. Regional migration pressures, transnational crime, and humanitarian spillovers will affect us all. Warfare of drones, gangs, and mercenaries will not spare the Haitian people from suffering. It may seem necessary out of desperation, but the longer this violent path continues, the harder it becomes to find a peaceful solution.

    CARICOM does not have the money or troops to help Haiti. Still, it does have the capacity for diplomatic coordination, humanitarian response, and high-level advocacy at the UN, as well as for assisting the OAS Secretary General’s plan to become a reality.

  • COMMENTARY: Haiti Is Bleeding—And the Caribbean Cannot Look Away

    COMMENTARY: Haiti Is Bleeding—And the Caribbean Cannot Look Away

    Haiti continues to wallow in deep crisis as criminal gangs entrench their violent control over nearly 90 per cent of Port-au-Prince and other parts of the country. These armed groups have become a de facto regime of terror.

    Especially chilling is the rampant sexual violence being used as a twisted reward for gang members, some as young as 14. As I noted in my previous commentary, young women and girls are being raped with impunity in areas under gang rule. Kidnappings for ransom are an everyday fear, and normal life is grasped in the brief moments that it comes. The trauma inflicted on Haitian society is incalculable.

    The Transitional National Council (TNC), charged with governing Haiti until February 2026, has been unable to contain this descent into chaos. The Haitian National Police are both outmanned and outgunned. Meanwhile, the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission of mostly Kenyan troops—deployed in the absence of a UN Security Council-authorized force—is largely confined to barracks. Starved of funding and operating without a clear mandate to use force, their capacity to confront the gangs is essentially non-existent.

    Faced with these dire realities, the TNC has taken an extraordinary and controversial step: hiring a private mercenary group to combat the gangs. Until last week, this initiative remained unannounced and unexplained. The TNC had not identified the group involved, disclosed the financial terms, or described its rules of engagement. Surprisingly, this development has received scant international press coverage. But details are now beginning to emerge.

    According to the UK Guardian newspaper, the mercenary group has deployed “first-person view” (FPV) kamikaze drones—equipped with commercial mining explosives—to identify and kill gang leaders. But after three months of drone operations, not a single gang leader has been confirmed killed. Instead, several drone strikes have damaged buildings in gang-controlled zones and may have harmed civilians. These are dangerous occurrences in a fragile and densely populated environment.

    Yet the TNC’s decision is not without logic. With a paralysed MSS, a compromised national police force, and no external military assistance under UN authority, Haitian leaders are at the end of their tether. In this vacuum, the mercenaries appear to be the only actors taking the fight directly to the gangs. And this has led even some Haitian human rights defenders to reluctantly view the use of mercenaries as a “necessary evil.”

    But this course of action is fraught with risk. As I warned earlier, it is only a matter of time before the gangs strike back using the same technology. That time may be fast approaching. Reports surfaced last month of three alleged gang members being arrested in neighbouring Dominican Republic while attempting to purchase drones. Meanwhile, the mercenary group in Haiti is reportedly building a 150-person strike force from among overseas-based Haitians with prior service in the military forces of Canada, France, and the United States. A substantial weapons cache has already been moved into the country.

    I am not surprised at this development. More than two years ago, leaders in the Haitian diaspora in the United States told me they were willing to organize themselves into a military-style force under credible leadership to confront the gangs. They already had an organizational blueprint. That vision now appears to be taking form.

    Some voices—like that of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio—have suggested that, in the face of UN Security Council inaction, the Organization of American States (OAS) should take the lead. However, the OAS has no military capability, and its Charter forbids intervention in the domestic affairs of its Member States. Even if the Haitian government invited them, governments would still draw back in the absence of international authority.

    It is in this context that the OAS held its 55th Regular Session of the General Assembly on June 27, 2025, in Antigua and Barbuda. The Assembly adopted a resolution, “Calling for Concrete Solutions to Resolve the Grave Security and Institutional Crisis in Haiti.”

    The resolution acknowledges Haiti’s deep security, political, economic, and humanitarian collapse. It calls for urgent and coordinated international cooperation—multilateral, regional, and bilateral—to support Haiti; assistance to restore law and order, facilitate humanitarian aid, and organize free and fair elections; increased contributions to the MSS mission and the Haitian police; stricter enforcement of arms embargoes and illegal weapons control; judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts to tackle root causes of instability; and a 45-day deadline for the OAS Secretary General to present a consolidated Action Plan—developed in consultation with Haiti and the UN—to provide a structured roadmap for institutional support and national recovery.

    The problem with the resolution is that it is binding on no one, and the Secretary General cannot develop a plan that is not approved, mandated, and resourced by Member States. So, while the resolution is encouraging, it is still words on paper. Haiti needs action, not just the expression of commitments. It requires resources, not just rhetoric.

    Worse now, US President Donald Trump has called for slashing $9.4 billion in UN contributions. As columnist Jacqueline Charles pointed out recently in The Miami Herald, this would jeopardize programmes for Haiti, including the MSS mission.

    If this crisis escalates—as it now seems set to do—the consequences will not stop at Haiti’s borders. Regional migration pressures, transnational crime, and humanitarian spillovers will affect us all. Warfare of drones, gangs, and mercenaries will not spare the Haitian people from suffering. It may seem necessary out of desperation, but the longer this violent path continues, the harder it becomes to find a peaceful solution.

    CARICOM does not have the money or troops to help Haiti. Still, it does have the capacity for diplomatic coordination, humanitarian response, and high-level advocacy at the UN, as well as for assisting the OAS Secretary General’s plan to become a reality.