Over the past several months, Pakistan has steadily expanded its diplomatic footprint, positioning itself as a regional mediator to de-escalate tensions between Washington and Tehran. This diplomatic push reached a landmark milestone last month, when Islamabad joined Saudi Arabia and Turkey to sign a historic trilateral Joint Defence Agreement in Mecca, Islam’s holiest city.
Signed on August 7, the pact’s core mutual defense clause mirrors NATO’s Article 5, stipulating that an armed attack against any one signatory will be considered an attack against all three. While the clause has drawn immediate comparisons to the NATO collective security framework, regional analysts have long warned against interpreting the text too literally.
That warning became relevant just one month after the signing, when Iran-aligned Houthi forces launched a large-scale barrage of drones and missiles into Saudi Arabia on September 8. The attack targeted critical military and energy infrastructure, turning the pact’s abstract security commitment into an urgent, high-stakes operational test for Pakistan and Turkey.
In the days following the strike, neither Islamabad nor Ankara launched direct military counter-operations alongside Riyadh. Instead, both countries opted for firm diplomatic statements of solidarity, highlighting a growing tension between political alliance commitments and direct military involvement that has left Pakistan walking a geopolitical tightrope between its Saudi alliance and fragile neighborly ties with Iran.
Shortly after the Houthi attack, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif publicly reaffirmed that Pakistan remained bound by the terms of the pact and would honor its commitments if needed. But just days later, foreign ministry spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan clarified that direct military action against the Houthi movement was not under active consideration. “Pakistan has signed a joint defence agreement, which is a fact… But as of now, there is no discussion of this kind,” Khan stated during his September 10 weekly media briefing in Islamabad.
This carefully calibrated response exposes the delicate balancing act Pakistan must maintain. Pakistan has maintained a longstanding military presence in Saudi Arabia and has significantly deepened bilateral defense cooperation in recent years. Under a separate 2025 bilateral Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, Saudi Arabia confirmed in April that Pakistani troops, including Pakistan Air Force fighter jets and support aircraft, had deployed to King Abdulaziz Air Base to bolster regional security amid rising tensions.
But Pakistani officials and independent experts alike draw a clear distinction between providing defensive support to protect Saudi territory and infrastructure, and joining offensive military operations against Houthi forces inside Yemen. One senior Pakistani official with expertise in Gulf affairs notes that this current dilemma echoes a similar crisis Islamabad faced back in 2015, when parliament voted to stay neutral rather than join the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen, a decision that severely strained bilateral ties with Riyadh at the time.
Today, both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia appear united in their determination to avoid being dragged into a wider regional conflict that could draw in Iran, the United States and Israel, according to regional security experts. Qamar Cheema, head of the Islamabad-based Sanober Institute think tank, explains that neither country wants to see the existing conflict spill over onto Saudi territory. “This alliance will fight with state actors and work as a deterrent and a clear case of strategic depth, which Saudi Arabia is searching for,” Cheema told Middle East Eye, adding that Riyadh is keen to avoid a repeat of past crises that disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
Maintaining this careful balance between defensive support and active offensive participation could grow increasingly difficult if Houthi missile strikes against Saudi Arabia escalate. The geopolitical flashpoint has already shifted to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where the Houthis announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia back in July, a strategy they describe as “blockade for blockade” launched in response to Saudi restrictions on Houthi-controlled infrastructure in Yemen. The move followed a cycle of escalation that included strikes on Sanaa Airport and repeated Houthi drone and missile attacks on Saudi energy facilities.
According to Pakistani officials, Riyadh has now concluded that political negotiations with the Houthis are no longer viable, forcing the kingdom to prepare for a protracted military engagement. Pakistan has already joined the Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance, which launched in Riyadh at the end of July with military representatives from more than 40 countries in attendance. Fourteen nations including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan have backed the initiative to protect commercial shipping lanes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Beyond that, Pakistan also participates in ongoing regional maritime security operations through the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 150, a multinational naval coalition that patrols the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
For Pakistan, the immediate top priority remains avoiding escalation. But a senior Pakistani official warned that if Houthi strikes intensify and cause mass casualties among Pakistani troops deployed at strategic sites inside Saudi Arabia, growing public and political pressure in Islamabad could force the government to abandon its current neutral stance. That scenario would turn the current ambiguity surrounding Pakistan’s commitments into a direct, high-stakes test of the trilateral pact.
Cheema notes that attacking the Houthis is not a viable option for Pakistan at this stage. Having positioned itself as a regional peacemaker, Islamabad is currently prioritizing diplomatic dialogue to contain the broader crisis, particularly because closure of the Strait of Hormuz or disruption of Gulf of Aden shipping would put critical global supply chains and energy routes at severe risk.
For Pakistan, the most complicated factor in this entire strategic equation is its long border with Iran. The two countries share a 900-kilometer porous border, and both governments have worked for years to contain cross-border friction that flared into open exchange of missile strikes back in January 2024. If Pakistan were to launch offensive operations against the Iran-aligned Houthis, it would risk reigniting open conflict with Tehran, and experts warn that direct engagement with an Iranian proxy force would severely damage bilateral ties and create new security threats along Pakistan’s already volatile western frontier.
Domestic stability adds another layer of complexity. Pakistan is home to one of the world’s largest Shia populations outside of Iran, many of whom follow religious guidance from Tehran under the Wilayat-e Faqih doctrine. While Pakistan’s military was able to contain internal unrest following the reported killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in U.S.-Israeli airstrikes in February, sectarian sensitivities remain a persistent constraint whenever relations with Iran deteriorate.
Economic risks also compound Pakistan’s strategic dilemma. Pakistan relies heavily on Middle Eastern energy imports and unimpeded access to critical shipping corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Regional instability can quickly translate into economic disruption at home: recent Middle East hostilities already triggered a sharp spike in Pakistani domestic fuel prices within the span of a single week.
Beyond geopolitical and domestic challenges, the trilateral alliance also faces structural hurdles rooted in differing threat perceptions across the three member states. Pakistan’s primary security focus remains its long-running border tensions with India, with additional concerns over cross-border militancy from Afghanistan’s Taliban regime adding a second layer of security priorities. Saudi Arabia’s core priorities are focused on protecting its own territory, energy infrastructure and maritime shipping lanes, while managing threats from Iran and non-state armed groups such as the Houthis along its southern border. Turkey’s security perimeter extends even further, across Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus.
These divergent priorities raise a fundamental question: would each member state be willing to accept major economic and geopolitical costs to defend another member in a conflict that it does not view as a core threat to its own national security? This operational friction is further compounded by the fact that the three countries use disparate military hardware platforms. Saudi Arabia relies heavily on sophisticated U.S. and Western-supplied defense systems. Pakistan operates a mix of Chinese-origin and Western equipment, while Turkey has invested heavily in developing its own indigenous defense industry.
The trilateral agreement itself remains a work in progress. Senior defense ministers and military officials from the three countries met in Istanbul on August 31 to agree to establish a permanent secretariat based in Saudi Arabia and pledged to deepen cooperation on defense technology development. But experts note that the pact currently exists as a general policy framework rather than a fully integrated military command structure. Specific details on how the alliance will operate, including provisions for air defense assistance, intelligence sharing, protection of Saudi military installations and rules for participation in offensive operations against the Houthis, have yet to be finalized.
“A lot of institutional development is required at the moment, particularly in inter-military planning and interoperability among the armed forces of the three countries,” Cheema said, adding that the three nations also need to establish clear, agreed procedures for responding to threats from both state and non-state actors. Pakistan’s foreign ministry spokesperson Khan acknowledged these limitations last week, describing the agreement as an “umbrella agreement” whose institutional mechanisms will take time to fully develop. “At this stage, I don’t think we should be discussing this topic in the context of its operationalisation,” he told journalists.
